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New editor takes over 
Over  the past  18  months,  Courier  readers  will  have  seen  that 
some of the articles  have been  signed by F  ernand Thurmes,  who 
took over the job of  editor in November 1984. 
Mr Thurmes has now left the Development Directorate to become 
the Head of  the Private Office of  Nicolas M osar,  the Commissioner 
for Energy.  I  am of course delighted that our friend has obtained 
this promotion. It will take him to pastures new,  a wide field offer-
ing much to  learn.  It is  almost bound to  be difficult- because he 
will not just have to come to grips with the European energy policy, 
with  coal and hydrocarbons  and nuclear energy,  but  with  energy 
saving,  alternative energy and more.  But I  cannot  but  regret  the 
departure  of a  colleague  whom  our ACP and European  partners 
know well.  Some of  them had the opportunity to  get to  know him 
during the negotiations for Lome III and he is  well known to  the 
MPs and in our social circles as he spent some time working in the 
Commission  department for  relations  with  the  European  Parlia-
ment,  the  ACP-EEC Joint  Assembly,  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the other institutions. 
The  editorial  team. 
From  left  to  right, 
Amadou  Traore, 
Roger  De  Backer, 
"A-fyfanwy  ••an  de 
Velde,  Augustine 
Oyowe,  Tom  Glaser 
and Lucien Pagni 
Marie-H e!ene Birindelli is  now editor of The Courier.  She is the 
first woman to occupy a post of  this level in the Development Direc-
torate- where she has worked since 1962. 
Our new editor trained in  both economics and arts and is  com-
pletely familiar with  the house and the context of  ACP-EEC rela-
tions.  She,  too,  has experience of  negotiations (Lome II),  which fol-
lowed her responsibility as  a desk officer for Madagascar and var-
ious countries in  the Indian Ocean and then for a number of  coun-
tries in  western Africa.  She also had a spell as an agricultural and 
water  engineering project  economist.  Mrs  Birindelli  has  lived  in 
·  both  Niger and the Central African Republic.  Since 1982 she has 
dealt  with  cultural cooperation,  population involvement and infor-
mation, and her varied experience will,  I am sure,  serve us well in 
maintaining  the  high  standards  of The  Courier,  that  respected 
organ  of reciprocal  information  on  relations  between  the  ACP 
Group and the Community. 
I  wish  her every  success  in  this  unique experience of enriching 
cooperation  on a team of  ACP and EEC journalists. 
Dieter Frisch  - Publisher 
.  _ _,._~~-------~-- -·~~-~---
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Marie-Helene Birindelli MEETING POINT  ... 
Edwin CARRINGTON 
Secretary-General of the ACP Group 
''  A  pragmatist with a vision '' 
Elected Secretary-General of  the ACP Group in October last year after 
10  years as deputy, Edwin Carrington has assumed office  at a particu-
larly difficult time in the ACP Group's existence. The Courier discussed 
with him the challenges facing the Group. 
,...  You  assumed  office  recently  as 
Secretary-General of the  ACP Group. 
How  are  you  approaching  your  new 
job? What are the challenges and what 
is your conception of  international coo-
peration? 
- First of all, I would like to thank 
The  Courier  for  this  interview. 
Though you referred to my new job, I 
feel  as though I assumed office a long 
time  ago.  For  it's  over  a  year  now 
since  I  began  directing  the  affairs  of 
the  Secretariat-!  March  1985.  In  a 
formal  sense,  however,  you  are  right, 
as  my  substantive  appointment  did, 
however,  take  effect  on  25  October 
1985. As  regards the manner in which 
I am approaching this task which, very 
clearly, is a monumental one, it is with 
the hope of building faith in the long-
run  future  of the  ACP  Group.  The 
importance of this Group for  the so-
cial and economic development of the 
Member States,  in my view,  is  some-
thing that is  difficult to  overestimate. 
I'm therefore approaching my task de-
termined  to  improve  the  functioning 
of the  Group.  In this regard,  I'm not 
unaware of the weakness of the insti-
tutional structures we now have and of 
the need for  some redefinition of res-
ponsibilities and roles. Finally, I'm ap-
proaching my task with  an  eye  to ex-
ploiting  what  prospects  there  are  for 
improved cooperation benefits for the 
ACP countries in the present interna-
tional climate.  Recently,  for  example, 
the European Centre for  the Manage-
ment  of  Development  Policy  was 
inaugurated  in  Maastricht,  Holland. 
The ACP States should be  very inter-
ested  in  this  Centre,  an  initiative 
which was announced at the signing of 
Lome  III by  the  Dutch Government, 
because it could perform a useful com-
plementary role to the mechanisms in 
the Lome III Convention. I was asked 
by  the  Dutch  Government  to  be  a 
member  of the  board of the  Centre, 
and  I  grasped  that  opportunity  as  a 
means of bringing further assistance to 
the ACP cause. This is just one exam-
ple  of the  prospects  that  I  think are 
sometimes there and that we  have to 
grasp  to advance further  the  interests 
of the ACPs.  Now that is the context 
in which I am approaching the job. 
As  for  my  concept of international 
cooperation,  I  would  like  to  believe 
that I'm what I call a pragmatist with 
a  vision.  I  have  been in  the interna-
tional field  for quite some time and I 
believe that international cooperation 
has  to  start  from  a  very  pragmatic 
conception. The immediate post-inde-
pendence  phenomenon  of grandiose 
visions of what is  achievable and the 
excessive hopes of achieving them vir-
tually overnight, in my view,  has now 
passed.  We  must now,  without losing 
sight  of all  visions,  start  from  prag-
matic bases towards what I would call 
an  increasing  coordination  and  har-
monization  of our  policies  and  pro-
grammes-especially  external  poli-
cies-in the face of  certain major com-
mon problems of an international di-
mension. In other words, we  must ad-
opt an approach of realism, harmoniz-
ing and coordinating policies and ap-
proaches.  We  cannot expect to  adopt 
identical  policies  because  circum-
stances are different among the devel-
oping world's nations, but there is oft-
en scope for consultation and harmon-
isation.  I believe this is  the first  base 
from which to  start. 
"We should concentrate 
on  the  areas of similarities " 
Secondly, we  must recognize that in 
a group as diverse as ours we can nev-
er expect identical positions on all  is-
sues.  Therefore,  what we  should con-
centrate on,  in my view,  is  exploiting 
the areas of similarities rather than la-
menting the areas of differences. If we 
adopt that approach,  I  believe  much 
more can be made of our international 
cooperation and economic aid. Third-
ly,  my own orientation on internation-
al cooperation is that it must ultimate-
ly  get  beyond the governments to the 
people.  That is  why  I am very inter-
ested  in the work of the non-govern-
mental  Organizations  and  Youth.  I 
think  it  is  critical  that  we  recognize 
that  international  cooperation  is  not 
just cooperation  of governments  but 
of  peoples because, in the end, govern-
ments generally emerge from the peo-
ple.  Now,  those  are  overall  percep-
tions,  but at  the  end  of the  day  we 
have  to  implement  them  by  way  of 
specific mechanisms.  How do we  im-
plement them? As  I see  it,  one of the 
most  important  mechanisms  for 
achieving  international  cooperation 
lies  in  the  establishment  of regional 
cooperation  or  integration  schemes. 
The rise  of mini-nation  states  (small 
nation states)  and the  polarization of 
the world into two  ideological camps 
have  led  to  a  situation  whereby  the 
world  community at large  and  small 
nations as  well can gain by increasing 
intra-regional  cooperation  and  by 
coordination  between  regional  blocs. 
This is  why intra-ACP cooperation is 
such  an  important concept  for  us  in 
the  ACP  Group.  Finally,  by  way  of 
mechanisms, the developed industrial-
ized  countries  must  recognize  that 
they have a vested interest in the de-
velopment of the developing world. It 
is  as  much an investment for them as 
it is for the developing world and this 
approach  to  North-South  relations, 
that willingness to invest in the future, 
is, in my view, critical and is the basis 
of my perception of international coo-
peration. A world divided starkly into 
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poor but wrong. In a sense, that is one 
of the moral dimensions of Lome  III 
or the  Lome  arrangements  generally. 
The Lome mechanism must represent 
an investment by the developed EEC 
countries  in  the  development  of the 
poor ACP countries. 
...,.  The ACP Secretariat  has  in  the 
past been criticized,  sometimes unfair-
ly, for inefficiency. How do you see the 
problem?  What  do  you  intend to  do 
about it? 
- Well,  sometimes  the  criticisms 
have been justified. Sometimes, as you 
said, they may have been beyond what 
could fairly be described as such but I 
think  there  is  no  doubt that there  is 
great  need  for  the  Secretariat,  as  the 
technical institutional backbone of the 
ACP,  the  nerve  centre,  to  be  greatly 
improved. It may be useful to see how 
this  can  be  done,  what it can  do  by 
itself, what can be done by others and 
how  far  we  have  gone  in  trying  to 
achieve  this  in the  last year.  First of 
all,  there is  a problem of the place of 
the Secretariat among the institutions 
and organs of  the ACP. There are only 
two organs formally in the ACP struc-
ture : the Council of Ministers and the 
Committee of Ambassadors.  The  Se-
cretariat does  not enjoy the  status of 
an organ. This has implications for its 
capacity  to  take  initiatives,  to  repre-
sent  the  Group  and  to  take  actions 
which may call for a certain amount of 
autonomy on the part of the organiza-
tion:  for  example,  if you  take  the 
Commission  in  the  EEC  institutional 
structures-I am not equating the Se-
cretariat  with  the  Commission-but 
we  need  to  move  in  that  direction, 
rather than in the context where it is 
now seen as-and more or less treated 
as-a mere  technical  adjunct  of the 
Committee  of  Ambassadors  or  the 
Council  of Ministers.  The  Secretariat 
needs to enjoy a more appropriate sta-
tus in the constellation of institutions 
in  the  ACP.  Secondly,  it  needs  the 
means, in volume, in quality and with 
certainty.  What  do  I  mean  by  that? 
The  financing  of the  Secretariat  has 
been one of the biggest difficulties. As 
you  know,  our  Secretariat  budget  is 
extremely modest.  We  have a budget 
of about $ 3 million a year (over the 
last three years it has not changed). Of 
that, just under $ 2 million is paid by 
the ACP States and just over $ 1 mil-
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lion comes from the EDF and is there-
fore  paid by the EEC.  Our staff num-
bers, all told, 80, from driver to Secre-
tary-General,  to  serve  the  66  coun-
tries. Now, if you look at this and try 
to  assess  its  capacity  to  serve  the 
Group,  and look at it in comparison 
with  other  international  bodies  that 
are facing  the same kind of task,  you 
will find the following: our Secretariat, 
which serves the 66  ACP countries, is 
really  small  compared  with  say  the 
OAU Secretariat which serves 50 or so 
countries,  which  has  about  700.  You 
look at the ECOW  AS  group which is 
made up  of 16  of the  66  ACP coun-
tries,  their secretariat  numbers  about 
300  and  the  CARICOM  Secretariat, 
which services 12 of  the 66 ACP coun-
tries, consists of about 200 and so on. 
Now,  we  are not saying that numbers 
are necessarily the key or even the sole 
question. We are saying, however, that 
without  a  certain  critical  minimum 
staff you cannot effectively undertake 
the  task  and  we  are  way  below  that 
critical  minimum.  That's  the  first 
point.  Secondly,  even for  that critical 
m1mmum  (which  we  have  not 
achieved) the means to maintain what 
we have now is so feeble that it casts a 
pall of uncertainty and demoralization 
over the staff of the Secretariat, where 
from  day  to  day  they  are  not  sure 
whether salaries will be available. The 
conditions  of service  are  themselves 
already  extremely  modest,  as  I  am 
sure you are aware: limited or no pro-
motional opportunities, relatively low 
salaries and termination benefits.  We 
have therefore great difficulties in at-
tracting competent  people  and in  re-
taining them when  we  have attracted 
them.  Then the Secretariat is,  on the 
other  hand,  faced  at  this  particular 
moment, with an enlarged area of  coo-
peration with the EEC following Lome 
III and an enlarged role related to our 
intra-ACP cooperation. As you know, 
we  have arrived at our tenth anniver-
sary and we  are putting together,  fol-
lowing  the  Harare  Council  of Minis-
ters, a practical intra-ACP programme 
of  action.  That  programme,  when 
agreed on by the Council of Ministers, 
would have to be implemented. 
And  while  we  are  now  looking  at 
wider  international  possibilities  and 
prospects from  which  we  can extract 
some benefits for the ACP,  how does 
the  Secretariat,  faced  with  the  situa-
tion I've just described, survive, much 
less  rise  to  these  challenges  and  im-
prove on its performance? This is the 
million dollar question. It is clear that 
we need to take steps to encourage and 
develop the staff.  Some of these steps 
must include better conditions of ser-
vice: salaries, promotional opportuni-
ties  within  the  Secretariat and so  on 
and so  forth,  including more autono-
my for the Secretary-General to define 
more effectively the work of  the Secre-
tariat, determine the allocation of res-
ponsibilities, in short the putting into 
function  of an efficient  body.  And  I 
put  great  store  on  this  final  require-
ment. In this task there is the need for 
means for  further training and expos-
ing our staff to international methods 
and  techniques  for  an  organization 
such  as  ours.  If these  things  can  be 
done the Secretariat, which is already 
striving manfully against the odds, can 
be transformed slowly but surely into 
an institution of excellence,  servicing 
the  wide  and  far-flung  group  of the 
ACP States-because let us not forget 
that the ACP States are in the Ameri-
cas-the Caribbean-some are  in the 
Pacific and the bulk across all of Afri-
ca. It is a very wide canvas and a very 
large constituency to serve, and a very 
diverse  one  at  that.  The  Secretariat 
must be given adequate means if it is 
to effectively discharge its responsibil-
ities  to  this  constituency-the  largest 
institutional  grouping  of developing 
countries aside  from  the  United Na-
tions. 
"Cautious optimism " 
in the ACP Group 
...,.  Lome  III  has  just  come  into 
force.  What  is  the  mood now  in  the 
ACP Group? Is it one of  pessimism or 
one of  hope? 
- I  would  say  there  is  a  certain 
cautious optimism. Very cautious, be-
cause  I think everyone  is  aware  after 
1  0 years of cooperation that the reality 
hardly  ever  matched  the  promise  of 
earlier  Conventions.  There  is  a  wide 
gap  between  promise  and  perf  or-
mance.  Secondly,  we  are  at the  mo-
ment  faced  with  a  very  serious  eco-
nomic crisis, especially in Africa. Afri-
ca, as you know, represents two-thirds 
of the  ACP  Group.  We  are  preoccu-
pied with the situation there which has 
been  exacerbated  by  the  situation  in 
Southern Africa. So the atmosphere is 
not one of very hopeful signs.  On the other hand, we  had the tenth anniver-
sary  of the  ACP  Group.  We  have 
therefore survived  10  years.  We  have 
been able to stay together in our com-
mitment to international cooperation. 
By  the  Convention itself,  with  Lome 
III,  we  have  improved  our  North-
South  links,  through  the  ACP-EEC. 
There  is  obviously  a  need  to  look 
beyond  that  horizon  and  I  think  in 
every ACP state you would find great-
er  internal  national  efforts  being 
made.  The  recent  lowering  of  oil 
prices  has  helped  some of our coun-
tries.  It  hasn't  helped  others  but  I 
think in  that background  now it is  a 
cautious realistic hope (maybe ·optim-
ism is too optimistic a word) certainly 
cautious hope, that the objectives and 
commitment which  we  have  set  our-
selves  in Lome III  will  be  effectively 
discharged  through a closer  matching 
of the  implementation  and  achieve-
ment with the promise. 
.- Lome III has introduced the con-
cept of  policy dialogue into ACP-EEC 
relations.  The  programming  missions 
are in full swing.  From feedbacks,  how 
have the A CPs found dialogue? Would 
you comment on the trend in emphasis 
in the indicative programmes? 
- Well,  you  know  how  we  ended 
the negotiations and what is  reflected 
in the Convention is not what was put 
to us as the concept of policy dialogue 
but an approach towards the objective 
of seeking more efficiency rather than 
more  conditionalities.  We  will  see 
whether in the implementation of the 
Convention this will be the emphasis. 
Now  the  Commission  is  the  body 
which is doing the programming mis-
sions  alone.  Programming  missions 
are not done jointly in the sense of an 
ACP institution with an EEC  institu-
tion. It is between the EEC institution 
and  the  member  state  of the  ACP 
alone.  We  at  the  ACP  Group  level 
have not yet met to have an exchange 
of views  on  what  individual  experi-
ences  have been to draw up a sort of 
overall picture. But there seems to be 
a certain orientation towards prioriti-
zation and concentration of resources 
within limited sectors rather than div-
ersification  and  spreading  of the  re-
sources.  I gather some 70-80% of the 
resources  so  far  seem  to  be  directed 
towards agriculture and food  security. 
Now I  think this is  a desirable trend 
and I support, myself, this approach to 
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concentrate on particular areas, main-
ly agriculture, especially in the light of 
the recent experience of Africa.  How-
ever, I would like for us not to forget 
that there is a fair amount of diversity 
in the ACP Group and that for  some 
countries this particular approach and 
orientation  of resource  use  towards 
food  and agriculture  may  not be  the 
best one.  On this,  I want to draw at-
tention  to  the  basic  premise  of the 
Convention that it will  be  the choice 
of the ACP States to decide on the use 
advantage to ensure a more just inter-
national financial  system.  You  your-
self,  I  understand,  have  spoken  very 
much about  it  in  the past.  What  can 
you  do  now  as  Secretary-General  to 
motivate it? 
- This is an area in which we have 
not yet done much in the international 
financial system as a group. The ACP 
Group has certain assets which, as you 
rightly  said,  have  not  been  used  to 
maximum advantage. A large number 
of the  ACP  States,  for  example,  are 
members  of  the  Commonwealth 
which  has  some  developed  countries 
as  members.  A large  number of ACP 
States  are  members  of  the  Latin-
American system.  A large  number of 
them are members of French Techni-
cal  Cooperation  Agency.  We  are  al-
most all members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.  And yet  we  do  not seem 
u  to see the need to harness these mem-
t!J  berships  in  a  general  approach  to 
Mr  Carrington  beside  Mr  Rabbie  problems such as the international fi-
Namaliu of Papua New Guinea during  nancial  system.  Even  in  the  Lome 
the negotiations of Lome III  Convention, on the question of debt, 
of their resources.  Now where,  there-
fore,  a  country or group  of countries 
were to perceive their best interest to 
lie  elsewhere,  I'm  hoping  that  those 
who are involved in the programming 
mission will not attempt to insist that 
they must all follow the pattern of the 
majority.  I  was  in  the  Caribbean  re-
cently and I got that feeling from talk-
ing  to  certain  officials  in advance  of 
the Commission team which was  go-
ing to one of  the countries around that 
t1me  to begin  the  programming  mis-
sion.  They asked me:  "Is it true that 
we  must  use  all  the  resources  from 
Lome III in one sector?". I stated that 
as  far  as  I  was  concerned it was  not 
true.  They  were  worried  because  in 
that  particular  country  they  did  not 
perceive  their  best  interest  to  lie  in 
one  sector.  So  there  is  still  a  certain 
amount of fear.  There may well  be  a 
certain  amount  of more  than  diplo-
matic leaning on countries to move in 
a certain way, but I think by and large 
no  serious  complaints  or  any  com-
plaints  at  all  have  to  my  knowledge 
emerged  from  the programming mis-
sions.  On the contrary,  they  seem  to 
have gone remarkably well. 
..,..  Together the ACP Group  can  be 
an  effective lobby  with  its EEC,  Com-
monwealth  and francophone  connec-
tions.  It has not been able to  take this 
you  will  find  in  Article  198  a  very 
small reference  which  states:  "At the 
request of the ACP  States,  the  Com-
munity shall lend technical assistance 
in studying and finding practical solu-
tions  to  their indebtedness,  debt-ser-
vicing and balance-of-payments prob-
lems". Now what can be done? I be-
lieve one of the first things that needs 
to be  done is  that the ACP must be-
come  known  in  the  international  fi-
nancial  centres.  Let's  face  it,  that 
means going,  establishing contact and 
working  with  the  financial  centres in 
Washington  to  start with.  I  was  dis-
cussing  this  possibility  recently  with 
certain contacts in Washington in re-
spect  of the  American  system.  This 
team which goes to New York ( t)  will 
want to take the. opportunity to get in 
touch  with  UNDP  while  there.  But 
there is need for a comprehensive stu-
dy of  this question as to how and what 
can be done. We must, however, have 
no illusions of  grandeur that we can in 
some way influence the system beyond 
marginal adjustments,  but those mar-
ginal changes could be very useful for 
the ACP countries as regards debt and 
other international financial  questions. 
(I)  Interview conducted on the eve of the UN 
Special Session on Africa. The ACP States sent a 
delegation  to  the  conference  to  " reinforce  the 
ranks of the African delegates", according to Mr 
Carrington. 
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are deteriorating rapidly for the devel-
oping countries.  What should be done 
to  redress  the  balance,  in  your  opin-
ion? 
- It's  a  very  interesting  question 
because recently there was a commen-
tary  that  the  fall  in  oil  prices  has 
brought  benefits  to  the  developing 
countries to the tune of  about $ 20 bil-
lion in one year, and this was consid-
ered  by  the  commentator to  be  very 
good.  Some  of  us  were  concerned 
whether this benefit was  not a reallo-
cation, coming in the main from other 
developing  countries ...  No,  you  are 
quite  right,  the  present  international 
situation continues to be  difficult  for 
the developing countries and I believe 
there  is  no  doubt  that  we  need  im-
proved  commodity  agreements  be-
cause the world prices of most of our 
commodities traded internationally at 
this  time  are  extremely  low.  In  real 
terms, some of them are the lowest we 
have experienced  over the last half a 
century. Secondly, the trading arrange-
ments themselves reflect the structure 
of  production of the developing world. 
We  are  still,  by  and large,  except  for 
the  few  countries  that  have  emerged 
on the industrial scene, cornered with-
in  the  primary  production  stage.  We 
need  more  resources  for  investment 
whether it be  from  the  World  Bank, 
IDA, F  AO or the IFC, complemented 
by  appropriate  national  and  regional 
policies  to  help  to  bring  about  this 
structural transformation of our econ-
omies.  This  is  the  only  way  we  are 
going  to  remove  ourselves  from  our 
dependency  on  primary  commodity 
exports.  Today the international mar-
kets are so fragile and prices are so low 
and we  will continue to be kept down 
by mountainous debts, low foreign ex-
change  earnings,  high  debt  charges, 
etc.  Now how to break this cycle? We 
can  only  break  it  by  increased  re-
sources  for  investment in agriculture, 
industry,  etc.  This  will  structurally 
transform  us  into  quasi-industrial 
economies  moving  us  slowly  out  of 
our dependence on primary products. 
This, to me, is the only way we can do it. 
ACPs' weak industrial capacities 
""'  The weak industrial capacities of 
some A  CP  countries  are  indeed  per-
ceived  to  be  one  of the  reasons  why 
they have been  unable to take full ad-
6 
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vantage  of the  provisions  of the  past 
Conventions  on  trade.  Do  you  agree 
with  this perception? 
- Well  it is  a chicken-and-egg ar-
gument.  Some  say  that our weak  in-
dustrial capacities have meant that we 
have not been able to take full advan-
tage.  Then  we  say,  OK,  we  need  re-
sources to strengthen our weak indus-
trial structures. We  do not get the re-
sources so the industrial capacities are 
not  strengthened,  so  we  are  thrown 
back on the primary production struc-
ture  which  I've just described.  Now 
that's one observation. Secondly, even 
within that weak industrial production 
structure,  we  face  so  many  obstacles 
with  all  the  goods  we  do  produce. 
Even  in  the  Lome  arrangements, 
which  are  among  the  most  preferen-
tial, we still have rules of origin which 
are much too stringent for us. We still 
have, in areas where  we  can produce, 
special limitations imposed within this 
most  favourable  arrangement:  sugar, 
beef,  rum.  Let's  face  it,  we  already 
have  limited  production  structures. 
Why then block these areas in which 
we can produce with advantage? Then 
there  are  areas  to  exploit  at  times 
when  opportunities  arise.  For  exam-
ple, with the entry of Spain and Portu-
gal  into  the  EEC,  a  market  for  over 
300 000 tonnes of cane sugar emerged 
because of Portugal's needs.  Here was 
a chance for  the EEC  to improve on 
the  197 5 fixed  quota which they gave 
to the ACP in sugar-the 1.3  million 
tonnes  when  the  ACP  was  46  coun-
tries and the EEC was Nine. The EEC 
has  grown  to  12,  the ACP  to 66  and 
here you had a chance to move from 
1.3  million  tonnes  to  1.6  million 
tonnes without robbing anyone else of 
his  market.  No,  that opportunity was 
not given  to  the  ACP.  It was  taken 
away from us ... So first our structures 
are weak and we do not get the invest-
ment  to  strengthen  them.  Secondly, 
within the weak structures we produce 
certain  goods  which  we  can  export, 
those  are  limited  by  certain  mecha-
nisms of entry in our most preferred 
market. Thirdly, opportunities emerge 
which could be exploited to our bene-
fit  but we  are  blocked.  So  when  we 
start making all these exceptions, what 
is left? There was a study done by an 
EEC  group  of professors  and one  of 
the observations they made on the re-
latively poor performance of the ACP 
trade in the EEC  was  that,  unless the 
ACP trade was treated in the Commu-
nity no less favourably than Commun-
ity trade, the chances of the EEC ever 
making  a  significant  impact  on ACP 
development through trade were  very 
limited. It is not enough to treat ACP 
trade  more  favourably  than  third 
countries. It is important that they be 
treated no less favourably  than Com-
munity trade itself. To me, this should 
be a guideline for us, if only for a lim-
ited  period  to  assist  ACP  trade.  We 
already  have  an  additional disadvan-
tage  of distance  in  transport  costs. 
We'll never be  on equal terms. If  for 
example we  produce the same shirt in 
Mauritius and in Portugal at the same 
cost,  Portugal is  already in the  Com-
munity market,  Mauritius has  to  pay 
transport costs to bring it from Mauri-
tius  to  Europe.  But  when  it  comes 
here,  it is  still treated less  favourably 
than the Portuguese shirt. 
""'  You  mentioned  the  problem  of 
sugar;  it's one of  the most intractable 
in ACP-EEC relations.  An agreement, 
however,  was  reached recently.  Are the 
A CPs satisfied with this? 
- We  are  not  satisfied  with  the 
agreement  which  was  reached  on su-
gar.  But there was  an agreement:  the 
ACP  agreed.  by  and large,  to  accept 
the recent final offer of the Communi-
ty. This difficulty in reaching an agree-
ment  is  symptomatic  of something 
which  has  been affecting  the  issue  of 
the  Sugar  Protocol  for  a  long  time. 
Basically  a  large  body  of opinion  in 
the  Community  feels  that  the  Sugar 
Protocol  is  something  it would  have 
been better off without.  This is  basi-
cally what is the matter. Its undertak-
ing  was  given  in  1975  when  its  pro-
duction  was  low  and it needed  ACP 
sugar.  It  now  thinks  it  would  have 
been  happy  to  do  without that sugar 
after its own production returned not 
only to  self-sufficiency  but to  a  mas-
sive  export  surplus.  So  the  Protocol 
was  attractive  to  the  Community 
when the Community was short of su-
gar, but it is no longer attractive to the 
Community now that the Community 
has a continous surplus for export. As 
a result, there is a certain weakening of 
the  basic  pillar  of the  commitment 
and a loss of vision of the wider issue 
of  what this represents. We at the ACP 
reiterate the importance of this instru-
ment  for  ACP-EEC  cooperation.  We 
also  reiterate  the  importance  of this instrument  for  the  demonstration  of 
the  good  faith  of the  Community in 
long-term  cooperation  and  develop-
ment in the ACP. 
.~  1985 revealed the precariousness 
of  the food situation in Africa with hor-
rendous  television  pictures of starving 
populations.  Do  you have  any reason 
to believe that adequate efforts are be-
ing  made  to  ensure  that  last  year's 
large-scale famine is  not repeated? 
- The most encouraging hope that 
one has lies not so much with the pol-
iticians  but  with  Mr  Bob  Geldof.  I 
have a feeling that in one year he has 
done more than we have been able to 
do  within the  political institutions in 
the last decade.  I do not think any of 
us can relax,  feeling  that adequate ef-
forts are being made to ensure that last 
year's  famine  is  not  repeated.  We 
gather that there  has  been  some  rain 
and that there has been an increase in 
domestic production within the conti-
nent of Africa and within many of the 
affected countries. I think this is prob-
ably one of the most hopeful and en-
couraging signs.  If,  therefore, the fam-
ine does not repeat itself, and we hope 
it doesn't this year, I believe it will be 
due more to the national efforts in the 
ACP States concerned'" and to the ini-
tiatives  of people  like  Geldof and to 
ordinary people than to what I would 
call  effective  international  economic 
cooperation.  Lome  III has  given  this 
area of concern the number one prior-
ity,  but, of course,  the resources  pro-
vided in the Convention and the tight 
frame of its functioning is not such as 
to affect so much the possibility of  this 
year's  famine.  There  is  a  certain 
amount of  resources for emergency aid 
but  that  is  less  than  a  drop  in  the 
bucket in  the  situation at the  end of 
1986. In short, the answer is no.  I am 
certain that adequate efforts have not 
been made, but we are hoping that the 
problem  will  not  be  as  critical  as  it 
was  last  year  and that all  the  efforts 
being  made  nationally,  including  the 
Geldof type of  initiative and the inter-
national economic cooperation, would 
be enough to diminish the scourge of 
famine. 
lntra-ACP cooperation 
~  You mentioned earlier in this in-
terview  intra-ACP  cooperation.  This 
cannot be underestimated.  The poten-
tial is there.  The ACP Council of  Min-
isters,  meeting in Harare last year,  has 
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requested a more realistic approach  to 
the objectives and the ways and means 
of  achieving them.  What are the pros-
pects? 
- You are quite right.  The Minis-
ters' meeting in Harare, which I think 
was  a  watershed  in  the  ACP's  exis-
tence,  coinciding  as  it  did  with  its 
tenth anniversary, called for a realistic 
implementable  programme  of action 
for  cooperation  among  the  ACP 
States. Now this flowed from the origi-
nal  document  establishing  the  ACP 
States,  the  Georgetown  Agreement 
signed in June  197 5 just after we had 
signed  Lome  I  and  came  through  a 
number of elaborated documents; the 
Suva  Declaration  and  Programme  of 
Action  which  was  signed  in  Suva  in 
April  1977  where  six  priority sectors 
for cooperation among the ACP States 
were selected, right through to Monte-
go Bay in July 1980 when we adopted 
a  Plan  of Action  which  we  imple-
mented more in the breach than in the 
observance  between  1980  and  1985 
when  we  went  to  Harare.  In  Harare, 
the  Ministers  quite  rightly  said, 
"Enough is  enough, we need a practi-
cal  implementable  realistic  pro-
gramme  of action  and  we  need  the 
first tranche of this to be brought be-
fore  us  at  the  Council  of Ministers" 
which was  scheduled for  Barbados in 
April.  Well  between  Harare (October 
1985)  and  Barbados  (April  6,  1986), 
we at the Secretariat worked feverishly 
with the help of a number of regional 
and international organizations to put 
together  the  first  phase  of this  pro-
gramme. The first phase concerned it-
self with  the  transport  sector  (mari-
time  and  air),  trade  cooperation and 
trade financing.  The assistance which 
we  received  from  the  International 
Maritime Organization in London, the 
International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion in Montreal and the African Civil 
Aviation  Organization  was  tremen-
dous.  We  also  got  a bit of assistance 
from  UNCT  AD  in  the  trade  sphere. 
The net result was that we prepared a 
programme  of action  in  intra-ACP 
cooperation  totalling  $ 140  million 
over five years, covering air transport, 
maritime transport, trade cooperation 
and trade financing.  The  most costly 
was  the  air transport which  was  110 
million dollars, the maritime transport 
was  28  million  and  the  trade  was  2 
million. In the trade area, a large part 
of  the work has to do with studies. But 
we were able to put forward a practical 
set  of project  proposals  within  the 
context  of  an  overall  programme 
based on  the  revealed  needs  and de-
mands of the ACP States. In the area 
of  maritime transport, for example, we 
are concentrating on training, on mar-
itime legislation,  on advisory services 
for  the establishment of maritime ca-
pacity in the ACP States. We took this 
programme to Barbados. Unfortunate-
ly,  because of the short time between 
the preparation of the programme and 
the distribution of documentation, the 
Council of Ministers did not feel  that 
they  had  had  enough  time  to  study 
them in depth. So they have agreed to 
postpone  the  definitive  decision  on 
the programme until the next meeting 
which is due to take place towards the 
end of the year.  In the meantime, the 
Committee  of Ambassadors  in  Brus-
sels is  to undertake an in-depth study 
of the  proposals,  the  ACP  States  are 
also  supposed to  study  the  proposals 
and  feed  their comments in to  us  in 
Brussels.  We  hope  by  November we 
will be able to take a firm decision on 
certain aspects of the programme. It is 
now a matter for political decision, the 
technical  work  has  essentially  been 
completed. We have, of course, got to 
go  on to the other sectors; technology 
transfer, technical assistance,  the pos-
sibility for joint ventures, the question 
of development  finance,  of culture, 
education  and  scientific  cooperation. 
We  are  only  now  beginning  to  map 
out this  work.  I  do  not  see  it  being 
ready  before  1987,  but  we  wish  to 
have  an  overall  programme-modest 
and  realistic,  studied,  amended  and 
adopted-and to start implementation 
so  that we  can then prepare ourselves 
for the next round of negotiations for 
another  North-South  cooperation 
agreement  with  the  EEC.  If we  have 
these  two  initiatives working  in  1990 
in  full  force-a  new  Convention  for 
the  North-South  relationship  and  an 
effective  cooperation  programme 
among  ourselves-and one  that feeds 
on the  North-South relationship,  too, 
because  a large  part of the  EDF goes 
into regional cooperation-I think that 
at last the ACP  would then-I won't 
say  be  taking  off-but taxiing  down 
the runway and hopefully be in a posi-
tion  to  take  off.  This  is  my  dream. 
This is my vision. This is my commit-
ment.  o  Interview by 
Augustine OYOWE 
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opened the  session  with a plea to  the developed countries 
Vice-President Natali: "I recognise  that Europe must show 
the  way  in  this" 
UN Special Session on  Africa-
a global  ''act of faith'' 
The old tag "Ex Africa semper aliquid novo" has 
proved its validity over the last two thousand years, 
and it would be hard to deny that in New York, from 
27  to  31  May,  it was,  at least in part,  proved valid 
again. For the first time in the history of the United 
Nations, the General Assembly devoted a special ses-
sion to the problems of  a single continent, Africa. For 
the  first  time,  African  delegates-mostly  of senior 
ministerial rank-admitted that the major part of  any 
solution to their problems would have to come from 
their own efforts,  and admitted further that at least 
part of the  problem  had its  roots  in  Africa's  own 
post-independence political, social and economic be-
haviour. And for  the  first  time the European Com-
mission, and the ACP Group, spoke in a plenary ses-
sion of the Assembly, in their own right. 
While it was  not expected that the special session 
would end with concrete pledges-it was  specifically 
described as "not a pledging conference"-it was ex-
pected  that  two  things  would  penetrate  into  the 
world's  consciousness.  These  are:  the  catastrophic 
nature of Africa's economic problems, and the need 
for developed countries to match Africa's own efforts 
to bring about a solution. 
Historical background 
The gravity of the  problems facing 
Africa and its development were clear-
ly outlined as far back as 1980: on the 
one hand there was the Berg Report, a 
study  commissioned  by  the  World 
Bank at the request of  the Bank's Afri-
can  governors  on  the  perceived  rea-
sons for the failure of African govern-
ments  and  economies  to  keep  pace 
with the basic needs of  the population. 
And, on the other hand, there was the 
Lagos Plan of Action which had at its 
root  the  recognition  by  African  gov-
ernments that new development prio-
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rities  would  have to  be  set.  The  fol-
lowing  years  saw  a  worsening  of the 
situation-the  world  recession,  the 
growing  instability  of  commodity 
prices,  the  mounting  of African  in-
debtedness  as  a  consequence;  and, 
most  devastating  of all,  the  drought 
and consequent  famine  which  struck 
much of Africa in  1984. 
Again, on a parallel track,  1985  saw 
the  emergence  of two  new  pieces  of 
work.  The  World  Bank  produced  a 
lengthy report, entitled "Towards sus-
tained  development  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa" (reviewed in The Courier no. 
90)  which  covered,  with  a  wealth  of 
statistics,  all  the adverse factors  with 
which  African  countries  had  had  to 
contend,  from  demography  to  poor 
donor coordination. It was a masterly 
analysis and a call  to action.  The re-
sponse  to  that  call  was  on  the  one 
hand, the World Bank's Special Facili-
ty (of over $ 1 bn) and on the other the 
document which the UN General As-
sembly  swiftly  learned  to  call  AP-
PER-Africa's Priority Programme for 
Economic  Recovery.  This  document 
was adopted in July 1985 by the OAU 
Heads  of State  and  Government  at 
ameeting in Addis Ababa. It had three 
main aims, namely: (  1)  to ascertain  the  progress  made in 
the implementation of the Lagos Plan 
of Action,  and the  definition  of new 
measures  for  an  early  attainment  of 
the objectives of the Plan; 
(2)  the  formulation  of an  emergency 
programme for Africa, comprising im-
mediate measures in the priority eco-
nomic  areas  and  particularly  in  the 
agricultural and food sectors; 
(3)  the  establishment  of a  common 
platform  for  action  intended  for 
the  specialised agencies of the United 
Nations System  on international eco-
nomic  issues  of a  crucial  interest for 
Africa. 
When,  in  Resolution  40/40  of De-
cember  1985,  the  General  Assembly 
decided  to  devote  the  13th  Special 
Session  to  the  problems  of Africa,  it 
created a Preparatory Committee un-
der  the  chairmanship  of Edgard  Pis-
ani,  former  EEC  Development Com-
missioner. And the Preparatory Com-
mittee  took,  as  its  basis  reference 
point, the OAU document. 
APPER 
Africa's  Priority  Programme  for 
Economic Recovery has finance at its 
base. The OAU, ECA and national ex-
perts  who  analysed  what  was  wrong, 
and pointed the way to putting it right, 
UN  SPECIAL  SESSION 
were obliged to price the recovery, and 
to  price  it highly:  $ 128  bn over five 
years.  If one  adds  to  this  figure  the 
requirement for debt rescheduling, the 
total sum would require a trebling of 
aid flows  to Africa. 
As  a  first  step,  APPER  analysed 
what had hampered the  implementa-
tion of the Lagos Plan of Action. Five 
major causes were pinpointed, includ-
ing  the  seeming  immutability  of the 
colonial economic structures inherited 
by  almost  all  African  countries;  the 
national  development  plans  and  an-
nual  budgets  which  perpetuated  the 
"colonial" tendency through over-re-
liance on external resources (financial 
and human) and led to the misalloca-
tion  of domestic  resources;  lack  or 
inadequacy  of skilled  manpower;  ex-
ternal  obstacles,  climatic,  economic 
and  political;  and  internal  obstacles 
(lack  of  political  will  being  cited 
twice). 
The  next  major  part  of APPER, 
meriting a chapter to itself (where in-
dustry, science,  trade and many other 
subjects  do  not),  is  concerned  with 
agriculture. After setting out the scope 
of the  decline  in  agricultural  output, 
and  outlining  what  the  emergency 
food supply needs are, the paper states 
"it  is  desirable  that  investment  in 
agriculture should aim at attaining 20-
Mrs Eegje Schoo,  Development Minister of The  Netherlands,  who  also spoke on 
behalf of  the Community's Member States 
25% of aggregate  public investment". 
And in 15  paragraphs continues to set 
out  short-,  medium- and  long-term 
overall  strategies  on  the  national,  re-
gional and international levels. 
The final  major portion of APPER 
deals with Africa's debt burden, which 
the paper expected to exceed $ 170 bn 
by  the end of 1985.  Three significant 
pointers exist towards a further deteri-
oration: the declining share of "soft" 
loans  (down  from  62.5%  in  1972  to 
4  7%  in  1983),  the  increase  in either 
commercial  borrowing  (more  expen-
sive) or IMF standby agreements (stif-
fer  loan conditions),  and the increase 
of reverse financial flows (the fact that 
several African countries were  paying 
out more in  1985  in loan repayments 
than  they  were  receiving  under  the 
loan  agreements).  Debt  service  as  a 
proportion  of  export  earnings  was 
19.8% in  1982  and 27.4% in  1983. 
When  the  UN  General  Assembly 
agreed  on the  need to  hold a  Special 
Session  devoted to  Africa's economic 
problems, the Preparatory Committee 
decided  that  APPER,  drawn  up  by 
Africans,  would  be  the  most  appro-
priate document to  use  as  a basic re-
ference  point;  it  covered  the  points 
and,  above  all,  it  was  an  insider's 
view.  The aim of the Special  Session 
was to obtain the support and backing 
of the  international  community  for 
this  primarily  African  response  to 
Africa's problems; to  stimulate world 
awareness that "a sick Africa means a 
sick  world"  and. to  obtain  commit-
ment  to  concrete  measures  of relief 
where  these  were  appropriate  and 
beyond the control or the capabilities 
of the Africans themselves. Out of the 
$ 128  bn  additional  resources  for  the 
period  1986-90,  Africans  pledged 
themselves to find  $ 82  bn,  or almost 
65%.  For the  rest,  Africa  waited  for 
the international donor community, at 
the same time stating that the Special 
Session was not a pledging conference. 
Of the total sum, no less than $ 115 bn 
was  to  be  devoted to  agriculture  and 
its associated sectors. 
The Special Session 
27-31  May 1986 
The  UN Special  Session  was  con-
vened at the request of OAU Member 
~ States with the dual objective of mak-
ing  Africa's  position clear and of ob-
taining the international community's 
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''Lome is a culmination ... 
the  session is a beginning'' 
An interview with  Edgard  Pisani, 
Head of the Preparatory Committee 
._  The  OA U  document  stresses 
Africa's  human  resources  and  the 
need for  administrative reform.  Can 
these  problems  be  solved  without 
massive technical assistance? 
- First of all,  the  African  docu-
ment is  a  sound one,  I  think.  It is 
neither complete, nor divided up in 
terms of scenarios or dynamics.  But 
some of the  content  is  very  sound. 
Secondly,  I  believe  the  priorities  it 
sets  out,  the reforms  it has decided 
on  and  the  efforts  it  envisages  are 
exactly those that were needed. And 
thirdly-and in answer to your ques-
tion-I  think  that  Africa  will  need 
many kinds of aid to help implement 
this  plan.  It  needs  provisional 1igh-
tening of its debt burden, with some 
of the  loans  becoming  grants  and 
with some investments. There is  no 
development  without  risk  invest-
ment.  And  since  you  asked  me,  I 
think  that  the  technical  assistance 
the  countries  of the  North  offer  to 
Africa  is  too  expensive,  too  luxu-
rious,  too  abstract  and  too  ill ad-
apted and that one of the main aims 
of  our future thinking must be to red-
efine it.  I was  very taken with what 
the Indian Minister said at the UN, 
that  he  was  m)t  sure  that  a  subtle 
marriage  of North-South  technical 
assistance and South-South technical 
assistance was  not a good idea. 
._  You  criticized the donor coun-
tries for  their  incoherent  views-but 
aren't the African countries also part-
ly responsible? 
- Yes.  I said so  yesterday in my 
speech.  I  stressed  the  fact  that,  he-
cause of the absence of any national 
plans or national authorities to deal 
with managing the plan and cooper-
ating with  the  outside world,  Africa 
bore responsibility for failing to offer 
external aid the reception infrastruc-
ture it needed.  But,  over and above 
Africa's ability to make proper use of 
what  it  receives,  there  is  a  kind  of 
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vanity or interest on the part of the 
donor countries which want to man-
age their aid themselves according to 
criteria of their own, using their own 
firms  and anxious  to  haul  up  their 
flag  on every occasion. The problem 
is  knowing whether aid is an oppor-
tunity for the countries of the North 
to look good or to develop Africa. 
._  Mr Pisani,  what do you think is 
the  absolute  minimum  amount  of 
money the  international community 
should be providing to have any effect 
on the crisis and live up  to the hopes 
of  the African nations? 
"The  problem  is  knowing 
whether  aid  is  an  opportunity 
for the .countries of the North to 
look  good  or  to  develop  Afri-
ca". 
- I  shall give  you  three  answers 
which  in  fact  converge.  First of all, 
the aid we  currently give is not used 
properly,  so  there  is  a  great  deal 
more that could be got from  it.  Se-
cond,  it is  ill-suited to the situation 
in  Africa  in  that  it  provides  credit 
where  investment is  called for-the 
Lome  grants  are  one  exception.: 
Third, there ought to be  more of it, 
although  personally  I  incline  to  the 
view that we  ought to help the Afri-
cans  do what they cannot do  alone 
and  not  just  do  anything.  What  I 
mean is that the fight against the de-
sert,  control of population problems 
and the  setting  up  of a  very  long-
term  research  system,  for  example, 
are all very particular things the Afri-
cans  cannot  do  by  themselves  and 
that  is  where  we  should  be  giving 
money,  because  Africa  will  not  ad-
vance  without it.  You  asked  me  to 
put  a  figure  on  how  much  was 
needed-I  tend  to  think  that  the 
loans could stay put, more or less, if 
the  grants  and package  investments 
went  up  by  something  like  50%. 
That's really  very  approximate,  but 
it's  about right-don't  increase  the 
loans,  or decrease  them  either,  but 
plough them into schemes that have 
got behind, where there is an advan-
tage  or  something  being  produced, 
and  really  push  up  the  grants  and 
direct investments-which  amounts 
to  the  same  thing,  as  the  business-
man  who  invests  and  doesn't  ask 
anyone for any guarantees and takes 
the  risk  himself,  creates  wealth  in 
Africa without asking Africa to give 
it back.  So  it's a  marriage of grants 
and investments which I think would 
give Africa the best chance. 
._  And now how could the African 
countries help themselves? 
- I~ they  improve  their  struc-
tures,  their behaviour and their ad-
ministration,  if the  development  of 
civil  society  is  encouraged,  if they 
reduce  State  intervention  but  im-
prove the quality of it and if they do 
all  that in five  years,  then they will 
have given us  our answer. 
._  And lastly,  as the former Com-
missioner  who  negotiated Lome Ill 
over 14 months of  bargaining, do you 
think it  is  reasonable to  hope that a 
week-long session will have compara-
ble results? 
- There  are  two  ways  of  an-
swering that and I am not trying to 
wriggle out of it.  Lome is a culmina-
tion.  Today's  session  is  maybe  a 
beginning.  We  will  be  discussing 
Africa and,  basically, what the Afri-
cans  should  be  looking  for  at  this 
session  is  not  the  answer  to  their 
problem but that the problem should 
be  properly  stated.  My  second  an-
swer  is  that,  obviously,  we  don't 
have enough time to do such serious 
things as we  should have done.  o 
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The  African  states  appointed five  spokesmen  to  cover  the  major  themes.  The  Hon.  B.  Chidzero,  Planning  Minister of 
Zimbabwe (left),  spoke on  the  international economic environment,  while Mr Akinyemi, Nigeria's Foreign  Minister,  dealt 
concrete  support  for  a  recovery  pro-
gramme. It would not be inopportune 
to  state at this juncture that the Spe-
cial  Session  achieved  both  its  objec-
tives. It was a notable session, as well, 
for  a  number  of  reasons.  As  said 
above, it was the first time that a ses-
sion  of the  General  Assembly  had 
been  convened  to  discuss  the  prob-
lems of a single  continent; it was  the 
first  time that either the  EEC  or the 
ACP  had addressed  the  General  As-
sembly in plenary session (Vice-Presi-
dent  Lorenzo  Natali,  Commissioner 
for Development, spoke for the Euro-
pean  Community,  Ambassador  Mo-
hammed Omar Giama of Somalia on 
behalf of the ACP States); and it was 
the first time that an  entire continent 
pledged itself to a programme of eco-
nomic re-programming and overhaul, 
obtaining in  that process  the  support 
of the world community. After intro-
ductions  by  the  Assembly  Chairman 
Jaime de Pinies and the UN Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Presi-
dent Abdou Diouf of Senegal,  current 
OAU  Chairman,  addressed  the  As-
sembly,  calling the session "an act of 
faith  on  the  part  of the  continent's 
partners". Since the crisis had structu-
ral  causes  and  affected  all  of  the 
world's  economies,  he  asked,  did  it 
not  reflect  a  questioning  of  social 
structures and cultural· norms and val-
ues  on which  civilization was  based? 
with  agriculture 
The world was going through a muta-
tion of gigantic proportions which had 
nonetheless had positive effects. It  had 
highlighted  shortcomings  and  mis-
takes in a continent where great natu-
ral  and  human  capabilities  coexisted 
with famine,  illiteracy and total desti-
tution.  Structural  deficiencies  had 
been  aggravated  by  natural  disasters, 
falling  commodity  prices,  the  over-
whelming  debt  and  debt-servicing 
burdens,  the  stagnation and even the 
decrease  in  real  terms  of  financial 
flows  to Africa, and a high concentra-
tion  of refugees  and  displaced  per-
sons. 
Such  a  grave  situation  called  for 
structural  changes  and  medium- and 
long-term solutions, demanded a new 
development  approach  in  Africa  and 
an  improved  framework  for  interna-
tional cooperation. That, he explained, 
was the reason why African Heads of 
State and Government had studied the 
situation  in  depth  and  adopted  the 
Priority Programme.  The Programme 
expressed  the  African  countries'  col-
lective and individual resolve to take 
into their own hands the economic re-
covery of the continent. It set out the 
adoption  of new  economic  develop-
ment priorities which gave the rehabil-
itation of agriculture and the improve-
ment of the food  situation  the atten-
tion they deserved. 
But,  added  President  Diouf,  im-
provements  at  home  had  to  be 
matc'f\ed  by  increased  efforts  by  the 
international  community,  notably  by 
improving the framework of coopera-
tion,  and  modifying the international 
economic  environment  by  stabilising 
raw  material  prices  at  profitable 
prices,  increasing  the  flow  of conces-
sional  financial  resources  to  Afri~a, 
.  al),d  alleviating the debt and debt-ser-
vicing burden. He stated that the Spe-
cial ·session must arrive at agreements 
which  clearly  defined  each  partner's 
contribution,  and  that  commitment 
would  have  to  be  scrupulously  re-
spected over the next five years on the 
basis of evaluation procedures and fol-
low-up  mechanisms  similar  to  those 
outlined in the African proposals. 
Action  was  what  President  Diouf 
was seeking, and that was what he did 
not get.  From  the  start,  it had  been 
accepted that the Special Session was 
not a pledging conference, but African 
countries continued to  hold on to the 
hope that clear and quantifiable com-
mitments would be forthcoming. With 
some minor exceptions, they were not. 
What was much more in evidence was 
the desire  to  score  ideological  points. 
The great bulk of the three days' plen-
ary  session  was  taken  up,  therefore, 
with  exhortations  from  one  group  or 
another to  abandon central  planning, 
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Two  major spokesmen: Vice-President Natali and President 
Diouf meet to  discuss  the final resolution 
espouse  the  free  market and provide 
incentives on the one hand, or a tirade 
against  the  evils  of the  past and the 
virtues of state enterprises on the oth-
er.  Even  Africa's  oldest  partners,  the 
major European  countries,  contented 
themselves by and large with a recital 
of what  they  had  already  achieved 
rather than with what they could do in 
the future and only a few  minor open-
ings were perceived. It fell  to Canada, 
Denmark  and  The  Netherlands  to 
make the small gestures which greater 
nations  found  it  hard  to  follow:  Ca-
nada announced a five-year renewable 
moratorium on ODA debt; Denmark 
announced an increase in ODA from 
0.82% of GNP to 1% and the cancel-
lation of $ 83 m  worth  of debt owed 
by  Tanzania,  while  stating  its  readi-
ness to do the same for other LLDCs; 
and The Netherlands announced a $ 5 
m  increase  in aid-to  increase  man-
agement effectiveness-and a  willing-
ness  to  discuss  the  cancellation  of 
ODA debt for LLDCs which were pre-
pared to commit themselves to effec-
tive adjustment policies.  Sweden also 
promised some concessions. 
The  Netherlands  Development 
Minister, Mrs Schoo,  who announced 
this good news also spoke, by virtue of 
the Dutch Presidency of the European 
Council,  on  behalf  of  the  Member 
States of the Community. Her speech 
was  divided into two  portions, there-
fore,  and  it  must  be  said  that  the 
"Community" part was by no means 
the more striking. Though based origi-
12 
nally  on a  liberal  Commission docu-
ment it reflected the largely-minimal-
ist  position  of the  Member  States, 
many of whom, like the UK, Belgium 
and Germany,  are  pursuing  austerity 
policies at home and do not feel  that a 
general commitment to higher spend-
ing would do much fiscal  or electoral 
good.  Nevertheless,  three  positive 
points did emerge from the Commun-
ity  declaration.  Firstly,  support  was 
given firmly for IDA 8 replenishment 
up to $ 12  bn, a "substantial increase 
in the capital of the World Bank" and 
the  contribution  of $ 2. 7  bn  of the 
IMF Trust Fund within the framework 
of the  Structural Adjustment Facility 
to be used for African countries.  Sec-
ondly,  the  Community  was  firm  on 
the position that for  the  period from 
1986  to  1990,  bilateral donors should 
not become  net  recipients  of official 
capital  flows  from  African  countries 
undertaking  adjustment  programmes. 
"Thirdly",  Mrs  Schoo  said,  "we are 
ready  to  support  policies  aiming  at 
conservation  of the  natural  environ-
ment and are prepared to assist Gov-
ernments at their request in the imple-
mentation of  appropriate demographic 
policies". 
Vice-President  Lorenzo  Natali, 
spokesman  for  the  Commission, 
which had, for  the first time been al-
lowed to address the General Assem-
bly,  found  himself with a  theme and 
an appeal  ready  to  hand.  In essence, 
the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities had even less  room for 
manoeuvre  than  the  Council.  The 
amount of aid of which it disposes is 
fixed  by the Member States, and Mrs 
Schoo gave no hint in her own speech 
that a collective decision to increase or 
re-direct  this  aid  had  been  made. 
Moreover, since the vast bulk of EEC 
aid is in the form of grants, there was 
little chance of a gesture by Mr Natali 
on a  repayment moratorium.  He  did 
point out that Lome was  a model-if 
only in miniature-of the sort of sta-
ble,  contractual,  foreseeable  aid  that 
Africa needed. 
But,  undeterred  by  the  slenderness 
ofhis negotiating margins, and unwill-
ing  to  confine himself to  a  recital  of 
the Commission's past and present ef-
forts,  Mr Natali pointed out the three 
significant  areas  in  which  the  Com-
mission felt that progress was possible. 
The first was debt. "As regards debt", 
he said, "Mrs Schoo has already indi-
cated the main points to bear in mind, 
that is to say, a case-by-case approach 
adapted to  the  medium-term structu-
ral adjustment policies followed by the 
countries  concerned,  and  applied  as 
flexibly  as  possible".  More than that 
he  could not say,  since  the  Commis-
sion is not a major creditor. He could 
have said little on financial flows,  too, 
had he wished,  beyond  pointing out, 
as he did, that the Community and its 
Member States were "the largest don-
or of development aid to sub-Saharan 
Africa (providing 55% ofODA)". But 
Mr Natali did go further; not in vague 
terms but in the opening of  the debate 
towards its implementation phase. His 
words  may  not have  been  as  full  of 
promise  as  some  African  countries 
might have hoped,  but they were  full 
of realism.  Speaking  of the  need  for 
non-concessional flows  to Africa,  and 
yet the unpromising climate for inves-
tors,  he recognised the need for  more 
aid,  if only for  a  time.  "Initially" he 
stated, "an increase in official  devel-
opment assistance, especially grants, is 
important  in  order  to  break  the  vi-
cious circle.  In  this regard,  if the ne-
cessity to do more for Africa is recog-
nised-as the Heads of  State and Gov-
ernment indicated yet again in Tokyo, 
and  the  European  Community  de-
monstrated  with  the  Lome  Conven-
tion-it would (unfortunately) be rash 
to count on -immediate,  massive sup-
plementary transfers, and stress should 
accordingly  be  placed  on  using  the 
available  resources  in  the  best  and most  efficient  way.  In  any  event,  a 
steadily  progressive  increase  in inter-
national aid,  which  certainly remains 
indispensable, will be secondary to the 
determined efforts of  Africans to stand 
on their own two  feet". 
That was  a  part of his  theme-the 
need to get down, as the provisions of 
the Lome III Convention had done, to 
the real needs: flexibility, policy dialo-
gue,  effectiveness,  multiplicity  of op-
tions, and not to concentrate too much 
on the mere numbers. But at the core 
of Mr Natali's speech was an appeal to 
the  developing  countries  "to under-
take  actions  aimed  at  stabilising  ex-
port earnings similar to the Stabex and 
Sysmin systems operated by the Com-
munity, in order to tide countries over 
the  transitional adjustment period.  It 
is  in that spirit that the  Community 
recently  decided  to  introduce  a  Sta-
bex-type  system  for  those  LLDCs 
which  are  not members of the Lome 
Convention. It would reiterate its ap-
peal  to  other  countries  to  bring  in 
comparable arrangements, at least for 
the  least-developed  countries.  Com-
pensation systems are particularly im-
portant where  the  effects  of the  stag-
nant or falling purchasing power of  ex-
ports  have  been  exacerbated  by  a 
countraction  of financial  flows  or an 
increase in the debt burden, two  fac-
tors which are closely linked". 
"In view of our close ties with Afri-
ca",  he  concluded,  "I recognise  that 
Europe must show the way in this: at 
all  events,  I  can  assure  our  African 
friends that the Community will exert 
its own efforts and influence to ensure 
that the consensus  towards  which  we 
are working is  given  effect in our fu-
ture decisions". 
Vice-President Natali's closing sen-
tence  was  taken  up by  Somali's  Mo-
hammed  Giama,  Ambassador to  the 
EEC and Chairman of the ACP Com-
mittee of Ambassadors, who spoke to 
the General Assembly on behalf of the 
ACP  Group.  The  Group,  he  pointed 
out,  had but one important asset-its 
unity, which it intended to use in ful-
lest support of  its African brothers and 
sisters.  He went on to recall the work 
being  done  to  foster  intra-ACP  coo-
peration  (see  Courier  no.  94  for  re-
ports  on the  Paramaribo Conference) 
and then went on to say that he con-
sidered  cooperation  with  the  EEC  to 
be  of  "critical  importance".  He 
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looked forward,  he  said,  "to the EEC 
being among those playing a substan-
tial  leadership  role  in  the  quest  for 
additional  support" of African  coun-
tries.  While  the  undertaking  by  the 
EEC  had been "encouraging in many 
aspects" he was hoping for still more. 
But in his final appeal, against protec-
tionism  and  in  favour  of increasing 
Africa's  role  in  world  trade  patterns, 
he  alluded to  Mr Natali's appeal and 
appealed in tum to the EEC to "play a 
leading role" in this matter. 
Everyone  had  a  chance  to  speak; 
but  there  were  few  speeches,  apart 
from those mentioned, which struck a 
note or which deviated far fro:rh gener-
al expectations. By the end of  the third 
day  of the  plenary  session,  attention 
was  drawn to the final declaration. 
The final  declaration 
Whatever  the  expectations  of the 
Africans  had  been,  they  themselves 
had  agreed  that  the  Special  Session 
was not a pledging conference.  More-
over,  a "global Lome" was  never on 
the cards: it took ten European and 64 
ACP countries 14 months of  very hard 
bargaining  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory 
concluion to  Lome III.  The UN con-
ference  and its  final  declaration were 
not a conclusion according to Edgard 
Pisani (see  interview p.  1  0)  but a be-
ginning.  And,  a~  a  beginning,  they 
were by no means disheartening. 
Firstly,  in more  general  terms,  the 
Special Session set an international di-
mension to the African crisis-it was a 
recognition, on the one hand, by Afri-
can governments  that a great deal  of 
internal reform  was  required,  and by 
the international community that the 
reforms could not be carried out with-
out external  help.  Secondly,  it was  a 
recognition by  the international com-
munity that aid would have to be in-
creased and Africa's debt burden ligh-
tened. 
The vexed problem of putting a fig-
ure  on  the  reciprocal  commitments 
was  avoided  by  the  inclusion  of an 
edited version of APPER in the final 
document but not in the part entitled 
"Positive  response  and  undertakings 
by the international community". The 
final declaration, recommended by the 
ad  hoc  negotiating  committee  and 
adopted by consensus by  the General 
Assembly  on  1 June,  falls  into  four 
parts: an analysis of the situation, AP-
PER-commitment on a common re-
ference  point,  the  positive  response 
and undertakings by  the international 
community, and finally, follow-up and 
evaluation. 
The positive mood of the consensus 
was summed up in the analysis, which 
contains  the  following  paragraph: 
"Africa is convinced that, with the ne-
cessary  support  of the  international 
community, it can create, in the rela-
tively  near  future,  national,  sub-re-
gional  and  regional  structures  which 
will ensure autonomous and sustained 
economic development". 
The  part which  was  one~ APPER, 
the African plan, is now entitled "UN 
Action  Programme  for  economic  re-
covery  and  development  in  Africa 
1986-90" and retains the APPER fig-
ures. It is  in the next section that the 
international  community  pledges  it-
self,  if not  to  the  figures,  then  to 
"spare no efforts to furnish  sufficient 
resources to support and complement 
Africa's  development  efforts"  and  to 
improve not only the quantity but the 
quality of its aid.  Moreover,  on debt, 
the  international  community  "is re-
solved  to  help  African  countries  in 
their efforts to overcome the financial 
obstacles", and "is aware of the need 
to take measures". 
Of course,  the  Special  Session  will 
not have pleased everybody. Bob Gel-
dof, the Live Aid organiser, who spent 
the week at the Session, called it "fu-
tile  and  ridiculous".  Senior  African 
figures  were  often  seen  shaking  their 
heads gloomily and voicing fears  that 
nothing concrete would emerge. 
Taken  overall,  the  Special  Session 
has  succeeded.  In years  to  come,  the 
commitments on both sides  made  in 
New  York  will  be  quoted  whenever 
more  limited  matters  of finance  are 
broached.  The undertaking to reform 
itself on  the  part  of Africa  and  the 
recognition by  the international com-
munity of its place in that process will 
become  part  of the  complex  back-
ground to development strategies eve-
rywhere.  If New  York  was  not  the 
time or the  place  to  talk in terms of 
pledging,  then New York will  at least 
be  a  moral  and  operational  point of 
reference when the time for firm com-
mitments of that sort do come.  o 
Tom GLASER 
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Ten  years  of 
EEC-NGO cooperation(*) 
Plan,  mobilising  ECU  120  million, 
contributed to the survival of some 15 
million people, about half of the pop-
ulation  affected  by  famine.  NGOs 
were  largely  associated  with  the  fi-
nancing  and  implementation  of the 
Plan.  The  EEC  granted  them  ECU 
10.2 m which went into 16 joint (EEC-
NGO)  actions of the  60  launched  by 
the Plan. 
European non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) working in the 
development  field  met  at  the 
EEC's headquarters in Brussels for 
their 12th Annual General Assem-
bly  from  22-24  April.  The  occa-
sion  provided an  opportunity  for 
both representatives of the NGOs 
and officials from the Commission 
to review ten years of cooperation 
and  to  look  at  future  prospects. 
Present at the gathering  were  not 
only Jacques  Delors,  President of 
the  Commission,  Claude  Cheys-
son, Commissioner responsible for 
North-South  relations  and  Giov-
anni Bersani, Vice-President of the 
European  Parliament's  Develop-
ment Committee,  but also  repre-
sentatives from  Spanish and Por-
tuguese  NGOs,  attending  the  As-
sembly for the first  time. 
It was with an appeal to realism and 
modesty  that  Mr  Delors  opened  the 
General Assembly: "I do not share the 
belief  of  those  who,  in  all  circum-
stances,  affirm  their  certainty  in  the 
government of  people and things. I per-
sonally  doubt  sometimes.  I  have 
doubts  about the  accumulation  of the 
Community's  food  surplus,  and  also 
about sending this surplus to the starv-
ing  populations  of  Africa.  I  have 
doubts about differential claims in our 
countries when we  are faced with pov-
erty and our 16  million unemployed". 
For Mr Delors,  this doubt-or this 
lucidity-is  not  a  sign  of weakness, 
rather the best possible inspiration for 
NGOs in  their persevering  action  on 
two fronts: the first is the "daily strug-
gle for collective progress to be accom-
plished  one  step  at a  time". The se-
cond  front  is  for  creativity and  vigi-
lance: the NGOs must be pathfinders 
for  their governments. 
"Their role  is  also  to  provide gov-
ernmental authorities with criticism",  Q) 
but in this domain they must take care  ] 
to  avoid  the  traps  of sterile  polemic  j 
dispute or self-satisfaction.  8' 
w 
(*)  Article provided by the Directorate-Gener-
al for Development, Division "Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations". 
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This idea was echoed by Mr Menot-
ti  Bottazzi,  the  outgoing  President of 
the  Liaison  Committee  of Develop-
ment NGOs to the European Commu-
nities,  in  his  answer  to  Mr  Delors. 
"The civic society, the very backbone 
of which  is  the world of associations 
and all  the intermediary bodies,  such 
as  unions,  political movements, is  es-
sential to  a well-run  state.  Without a 
civic society worthy of the name,  the 
State is faced with nothing more than 
an undifferentiated mass.  Rather than 
reinforcing  the  State,  the  absence  of 
group spokesmen only weakens it". 
The Natali Plan 
The  Assembly  in  Brussels  was  the 
fitting  occasion  to  examine  the  road 
travelled  since  the  11th  General  As-
sembly  in April  1985  which  had de-
bated  at  length  on  the  action  to  be 
pursued against the drought and fam-
ine in Africa. At that time, the NGOs 
had emphasized .a  twofold  direction: 
emergency aid (such as medicine) and 
food aid, vital for the survival of mil-
lions,  had  to  be  coupled  to  aid  for 
medium- and long-term  development 
which  would  enable  people  to  secure 
their own food and livelihood. 
This  twofold  direction  was  made 
manifest in  the "Natali Plan" aimed 
at  rehabilitating  eight  African  coun-
tries, the hardest hit by famine (Ethio-
pia, Sudan, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Chad, Mozambique and Angola).  The 
Three sectors were involved: medi-
cal  assistance, food  aid and agricultu-
ral  rehabilitation  (seeds,  small  tools, 
small hydraulics, basic technical train-
ing ...  ).  These  three  forms  of aid  are 
closely  interlinked.  For  example,  a 
joint action with the Red Cross which 
reached  500 000  people,  400 000  of 
whom were  displaced, in the Planalto 
region  of Angola:  medicine  was  dis-
patched, along with a doctor and five 
nurses;  food  aid  was  distributed-
most of all com and bean seeds-and 
small  farm  equipment  provided,  to-
gether  with  two  agronomists.  This 
equipment was purchased on site from 
local craftsmen, which is also a means 
of launching development. 
NGO-EEC co-financing 
in 1985 
The NGO-EEC  effort  on  behalf of 
the African countries hit by  famine is 
just part of the EEC's contribution to 
the work of NGOs. A few  figures  will 
illustrate the breadth of the Commun-
ity's  effort,  amounting  to  a  total  of 
ECU 150 m distributed over three sec-
tors:  ECU  58 m  for  food  aid,  ECU 
46 m  for  emergency  aid,  and  ECU 
43 m for development per se.  As Mau-
rice  Foley,  Deputy  Director-General 
The President of  the Commission, Jacques Delors, opening the 12th NGO General 
Assembly.  On  his  left is  Maurice  Foley,  Deputy  Director-General for Develop-
ment for  Development,  recalled,  these  fig-
ures,  in  themselves  modest,  are  nev-
ertheless 16 times more than the sums 
allocated by the EEC to NGOs for de-
velopment projects  since  co-financing 
began  (ECU  2.5 m  in  1976).  At  the 
same time Mr Foley,  like  Mr Delors, 
emphasized that the efficiency of  EEC-
NGO cooperation could not be  mea-
sured  by  numbers  alone.  The NGOs' 
criticism of the EEC's policy on food 
aid  was  useful.  "For our  part",  he 
stressed "we are fully  involved in the 
studies carried out by the Commission 
to  remodel the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP)  with a view to ensuring 
compatibility  between  the  CAP  and 
the  food  security policies of develop-
ing countries". 
The UN Special Session 
-Africa's plight brought 
to  the  world's  notice 
Along the same lines, the European 
NGOs  also  had a  special  interest  in 
the Special Session of the United Na-
tions Assembly on the Crisis in Africa 
which  took  place  in  New  York  from 
27-31  May.  With their African partn-
ers  the  European  NGOs,  which  have 
vast experience in all the fields on the 
New  York  Assembly's  agenda  (land 
access;  systems  of distribution,  sto-
rage, marketing and processing of agri-
cultural products; prices paid to farm-
ers; research and training;  promotion 
of womens' rights; settlement of debt), 
have approached the  Session  officials 
to participate in the debates and more 
importantly to be associated later with 
the  implementation  of the  decisions 
taken at the Session. 
The rise of racism 
and  apartheid 
The  three-day  meeting  of the  As-
sembly was marked by a serious note. 
The participants-some 100 represent-
ing  500  NGOs  in  the  12  EEC  coun-
tries-have  noted  the  rise  of racism 
and intolerance in their countries. It is 
no  secret  that there  is  no  simple  an-
swer  to  this  problem.  Of the  sugges-
tions put forward by the Assembly, two 
seemed to be of particular importance. 
On  the  one  hand  experience  shows 
that schools, from early childhood, are 
the best places to promote intercultu-
ral exchange and to show that this ex-
change can be a factor of personal and 
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EEC-NGO relations founded 
on  mutual confidence 
Cooperation between the EEC and 
the NGOs  involves schemes to  make 
as direct a contribution as possible to 
lightening the load and improving the 
lot  of the  most underprivileged peo-
ple. 
It was  started back in  1976 and it 
embodies  the  Community's  involve-
ment in  the solidarity of  non-official 
Europe  with  the  worst-off  in  the 
Third  World.  It covers  the cofinanc-
ing of development  microprojects  in 
the  developing  countries,  campaigns 
to  make  European  public  opinion 
aware of  what is going on,  the organ-
ization of  food aid and emergency aid 
and  support  for  inter-NGO  coordi-
nation with a view to greater efficiency. 
The Commission is convinced that 
aid channelled through  these  opera-
tions  is  considerable  and  well  able 
to  stand  comparison  with  conven-
tional aid projects.  The success of  the 
schemes is  primarily due to  the high 
degree  of motivation  and  personal 
commitment in  the  non-governmen-
tal  organizations  and to  their  inde-
pendence  of any  external pressures, 
their relatively small size and the au-
tonomy  and flexibility  of the  man-
agement that goes  with  it.  The inter-
action  of these positive factors  tends 
to be reflected in remarkably efficient, 
speedy and flexible design and imple-
mentation. 
The  Commission  has  undertaken 
to  respect  and encourage the special 
characteristics  of the  NGOs-their 
autonomy ·and pluralism,  for exam-
ple,  based  on  the  great  diversity  of 
motivations encountered in  them.  In 
the vast  majority of  cases,  this confi-
dence continues to be amply justified 
by the results. 
The total Community contribution 
to cofinancing over the 1976-85 per-
iod was  ECU 174  million (of a total 
combined  EEC-NGO  investment  of 
ECU  431  million).  This  financed 
1913 projects with  280 NGOs in  113 
developing  countries.  All  available 
budget credit  was committed. 
The geographical breakdown shows 
that 46% of  the funds over the refer-
ence period were allocated to projects 
to help the populations of  Africa, 27% 
for Latin America, 20% for Asia, 6% 
for the Mediterranean and 1 %for the 
Pacific.  The  A CPs  got  45%  of the 
total  Community  contribution  and 
54%  of the  funds  were  channelled 
into projects  in  developing  countries 
with  a per capita  GNP of less  than 
US$ 500. 
In  1985,  315  projects  were  cofi-
nanced  in  90  developing  countries 
and  there  were  450  mini-schemes 
(global donations).  The projects were, 
as  in  the past,  extremely varied and 
they continued to  be spread over  the 
three main traditional sectors-rural 
development,  training  and  public 
health.  Most of  the projects do,  how-
ever,  cover  several sectors  at a time, 
thus  reflecting  the  integrated  ap-
proach  that  is  so  typical  of NGO 
operations. 
The campaign  to  make European 
public opinion aware of  North-South 
interdependence,  especially in  indus-
try and agriculture,  resulted over the 
decade in the cofinancing of  275 pro-
jects  (ECU  11  million)  with  231 
NGOs.  A large number of  the 66 pro-
jects  run  in  1985  were  on  matters 
closely  connected  with  the  African 
food crisis. 
EEC food and emergency aid was 
also  channelled  through  the  NGOs 
and,  in  1985,  the  emergency funds 
put at the disposal of  these organiza-
tions was around the ECU 46 million 
mark-20% of the funds  earmarked 
under the Dublin Plan for the African 
populations hit by drought  and 50% 
of  emergency aid outside the Dublin 
Plan.  This amount makes the NGOs 
one of  the biggest channellers of  this 
type  of aid.  Ordinary food  aid sent 
out in 1985 totalled 78 900 tonnes of 
cereals,  milk powder,  sugar,  beans, 
dried fish etc.  This was distributed in 
50 developing countries by the NGOs 
and was  worth  something like ECU 
46  million. 
In the same year,  the NGOs chan-
nelled  25 345  tonnes  of emergency 
food aid,  worth  a total ECU 12  mil-
lion,  in particular to Africa (Ethiopia, 
Sudan etc.),  and also to other parts of 
the  world  where  disaster  had struck 
(Chile,  Cambodia etc.).  o 
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Refugees in  Somalia (left) and Sudan: NGOs are  vitally important in  bringing food and emerging aid to  where it is most 
·  needed 
collective growth as  decisive as  intel-
lectual training based on the selection 
of the "best students".  On the other 
hand  the  fight  against  terrorism  is 
more  a  matter  of  political  action 
aimed  at  relieving  tension  between 
countries rather than displays of mili-
tary  strength.  It is  up  to  Europe  as 
such to assert itself in this domain. In 
other words,  the NGOs would like to 
see  a  clearer  assertion,  a  reinforce-
ment, of the Europe formed by all its 
people, which could gain assurance as 
an interlocutor and be better heard in 
the Mediterranean basin. 
The  policy  of apartheid  in  South 
Africa  is  another,  even  more  tragic, 
expression of  racism. It is also a signif-
icant factor of destabilization and un-
derdevelopment.  NGOs  have  long 
waged battle against apartheid. A large 
number of them  lend  particular sup-
port to operations favouring the politi-
cal,  social,  cultural  and  professional 
promotion of blacks. The General As-
sembly has prepared a resolution urg-
ing  the  European  Community  and 
Member States  to implement rapidly 
the  budgetary  proposal  ("Special 
Fund")  of ECU  10 m  voted  by  the 
European  Parliament  in  support  of 
victims  of  apartheid  in  1986-1987. 
Two conditions should be observed in 
its implementation: the need for  thor-
ough  consultation  with  European  and 
South African  NGOs in order to  fol-
low strictly the guidelines provided by 
South African anti-apartheid organiza-
tions,  and the need to  allocate a spe-
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cific  portion  of the  Special  Fund  to 
Namibian NGOs along the same gui-
delines.  ' 
On the road  to  a new  decade 
This year,  1986,  marks the  lOth an-
niversary of cooperation between Eu-
ropean  NGOs  and  the  Community. 
The  Liaison  Committee  wished  to 
commemorate  this  anniversary  by 
publishing,  with  the  editorial  and fi-
nancial  help  of the  EEC,  a  brochure 
entitled "Partners for  Development-
The NGOs,  the EEC  and the peoples 
of the  Third World  working  together 
for a new solidarity". This publication 
sums up  10  years  of cooperation and 
situates the present with one overrid-
ing concern: this is not an occasion for 
self-satisfaction,  nor  self-congratula-
tion, rather the time to think about the 
direction to  take in the few  years  left 
before the year 2000. 
This  reflection  is  all  the  more  ap-
propriate in view of the major changes 
in the structure of the General Assem-
bly  of NGOs  and the  Liaison  Com-
mittee. On the one hand two new del-
egations have joined the  General As-
sembly:  a  Spanish  and  a  Portuguese 
delegation, following Spain and Portu-
gal's joining the Community on 1 Jan-
uary  1986.  This is not just a quantita-
tive  increase;  it  is  also  a  "rebalanc-
ing" in  its  reinforcement of southern 
Europe. On the other hand an impor-
tant change has come over the Liaison 
Committee:  of its  12  members  (one 
per country),  7 have just entered  the 
Committee.  Moreover,  the  Liaison 
Committee's  President,  Mr  Menotti 
Botazzi  (France),  has  arrived  at  the 
end of his term of office and has been 
replaced  by  Mr  Pierre  Galand  (Bel-
gium). 
The experience of the past  10 years 
has provided some major guidelines at 
the start of this new  stage.  These gui-
delines are laid out in the  lOth anniv-
ersary  brochure  and were  debated  at 
length  at  the  General  Assembly.  As 
such,  these  guidelines  make  up  the 
body of this memorandum. In conclu-
sion we  shall resume: 
- there is  a link to develop between 
emergency aid,  food  aid and develop-
ment aid, 
- increased efforts are needed in de-
velopment education  to  associate  aid 
to  development with a corresponding 
transformation of our mentalities and 
of the structure of our societies in or-
der  to  become  aware  of the  interde-
pendence  between  our  own  develop-
ment and that of the Third World, 
- increased efforts are needed in the 
fight . against  racism  in  our  countries 
and to end the regime of apartheid in 
South Africa. 
- To  foster  the  existence  of Europe 
and to reinforce the Europe of demo-
cracy, culture and solidarity; a Europe 
open to other peoples; capable of play-
ing  a  more  affirmative  role  in  the 
North-South  dialogue;  a  Europe  that 
is  the home of fraternity,  companion-
ship and a harbinger of peace.  o From  Lome II  to  Lome III 
The EIB and  Community aid 
for  the ACP States 
The  European  Investment  Bank,  reflecting  the  convictions  of the 
Member States, has, from the outset, been shouldering its responsibili-
ties in terms of making financial and technical cooperation work on the 
ground, helping to forge new working relations between the Community 
and an ever-increasing number of partners 0).  The Bank has every inten-
tion, with the Lome III Convention providing its terms of reference, of  continu-
ing to play an active part in the process of financial and technical cooperation 
between Europe and the ACP States. At the same time, there can be no escaping 
the fact that the grinding effects on most ACP countries of world economic and 
financial conditions are going to make it even more difficult for the Bank to go 
about its  appointed  task  of financing  productive investment in  the  countries 
concerned by  means of loans. 
Before looking at the broad lines of 
prospective  EIB  activity  under Lome 
III,  however,  a useful  perspective can 
be gained by a glance at the EIB's de-
veloping role in the implementation of 
the  Community's  development  aid 
policy  for  the  ACP  States  as  it  has 
emerged through its operations under 
Lome  I  and  II  between  1976  and 
1985 (2). 
One or two  basic  background facts 
about EIB  operations in  this  domain 
might perhaps first  be stated: 
(a) the financial aid administered by 
the Bank is  of two  kinds : loans from 
own resources, the bulk of which con-
sists  of  the  proceeds  of  borrowing 
operations on the capital markets, and 
financing  from  risk  capital  which  is 
drawn from the resources of the Euro-
pean Development Fund. 
Loans  from  own  resources  are  re-
served  for  financing  investment  that 
looks  likely  to  provide  an  adequate 
economic and financial return. In each 
case,  the  EIB  takes  stock  of the  eco-
nomic  and  financial  situation  in  the 
ACP country concerned and of factors 
likely to ensure that service payments 
on the loan are  kept up.  As  a general 
rule, loans from own resources attract 
an interest subsidy, usually of 3%, but 
there  is  automatic adjustment,  where 
appropriate, to ensure that the rate of 
interest actually paid by the borrower 
is not less than 5% and not more than 
8%. 
Risk  capital  financing,  a  form  of 
credit devised by the Bank and refined 
and  proven  during  the  currency  of 
Yaounde II, is well suited to the finan-
cial situation and economic conditions 
found  in  many ACP countries. It af-
fords the Bank greater flexibility in its 
operations and is  by  definition  com-
plementary  to  lending  from  own  re-
sources. Indeed, it will  often, in prac-
tice,  be  arranged alongside  subsidised 
loans, either for different components 
of a given project, or by way of setting 
up  a  financial  package,  the  overall 
terms and conditions of  which are bet-
ter  fitted  to  investment  in  the  ACP 
field.  Risk  capital  may  be  deployed 
either for the acquisition of  equity par-
ticipations or a quasi-capital  funding. 
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The  EIB  is  at  liberty,  acting  in  the 
name of the Community, to  purchase 
stakes in the capital of companies or 
development banks in the ACP coun-
tries. The holding must be of minority 
proportions, acquired on  a temporary 
basis  for  transfer  at  the  appropriate 
time, preferably to nationals of,  or in-
stitutions based in, the ACP countries 
in  question.  Quasi-capital  funding 
may take  the form  either of subordi-
nated loans, repayment of which  only 
occurs when  the  borrower has  settled 
all  other  bank  commitments,  or  of 
conditional loans,  the terms of repay-
ment, duration and rate of interest are 
not  fixed  firmly  in  advance  but  can 
vary-depending  on  the  extent  to 
which target profits or output are real-
ised-and only be  set at the time the 
funds are disbursed. 
(b)  financing  is  provided  by  the 
Bank  for  deployment  in  a  specified, 
sector.  According  to  the  Lome  Con-
ventions,  it is  the EIB  that has  been 
appointed  to  give  priority  to  the  ap-
praisal of applications for financing of 
projects  in  the  industrial  sector  (in-
cluding agro-industrial ventures), min-
ing,  tourism and energy  projects con-
nected  with  investment in  those  sec-
tors.  This guideline does not preclude 
the granting of loans for economic in-
frastructure  projects,  especially  in 
those countries where  such a form  of 
financing  is  deemed suitable,  by  rea-
son  of the  level  of development they 
have attained or of  their economic and 
financial  situation. 
(c) the financial aid administered by 
the Bank is not subject to a systematic 
programme  specifying  set  amounts, 
(1)  See  EIB-information no 25 (April  1981) re-
cord of EIB  funding in Africa since Yaounde I.  co 
(2)  The EIB also operates in  12 Mediterranean  w 
countries  under the  terms of cooperation agree-
ments between these countries and the EEC.  The  European  Investment Bank's headquarters in  Luxembourg 
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country by country.  Unlike the Com-
mission,  the  Bank cannot-given the 
very  nature of the  operations it con-
ducts-enter into commitments to de-
ploy predetermined financial resources 
over a five-year period.  Nevertheless, 
within  the  confines  imposed  by  its 
mode of operation, the Bank does take 
part in a process of concertation with 
the authorities in the States concerned 
with the aim of  achieving optimal util-
ization of the  financial  resources  po-
tentially  available.  Indeed,  because  it 
is impossible to carry out a systematic 
programme based on set amounts, it is 
equally  impossible  to  take  it  for 
granted that the volumes of  aid placed 
under Bank administration will actual-
ly be committed, in particular the total 
stated for lending from own resources, 
which should be looked at as a ceiling 
figure  and not a  package  to be  com-
mitted, regardless (the phrase "up to" 
is clearly inserted).  The amounts spe-
cified under the Lome I  and II Con-
ventions  were  ECU  487  million 
(390 m  from  own resources and 97 m 
from  risk capital) and ECU 969  mil-
lion (685  m  from  own  resources and 
284 m from risk capital). 
The pattern of Bank 
financing under the 
Lome I and II Conventions 
Amounts committed 
During the Lome I Convention, EIB 
commitments-loans  from  own  re-
sources  and  risk  capital  combined-
progressed steadily and in the end the 
entire  volume  of financial  aid  pro-
vided for was committed. 
With  Lome  II,  on the  other hand, 
the  Convention  was  in  force  at  the 
time  the  repercussions  of the  world 
economic crisis  were  beginning to be 
felt,  with a  consequent slow-down  in 
investment  programmes,  increased 
difficulty  with  their  balance  of pay-
ments for  most ACP countries and a 
marked  deterioration  in their budget 
positions constricting their borrowing 
capacity and hence their scope for ab-
sorbing loans from the Bank. The situ-
ation  was  still  worse  in  that  an  in-
creasing number of countries in Africa 
were  affected  by  persistent  drought. 
Certain  of  these-amongst  the  lar-
gest-are currently contending with a 
grave financial crisis or are locked into 
a credit squeeze or austerity measures 
that are inhibiting investment. 
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In  1981,  the first  year of Lome  II 
operations,  commitments  from  own 
resources showed the same rate of  pro-
gression  as  during  the  final  phase  of 
the first  Convention (with  a  stock of 
projects built up in 1980), but between 
1982  and 1984 the volume of lending 
from the Bank's own resources in the 
A  CPs  showed a  marked drop,  to  the. 
extent  that  by  the  end  of 1984,  less 
than  60%  of the  overall  package  of 
ECU 685  million provided for  in the 
texts had been committed. After that, 
there was something of  a recovery and 
it now seems certain that by the end of 
1985,  which should in fact  have seen 
Lome II run to expiry, almost 84% of 
the  total  will  have  been  accounted 
for. 
With risk capital  financing,  on  the 
other  hand,  and  in  spite  of the  fact 
that the volume of funds specified un-
der this heading was  three times that 
provided for  under the Lome I  Con-
vention,  the  entire  amount  of ECU 
284 million will be committed. This is 
further confirmation that this form of 
aid  is  particularly  appropriate  for 
countries whose  economic and finan-
cial  circumstances  are  like  those  of 
most  of the  ACP  countries.  This  is 
why,  as  will  be  explained  presently, 
the Lome III negotiators were bidding 
for the risk capital appropriation to be 
doubled to  ECU 600  million (i.e.  six 
times the Lome I allocation). 
Between  1976  and  1985,  the  Bank 
will  have  mounted  operations  in  al-
most every ACP country, financing in-
vestment-either  directly  or  through 
the  intermediary  of  development 
banks  in  support  of small  and  me-
dium-sized  enterprises-that  should 
help to create about 50 000 jobs, large-
ly  in  industry  and  in  agro-industrial 
sectors.  In industry as  such  the aver-
age cost of investment per job created 
is ofthe order ofECU 45 000. Howev-
er, the figures do not include rehabili-
tation projects or help for firms during 
the start-up phase,  the  main purpose 
of  which is to get companies operating 
on an economically and financially vi-
able  basis.  As  far  as  the energy  pro-
jects are concerned, these should help 
either  to  substitute  for  imports  or 
achieve  additional  exports  of  the 
equivalent of about 2.3 million tonnes 
of oil a year, or about 7% of the total 
petroleum import requirements of all 
the  ACP  countries  taken  together  in 
1984. 
Sectoral breakdown of financing 
Going back to  1976,  various broad 
trends in the sectoral pattern of Bank 
financing have emerged. 
During the first two  years  of Lome 
I,  the main bias of operations was to-
wards  individual  financing  for  new 
projects or extension works, with agro-
industrial  ventures  taking  the  lion's 
share,  followed  by energy  sector pro-
jects (34%  of all  loans  from  own  re-
sources). 
The  most  striking  thing  about  the 
second phase of Lome I was the high 
incidence of global loans (lines of cre-
dit) granted to national or regional fi-
nancial  institutions  (25%  of  ACP 
loans  from  own  resources  between 
1978  and  1980).  This versatile  mode 
of financing, the effectiveness of  which 
had already been shown in the Mem-
ber States of the Community and var-
ious Mediterranean countries, is espe-
cially useful as a medium for channell-
ing investment finance into small and 
medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs) 
which,  in  the  ACP  countries,  are 
sometimes  better  able  to  accommo-
date the diverse needs of what are oft-
en quite narrow markets. 
The  trend  has  been  thrown  into 
greater relief with  the  Lome  II  Con-
vention,  which  provides considerably 
broadened  scope  for  the  deployment 
of risk  capital  to  help  development 
banks. The present impression is that 
this type of operation has more or less 
found  its  level:  that global  loans  are 
running at something like  20% of all 
Bank  financing,  and that this  should 
continue to be the pattern in the future. 
Since  1982-83,  what  has  com-
manded  most  attention  is  a  twofold 
development: a higher incidence of fi-
nancing  for  viable  infrastructure  on 
the  one  hand,  and  for  rehabilitation 
projects on the other, a trend that will 
doubtless  gain  momentum  under 
Lome III. 
The scope for infrastructure financ-
ing  was  not excluded during the cur-
rency  of Lome  I,  but neither  was  it 
actually  exploited.  The  first  such 
loans,  granted from  own  resources  in 
1981  under Lome II,  went for invest-
ment in the transport sector.  Between 
1982  and 1985,  further financing  was 
provided  for  telecommunications, 
water  supply  schemes  and  harbour 
works. As  regards  rehabilitating capital in-
vestment,  such  operations  were  rela-
tively thin on the ground up to the end 
of 1983, but expanded considerably in 
1984.  All  these  operations  used  risk 
capital  funds,  amounting  to  43%  of 
total  operations  under  this  heading 
and 22% of all ACP financing  by the 
Bank.  To  get  new  projects  off  the 
ground,  especially  in  industry  and 
mining,  has  been  proving  ever  more 
difficult  in  recent  years,  chiefly  be-
cause of the extremely straitened eco-
nomic and financial  circumstances of 
most ACP countries and the unpropi-
tious world economic climate.  At the 
same  time,  various ongoing activities 
in  the  manufacturing  sector,  mining 
and  economic  infrastructure  have 
been  running into problems and fail-
ing  to  perform  as  they  should.  Of  The  palm  oil industry  in  Papua  New 
these,  there are  various items of laid- . Guinea, which has been a beneficiary of 
up  plant  or  installations  running  at  EIB funding 
low efficiency which could be brought  and special trade arrangements, Stabex 
back  to  viability  through  renovation,  and Sysmin. 
restoration or restructuring. In the ap- - The new Convention goes  much 
praisal of these projects, an important  further than simply preserving the le-
element  is  identifying  what  went  gacy  of previous cooperation.  Having 
wrong:  factors  included bad manage- learned  lessons  from  changes  in  the 
ment, low productivity, narrower mar- world economiC environment, the par-
ket  than  projected,  a  lack  of foreign  ticular  difficulties  confronting  the 
exchange or perhaps an ill-judged pric- ACP  States  and  the  experience  of 
ing policy, but these were probably ag- nearly  a  quarter of a century of coo-
gravated  by  the  worsening  terms  of  peration,  the  Community  and  the 
trade  between  the  industrialized  and  ACP  States  have  sought  to  pinpont 
the  developing  countries.  Rehabilita- and establish all  measures and arran-
tion works  need careful handling and  gements which could serve to enhance 
before  any go-ahead is  given they re- the effectiveness of aid.  The quest for 
quire thorough examination of all po- greater  effectiveness  represented  the 
tentially  adverse  factors  and of ways  negotiators'  main  concern  and  this 
and  means  of circumventing  them.  ambition is reflected at all levels, both 
Not to  be  forgotten  either is  the  fact  in  the  objectives  set  for  cooperation 
that  putting  an  investment  project  and in the instruments of cooperation, 
back  on  firm  economic and financial  all  mechanisms  of which  have  been 
feet,  while in the long run it may un- overhauled  in  detail  with  a  view  to 
derpin  the  economy,  may equally,  in  ensuring  more  effective  measures  ac-
the  early  stages,  involve  matters  of  commodating new requirements. 
some  delicacy  like  redundancies  and  _  The  new  Convention  also  con-
price revision.  tains a number of innovations. As  re-
The EIB and  the 
new Lome Convention 
- The new Lome Convention con-
firms  the  rights  acquired  and obliga-
tions  established  under  earlier  Con-
ventions. It clearly reaffirms the prin-
ciples  underlying  ACP-EEC  coopera-
tion such as  non-interference and mu-
tual  respect  of the sovereignty of the 
partners, while extending and building 
on the  main instruments of coopera-
tion :  trade  arrangements,  protocols 
gards private investment, for example, 
whose  role  is  universally  acknow-
ledged, as  indeed is the need to create 
a favourable climate and stable condi-
tions  for  such  investment,  the  Con-
vention sets a general framework  and 
spells  out  clear  principles,  especially 
that  of "non-discrimination"  which 
should foster the conclusion of  bilater-
al  agreements  between  Member  and 
ACP  States.  With  the  degree  of cau-
tion  necessary  in  this  sphere,  it  pro-
vides for a whole range of studies de-
ACP-EEC 
signed to facilitate ACP States' access 
to the capital markets and to improve 
conditions  for  financing  their  foreign 
trade. 
- One chapter focuses  on "Finan-
cial and Technical cooperation", with 
the EIB  playing an essential role. It is 
interesting  to  note  that,  in  a  highly 
unfavourable  international  climate 
which is restricting, sometimes consid-
erably, most multilateral development 
finance  institutions'  scope  for  action, 
the  Community is  stepping up its ef-
forts  on  the  financial  side  and  not 
merely  keeping  pace  with  inflation. 
The Convention, in  fact,  provides for 
an overall  financing  package  of ECU 
8.5 bn,  nearly  60%  more  than  under 
IIl  the  second  Lome  Convention,  com-
jjj  prising: 
•  ECU  7.4  bn  from  EDF  resources 
including  ECU  600 m  in  risk  capital 
funds managed by the EIB; 
•  (up to)  ECU  1.1 bn from  the EIB's 
own resources. 
The concern of Lome III negotiators 
to tailor aid more precisely to new re-
quirements coupled with the search to 
link  operations  more  closely  to  poli-
cies  pursued  by  recipient  countries 
have  prompted,  firstly,  adoption  of 
new  forms  of financing  (maintenance 
assistance,  sectoral  programmes,  sup-
port for  sectoral policies or strategies, 
particularly  food  strategy)  as  an  ad-
junct to traditional aid for new invest-
ment and, secondly, far more compre-
hensive aid programming. 
- As  far as  the EIB  in particular is 
concerned,  the  Third Lome  Conven-
tion serves to strengthen its role both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. In ad-
dition to  the  ceiling  amount of ECU 
1.1. bn,  already  mentioned,  for  loans 
from  own resources with interest sub-
sidies (subsidies for which ECU 210 m 
in  grant  aid  has  already  been  ear-
marked),  the  Bank  will  also  deploy 
ECU 600 m in the form of risk capital 
financing,  i.e.  more  than  double  the 
amount  available  under  the  Second 
Lome Convention. 
The  Bank's  responsibilities  have 
been  reaffirmed  in  areas  already  fall-
ing  within  its  domain.  However,  in 
addition to  project financing-its tra-
ditional form of activity-special em-
phasis  has  been  accorded  to  funding 
productive  programmes  in  indudstry, 
agricultural  processing,  tourism  and 
mining as  well  as  energy  production, 
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transport  and  telecommunications 
schemes connected with these sectors. 
These sectoral priorities do not, how-
ever, preclude the Bank from drawing 
on its  own  resources  to  finance  pro-
ductive  projects  and  programmes  in 
other  sectors,  particularly  large-scale 
crop-growing,  where  such  ventures 
comply with operational criteria.  The 
Convention also underscores the need 
for restoring,  upgrading, rehabilitating 
or restructuring facilities  deemed eco-
nomically viable but which are tempo-
rarily  inoperative  or  ineffective,  as 
well as for equipment and plant main-
tenance.  With  these  aims  in  mind, 
cooperation should focus,  much more 
than in the past, on assistance for the 
start-up or rehabilitation of undertak-
ings, ground broken by the EIB at the 
end of 1983,  in view of the uncertain 
economic  climate.  Finally,  particular 
importance  will  be  accorded  to  pro-
cessing ACP States' raw materials, es-
pecially  agricultural  produCts,  as  well 
as to industries likely to establish links 
between  various  sectors  of the econ-
omy and to activities offering favoura-
ble repercussions on employment, the 
balance of trade and regional  integra-
tion. 
The  EIB's  role  in  implementing 
EEC-ACP financial and technical coo-
peration  has  clearly  been  enhanced 
significantly  under  the  new  Conven-
tion and this, paradoxically, at a time 
when it might have appeared prefera-
ble, given the ACP States' general debt 
situation  and  the  international  eco-
nomic and financial  crisis,  to  restrict  aJ 
w  "theoretical" scope for access to loan 
aid and to give added weight to finan-
cial assistance in the form of  grant aid. 
If the  EIB  is  to make full  use  of the 
means at its disposal while respecting 
the  principles  of sound management, 
it will  need to  turn to  best effect  the 
provisions of the new Convention: 
- in the case of loans from  own re-
sources, greater emphasis on pinpoint-
ing  and  appraising  productive  eco-
nomic infrastructure projects, particu-
larly  those  connected  with  energy, 
water supplies, transport and telecom-
munications; 
- scope  for  backing  projects  beset 
with  difficulties  either  during  imple-
mentation  (cost  overruns)  or  when 
operational  (rehabilitation  schemes); 
funding  for  rehabilitation  ventures, 
decided, of course, on the basis of an 
appraisal  confirming  the  viability  of 
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the  scheme  in question,  may be  pro-
vided first and foremost for plant and 
machinery (although finance may also 
be  advanced  for  purchasing  spare 
parts and raw materials) as well as for 
technical  assistance  in  managing  pro-
jects and for  replenishing working ca-
pital; 
- scope for supporting, either direct-
ly  or  through  development  finance 
corporations, schemes complying with 
the EIB's criteria and forming part of  a 
sectoral development programme; 
- confirmation, however,  of the im-
possibility of action at the macroecon-
omic level  in the  form  of "structural 
adjustment loans",  although  it is ac-
cess  the development policy  views of 
the  parties  underpinned  by  concerta-
tion  and  dialogue,  again  confirmed 
their  shrewd  judgement.  In  keeping 
with the spirit of the Convention, the 
Bank  will  assist  as  far  as  possible  in 
attaining  these  goals,  supporting, 
where  desirable,  action  embarked 
upon by  the Community with a  view 
to ensuring optimum sectoral concen-
tration of efforts. It may even,  in  ap-
propriate cases,  undertake  to  guaran-
tee the least developed ACP States (43 
out of a  total  of 66),  from  the  very 
start of the  Convention,  a  minimum 
allocation  of risk  capital  funds  to  fi-
nance operations in priority sectors. 
Copper mining in Zambia 
uro get new projects off  the ground, especially in  industry and mining, has been 
proving ever more difficult" 
knowledged  that  the  Bank  should 
coordinate  its  operations  in  ACP 
States  where  structural  adjustment 
programmes  are  being  implemented 
under the aegis of the World Bank or 
the International Monetary Fund, and 
if possible  to  attempt to  integrate  its 
operations  into  programme  compo-
nents complying with its criteria. 
One new  facet  merits  special  men-
tion. It was  recognised  that the quest 
for  effectiveness  implied  greater  ra-
tionalisation  and  constant  coordina-
tion  of  Community  financial  assis-
tance and that provided on a bilateral 
basis  by  the  Member States.  On this 
point, the partners, who sought to in-
corporate into the  programming pro-
In  conclusion,  although it  may  ap-
pear that the Third Lome Convention 
merely confirms the tenor of the pre-
vious Convention and does not imply 
any radical changes as far as  the Bank 
is  concerned,  it  is  nonetheless  clear 
that, in terms of  the resources which it 
is to deploy and the role it is to play in 
implementing  financial  and  technical 
cooperation with the ACP States,  the 
EIB will again need to strive to adjust 
its financing procedures to the scale of 
the tasks entrusted to it.  o 
Taken from  EIB-Information  no.  47  (January 
1986), available on request from the Information 
and  Public  Relations  Department of the  Euro-
pean Investment Bank,  100  bd K. Adenauer, L-
2950 Luxembourg, Tel.  (352)  4379-l. REGIONAL COOPERATION 
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The development of tuna  fisheries 
in  the  South West Indian  Ocean 
Boom or bust 
When  the  first  Klondykers  arrived 
in  the Yukon territory,  in  Canada, in 
1897  in  the  elusive  search  for  gold, 
they  could barely have imagined that 
within  ten  years  their dreams of fan-
tastic  riches  would  have  been  shat-
tered.  Some  people  no  doubt  made 
their fortunes - the lucky ones - but 
for  the majority this was  not to be. 
Like gold,  tuna is  a world currency. 
The most highly prized of fish species, 
its price is  quoted on the world's ma-
jor stock  markets and suffers  like  all 
such  commodities  from  the  vicissi-
tudes  of US  dollar exchange  fluctua-
tions  and changing  consumer  prefer-
ences. 
The tuna  boom  period  of the  '60s 
and early  '70s seems to  be  over.  The 
highly  competitive chicken and pork-
producing industries have pushed tuna 
prices  down,  whilst  tuna-catching 
costs have soared. Currently, few  tuna 
fishing  operations  world-wide  are 
making any money,  the  long-distance 
fleets  being particularly affected. 
Faced  with  such  financial  difficul-
ties,  the  tuna  industry has  been  des-
perately trying to get itself into shape. 
This has meant not only drastic surge-
ry-selling  off  uneconomic  vessels 
conceived  before  the  quadrupling  of 
oil prices in the early 1970s-but also 
in  renewed  searches  for  new  fishing 
grounds and markets. 
In  recent  years,  two  areas  of the 
world's  oceans  have become the new 
Eldorado of the tuna fleets-the South 
Western  Indian Ocean and the West-
ern Pacific. It would take a brave per-
son  to  predict  now  whether,  like  the 
Klondykers a century before them, the 
new tuna pioneers of these oceans will 
get  their  fingers  burned,  or  whether 
the  fisheries  resource  can  provide  a 
real  long-term  economic  benefit  for 
the regions. 
(*)  Administrator, Directorate-General for  De-
velopment,  Commission  of the  European  Com-
munities. 
By Tim CLARKE(*) 
Tuna  fishing  vessels  in  the  Seychelles:  "long  distance  fishing  fleets  . . .  may 
pose a threat " 
Tuna stakes are high 
There  are  four  types  of tuna  fish 
which  are  of real  commercial signifi-
cance in the Indian Ocean: the yellow-
fin,  bigeye, albacore and skipjack (see 
table). They are all  highly streamlined 
migratory  predatory  fish,  capable  of 
attaining  great  speeds  and  covering 
vast  distances  (two  hundred  kilom-
etres  in  a  day).  They  are  unique 
amongst  fish  in  having  their  blood 
temperature  higher  than  that  of the 
surrounding water  through  some  sort 
of  thermoregulatory  device-this 
makes  their  muscles  work  more effi-
ciently. 
The  temperature  of the  water  and 
oxygen  concentration  seem  to  be  the 
two  most  important  factors  limiting 
their  distribution.  The  true  tropical 
species-the skipjack and the  yellow-
fin-are  primarily  found  in  surface 
waters between 20-30 °C.  The albacore 
and bigeye  swim deeper and seem  to 
prefer  a  temperature  range  of about 
15-22 °C.  For all  these  species,  highly 
active  swimmers,  the  oxygen  concen-
tration of the  water is  often a  crucial 
factor. 
They  feed  on  aggregations  of prey 
fish, and other marine animals such as 
crustacea and cephalopods, which can 
often  be  found  at  the  junctions  of 
warm  and  cold  currents  where  the 
physical  characteristics  of the  water 
cause a mixing of nutrients. 
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makes them so  highly  valued.  Strong 
muscle  blocks  make  up  the  bullet-
shaped  body,  which  can  be  trans-
formed into a highly nutritious canned 
or frozen product. In Japan, one of  the 
two  primary world  markets for  tuna, 
(the  other being  the USA),  the  most 
highly prized flesh is converted into a 
special  product-sashimi.  The  world 
market  prices  vary  according  to  the 
species of  fish and quality of the meat. 
Skipjack-the cheapest-fetches about 
$ 800/tonne  of fresh  fish;  for  bigeye 
this  can  reach  $ 1500/tonne.  Once 
processed, the tuna prices can quadru-
ple  to  around  $ 4000/tonne.  For the 
highly  prized  sashimi  market,  prices 
can climb as high as $ 1000 for a sin-
gle  80 kg  fish!  (These  prices  must all 
be treated with some caution, howev-
er,  since they can fluctuate by  ±  30% 
in a year). 
First catch your tuna 
The fishermen's strategy is to catch 
the fish  in the most economical way. 
At the artisanal level  this may mean 
simple baited handlines,  or gillnets-
nets  hung  vertically  in the water de-
signed to catch the fish  by their gills. 
These methods are cheap and effec-
tive,  but  naturally  have  their  limits. 
Whilst perhaps suitable for local mar-
keting and consumption of their catch 
they  have  no  real  potential  as  large-
scale  income-earners  or  foreign  ex-
change producers. 
At an intermediate scale, three types 
of fishing  have  developed  of which 
two-trolling and pole-and-line fishing 
- are  aimed  at  surface-swimming 
tuna  (primarily  yellowfin  and  skip-
jack),  whilst  the  other-longlining-
aims  at  the  deeper-swimming  fish 
such  as  the  albacore  and bigeye  (be-
tween 50 and 150 metres deep). 
Trolling  is  done  by  using  fishing 
lures dragged from outriggers over the 
stern ofthe boat. Up to 10 tons offish 
can be  caught in a  day.  It is  a  tech-
nique used widely in the Indian Ocean 
in  places  such  as  Sri  Lanka  and the 
west coast of Sumatra in Indonesia. 
Pole-and-line fishing or "bait fish-
ing"  involves  the  capture  of  live 
bait-often by  dip-nets-and holding 
the bait on board in tanks until a tuna 
school can be sighted-either through 
seeing  activity  on  the  surface  or 
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watching  for  birds.  The  bait  is  then 
thrown overboard in a "chum line" in 
order to attract the tuna to bite.  The 
boat crew  try  to  stir the  tuna into a 
frenzy and heave them out of the wat-
er on  unbaited  hooks.  Great  skill  is 
needed in keeping the tuna biting for 
as long as possible and in using as lit-
tle live bait as possible. This technique 
is  quite common in many islands  in 
the  Indian  Ocean,  such  as  the  Mal-
dives. 
Longlining, as its name suggests in-
volves baiting hundreds or thousands 
of hooks which are then paid out on a 
line suspended at varying depths. The 
line may be many kilometres in length 
and  require  unpleasant,  dangerous 
work in baiting and removing the fish. 
The Japanese were  the first  to  intro-
duce longlining on an industrial basis 
in the eastern Indian Ocean in  1952, 
and later it was developed further and 
spread  to  other  parts  of the  Indian 
Ocean  by  the  Taiwanese  and  South 
Koreans. Longliners catch between 10 
and 25  fish  per thousand hooks. 
Purse-seining 
The  most  modern  technique  to 
make  its  appearance  on  the  Indian 
Ocean  stage  is  purse-semmg.  In  this 
technique  a  school  of tuna  is  sur-
rounded  by  an  immense  net  which 
may  be  1200-1600  metres  long  and 
150-220 metres deep (enough to swal-
low the EEC Commission's headquat-
ers-the  Berlaymont  building).  The 
net  is  designed  to  sink as  rapidly  as 
possible to prevent the tuna from  es-
caping, the bottom of the net is pulled 
tight like a purse string. If the opera-
tion is done well, an entire tuna school 
can be surrounded-equivalent to sev-
eral hundred tons of  fish. The tuna are 
then brailed or vacuum-sucked out of 
the  purse  into  super-chilled  brine 
where the tuna are instantly frozen. 
Modern  tuna  purse-seiners  are 
amongst the most sophisticated fishing 
vessels  in  the  world.  Costing  up  to 
$ 10 million, 80 metres long, equipped 
with up to 1000-tonne fish storage ca-
pacity, and costing up to $ 2 million a 
year  to  run,  they  are  the  most  ad-
vanced fishing  machines in existence. 
The larger  boats have helicopters  for 
seeking tuna schools and highly devel-
oped  satellite  and  thermal  mapping 
fish-finding gear. 
These formidable hunting machines 
have been fishing in the Indian Ocean 
Table 2 
World tuna production by major 
tuna-fishing nations, selected years 
(thousand metric tons, live weight) 
1970  1975  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Japan  502  542  672  723  642  674  696  788 
United States  214  259  218  226  222  199  266  263 
Spain  47  77  100  101  122  131  126  132 
Indonesia  21  39  61  73  84  90  103  115 
Philippines  52  84  94  79  95  103  119  104 
France  50  58  64  72  69  69  84  100 
Taiwan  89  90  109  106  90  104  104  99 
Mexico  11  23  31  34  68  45  38  78 
Korea, Rep.  NA  119  125  110  105  108  89  71 
Venezuela  2  1  3  4  6  4  39  53 
Solomon Islands  0  7  24  23  26  20  34  36 
Maldives  29  20  22  28  26  20  26  32 
Ecuador  16  36  34  19  19  21  15  29 
Ghana  0  8  6  9  15  29  33  22 
Brazil  1  2  5  10  24  17  17  22 
Panama  0  36  18  21  16  25  14  20 
Sri Lanka  18  22  14  20  21  22  23  18 
Australia  8  11  11  14  18  21  22  16 
Others  58  96  122  124  119  109  98  101 
Total  1118  1530  1733  1796  1787  1811  1946  2099 
Source: FAO FISHDAB. REGIONAL COOPERATION 
Since  the  tuna· stocks  are  not  static, 
some means need to be found forma-
naging  their  exploitation.  A  regional 
management  plan  makes  the  most 
sense.  Indeed  for  those  countries 
which are signatories of  the Law of  the 
Sea Convention, some form of region-
al  cooperation becomes an obligation. 
(Article 64-management of migratory 
species) 
Linked to this is a fully understand-
able desire of the countries in the  re-
gion to  establish their own tuna fish-
ing  fleets  and  processing  industries. 
w  After  all,  fish  represent  one  of their 
~ most  valuable  natural  resources.  In 
~ many  cases,  the  long-distance  fleets 
8 operating  in  the  region  may  pose  a 
o  threat,  not only  in  terms  of over-ex- ; 
f  ploitation  of fish  stocks  but  also  in 
E.,·en  nets are  high  technology  - note,  at lower left,  the bank of  controls  terms of competition with  local  tuna 
fleets. 
since December 1980 when France un-
derwrote a 4-month fishing trial based 
in the Seychelles with a 48-metre boat 
the  "Ile de  Sein" which  caught  4  70 
tonnes.  This  was  followed  by  a  7-
month trial with  the  70-metre "Yves 
de  Kerguelen"  which  caught  1370 
tonnes  of tuna.  The  echoes. of these 
catches  spread  rapidly  amongst  tuna 
fleet  owners  (in  France,  based  exclu-
sively  in  one  port,  Concarneau)  such 
that  by  mid-1983  the  purse-seining 
fleet had grown to  18. One year later it 
was over 30, and by the end of 1985 it 
had reached over 60  purse-seiners. At 
present most of the French and Cote 
d'Ivoire  Atlantic  tuna  fleet  has 
switched to the Indian Ocean as  have 
several Spanish vessels. Recently some 
of these boats have returned to Atlan-
tic  fishing  but  it  appears  that  catch 
rates  are  much  less  favourable  there 
than in the Indian Ocean. 
Four  of the  larger  French  seiners 
have caught over 4500 tonnes of fish 
in  a year,  and the  French fleet  of 27 
vessels caught, in  1985,  87 000 tonnes 
of tuna,  divided  roughly  equally  be-
tween skipjack and yellowfin. 
The market 
Of course  catching  the  tuna  is  not 
enough. They have to be sold-and at 
a  profit.  Of the  1 800 000  tonnes  of 
tuna caught worldwide,  about 50% is 
consumed fresh,  or prepared by a var-
iety of  preservation methods, and 50% 
is consumed in canned form. Virtually 
all  the  " fresh "  tuna  is  consumed  in 
Asia,  where  Japan  is  the  principal 
market.  Of the  850 000  tonnes  con-
sumed in canned form, the USA takes 
the lion's share (about 65%) whilst Eu-
rope  absorbs  some  30%  (about 
230 000  tonnes....:..principally  in  Spain, 
Italy, France and Portugal). 
A  major  difficulty  for  a  long-term 
exploitation of the Indian Ocean tuna 
resources is  the distance of the major 
consumer  markets  from  the  region, 
and hence the high transport costs in-
volved. 
To  cope  with  this,  many  countries 
in the region have started investing in 
trans-shipment  facilities-notably  in 
the Seychelles and La  Reunion. Some 
countries-such  as  Mauritius-have 
opted for establishing processing facil-
ities  (based  on a Japanese  venture)-
but this is  experiencing many difficul-
ties.  The fall  in the value of the US  $ 
is certainly not making things any ea-
sier.  Such  is  the  present  flux  of the 
market, and the high-risk nature of  the 
operations, that sound long-term plan-
ning is  a nightmare. 
Fishing agreements 
But  marketing  is  by  no  means  the 
only problem. How long can the rela-
tively  unexploited  tuna  stocks  of the 
region withstand this huge increase in 
fishing  pressure?  The  Indian  Ocean 
had always been considered a relative-
ly impoverished area for tuna. Most of 
the existing vessels fish in intemation- · 
al waters outside the control and juris- . 
diction of the region's sovereign states.  · 
In the short term, at least,  they are 
obliged  to  rely  on  foreign  expertise 
and  know-how.  The  EEC  has  now 
signed  two  fishing  agreements  with 
countries in  the region-one with the 
Seychelles signed in January 1984 and 
one with Madagascar signed in Janua-
ry  1986.  In  addition,  Spain  has  an 
agreement with the Seychelles. 
The EEC  agreements have a 3-year 
duration and permit a certain number 
of tuna vessels  (27  in all,  but limited 
to 18 at any one time) of a certain size 
to fish in the Seychelles and Madagas-
car's Exclusive  Economic Zone,  upon 
payment of licence  fees  (for  the  Sey-
chelles,  for  example,  this  represents 
ECU 20/tonne paid by  the  tuna boat 
owner,  and ECU  900 000/year by  the 
EEC for the equivalent of 6000 tonnes 
of  fish).  In addition, the EEC contribu-
tion includes programmes of scientific 
cooperation and training. 
In all likelihood, negotiations to ex-
pand these  agreements will  be  sought 
by the EEC  in the future,  encompass-
ing  other  countries,  and  taking  ac-
count of an enlarged Community. The 
highly migratory nature of tuna makes 
such  agreements,  especially  between 
neighbouring  coastal  states  with 
shared resources,  highly desirable. 
A regional development project 
At  the  same  time,  the  European 
Community  has  been  requested  to 
fund  from  its Lome II  Regional  Pro-
gramme a comprehensive programme 
for  the  commercial  development  of 
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countries are principally involved in this 
project  - The Comoros,  Madagascar 
and Mauritius - whilst The Seychelles 
and La Reunion are observers. 
The project has had a relatively long 
gestation  period.  It was  approved,  in 
principle,  at a  meeting  of the  Indian 
Ocean Foreign Ministers at Mauritius 
on 6th January and is  expected to  be 
approved  by  the  Commission  by  the 
end of 1986. It has three prime objec-
tives: 
- to determine the most appropriate 
techniques  for  fishing  tuna  by  the 
countries concerned; 
- to  evaluate  the  regional  tuna  re-
sources  and  establish  a  regional  sys-
tem for their management and conser-
vation; 
- to assist the countries concerned in 
developing their own  tuna fishing  ca-
REGIONAL COOPERATION 
An entire  tuna  school on  the  point of 
being captured 
Table 3 
Tuna production by FAO Statistical Fishing Area 
metric tons 
1970  1975  1979 
Western 
Indian  Ocean  117 500  126 697  118 484 
Eastern 
Indian  Ocean  39 800  62 355  73 495 
Total: 
Indian  Ocean  157 300  189 052  191  979 
pac1t1es  (in  terms of institution-build-
ing,  research  and  development  and 
training etc.). 
It seeks  to achieve these  objectives 
by various means: - firstly, by estab-
lishing a regional structure for permit-
ting  the  countries  concerned  to  coo-
perate  closely  together  in  tuna  man-
agement and development. A Region-
al  Association  for  tuna  management 
and exploitation is to be established in 
Madagascar and a  Scientific Commit-
tee will  be created to collect and ana-
lyse  resource data. 
Secondly, by providing the countries 
of the region with a regional tuna ves-
sel,  the  size  of which  has  yet  to  be 
determined (of 35-50  metres)  capable 
of  both  pole-and-line  fishing  and 
purse-seining, that over a 2lf2-year per-
iod would undertake test fishing with-
1980 
120 691 
94 712 
215 673 
1981  1982  1983 
133 825  164 308  192 736 
77 521  99474  116 294 
211346  263 782  309 030 
1984 
233 653 
115 818 
349 471 
and crewed  by  locals,  with  European 
technical assistance. 
Thirdly, the project would assist na-
tional centres established in  the three 
countries  to  carry  out  national  re-
search and development programmes, 
and  in  particular  provide  funds  for 
constructing a  number of Fish Aggre-
gating Devices in their EEZs. 
The  observer  countries,  the  Sey-
chelles  and  La  Reunion,  have  indi-
cated their willingness to allow the re-
gional  tuna vessel  to  operate  in  their 
waters,  and  assist  in  the  analysis  of 
tuna data. 
By  the end of the project,  which  is 
expected  to  last  about 21 12  years,  and 
cost  approximately  ECU  7 m,  it  is 
hoped that the necessary scientific and 
technical  parameters  will  have  been 
determined to  lay the foundations for 
a long-term tuna development policy. 
Long-term future 
The long-term aim for all concerned 
is  to see  that tuna development in  the 
Indian  Ocean  proceeds  in  an  orderly 
way  based  upon  sound  principles  of 
economic and ecological management. 
The  current  situation,  where  tuna 
fleets  operate  in  international  waters 
outside  any  such  controls,  threatens 
the  long  term  viability  of the  opera-
tion. It must be said that the history of 
the tuna-industry in other parts of the 
world,  which has often led to overca-
pitalization of the fleet  based upon fa-
vourable state subsidies and to severe 
stock  depletion,  is  not  a  happy  one. 
Development  planners  in  the  Indian 
Ocean must have the courage and the 
will  to introduce appropriate manage-
ment measures as  soon as  possible to 
avoid  similar  disappointments. 
Whether this is  by  means of a  wide-
ranging convention on tuna conserva-
tion,  envisaged by the FAO and oth-
ers,  based on a  similar convention in 
the Atlantic, or by some other means, 
is  not clear.  Two  conferences  in  late 
1985,  in  Bangkok  and  in  Colombo, 
looked at some of the potential man-
agement measures that could be intro-
w  duced, as well as methods for data col-
~  lection and analysis. 
8:; 
a:  Whatever the  outcome,  the  sudden 
8 boom  in  interest  over  the  last  few 
in the EEZs of the three countries con- o  years is  a welcome sign  for  the island  _g 
cerned-and  in  international  waters  a..  states  involved.  It's  in  everyone's in-
where approprl .ate  The boat would be  terest to make sure the bubble doesn't  ·  Several hundred tons of  fish are  taken 
managed by the Regional Association  in a single catch  burst.  o  T.C. 
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Archipelago drowsy with the  scent of spices 
As  the plane comes into Hahaya international air-
port, the visitor gets his first glimpse of Grande Co-
more,  the  main island of the archipelago,  and gains 
impressions  that are  confirmed  once  he  lands.  His 
first feeling is one of relief at having actually arrived, 
as it is  by no means easy to find a convenient flight 
over from the continent, and the people haphazardly 
congregating in the airport buildings will  be  further 
proof that every landing is  an event that breaks the 
otherwise relative isolation of the islands  - at least 
for a while. He could see that the island was volcanic 
from  the  plane,  although  the  crater  atop  Kartala, 
which is still active, is almost permanently hidden in 
the  clouds.  He  saw  the  few  sandy  beaches  and the 
fringe of luxuriant vegetation giving way to the barer 
mountains  of the  interior,  houses  dotted  here  and 
there,  sometimes  by  farmland  on  the  steep  slopes, 
minimal plant cover and the  signs  of bad erosion. 
And he  saw  that,  apart  from  the  coastal  highway, 
there are very few  roads. 
Once the plane has landed and the visitor has been 
warmly welcomed, the humid tropical climate begins 
to make itself felt.  He notices that the population is a 
young one, concentrated on the coast and becoming 
denser towards the capital,  Moroni, which,  in many 
ways,  is  more Arabic than African.  He sees coconut 
palms,  clove  trees,  pepper  plants  and bananas  and 
mangoes,  sometimes intertwined with vanilla,  along 
the  roadside  and he  sees  the  strange  forms  of the 
ylang-ylang  bushes.  When,  in  the  evening,  he  rests 
after his long journey, another sensation, the chant of 
the muezzin calling the faithful to prayer, completes 
the picture and the air is  filled  with fragrance.  And 
lastly, he realizes that the people still in the streets are 
mainly men and that the women, in this matriarchy, 
are all at home, in "their" homes. 
When he turns it over in his mind, he sees that all 
these impressions confirm everything he remembers 
reading about the Comoros. It is a volcanic archipe-
lago  in the Indian Ocean between Mozambique and 
Madagascar. It is  a  federal,  Islamic republic  that is 
relatively little served by ship and plane and it has on 
top of this to cope with the isolation of  the individual 
islands that make it up.  Local resources are few  and 
overpopulation is increasing.  Although the main ac-
tivity  is  farming,  the  country  still  has  to  import a 
large proportion of its food as the limited fertile land 
is at risk from  deforestation and erosion.  The econ-
omy centres on the three main export crops- vanil-
la,  cloves  and  ylang-ylang- and  fluctuating  world 
prices make it vulnerable. It is heavily dependent on 
foreign aid, but has a large debt burden too. Political-
ly it seems fairly stable now after the upheavals of  the 
post-independence  era.  These  paradise  islands  are, 
after all,  relatively unknown because they are off the 
traditional tourist routes to the Indian Ocean. 
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Four-island archipelago 
to  three-island nation ? 
The Comoros is on the mouth of  the 
Mozambique  Channel  about  300 km 
east  of the  Mozambique  coast  and 
350 km north-west of Madagascar. So, 
strategically  speaking,  it is  fairly  im-
portant in view of its position on the 
route  the  oil  tankers  take  from  the 
Arabian Gulf. There are four main is-
lands- Grande  Comore  or  Ngazidja 
(1148 km2),  Anjouan  or  Ndzouani 
(424 km2)  Moheli  or Moili  (290 km
2
) 
and  Mayotte  or  Maore  (374 km
2
)-
which are the tips of great volcanoes. 
Grande  Comore  is  the  biggest  and 
highest,  with  the  peak  of  Kartala 
reaching  2 361 m,  and  it  is  the  only 
island with  an active  volcano,  which 
last went off in 1977. The islands have 
few  natural  resources.  There  are  no 
known mineral deposits and less than 
half the  land  is  suitable  for  farming 
and  while  verdant  tropical  isles  are 
tempered  by  sea  breazes,  their  posi-
tion on the edge  of the Indian Ocean 
means they sometimes get devastating 
hurricanes too. 
The  Comoros  currently  comprises 
Grande  Comore,  Anjouan  and Mohe 
li-while Mayotte, a French territory, 
is still administered by France. 
The Comorian Government made a 
unilateral  declaration  of  indepen-
dence,  in  the  absence  of any  agree-
ment with  the  former  metropolis  on 
the  arrangements  for  sovereignty. 
Mayotte came out in favour of  the sta-
tus  quo  and stayed  with  France,  but 
the organization of the referendum in 
which it did this and the de facto sep-
aration  which  this  now  involves  are 
unacceptable to the Comorian autho-
ntles,  which  say  that  the  crescent 
moon  on  the  national  flag  shines 
above  four  stars.  As  they  see  it, 
Mayotte is  an integral part of the na-
tional  territory  and  therefore  has  to 
come back- a case they have pleaded 
in various international meetings (see 
also the interview with the President), 
which gave them support. 
The uniting factor 
·of Islam 
The  Republic  has  a  population  of 
about  390 000  (this  does  not include 
the people living on Mayotte), the vast 
majority of it very young,  almost two 
thirds being under 25,  with a growth 
rate  of about  3.3%  p.a.  Such  rapid 
growth is already posing serious prob-
lems  when  it  comes  to  providing 
enough food and jobs, not to mention 
infrastructure,  public  health and edu-
cation, and it puts enormous pressure 
on  the  arable  land,  which  is  already 
exposed to erosion and deforestation, 
too.  There  are  about  350  people  per 
km2  of arable  land  and although  the 
population density varies widely from 
one island to the next, the average fig-
ure,  up near the 200 per km 
2 mark, is 
one of the highest in eastern Africa. At 
this rate, there will be almost 750 000 
inhabitants come the end of the centu-
ry - which means that The Comoros' 
only  productive  capital,  the  land,  is 
clearly under threat. 
The Comoros is  a  real  melting  pot 
of Bantus  from  the  continent,  Arab 
sailors,  Indonesians,  Iranians  and 
Madagascans  the  latter  two  races  in 
particular  having  had  a  strong  in-
fluence  on  its socio-cultural,  political 
and economic life.  The first  wave  of 
Iranians  (especially  from  Shiraz)  put 
the  islands  on  the  map  in  trade  be-
tween Indian and East Africa and the 
second,  from  the Persian Gulf in the 
Islam  is  the great uniting factor of the Comorian people.  All the  traditions and customs are  moslem ones  and the  whole 
atmosphere is  oriental (Left,  inside the Mosquee du  Vendredi.  Right,  the medina in  Moroni,  the capital) 14th-16th  centuries,  confirmed  the 
people's  swing  to  Islam and replaced 
the  traditional  tribal  set-up,  with. 'its-
chiefs by a form  of socio-political or!· 
ganization with more feudal sultanates 
at the base. The many Madagascan at-
tacks in the 19th century weakened the 
sultanates, which were already split by 
internal  rivalries,  and  thus  helped 
pave  the  way  for  French  coloniza-
tion-although it was  the  Portuguese 
who  were  the first  Europeans to  visit 
the islands (in  1498),  the English,  the 
Dutch  and  the  French  coming  only 
later. Some people claim that, in 1841, 
one of  the sultans, who was anxious to 
outdo his  colleagues,  sold Mayotte to 
France which thus got one more naval 
base in the Indian Ocean. In 1886, the 
other three islands came under French 
protection too, subsequently being de-
clared  colonies  and  attached,  for  ad-
ministrative  purposes  to  Madagascar, 
from  which  they  were  only  separated 
in 1946.  Autonomy of administration 
and management was granted gradual-
ly and 95% of  the people on the archi-
pelago  voted for  independence in the 
December  197 4  referendum.  On 
Mayotte  alone  there  was  a  majority 
against, and it was this that ultimately 
led to the present situation. 
Islam  is  clearly  the  major  uniting 
factor  in  The  Comoros.  More  than 
99 %  of the  population  is  orthodox 
moslem and the whole country runs to 
the  Islamic  routine,  with  the  1400 
mosques clearly the focus  of everyday 
life. The customs and traditions reflect 
the faith, and the atmosphere is a very 
oriental one. 
Another unifying factor is  the com-
mon language,  Comorian, with all  its 
dialectal variants, which is very close 
to  Swahili,  although  French  is  also 
used in education and Arabic, particu-
larly,  for  the study of the Koran.  But 
regardless of this religious and linguis-
tic  unity,  there  is  still  some  rivalry 
between  the  different  factions  of the 
Comorian nation - as of course is the 
case  in almost any other multi-island 
state in which each island has a char-
acter of its own. 
A doubly vulnerable 
economy 
With  a  per capita  GDP of around 
$ 250 p.a., The Comoros is one of the 
least developed countries in the world. 
The  1984  GDP  was  an  estimated 
CF  43.1  billion (1),  with growth up by 
3.3% in real  terms over the previous 
year.  The  figure  was  around  4%  in 
1980-84 as  a whole, but it was mostly 
due to the expansion of the secondary 
sector attendant on a large and essen-
tially  foreign-funded  investment  pro-
gramme.  Aid  has  been  increasing ra-
pidly  since  1979.  The  total  so  far  is 
already more than $ 100 per head p.a. 
(around $40 million in all) and repre-
sents  almost 80% of public  spending 
and more than half of GDP. The gen-
eral  budget  deficit,  filled  by  foreign 
aid,  takes  up  about 30% of state ex-
penditure. 
The  state  and the  prospects  of the 
Comorian  economy  depend  on  the 
health of its agriculture. This is an es-
sential  sector,  as  almost  90%  of the 
people  depends  on  it,  7  4%  of the 
working population works  in it,  38% 
of GDP is derived from it and almost 
all the foreign exchange is produced by 
it. But agriculture is vulnerable on two 
counts - food  crops  and  cash  crops. 
The  Comorians  are  far  from  being 
able to produce all the food they need. 
The  population  is  expanding  faster 
than is food production and farm pro-
ductivity is generally poor. Ever-great-
er demand has  to be  parried by  vast 
imports,  especially  of rice  (of which 
around 30 000 tonnes are brought in), 
(1}  The  Comorian  franc  (CF)  is  in  the  franc 
zone and equal to CF  AF 1 (ECU  1 =  CF 344 in 
May 1986). 
I 
which already account for more than a 
third of the  import bill  and are  con-
stantly worsening the already substan-
tial trade deficit.  The cash crops, cur-
rently  primarily  vanilla,  cloves  and 
ylang-ylang (copra used to be exported 
but it now  goes  mainly  for  domestic 
consumption)  are  very  much  depen-
dent  on  demand  and  on  prices,  and 
even  speculation,  on  the  world  mar-
ket. This dual vulnerability of the key 
sector has obviously to be seen against 
the background of all the other devel-
opment  constraints  already  outlined, 
i.e.  erosion,  the  difficult  system  of 
land ownership and all the other diffi-
culties  attached  to  the  small  amount 
of arable land,  together with the rela-
tive  isolation  of and the  problematic 
communications between  the  islands, 
which is  a handicap to both domestic 
and  foreign  marketing  of farm  pro-
duce. 
A race  against time 
Mr Mohammed Ali, the Minister of 
Production,  commented:  " Of course 
we  could talk  in terms  of a fight  for 
the land between  our cash  crops  and 
our food crops  ...  yet our guiding prin-
ciple in the long term is that we must 
achieve  self-sufficiency  in  food,  and 
we  have  launched a  study on a food 
strategy  with FAC financing.  Our ex-
port crops  play a  key  part in  the  na-
tion's earnings and, without wishing to 
increase  the  areas  under  which  they 
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sector by bettering our technology, our 
output,  the  quality  of our  products 
and  the  returns  on  processing  them. 
Farming techniques  will  have to  im-
prove everywhere to give us the higher 
agricultural  production we  need from 
the land we have available, as there is 
a really serious clash between the pres-
sure of the population and the extent 
of our arable  land.  And  greater  pro-
ductivity should go hand-in-hand with  iii 
reduced demographic pressure. Family  g 
u 
planning is  a  must -although ours is  ~ 
a moslem society. And of course there  ..... 
is the problem of the constant deterio- Vanilla  production  and  marketing  is 
ration of our arable land. Much of it is  the  main  economic  activity  of  the 
being over-farmed. It is exhausted, de- islands 
graded and eroded. Some of our peas-
ants  are  even  growing  things  on  40° 
slopes with all  the dangers of erosion 
and  very  few  of them put down  any 
fertilizer or let the soil breathe. So·  we 
are  running  a  veritable  race  against 
time  to  get  our peasants  to  save  our 
land  and  thus  our  future  too."  The 
Minister is counting on the support of 
the  Cefader (the  federal  development 
support organizations) and the Caders 
(the  island  development  support  or-
ganizations) here. 
Self-sufficiency  in  food  is  no  sine-
cure, but the Planning Minister, Miki-
dache Abdou,  Rahim,  maintains that 
there  is  no  doubt about is: "It is  an 
aim to be  achieved gradually".  Food 
dependence  is  currently  considerable, 
especially in the rice sector, where, the 
Minister  said,  "imports  are  soaking 
up  foreign  exchange".  The  gradual 
change  in  eating  habits  has  brought 
rice  to  the  fore,  to  the  point  where 
there are regular shortages when stocks 
run out and deliveries are late. This in 
turn is  leading  people  back  to  maize 
(the EDF is  very active in this sector 
on  Grande  Comore)  and  other  food 
crops. 
Local  livestock  is  of a  fairly  low 
standard.  The  authorities  are  very 
concerned with the health of the herds 
and breeding stock will  be brought in 
at the end of 1986 to improve the local 
cattle.  Poultry  breeding  has  more  or 
less kept pace with the increase in de-
mand,  but meat imports are  expand-
ing rapidly.  Fishing,  said the Agricul-
ture Minister, is still archaic. The coral 
plateau  is  overfished  but  rich  ocean 
areas  further  out  are  underexploited. 
The  most  curious  denizen  of Como-
rian waters is of course the coelocanth, 
the living fossil  thought to have died 
out millions of years ago,  a link in the 
evolutionary  chain  that  can  still  be 
fished off the islands. There are about 
4000 fishermen  bringing in catches of 
4500 tonnes of more ordinary fish too, 
but their methods and equipment are 
inadequate. Less than 3% of the 2800 
pirogues and other craft have motors 
and there are storage and outlet prob-
lems  too.  However,  outboards are  to 
be  provided with  Japanese aid and a 
fishing school has been opened on An-
jouan.  Studies have  shown  that there 
is  considerable potential in Comorian 
waters-in  particular  it  seems  that 
25 000-30 000 tonnes of tuna could be 
caught every year, which would make 
a big contribution to the nation's pro-
tein intake and constitute the basis for 
a processing industry- but, the Min-
ister added, " there are several foreign 
powers in our economic zone stealing 
our fish,  as  we  are too poor to patrol 
our waters properly". The authorities 
are  now  setting  up  a  department  to 
manage fishing contracts and they also 
intend to  ask for  a fishing  agreement 
with the EEC,  as Madagascar and The 
Seychelles· have done. 
Mohammed Ali, the Minister for Production, commented: "We are running a real race against time to get our peasants to 
save our land and thus our future" 
28 Sales problems with 
cash crops 
Cash crops account for around 28% 
of agricultural  output.  There are  four 
main ones, vanilla, cloves, ylang-ylang 
and copra, but copra has faded as  an 
export  product  as  a  combination  of 
low world prices and greater domestic 
consumption  has  brought  it down  to 
only  1%  of the export trade.  A great 
many coconut palms are  old and the 
World Bank is financing a seed bed of 
higher yield but smaller palms, which 
third  to  France.  Sales  collapsed  in 
1984  when  only  26  tonnes were  sold, 
bringing in CF 589  million as  against 
177  tonnes  in  1984  (CF  3.5  billion) 
and 259  tonnes  in  1983  (CF  4.2  bil-
lion).  So  it  is  not surprising  that Mr 
Hassan  Mohammed  Ahmed,  one  of 
the foremost representatives of  the im-
port-export sector that is so important 
to  the  nation's  wellbeing,  described 
the  business  climate  since  1984  as 
"depressed,  with  only  a  slight  im-
provement  now...  We  were  nearly 
wiped  out  by  world  speculation". 
What  happened?  In  May  1984,  the 
vanilla producing countries of the In-
dian Ocean signed an agreement with 
the  consumer  countries  at  Nosy  Be, 
Madagascar.  This  provided  for  the 
price to go up from the US $ 62.15 per 
kg  fob  Moroni  of 1983  to  US$ 69.5 
(and the dollar was  then worth about 
FF 8.20).  But then the dollar took off, 
to  almost  FF 1  0.5,  and the  exporters 
seem  both to  have speculated  on  the 
rise  by  offering  producers  more  than 
the  fixed  green  vanilla  price  of 
CF 2000  per  kg  and  then  refused  to 
It takes 19 hours to distil 200 kg of  ylang-ylang flowers and obtain 4.8 lit  res of  essence - a drop of  which will find its way 
into some of  the  world's most famous perfumes 
are easier to handle, to provide young 
stock. 
Vanilla production and marketing is 
actually the country's main economic 
activity  in  terms of employment and 
income.  Vanilla is  an epiphytic plant, 
so  care  and harvesting are  labour-in-
tensive activities and the market price 
determines how  much time the  peas-
ants  can  spend  on  it and  how  good 
production will  be.  Over the past few 
years,  The Comoros has produced an 
average of 900 tonnes of green vanilla 
(it takes almost 5 tonnes of green van-
illa  to  make  one  tonne  of prepared 
vanilla).  There  are  three  main  Bour-
bon  vanilla  suppliers  in  the  world - ~ 
Madagascar  with  1100-1200  tonnes, 8 
The  Comoros  with  180-200  tonnes,  ~ 
and Reunion  ~ith 15-45  to~mes.- but  Hassan  Mohammed Ahmed, from  the 
the  wh~le Indmn Ocean  re~on  IS now  import-export sector says:  ~~The busi-
up  against  strong  competiton  from  ness  climate  since  1984  has  been  de-
synthetics.  More  than  half The  Co- pressed and things are only picking up 
moros' vanilla goes to the USA and a  slightly now " 
agree  to  a  cut  in  the  price  fixed  at 
Nosy  Be.  The  buyers  in  turn  specu-
lated  on  a  drop  and  ran  out  their 
stocks  before  staggering  and  delaying 
their deliveries as much as they could. 
Fortunately,  the  situation  seems  to 
have righted itself in  1985  and,  most 
important,  the  quality  of the  vanilla 
was very high that year, which reflects 
the  desire  of both  the  Government 
and the trade to beat synthetic substi-
tutes by the high quality of the natural 
product. 
Cloves,  now  the  country's  second 
source  of export earnings,  have  been 
grown  on  the  islands  since  the  '30s. 
Harvests  vary  from  one  year  to  the 
next, as  the tree has a four-year cycle 
and takes  20  years  to  reach  full  pro-
duction.  The  main  competitors  are 
Zanzibar and Madagascar. One of the 
biggest  traditional outlets,  apart from 
one or two EEC countries, was Indon-
esia where cloves are used in tobacco-
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making, but this country is now devel-
oping  its  own  industry.  Clove  prices 
have also fluctuated,  especially down-
wards,  and the  purchase  price  to  the 
producer dropped  to  below  CF  1  000 
per kg  in  1984  from  the CF 2350  of 
1983.  The drop on the  world  market 
was  spectacular too,  as  the FF 68  per 
kg fob Moroni of late 1983-early 1984 
dropped to FF 21  per kg in December 
1985 and was still only around the FF 
30  mark  in  April,  although  Hassan 
Mohammed says it needs to be FF 40 
to make a profit. 
The vanilla and clove  export earn-
ings problems have given The Comor-
os Stabex transfers, which, Production 
Minister Mohammed Ali told us, " has 
played  a  crucial  and  indispensable 
role.  Stabex has given  us  time to get 
our breath back, if you like, at a diffi-
cult  time - and  God  knows  it  has 
been difficult... The failing sales of our 
main  cash  crops  have  been  a  harsh 
blow that has encouraged us  to try to 
diversify our economy more,  not just 
the food crops but the cash crops too, 
and to try and improve the way  mar-
keting  is  organized,  especially  in  the 
region,  with  Madagascar  and  Reu-
nion".  The  Minister  stressed  quali-
ty-The  Comoros  label,  he  said,  re-
Most goods arriving on  Grande Comore and Moheli have to  be taken ashore on 
dhows.  Only Anjouan has a port, at Mutsamudu, that can handle vessels of  more 
than 350 tonnes 
30 
called  Napoleon's  cocoa,  the  famous 
criolo,  that was  produced  on  the  is-
lands - and  said  there  were  plans  to 
relaunch  and rehabilitate the  produc-
tion of pepper, coffee, cocoa and citrus 
fruit. 
Shalimar by Guerlain, Coco by Cha-
nel, Chloe by Lagerfeld and Femme by 
Rochas  are just some  of the  famous 
perfumes in which the Grasse blenders 
decided to  put a  drop of ylang-ylang 
from  The  Comoros,  which  supplies 
80%  of world  demand.  Four degrees 
of  distillation  are  sold - the  extra 
grade,  the  nee  plus  ultra  of ylang-
ylangs,  and  1st,  2nd  and  3rd  grades, 
with  fob  prices  ranging  from  CF 
20 500  to  CF 11 000  per  kg - above 
all,  and  obviously  in  addition  to  its 
own special fragrance, because it holds 
the  bouquet of a  perfume  for  a  very 
long time. Here again, production var-
ies  widely with international demand, 
but  the  potential  is  about  65  t  p.a. 
Many  of the  trees  were  abandoned, 
especially  after  the  former  colonial 
plantations were divided up, and some 
of the  distillation  equipment  is  old. 
All this endangers both the quality and 
quantity  of the  essence  that  can  be 
produced and of course there is  com-
petition  from  synthetic  products  too, 
particularly  the  Indonesian  cananga. 
Energy supplies for processing are also 
a  problem-either  the  distiller  uses 
oil  and feels  penalized by  the cost or 
he uses wood and worsens the already 
acute problem of deforestation. 
Communications and  debt 
The Comoros has  made a huge  ef-
fort  to  give  the country better infras-
tructure over the  past few  years,  par:. 
ticularly  in  the  matter  of water  and 
electricity  supplies,  but  in  road,  air 
and  sea  communications  and  trans-
port too. It comes as  no surprise that 
reducing the isolation of  the interior of 
the  islands (which  is  fine  for  agricul-
ture but has inadequate links with the 
coast) and improving communications 
between  the  whole  country  and  the 
outside world is one of the top devel-
opment  priorities.  Take  communica-
tions:  Moroni and Dar-es-Salaam are 
barely 700 km apart, but a phone call 
between  the  two  has  to  go  through 
Paris and London. If  you try to import 
a  few  tonnes  of merchandise  to  the 
islands,  you  must  expect  the  high freight  and insurance costs,  given the 
conditions in the ports of Grande Co-
more and Moheli, to add 50% to the 
fob  price  of your goods.  Grande Co-
more and Moheli can only handle ves-
sels of up to 350 t and bigger shipping 
has to land the goods on dhows, which 
is  a  costly and time-wasting business 
involving  considerable  risk  of dam-
age. 
Anjouan has just got a port, at Mut-
samudu,  which  can  take  vessels  of 
15 000-25 000 t  and  170m in  length. 
But everyone we spoke to emphasized 
th~ fact that Grande Comore and Mo-
heli also need better ports for Mutsa-
mudu to be really efficient. The EDF- ·~ 
financed studies have been completed  8 
Q) 
and the Government is now collecting  t= 
cofinancing,  in  particular  from  the 
Community and the French CCCE. 
However, although the port of Mut-
samudu  is  a  big  step  towards  better 
contact with the outside world, it is a 
financial problem. It was  financed by 
an EDF loan and above all  by fairly 
hard loans from  the Arab Funds, the 
ADB  and ABEDIA  and  cost  almost 
$ 39  million (1982).  Economic and Fi-
nance Minister Said Ahmed Said Ali 
said that the port of Mutsamudu "ac-
counts  for  a  lot of our debt".  More 
than  CF 0.8  billion  will  have  to  be 
paid back on it this year and CF 1.2 
billion  next,  although  it  is  not really 
operational  yet.  This is  more  than a 
third of the  servicing  of the  external 
debt proper (i.e.  CF 2.57 billion). 
When we  talked, the Minister reck-
oned The Comoros' debt to be of the 
order of CF 96  billion (including CF 
50  billion  paid over),  which  is  twice 
the  GDP.  "  Our  haste  for  develop-
ment has  sometimes  made  us  accept 
loans on terms that were beyond what 
the country could manage", said Said 
Ahmed  Said  Ali,  " and in future  we 
shall be absolutely rigorous in our fi-
nancial commitments, for  in the past 
we  were  fairly  disorganized and even 
negotiated  some  financial  agreements 
badly and we  are feeling the effects of 
all this now", he added - although he  ·~ 
was  preparing  to  go  round  the  main 8 
creditors  with  every  hope  of getting  ~ 
the debts rescheduled. 
Said Ahmed Said Ali, the Minister for 
Economic  Affairs  and  Finance  said : 
"Our .haste for development has some-
times  made  us  accept  loans  that  were 
beyond  what  the  country  can  man-
age" 
than before. For the first time in 1986, 
the  financial  law,  for  example, ·put 
more than 90% of the expenditure in 
the equipment and investment budget, 
the Minister told us.  This budget in-
volves  the  spending  of CF 17.37  bil-
lion in  1986,  more than 97% of it to 
be  financed  from  external  resources. 
The federal operating budget provides 
Mikidache Abdou'Rahim, 
the Planning Minister, said :  The Comorian financial situation is 
"cause for some concern", but the Fi-
nance Minister has done his utmost to 
produce a sincere and realistic budget 
and make State  finances  more trans-
parent and management more efficient 
"The Comoros is  a crossroads and the 
friendship  that many countries are  al-
ready  extending  to  us  should  be  fol-
lowed up  by even  more effective devel-
opment means " 
for  own  resources  (95% global  earn-
ings and most of the rest from French 
budget  aid)  of CF 8.6  billion  and  a 
CF 1.8  billion deficit.  The adjustment 
and restructuration budget is vital, the 
Minister  says,  but  there  is  limited 
room  for  manreuvre  in  view  of the 
obligatory  spending- debt  servicing, 
in the broadest meaning of  the term, is 
already up at the CF 2.8 billion mark 
and  this,  combined  with  the  biggest 
budget item, the civil service wage bill 
(CF 4.2 billion), accounts for CF 7 bil-
lion. Yet the Minister is determined to 
win through. The number of civil ser-
vants on the federal wage-bill has been 
reduced  (350  jobs  have  been  done 
away  with  since  December  1985),  al-
though let us not forget the social im-
plications of this,  as  each member of 
staff looks after  11  people or so.  Tax 
evasion,  at  a  conservative  estimate 
costing the country CF  1. 5 billion,  is 
due to be tackled. Other measures are 
planned  too.  Operating  expenditure, 
for  example  trips  abroad  and  staff 
housing,  will  be  controlled and there 
will be nationwide cuts that some peo-
ple will see as draconian, while public 
firms,  which  are  important  but  run-
ning a deficit overall, will be reorgan-
ized  and  forced  to  fulfil  their  rights 
and obligations. 
What it all  amounts to is  maybe a 
policy  of austerity for  The Comoros, 
something that many other developing 
countries  and  even  some  nations  of 
the  industrialized  world  are  already 
familiar with.  Yet dependence on the 
outside world will be no less for it. On 
the  contrary-which  is  why  Miki-
dache  Abdou'Rahim,  the  Planning 
Minister, says that "The Comoros is a 
crossroads  and  the  friendship  that 
many countries are already extending 
to us  should be followed  up by  even 
more effective development means". 
The islands intend seeking solutions 
for  some of their problems in th.e  re-
gion,  that is  to  say  through  the "ZEP 
and  the  Indian  Ocean  Commission, 
which  The  Comoros  currently  pre-
sides. Every effort - external, regional 
and  perhaps  most  important nation-
al- must be made to get an economy 
genuinely based on the productive sec-
tors off the ground. It will  take time, 
for as  Minister Mikidache said, " The 
Comoros  is  a  small  country  with  a 
thousand and one problems". o 
R.D.B. 
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greater solidarity between rich and  poor '' 
An  interview with President Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane 
After  leading  his  country  to  independence  on  6 
July  1975,  President Ahmed Abdallah  Abderemane 
lost power to the so-called "lyceens' uprising" that 
took place soon after, but returned to lead the nation, 
which  became  a  Federal  Islamic  Republic,  after  a 
counter-putsch in  1978. 
The key issues dear to the President's heart remain 
indelibly  imprinted  after  listening  to  the  colourful 
language in which  he  stressed them during the long 
audience in  which  he  also  handed over written an-
swers to The Courier's questions. 
The  thing  that hurts  him  most is,  of course,  the 
Mayotte  affair.  "We shall  never give  up  and there 
will  be  no  peace  in  the  Indian  Ocean  as  long  as 
France  occupies  Mayotte,  making  us  a  three-legged 
ox! ... I want the war with France to be one of words 
not blood,  to  achieve understanding,  a friendly  and 
amiable  solution,  and to  repair the  French  Assem-
bly's  mistake  that  President  Mitterrand  acknow-
ledged  at  the  last  summit  of French-speaking  na-
tions". 
And then there is the huge problem of debt, where 
the President is  not without frustration and even ill-
feeling. "No, we shall not refuse to pay our debts, but 
they  have  to be  reasonable and with reason behind 
them. Brothers who force harsh loan conditions upon 
us  are  enemies.  What do  they  want? To encourage 
revolution where we  want evolution?" 
Trends in the Comoros' main export products,  of 
which  visitors  are  courteously  given  free  samples, 
have caused Ahmed Abdallah to  say,  not without a 
certain  bitterness:  "We have  incurred great  losses, 
through price drops organized by the principal con-
sumers. You in the West are increasingly worried 
about AIDS  and cancer,  but you go  on using  more 
and more artificial products. Why don't you use ours 
instead? They don't cause all these diseases". 
Improved  communications,  a  programme  which 
has begun with the port of Mutsamudu, provoked the 
following  comment.  "Unless  we  build  the  port  of 
Mutsamudu-and Moheli-it will  be  neither  useful 
nor profitable". On the general situation in his coun-
try,  the  President  was  philosophical-"  Everything 
has  declined.  Only  our  spirits  have  improved.  We 
may be very poor, but we  are not unhappy, for here 
we  get  on  with  each  other  ... But  no-one  listens  to 
sound  ideas  from  a  poor  man  in  a  little  coun-
try  ... ". 
IJI>  Mr President,  The  Comoros  has 
been  independent  for  10  years  now. 
What do  you think about  its progress 
so far and how do  you see the future? 
ty and economic chaos, and in spite of 
the  world  economic  crisis,  The  Co-
moros has  had many encouraging re-
sults since  1976. 
greater  popular  involvement  in  the 
country's future; 
- an  honourable  economic  record, 
with  growth  at  around  5%  p.a., 
through a liberal policy that stimulates 
and  develops  private  initiative.  It 
would  not,  however,  have  happened 
without  the  Comorian  Government's 
persistent  desire  to  give  the  country 
proper  structures  to  support  and  ex-
pand  economic  activity  and  to  pro-
duce  and  run  the  investment  pro-
gramme  that has  encouraged  growth. 
However, the national economy could 
not have put up  this substantial per-
- We  celebrated our lOth anniver-
sary barely a year ago.  And what a lot 
of ground we  have covered-although 
we  still have a long way  to go! 
In  spite  of the  problems  we  have 
encountered,  it  would  be  ungrateful 
and dishonest not to see the decade as 
a largely positive one. 
In  spite  of  the  first  three  years, 
which were years of political instabili-
32 
However, the substantial results we 
achieved  in  a  difficult  international 
context and a fragile  and very vulner-
able economy are thanks to the policy 
of the past eight years, which has ena-
bled our young nation to attain: 
- political  stability,  through  estab-
lishment  of the  right  sort  of institu-
tions  that guarantee  the  fundamental 
freedoms  of  every  Comorian  and formance  without  ever-increasing 
backing  from  our partners.  This  new 
development  process  has  been  facili-
tated by the production and adoption 
of an  interim  (1983-86)  plan  and by 
the  success  of the  First International 
Solidarity Conference for the Develop-
ment of The Comoros which was held 
in Moroni in July  1984.  This boost to 
the  national  economy,  sustained  by 
the  international  community,  means 
that,  in spite of the currently difficult 
economic  situation,  we  can  view  the 
future  with greater serenity. 
Boosting agricultural 
production 
...,.  The  rapidly  expanding  popula-
tion,  deforestation and soil erosion are 
putting  great  pressure  on  the  arable 
land and it looks as though productivi-
ty will have to go up.  Do you think you 
can  manage this? 
- In spite of the small amount of 
arable land currently available,  some-
thing that is aggravated by our gallop-
ing population growth of 3.3% p.a.,  I 
am  convinced  that  The  Comoros 
could gradually increase its food  out-
put by taking a variety of action at all 
stages in the rural production chain. 
A programme of this sort-and one 
is  already  under  way  with  the  inte-
grated  rural  development  which  CE-
FADER/CADER  began  five  years 
ago-would,  with  additional  human, 
material and financial means, beater-
rific generator of rapid growth in agri-
culture, herding and fishing. 
Preservation  of  our  ecosystem 
through  rational  management  of the 
forestry resources, plus an extension of 
the tree planting schemes begun early 
this  year  would,  given  better follow-
up, proper training for our rural work-
ers and a functional extension system, 
make  for  a  substantial  improvement 
in yield and gradually push up produc-
tivity.  However,  the  frequent  natural 
disasters that strike this archipelago-
the hurricanes,  the droughts,  the vol-
canic eruptions and so on-mean that 
we  need  more  and  more  means  to 
cope  with the  consequences  and pur-
sue  the drive for  national reconstruc-
tion we  began back in  1978 . 
...,.  How do  you see the balance be- ~ 
tween  food crops  and cash  crops  and  ti 
- In  a  country  like  ours,  where 
there are many development problems 
to tackle, self-sufficiency in food is the 
top priority in the Government's cam-
paign  against  under-development. 
And  to  us,  self-sufficiency  in  food 
means both boosting food  production 
and expanding our export earnings. 
This growth  in production is  being 
stimulated by our policy of encourag-
ing  and  backing  up  the  work  of the 
peasant farmers through: 
- the  CEFADER/CADER  organiza-
tions  set  up  with  the  help  of  the 
UNDP and other international bodies 
(the  FAO,  the  World  Bank  and  the 
ADB); 
- active support for farmers from the 
Development Bank in the distribution 
of credit; 
- creation  of structures  to  facilitate 
the  marketing  of production  and the 
maintenance  or  improvement  of the 
income  of  the  main  people  con-
cerned. 
Conditions of this  sort  would  give 
us tangible results in our food produc-
tion  in  the  short  and  the  medium 
term. It is a difficult challenge, but we 
have  the  determination  to  match  it 
and  we  will  surmount  the  obstacles, 
regardless  of the  demographic  explo-
sion that has  doubled our population 
in less than 22 years. If  this drive is to 
be an effective one, it must be accom-
panied by a series of measures encou-
raging  research,  extension  work  and 
back-up  facilities  for  the  rural  world 
and speeding  up  the  ongoing  process 
of agricultural production increase. 
~  What part do fishing and herding 
play and what is  the potential in these 
two  areas like? 
- As  I  have  so  often said,  we  are 
not exploiting our food production po-
tential to  the full  and so  the  country 
has to put priority on the growth and 
diversification of local  output. 
Fishing is  a promising sector as  far 
as  the  country's  future  is  concerned, 
but our limited means prevent us from 
exploiting  it  properly,  although  it 
could bring in foreign exchange for the 
State  and  improve  the  nation's  diet. 
We  are  making  contact  with  various 
funders,  Japan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Korea 
and so  ~ on, with a view to  developing 
the fisheries  sector  . 
We  could  intensify  our  livestock 
production.  We  have  made apprecia-
ble  progress  with  this  over  the  past 
few years and covered part of  the long-
standing deficit in this area and, with 
the  discovery  of a  large  number  of 
water holes, we will be able to intensi-
fy  meat production thanks to the aid 
we  are going to seek for  the develop-
ment of the  sector and the introduc-
tion of new species. 
Wild fluctuation of 
export products 
_....  There have been ups and downs in 
the marketing of  your main export pro-
ducts,  ylang-ylang,  vanilla  and cloves, 
over  the past year or  two.  Why is  this 
and how  has  it  affected the  economy? 
What have you done to prevent the pro-
ducers' income being unduly influenced 
by international speculation? 
how far  could you  cut  your food  im- The Comoros faces a galloping population growth rate of  3.3% p.a. which is likely 
ports?  to  double the population in  less  than  22 years 
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- The  vulnerability  of our island 
economy is mainly due to the produc-
tive  base being narrow and our main 
export products being subject to unfair 
competition  from  artifical  substitutes 
on the world market. 
The  sharp  rises  and  falls  in  the 
prices of our products therefore have a 
harmful  effect  on  the  State's  already 
meagre  resources,  on  the  finances  of 
the national firms and on the running 
of  our  present  investment  pro-
gramme. 
I should like to stress that the man-
ipulation of the markets in our export 
products,  ylang-ylang  and vanilla,  for 
example,  and the  fact  that the  tradi-
tional  buyers  fix  the  prices,  are  pre-
venting  us  from  obtaining  any  sub-
stantial earnings from  sales. 
Fighting insularity 
~  How do  you,  as  a federal  State, 
ensure a balance in  the distribution of 
infrastructure and economic and social 
facilities? 
- One of the handicaps our coun-
try has to overcome is being an island. 
The Comoros,  as  you  know,  is  made 
up of four islands and this has always 
forced  us  to try and strike a dynamic 
balance  between  the  different  regions 
so  as  to  ensure  the  continuous,  har-
monious progress of the population as 
a whole. 
Increasing  development  operations, 
of  course, boosts the volume of  invest-
ment, but at the same time ensures the 
relative autonomy of each region.  The 
1983-86  Interim  Plan  reasserted  the 
Growth in production is being stimulated by a policy of  encouraging the work of 
the peasants 
the  disordered  world  commodity 
markets,  the  poor elasticity  of world 
demand  and  the  competition  from 
substitute  products-as  well  as  the 
protectionist  measures  that  some 
countries  adopt-are  forever  com-
promising our development drive. 
And in view of this, our country, in 
spite of  its feeble means, intends going 
in for  maximum diversification of its 
export production and creating indus-
trial processing units and boosting ex-
port organization and structures from 
back-up for the producer to marketing 
on  the  main  consumer  markets 
through  the  cash  crop  stabilization 
fund. 
These  measures  will  get  the  econ-
omy  off the  ground  and  make  for  a 
continuous rise in the standard of liv-
ing of our peasant communities. 
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need to strike this dynamic balance, in 
the  light  of the  potential  of each  is-
land, and to seek the regional comple-
mentarity that is such an essential fac-
tor of unity and national cohesion. 
In this quest for fairness  in the dis-
tribution of investments in our differ-
ent regions, I have proposed that each 
funder  intervene  in  a  different  re-
gion. 
..,..  Communications in  The Comor-
os  are of three kinds-within  each  is-
land,  between the islands and with  the 
outside  world.  How  have  they  devel-
oped over  the past few  years  and will 
they go  on developing further? 
- Communications are  one of the 
four  top  priorities  of  the  Govern-
ment's development policy. More than 
half the  investments  of the  past  10 
years  has  been  in  roads,  ports,  air-
ports, telecommunications and so  on. 
This effort, an unprecedented one in 
the history of our young republic, has 
been a burden, but it had to be made 
before  any  proper national  economic 
take-off could take place. 
Over the past decade we  have, with 
the help of our friends,  completed al-
most 80%  of the circular road round 
three  of the  islands,  built a  dispersal 
port  at  Mutsamudu,  extended  the 
hertzian link between the islands and 
improved the  cable  network  in  Mor-
oni. 
Generous  aid  from  the  EDF  and 
loans  from  the  CCCE,  the  ADB,  the 
IBRD,  the Islamic Bank and friendly 
countries  such  as  Kuwait  and  Saudi 
Arabia  will,  we  hope,  enable  us  to 
build the ports of Moroni and Moheii, 
make  the  telephone  network  at least 
four  times  bigger,  build  and  extend 
telephone  exchanges  and  more.  And 
once the Moroni-Hahaya international 
airport and the projected Anjouan air-
port are completed, the volume of air 
traffic and our exchanges with the out-
side world will  go  up. 
Overwhelming importance 
of external aid 
..,..  The  Comoros  is  extremely  de-
pendent on external aid,  isn't it? Has it 
been possible to maintain it in spite of 
the world economic crisis and how far 
has it  worsened your debt problem? 
- With an investment programme 
of this  order,  our  external  aid,  both 
grants  and  soft  loans,  has  been  of 
overwhelming  importance  in  achiev-
ing the aims of the Government's de-
velopment policy. 
Although  these  are  small  invest-
ments,  the  weight  of the debt on our 
meagre  State resources has been wor-
sened by the world economic crisis, in 
which both interest rates and the dol-
lar  have  soared  over  the  past  three 
years. 
The excessive increase in the burden 
of the debt on  our public  finances  is 
due to certain loans we  have on exor-
bitant terms, to the price or failure to 
sell of our export products and to the 
effect all this has on our meagre State 
resources. But we are convinced that, with the 
help  of our partners,  we  can  get  our 
debts  rescheduled.  This  will  mean 
that,  with  the  actual  working  of the 
investments that have been made and 
the stimulating effect this should have, 
we can pursue our drive to rationalize 
the nation's finances and provide bet-
ter support for the rapid growth of our 
economy. 
.,...  People seem to envy The Comoros 
for its geographical position. How does 
this strike you? 
- If they do, I must say we haven't 
noticed  it  so  far.  The  Comoros  is 
fiercely  attached  to  its  independence 
and sovereignty and, although we  be-
lieve  in  the  principles  of Islam  and 
non-alignment,  our  liberal  policy 
adopted  in  1978  aims  at  cooperating 
with anyone who can help us promote 
our development. We are no-one's en-
emy.  And so  we  intend to  strengthen 
the ties of cooperation and friendship 
with  all  countries keen  on  peace  and 
freedom. 
Let  me  give  you  an  illustration. 
When a boy loves a girl and wants to 
get  engaged,  he  courts  her and sends 
her presents. Comoros is a pretty girl, 
but no boys have appeared yet. .. 
Bringing the whole 
territory together again 
.,...  How do  things stand on the diffi-
cult problem of  Mayotte-that The Co-
moros has always felt to be an integral 
part of  the national territory? How do 
you think this issue can  be settled? 
-:- The illegal occupation of part of 
our territory,  Mayotte,  by  the former 
colonial  power  is  a  challenge  to  the 
international  right  of nations  to  lead 
their  own  lives  inside  the  frontiers 
they inherited from  the colonial era. 
But because we are a peaceful nation 
and because we have longstanding ties 
with France, we intend to use dialogue 
and consultation to work towards the 
sort  of solution  that  will  bring  the 
whole  territory  together  again  and 
serve  the  legitimate  interests  of the 
country. 
This problem, which is  a barrier to 
the  harmonious  strengthening  of the 
ties of friendship that bind France and 
The Comoros, can only be settled with 
the common desire of the parties con-
cerned,  so  that  the  interests  and 
friendship  of our two  States are  pre-
served. 
I am happy to see that my Govern-
ment's persistence over the past eight 
years  in  international  organizations-
the UN, the OAU, the Islamic Confer-
ence  and the non-aligned countries-
and  in  the  international  community 
has  led  to  the  French  Government's 
first  recognition,  through  Fran9ois 
Mitterrand's final  communique at the 
meeting  of French-speaking  nations, 
of its  parliament's  historic  error  in 
balkanizing The Comoros in  1975. 
"The  illegal occupation of  part of our 
territory,  Mayotte,  by  the  former  co-
lonial power is a challenge to the inter-
national right of nations to  lead  their 
own  lives ... " 
..,.  The Comoros is  currently in  the 
chair  of the  Indian  Ocean  Commis-
sion. How do you see the future of  this 
organization and of regional coopera-
tion  in  general? And in  what  sphere 
could this cooperation be developed? 
- Comoros  welcomed  and  sup-
ported  the  idea  of an  Indian  Ocean 
Commission.  However,  please  note 
that there can be no peace or stability 
in the Indian Ocean while France oc-
cupies  the  Comorian  island  of 
Mayotte." 
But in spite of this unfortunate situ-
ation, we are happy today to chair this 
new sub-regional cooperation body. 
We are convinced that development 
cannot be  conceived of globally with-
out sustained regional cooperation, in 
line with the recommendations of the 
Action  Plan  and Final  Act  of Lagos, 
and we  intend working for the collec-
tive  autonomy  in  regional  and  sub-
regional  groupings  that will  stimulate 
our own development and provide the 
best  defence  for  the  interests  of our 
country. 
So,  over the coming months, we in-
tend to do ,all we can to bring together 
these  island  states  which  have  been 
linked in  many ways  over the centu-
ries  by  the  same historical process of 
colonization and population. 
The  indicative  programme  that all 
the member countries have adopted-
it  involves  energy,  the  tourist  trade, 
transport,  agricultural  production, 
fishing,  training  and  communica-
tions-is  a  dynamic  framework  in 
which  many  schemes  can  be  devel-
oped in a variety of fields. 
.,...  What do you think about cooper-
ation  with  the EEC so far  and what 
prospects  do  you  think Lome III has 
opened for you? 
- In  The  Comorian  Government 
and  people's  campaign  for  develop-
ment,  I  am happy  to  say  the EEC  is 
and has always been a provider of sol-
id  support  for  our  efforts  to  rid  the 
country of its  poverty and  under-de-
velopment. 
Do I need to remind you what EEC 
aid  has  done  for  Comoros  since 
1958? 
Our  development  needs  are  many 
and the varied forms of EEC aid pro-
vided under the Lome agreements are 
an example of  multilateral cooperation 
and a guarantee of North-South rela-
tions in current international negotia-
tions. 
We go  so  far as  to  hope that EEC-
Comoros cooperation will expand and 
make a bigger contribution to the ra-
pid development of our country. 
Interdependence  of nations  in  the 
world economy has become a reality. 
There  will  be  no  peace  in  the  world 
and no fulfilment  for the people who 
live in it unless there is greater, active 
solidarity between  rich  and poor and 
between all the countries of the inter-
national communtiy. 
And it is the name of this solidarity 
and in the light of the historic mission 
of the  EEC  in  the  under-developed 
world that we  intend working for  the 
strengthening  of EEC-Comoros  coo-
peration. o  Interview by R.D.B. 
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By Carlo MAN  AI(*) 
The Comoros became independent relatively recently, in July 1975. It 
joined the  Lome Convention soon afterwards,  in September 1976,  but 
cooperation with the EEC dates back to  1958,  to the start of the EDF, 
when the country was a French overseas territory (see  table summariz-
ing 1st-3rd EDF schemes over the 1958-75 period). Since it joined Lome 
in  its  own  right,  its  cooperation  links  with  the  EEC  have  developed 
continuously, to the complete satisfaction of both parties. 
Community aid began  with ECU (I) 6.32  million under Lome I (4th 
EDF), rose to ECU 14.5  million under Lome II (5th EDF) and to ECU 
21  million  under Lome  III  (6th  EDF).  These  are  the  figures  for  the 
national  indicative  programmes.  In  addition  to  this,  there  has  been 
annual food aid, emergency aid, Stabex transfers and the country's share 
of the regional cooperation funds. 
Programmes have always been run with close collaboration between 
the local authorities and the Commission. Almost all the possibilities of 
funds afforded by the Convention have been used and the Community 
has always  done its  best to support the Comorian Government in its 
drive  to  improve the standard of living  of its  people  and reduce  the . 
drawbacks of isolation. 
4th EDF cooperation 
The  whole  of the  indicative  pro-
gramme  of ECU  6 320 000  has  been 
fully committed. All the projects have 
now  been  completed  apart  from 
the  inter-island  telecommunications 
scheme where one or two minor oper-
ations are being finished. 
(*)  EEC  Resident Adviser in  The Comoros. 
(  1)  ECU  1 =  CF  AF 344 (May  1986). 
Table 2-the EEC  aid  programme, 
Lome  I -covers all  the  schemes  run 
over the period of the 4th EDF. 
EEC  food  aid  over  this  period 
reached a volume greater than that of 
the  entire  indicative  programme. 
Emergency aid was  very considerable, 
too,  largely  because  of the  Majunga 
tragedy (2). 
The projects with the greatest effect 
on the country were  those  run in  the 
Carlo  Manai,  the  EEC's Resident Adviser in  The  Comoros,  with  the  National 
Authorizing Officer,  Mr Said Ahmed Said Ali, Minister of  Finance 
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rural  development  sector-maize de-
velopment,  small-time  cattle  rearing 
and  soil  protection  in  Nioumakeie-
although  the  inter-island  telecommu-
nications  project,  which  substantially 
improved the domestic telephone ser-
vice, was  no  less important. 
The encouraging results of the agri-
cultural  projects  led  the  Commission 
to pursue its activities in this field and 
so  the maize project was  followed  up, 
with  an  enlarged  programme,  under 
the  5th EDF.  Soil  protection and res-
toration were also continued as part of 
the J  imile project. 
A  further  small  cattle  rearing  pro-
ject, similar to the first,  has just been 
approved by  the Commission. It is to 
be run on Anjouan and will cost ECU 
200 000. 
Under  the  regional  cooperation 
heading,  special  attention  should  be 
paid to the scheme to assist aerial nav-
igation in the Indian Ocean. This was 
run with additional financing from the 
5th  EDF  and  The  Comoros'  part  of 
the  project was  completed at the  end 
of last year.  · 
5th EDF cooperation 
The EEC  allocated the islands ECU 
14.5 million under the 5th EDF, all of 
it in the form of grants. 
The  indicative  programme 
(amended  in  December  1983),  was 
divided as follows: 
- Communications and economic in-
frastructure:  ECU 5 m (34.5%) 
- Agricultural  development:  ECU 
4 m (27.5%) 
- Social  infrastructure:  ECU  3.4 m 
(23.5 %) 
- Micro-projects:  ECU  0.3 m 
(2.1 %) 
- Training: ECU 0.35 m (2.4%) 
- Trade  promotion:  ECU  0.075 m 
(0.5%) 
- Reserve  fund:  ECU  1.375 m 
(9.5 %) 
- Total: ECU  14.500 m. 
Although the projects in the agricul-
tural  and  social  sectors  were  slow  to 
get under way,  they are well advanced 
now and a number of them-the Mut-
(2)  Ed:  At the end of 1976  there were  serious 
riots  between  the  Malagasy  population  and  the 
Comorian community living in  Majunga,  Mada-
gascar;  following  the  riots  16 000  Comorians 
were  repatriated. 1st EDF 
Table 1: Summary of aid, 
lst-3rd ED}fs, 
1958-1975 (Mayotte included) 
- Extensions to the jetty at the port of Mutsamudu 
- Asphalting of the main roads 
- Improvements to the roads 
- Electricity supplies on Moroni and in Mutsamudu 
- Mutsamudu school of domestic studies 
- Health training in Mamoutzou and Fomboni 
- Four maternity units 
Total 1st EDF 
2nd  EDF 
- Studies  and  improvements  to  the  road  net~ 
works 
- Electricity  supplies on Moroni and in  Mutsa-
mudu 
- Study grants 
- Health training in Foumbouni 
Total 2nd EDF 
3rd EDF 
- Modernization  of  roads  on  Anjouan  and 
Mayotte 
- Moroni water supplies 
Total 3rd EDF 
Table 2 : Summary of aid, 
Lome I, 4th EDF 
866 000 
1 148 000 
247862 
348 000 
198 000 
234 000 
274000 
3 315 862 
2 316 230 
4000 
51 000 
230000 
2 601 230 
2 142 526 
l 422 349 
3 564 876 
Projects 
Amount 
(ECU '000) 
1.  Rural 
- Development of maize growing 
- Development of small animal raising 
- Restoration  &  protection of soil in  the 
Nioumakele area 
2.  Internal telecommunications 
- Inter-islands  communications  (studies 
and projects) 
3.  Training, technical assistance, trade pro-
motion and a reserve fund 
- Training, study grants 
- Technical assistance 
- Study,  export  promotion  (ylang  ylang 
and cloves)  · 
- Development bank study 
Total 4th EDF indicative programme 
Other aid 
4.  Stabex  (1976~  1980) 
5.  Emergency aid 
6.  Food aid 1976-1980 (at world market prices) 
7.  Regional cooperation (Indian Ocean) 
Earmarked Committed 
2 850 
2 500 
970 
6320 
1900 
300 
650 
2 850 
2 580 
100 
680 
70 
12 
862 
6292 
2 327 
2 897 
6 350 
8493 
Table 3: Aid  programme 
Lome  II, 5th EDF 
Projects 
1.  Communications & economic infrastruc-
Amount 
(ECU '000) 
Earmarked Committed 
~  3~ 
- Port development 
feasibility  study  52 
technical studies  600 
- Pomoni bridge  230 
2.  Agricultural development 
- Development of maize growing 
- Soil protection &  restoration study 
- Development of Jimilime region 
- Pepper, coffee &  cocoa study 
- Multidisciplinary study for Jimilime 
- Banana plantation study 
- Anjouan small livestock scheme 
3.  Social infrastructure 
- Fomboni water supply study 
- Mutsamudu water supply study 
- Fomboni water supplies 
- Mutsamudu water supplies 
4.  Microprojects 
5.  Training 
- Training requirements study 
- Multiannual training programme 
- Vocational training study 
6.  Trade promotion 
- Fairs 
Cosmoprof (Bologne,  1984) 
Anuga (travel supp.),  1985 
7.  Miscellaneous &  reserve fund 
- Technical assistance to the post office 
- Technical assistance development bank 
- Building for funders' conference 
Total indicative programme (5th EDF) 
Other aid 
8.  Stabex (1976-1980) 
9.  Emergency aid 
10.  Food  aid,  1976-1980  (world  market 
prices) 
11.  Article 958  - Food strategy 
12.  Regional cooperation (Indian Ocean) 
4 700 
4072 
882 
2340 
10 
1 482 
20 
62 
8 
200 
4122 
64 
118 
805 
:3 085 
4072 
300  260 
580 
10 
550 
18.5 
578.5 
75 
7 
2 
9 
973 
325 
100 
50 
475 
14500  10 398.5 
6 575 
444 
7054 
300 
10 223 
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The  water supply project at Mutsamudu (Anjouan): left,  building one of  the  water tanks; right,  a finished water intake 
samudu (Anjouan) and Fomboni (Mo-
heli)  water  supplies-have  actually 
been completed, although there is still 
a  year's  technical  assistance  to  the 
EEDC  (as  requested  by  the  Govern-
ment) to go  in Mutsamudu. 
Phase  II  of the  maize  project  is 
working  more  or  less  normally  and 
there  are  no  particular  problems  for 
the moment. 
The  project  to  develop  the  Jimile 
region is now starting up in the field. 
There are still  a  number of problems 
to solve, most importantly the alloca-
tion  of land  to  the  peasant  farmers, 
The  Comoros'  land  · ownership 
situation being a  particularly compli-
cated one. 
The communications and economic 
infrastructure drive, however, is more 
or less at a standstill and this is behind 
a long-lasting immobilization of most 
of the funds earmarked for this sector. 
The delays in implementing the in-
dicative programme (it  is  about 75% 
committed at  present)  are  essentially 
due to the Government finding it hard 
to  obtain  the  cofinancing  needed  to 
build the ports of Moroni and Moheli 
- ECU  5  million  have  been  ear-
marked  for  this  sector,  but  the  only 
funds to be mobilized are those for the 
studies. 
Hence the Government's request for 
a further change in the indicative pro-
gramme so it can run other, more ur-
gent  schemes,  in  the" rural  sector  in 
particular. 
- Communications and economic in-
frastructure: ECU 3.8 m  (26.2 %) 
- Agricultural  development:  ECU 
4. 7 m (32.4 %) 
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- Social  infrastructure:  ECU  4.072 
m  (28%) 
Microprojects: ECU 0.3  m  (2.1 %) 
- Training: ECU 0.58  m  (4%) 
- Trade  promotion:  ECU  0.075  m 
(0.5%) 
- Reserve  fund  etc.:  ECU  0.973  m 
(6.2 %) 
- Total: ECU 14 500 m 
If,  as  seems  probable,  the  Moroni 
(or  Moheli)  port  plans  are  imple-
mented  and  the  amounts  earmarked 
for  this-about  ECU  3  million-are 
mobilized, then 95% of the indicative 
programme  will  have  been  commit-
ted. 
The  Government  has  also  had  a 
substantial  amount  of aid  from  the 
Stabex fund, in addition to the indica-
tive  programme,  under the  5th  EDF 
over the 1981-85 period. This totalled 
ECU 6.575  million,  a  good  ECU 4.4 
million of  it paid in 1985, a particular-
ly  large  contribution to the State cof-
fers  which  were  sadly depleted  when 
vanilla  and  cloves,  the  cash  crops, 
failed to sell. 
There was also ECU 444 000 worth 
of emergency  aid  and  ECU  300 000 
from  the Commission budget (Article 
958)  as  part of the campaign to fight 
world hunger in the Domoni region on 
Anjouan. 
More than ECU 7 million worth of 
food  aid was  sent out over the same 
period. 
Finishing  stages  in  the  building  of a  new  bridge  at  Pomoni;  the  old  bridge 
had  been  destroyed  by  rocks  and  mud coming  down  the  mountain  following 
torrential rains The Comoros called on Stabex funds to 
cushion their losses of  export earnings 
from  vanilla and cloves (above,  a path 
bordered by clove trees) 
Lastly,  the  EIB  gave  ECU  161 000 
risk  capital  to  the  capital  of the  na-
tional development bank. 
Community  aid  over  the  period 
1981-85 is summarized in Table 3 (5th 
ED F). 
6th EDF cooperation 
The 6th EDF indicative programme 
is for ECU 21  million, ECU 19 million 
of it grants  and  the  rest  risk  capital. 
This is an increase of about 45% over 
the Lome II contribution. 
The  programming  mission,  led  by 
Deputy  Director-General  Michel 
Hauswirth,  went  out  on  16-19  Nov-
ember last year.  The programme was 
finalized  and  signed  on  19  N  ovem-
ber. 
The EIB  representative on the mis-
sion  signed  a  separate  document set-
ting out the possibilities the Bank of-
fered  of contributing to  the  financing 
of productive projects and action pro-
grammes in agro-industry,  the  tourist 
trade and mining. 
The discussions  were  held  in a  eli-
mate of frank cooperation and reveal-
ed  substantially  similar views  on  the 
aims  and  priorities  of the  develop-
ment programme. 
lii  It was decided that the Community  ·§ 
contributions  would  be  concentrated  8 
Q) 
on  the  rural  sector,  backing  up  and  ~ 
strengthening the Government's drive 
to  reduce  the  country's  food  depen-
dency on the outside world and mak-
ing more from  cash crops. 
Other  specific  schemes  were  plan-
ned outside this sector,  but of course 
in line with  the State's priorities. 
At  the  end  of the  mission,  it was 
agreed that about 65% of Community 
aid would be concentrated on the rural 
sector and the other 35% would go  to 
vocational  training  and  technical  as-
sistance schemes, to the completion of 
Rural access  road financed by the EDF on  Grande Comore 
The  maize growing project has had an 
impact on  the country 
ongoing projects (especially to open up 
isolated  areas)  and  such  national 
schemes  as  were  necessary  to  make 
more of  certain regional projects in the 
fishing  sector,  the  tourist  trade,  arts 
and crafts and so  on. 
An indicative timetable of schemes 
to be  run between now and 1987  was 
also adopted. 
The main objectives within the rural 
sector are to : 
- increase  and  diversify  production 
of both cash and food crops; 
- campaign against deforestation and 
soil erosion; 
- boost the  production of meat and 
eggs; 
- intensify fishing schemes. 
The  EIB  document confirmed  that 
the Bank would commit at least ECU 
2 million worth of risk capital to The 
Comoros. 
A general discussion of the opportu-
nities available under the regional coo-
peration heading wound up  the  work 
of the two delegations. 
The  fine  spirit  of cooperation  be-
tween  the two delegations throughout 
the  mission was  indicative of the ex-
cellent  relations  between  The  Como-
rian authorities and the Commission. 
o  C.M. 
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Outposts of the desert 
Deserts  have  always  had  their  ad-
mirers,  unconditional  lovers  of  the 
vast  silent  spaces  where  nothing  dis-
turbs  the  fixed  order  of things  and 
where,  they  say,  man  can  be  alone 
with himself and commune with natu-
re  unadorned  yet  grandiose  in  its 
nakedness.  The  more  desolate  the 
land,  the  more  these  seekers  of soli-
tude and reflexion are happy. Which is 
no  doubt why  they  enjoy  themselves 
so much in Mauritania, that vast terri-
tory  of  more  than  a  million  km
2
, 
which  is  almost  entirely  desert  and 
particularly impenetrable-witness the 
veritable hecatomb that befell  the  ca-
ravan  of the  unfortunate  Thierry Sa-
bine in the Paris-Dakar rally in Mauri-
tania in  1985. 
Would-be hermits can rest assured. 
No-one will  disturb them  in  the  vast 
sands of Mauritania. And there is  the 
added bonus, if this is their desire,  of 
an  inevitable  hot  sun  in  a  cloudless 
sky.  And,  come  nightfall,  as  if to  re-
fresh them from the heat, the dust and 
the echo,  immense coolness  suddenly 
follows  the torrid heat of the day and 
the  firmament  glitters  with  myriad 
stars. 
It is  easy  to  wax  lyrical  about  the 
desert,  that unending source  of inspi-
ration  for  poets  and  mystics-if you 
are  not  an  economist  or  responsible 
for  economic  development.  They 
think desert is synonymous with steril-
ity,  unless  there  is  oil  (is  that  still 
true?) as there is  in Libya or Kuwait. 
And although the sands of Mauritania 
contain  resources,  they  are  far  from 
having  produced  the  sort  of wealth 
that  can  make  the  desert  green.  Or 
even halt its unrelenting advance. 
For it  is  advancing,  inexorably,  at 
the  rate  of 6 km  every  year.  There 
were only  15  million ha of non-desert 
of  Mauritania's  108  million  ha  in 
1960,  but since then  14 of the  15  mil-
lion the Sahara had spared have been 
eaten up in the desertification process, 
we learn from an UNSO (1) report that 
came out a few  years back.  Water hole-with  a somewhat battered 
rim-in the desert  Most of the country gets  very  little 
~  rain and what there is is very irregular. 
<x:  The southern part, below Nouakchott-
. ~  Tidjika,  the Sahelian part,  used to get 
::?.. more than  150 mm p.a.  and this  was 
0 
~  enough  to  grow  crops (sorghum)  and 
water  pastureland  for  the  cattle.  But 
there,  too,  the  Sahel-wide  drought of 
the past few years has struck, probably 
harder  than  elsewhere.  The  country 
has had 15 years of drought, general or 
local,  since  1967  and  this  has  pro-
foundly  altered the countryside in the 
areas  the  Government  is  striving  to 
t  preserve. 
The  plant  cover,  acacia  mainly, 
which was already sparse, has deterio-
rated further, but the rare or non-exis-
tent  rainfall  is  not the  only  thing  to 
blame,  although  it  has  considerably 
worsened the damage wrought by man 
and beast. Since the end of the 1960s, 
(1)  United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office. 
says  UNSO,  the  Sahel,  a  herding  re-
gion, has lost 80% of  its tree cover and 
even further south, along the Senegal, 
which  is  the  country's  real  farming 
zone,  the  losses  are  up  to  60%.  And 
the demand for firewood is growing-
by  800 000 m3  p.a.  at  the  moment-
eight  times  faster  than the forest  can 
grow.  Twenty-one  thousand  hectares 
of trees need to be planted every year 
to  cope  with  requirements  until  the 
year 2000, so  there is  every reason to 
worry  about the  131  000  ha of forest 
that Mauritania has now. 
The  diminishing  number  of trees 
has in itself led to more frequent sand 
storms-which in  turn  speed  up ero-
sion by the wind and threaten the na-
tion's  economic  infrastructure.  One 
example  of  this  is  the  asphalted 
Nouakchott-Nema  road.  It cost  bil-
lions to build, it was called, as if to lay a ghost,  Hope  Highway,  and it is  al-
ways  silted  up  with  sand.  And  then 
there  is  the  675 km  railway  between 
the  port  of  N ouadhibou  and  the 
Zouerate iron mine,  which  constantly 
needs  nine  teams  of diggers  clearing 
what  is  a  vital  link  for  the country's 
economy. "Our fight  against the sand 
is  a  real  labour  of Sysiphus ",  Ishak 
Ould  Rajel,  the  Secretary-General  of 
the  Ministry  of Mining,  told  us  re-
signedly.  "You have only just cleared 
the line when the dune forms again a 
couple  of metres  further  on  and you 
have  to  start  all  over  again".  The 
winds, the Harmattan, and the trades, 
which  are  created  by  anticyclones  in 
the Azores or over St Helena, send the 
sand  everywhere  and  it  destroys 
houses,  dries  up  oases  and threatens 
crops right down  to the Senegal  river 
valley. 
Fatalism 
But maybe  the most dramatic con-
sequence  of desertification -and here 
we are dealing with direct possibilities 
of survival-is the drop in, and some-
times complete drying up of, the water 
table,  which  is  no  longer  fed.  "The 
very  existence  of this  country  is  at 
stake", said one top official in face  of 
the size  of the  threat and the  meagre 
means  they  have  of coping  with  it. 
Another  leader,  Mohammed  Lemine 
Ould  Abdi,  Secretary-General  at  the 
Rural Development Ministry, brought 
in a note of fatalism, albeit one tinted 
with optimism (Mauritania, let us  not 
forget, is an Islamic Republic and thus 
profoundly marked by religion), when 
he said: "Our outlook and our system 
of values  always  tell  us  that one  day 
everything will be all  right.  Let us  not 
lose heart. It is our country. We  don't 
have  the  choice  of going  anywhere 
else,  so  we  are  forced  to  get  acclima-
tized and adapt". 
An  anti-desertification  campaign  is 
being  run  to  make  the  change  a 
smooth one, but the people running it 
realized from  the word go  that it has 
to  be  a  long-term  affair.  Yet time  is 
the one thing they are  short·  of,  given 
the  virtually  irreversible  nature  of 
some attacks.  And they are unable to 
reach unanimity on  measures such as 
dune fixing.  There is a pilot operation 
on the Boutilimit road, but this is only 
a  drop  in  the  ocean-or a  tiny  dam 
against a whole  ocean of sand.  "Try-
ing to fix  dunes is like throwing mon-
ey  out of the window", said Mr Ould 
Rajel, and he knows what he is talking 
about as he tried ... and his whole con-
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cession  and the  well  to water one  or 
two  vegetable  crops  were  lost  under 
the sand. 
So what can be done? Some people, 
including the adviser,  say  they some-
times feel  like throwing in the sponge, 
but once  this moment of discourage-
ment  (or  luc.idity?)  has  passed,  they 
start singing the  same old song-"  Stop 
desertification, find out how to count-
. er it, act at regional level". The prob-
lem is that all this is put off till tomor-
row, while it is a race against the clock 
(the  pessimists  say  the  countdown 
started ages ago) to save the remaining 
165 000 ha of  arable land and the total  Gi  .§ 
5 000 ha of oases.  Those who  reduce  8 
Mauritania to a strip along the Senegal  ~ 
forget the oases in Adrar, representing 
2 200  ha,  Tagant  and  Assaba-Hodh 
(which  share  the  rest  more  or  less 
equally). 
Abolition of slavery 
Mohamed Lemine Ould Abdi, 
Secretary-General at the Rural 
Development Ministry 
theory, but it is  the black population, 
traditionally  under  Moorish  domina-
tion,  who  works  on  the  plantations. 
Since  the  official  abolition of slavery 
in 1980, new and fairer relations seem 
to  have  emerged  between  the  two 
Mauritania's oases are very  impor-
tant. They are spread over a very wide 
area and they make it possible for peo-
ple to live in desert regions. The aver-
age oasis is 50 ha and some may be as 
big as  300 ha.  About 230 000  people, 
or orle  seventh of the population live 
on them. 
· .  groups,  one  particular innovation be-
ing  that  the  former  slaves  are  now 
paid for their work. 
These  are  where  the  date  palms 
grow · and  the  country's  1 500 000 
palms produce 165 000 t of fruit every 
year. Other crops-corn, barley, sorgh-
um,  cow-peas,  henna,  sweet potatoes, 
tobacco, fruit and vegetables etc.-are 
grown beneath the trees. The land bel-
ongs  to  the  Moorish  Berber tribes  in 
Even  today,  the  slavery  issue  is  a 
sensitive  one.  The  Mauritanians, 
white  and  black,  will  tell  you  that, 
contrary to external belief, there is no 
violence  or repression  between  mas-
ters and slaves, but that there is senti-
mental  attachment  and  that  slaves 
have their traditional rights in Mauri-
tanian society and masters have obli-
gations  to  them.  The fact  that many 
>  , 
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Cracked earth and parched trees  are signs of the advancing desert  in  the  Kaedi 
region 
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nomadic herdsmen ruined by drought 
have  been  forced  to  settle,  they  say, 
has  reversed  the  dependence.  The 
masters are no longer in a position of 
dominant economic  strength  and the 
changes  in  Mauritanian  society  have 
long since •  doomed the system to dis-
appear  now  that wage-earning  is  the 
rule in the villages. 
Another, equally delicate issue,  and 
one that is closely linked to slavery, is 
the numerical breakdown of the popu-
lation  into  two  main  groups-the 
Moors,  who  are  traditionally nomads 
and  subdivided  into  white  (Beidans) 
and black  (Harattins),  and the Suda-
nese, who are sedentary blacks of W  o-
lof,  Peul  and  Sarakolle  origin.  Many 
books on Mauritania suggest the ratio 
is  2: 1,  two  thirds  being  Moors,  but 
others  say  there  is  a  60:40  division 
(still  in  favour of the  Moors)  or that 
they  are  split  equally,  there  being  an 
apparently  much  higher  birth  rate 
among the Sudanese. This is a delicate 
question.  Not that there are  any  real 
problems of  cohabitation, but because, 
going beyond the contrast between no-
madic herdsmen and sedentary peas-
ant  farmers,  which  is  further  heigh-
tened by the advancing desert and the 
way  people are  moving south,  we  are 
faced with the matter of the country's 
future identity. 
Many ACP  countries,  especially  in 
the Caribbean and the Pacific, are in a 
similar situation. Mauritania, which is 
an  Islamic  Republic,  has,  in  its  reli-
gion,  a  powerful  uniting factor  which 
could well ensure its cohesion. 
U neon  trolled speculation 
And cohesion the country will unde-
niably need in the fantastic changes it 
is now undergoing. In two decades, the 
face  of Mauritania has changed com-
pletely.  In  1960,  for  example,  when 
independence  was  proclaimed  in  a 
tent  on  the  spot  where  Nouackchott 
was to be built, only 3% of Mauritan-
ians lived in towns. But today the ca-
pital  alone  houses  500 000  of  the 
country's 1 700 000 inhabitants. 
In  1963,  about 83% of the popula-
tion were nomads, but now the figure 
is down to 25%. The main reason for 
this  veritable  social  metamorphosis, 
which came about at breakneck speed, 
is  of course the drought, as the dying 
pastures meant nomadic herding could 
no longer be carried out properly and the  people crowd into the  towns  and 
along  the  roads  to  get  their food  aid 
rations. Since  1980,  the currently mil-
lion-strong  national  cattle  herd  has 
dropped by  35% and sheep and goats 
(6 500 000)  have  dwindled  by  20%. 
Only the camel herd has remained sta-
ble,  at  700 000  head.  But  many  of 
these  beasts  owe  their  survival  to 
transhumance pastures in Senegal and 
Mali. 
People  from  the  major  urban 
centres have gone in for  uncontrolled 
speculation  over  the  past  few  years, 
buying  animals,  often  very  cheaply, 
and  selling  them  further  south.  The 
water and pasture shortage has forced 
the  traditional herdsmen to  sell  their 
starving  animals  to  the  speculators 
and  abandon  their  age-old  way  of 
life-when they have not simply been 
forced  to  settle  because  their  herds 
have  died.· Mohamed  Lemine  Ould 
Abdi told me sadly that a whole civil-
ization was dying out. Once they have 
lost  their livestock,  some  nomads go 
off to the big  towns and others linger 
around  the  water  holes,  tentatively 
practising  farming.  The  traditional 
way of  life is upset. The authorities are 
trying to get  these uprooted people to 
fit  into  the  modern  way  of life,  but 
there are such things as family solidar-
ity ... and food aid, which is especially 
important, having covered more than 
half the annual 200 000 tonnes cereal 
shortfall over the past few  years. 
Every  year,  Mauritania  consumes 
something like  250 000 tonnes of cer-
eal, although it only produces an aver-
age 40 000 tonnes. Production went as 
low as 20 000 tonnes in 1983-84 when 
the  drought  was  exceptionally  bad. 
The per capita food output only repre-
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A tar,  one of the great oases  in  the Adrar region 
sents 40% of the figure  for  the '60s, a 
time when  rainfed  agriculture  (essen-
tially  millet  and  sorghum)  covered 
half the  nation's  food  requirements. 
Irrigated rice and maize growing may 
have increased threefold since the be-
ginning of  the '80s, but it still does not 
even cover 5%  of the  tot~ll cereal de-
mand.  The Manantali dam regulating 
the Senegal  will  no doubt have to  be 
finished before  120 000 ha of land can 
be  brought  under irrigation -and the 
work actually has to be done, which is 
not the least of the problems, as at the 
Windblown  sand buries homes and crops 
present rate of 800 ha p.a., it will take 
almost  150  years. 
So  food  aid  will  be  an  important 
aspect of the economy for some years 
to come. The Food Security Commis-
sariat is  responsible for managing this 
aid and for placing increasing empha-
sis  on food for work schemes,  in par-
ticular in respect of developing roads, 
tracks,  nursery gardens and so  on. 
Alongside this, there will be  a drive 
to boost agricultural production-this 
is  one of the priority targets-so as to 
cover 40% of the nation's cereal requi-
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The shortage of  water and pastures has drastically reduced the Mauritanian herd 
and is forcing many a nomad to  settle 
rements and provide 20% of its vege-
tables  by  1988.  This  is  one  of the 
points  in  the  1985-88  economic  and 
financial  recovery plan. 
The first cracks appear 
At the very moment Mauritania has 
to  take  up  the  daunting  challenge  of 
the growing desertification of its terri-
tory, it is faced with a serious econom-
ic  and  financial  crisis.  One aspect  of 
this is the debt, an estimated $ 1.8 bil-
lion  in  1984,  which  it  is  finding  in-
creasingly difficult to pay back.  There 
has  been  a  confirmation  agreement 
with  the  IMF,  followed  by  a  resche-
duling of repayments at the Paris Club 
at the end of last year. But as Moham-
med Lemine  Ould Deidah,  the  Head 
of Finance at the Ministry of Econom-
ic  Affairs  and  Finance  (and  Deputy 
National  Authorizing  Officer  for  the 
44 
EDF),  points  out,  "the  bulk  of the 
debt cannot be rescheduled because it 
was contracted with multilateral finan-
cial  institutions like  the  World  Bank, 
the ADB, the Saudi Fund and the Ku-
wait Fund, none of which reschedule. 
We  have  made  a  big  effort  to  settle 
our repayments in  1985, but it was to 
the  detriment of our foreign  assets-
which dropped by about 6 billion Ou-
guiyas". 
But how did it come to  this? It all 
goes back to the start of the mining of 
very  high  grade (65-70%)  iron  ore  at 
Zouerate  in  1963  and  copper  ore  at 
Akjoujt  in  1970,  both of which  ulti-
mately  led  to  the  highest  per  capita 
incomes  in  the  region.  Everything 
seemed  possible  and  Mauritania em-
barked  upon  an  onerous  investment 
policy.  These  investments-the 
(1)  The national currency. 
Nouadhibou oil refinery (costing$ 140 
million),  the Nouakchott-Nema road, 
the sugar project and the Gorgol Noir 
dam,  for  example-do  not  look  so 
wise  or profitable today, but by  1973, 
the country felt strong enough to come 
out  from  under  the  umbrella  of the 
West  African  Monetary  Union  and 
create its  own  currency,  the  Ouguiya, 
on the strength of its enormous miner-
al  wealth.  The  following  year,  it na-
tionalized the mines. 
But  the  first  cracks  were  soon  to 
appear.  They  stopped  mining  copper 
in  1978  after  reaching  a  production 
figure of almost 29 000 tonnes of con-
centrate  in  1973.  Iron  production, 
which  peaked  in  1974  with  11.1  mil-
lion tonnes, gradually declined, falling 
to 7.4 million tonnes in 1977-78 when 
world  demand  slumped-iron  and 
steel were in trouble everywhere-and 
repeated  attacks  on  the  Zouerate-
1 
Nouadhibou port ore railway from the 
Polisario  Front,  the liberation  move-
ment of Western Sahara, the territory 
Mauritania  and  Morocco  had shared 
out in  1976  when  the  Spanish  with-
drew. 
The Government of President Mok-
tar Ould  Daddah had  to  increase  its 
military  spending  tenfold  to  handle 
the conflict and the army soon swelled 
from  1 500 men to  12 000 in 1976 and 
then  to  17 000,  without  getting  the 
better of the guerillas, in spite of mili-
tary aid from France and Morocco. In 
July  1978,  the  Ould  Daddah regime, 
weakened by the war, was overthrown 
by a military coup. The following year, 
an agreement was signed with the Pol-
isario,  according to  which Mauritania 
renounced  all  its  claims  to  Western 
Sahara  and  withdrew  from  Tiris  el 
Gharbia-which was  at once annexed 
by  Morocco.  But the country did not 
find  immediate  stability  for  all  this 
and  there  have  been  four  different 
military leaders in the eight years since 
Ould Daddah was overthrown. Colon-
el Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya has 
been in power since December 1984. 
Encouraging signs 
Men may change,  but the problems 
remain.  The budget shortfall is  grow-
ing  (it  was  3.6  billion  Ouguiyas  in 
1984),  outstanding  debt  repayments 
amounted to  more than $ 23  million 
in 1981  and went up to $ 96 million in 
1984,  the balance of payments defici-Mahfoud Ould Lemrabott, 
Minister for Mining and Industry 
treached 12 billion Ouguiyas or almost 
a third of the nation's wealth,  making 
further  loans  inevitable,  and  agricul-
ture and herding continued to sigh for 
their pre-68 performances. The mines, 
the  main generators  of the economic 
growth of the  1960s and '70s, are still 
having price problems and have never 
managed  the  1974  production figures 
again,  but the National Industrial and 
Mining  Company  has  just  started 
working  the  Guelbs  El  Rhein deposit 
(see our interview with the head of  the 
SNIM),  which  should  mean  produc-
tion  capacities  can  be  maintained  in 
the  long  run.  There  are  encouraging 
signs,  as  Mahfoud  Ould  Lemrabott, 
the Minister of Mining and Industry, 
underlines,  from  sulphur,  manganese 
and oil, but for the time being nothing 
really tangible, in spite of the fact that 
two  well-known  companies,  Texaco 
and Amoco, are currently prospecting 
for oil.  However, there are proven re-
serves  of copper and  phosphates,  al-
though  the  market  in  these  products 
being what it is  now and for the fore-
seeable  future,  production  prospects 
are fairly distant. 
That leaves fish.  Mauritania's coas-
tal waters are some of the best stocked 
in  the  world,  as  is  borne  out  by  the 
fact  that  hotels  in  Nouakchott  and 
Nouadhibou are full of representatives 
of the great fishing  nations,  of Japan, 
Korea,  the  USSR  and  Spain,  who 
come to  negotiate their conditions of 
access to the country's territorial wat-
ers. And of course to observe the fren-
zied  activity  of their  ships  offshore. 
The  annual  catch  is  an  estimated 
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Mauritania's coastal waters are some of the best stocked in  the world 
600 000  tonnes,  460 000  tonnes  of it 
pelagic  species,  90 000  tonnes demer-
sals and 42 000  tonnes cephalopods. 
Fishing has taken over from mining 
and now represents  50%  of the value 
of exports  ($ ·148  million  in  1984  as 
against$ 144 million for iron ore). But 
its  contribution to  GOP is  small,  re-
flecting  the strong extraversion of the 
sector, which is almost entirely depen-
dent on foreigners. 
In 1979,  the Government produced 
a new fisheries policy aimed at replac-
ing the old system of selling licences to 
foreign  fleets  (a  difficult thing to con-
trol as Mauritania has 500 km of coast 
and pathetic means of patrolling it), by 
a  system  whereby  the  fish  resources 
would  be  exploited  by  Mauritanian-
registered  companies.  The  essential 
aim in this sector, which has expanded 
at an  annual  11%  over the  past few 
years,  is  to  ensure  the  country  has 
greater control over the amount fished 
and a better knowledge of the species 
available, the rate at which they repro-
duce and potentially how much can be 
caught. 
Not only does Mauritania have only 
meagre patrolling facilities-it has  no 
naval repair yard of any kind and can-
not make its storage and refrigeration 
installations on land a profitable pro-
position,  as  they are  only working to 
15%  of capacity  in  view  of the  fact 
that the vessels operating off its coast 
have  their  own  units.  Nevertheless, 
fishing  will  be the main driving force 
of the  economy  for  some  years  to 
come. The Government will  be  work-
ing along two  lines here-encouraging 
the  development of integrated activi-
ties from the catch through marketing 
and promoting small fishing  to boost 
the  currently  rather limited  domestic 
consumption. 
Some success stories ... 
In  terms  of financing,  the  nation's 
fish  projects represent, with 3 520 bil-
lion Ouguiyas, 8. 7% of all new invest-
ments  provided  for  in  the  1985-88 
economic and financial  recovery  pro-
gramme mooted in collaboration with 
the IMF and the World Bank. It thus 
comes  after  the  rural  sector,  with 
42.1 %,  urban hydraulics  (17.2%)  and 
infrastructure  (10%).  In  contrast  to 
this, the Third Plan put infrastructure 
to  the fore  (50%  of investments) and 
the Fourth Plan mining (31 %) and in-
frastructure (29%). 
That, then,  is  the economic picture 
in Mauritania, which is  trying to save 
what  is  left  of its  immense  territory 
from  desertification  in  an  economic 
climate that is  unfavourable to one of 
its  main  assets,  iron.  Will  it  manage 
it?  Aliou  Ba,  Economic  Secretary  to 
the  Military  Committee  of National 
Salvation believes  it will.  "Ours is  a 
vast country that is short of  water. It is 
rich  in  one  thing  that  many  other 
countries produce-iron. Fishing calls 
for  a  lot of capital  and we  have  500 
km of coast to patrol. And yet,  every-
where,  there  are  people  who  work 
hard  and  who  succeed,  although 
maybe not enough of them yet". o 
A.T. 
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''  The fight against the  desert has not  been  lost ... '' 
says Head of State Colonel Maaouya Ould  Sid'  Ahmed Taya 
Formerly army chief  of  staff, Co-
lonel  Maaouya  Ould  Sid'Ahmed 
Taya was Prime Minister of  Mau-
ritania from  1981  to  84  and be-
came  President  of the  Military 
Committee  of National  Salvation 
and Head  of State  in  December 
1984  when  he  ousted  Colonel 
Khouna Ould H aidalla. 
In this  written  interview,  he an-
swers the Courier's questions. 
..,._  Do  you  think  Mauritania  now 
has all the right conditions for the sta-
bility  that · is  vital  to  any  develop-
ment? 
- The  answers  to  your  questions 
derive directly from an analysis of the 
reasons  leading  up  to  the  changes  in 
our country. War, waste, bad manage-
ment,  personal power,  attacks on the 
fundamental  rights  of the  people  and 
the lack of a strong State  - all  these 
things have helped create the situation 
you are referring to. 
What i can say is that we  are doing 
and will continue to do our utmost to 
combat these  evils,  all  of them,  with 
the active help of all the people. 
For  our  people  are  perfectly  well 
aware of the risks our country has run 
over the  past few  years and they  un-
derstand the importance and the point 
of putting  things  in  order  as  we  are 
now doing. 
The very day after our restructura-
tion,  the  Military  Committee  of Na-
tional Salvation and the Government 
produced a plan for economic and fi-
nancial  recovery  so  our  economy, 
which had been hard hit by a combi-
nation  of drought  and  bad  manage-
ment of the  national  resources  could 
be got off the ground again. Almost 55 
billion ouguiyas would be invested in 
the country by  1988  and the 400 pro-
jects  planned  will  bring  work  for 
hundreds of our unemployed. 
And contact with our foreign partn-
ers has borne ample fruit  - we  have 
got our external debt rescheduled and 
won our funders' support for our eco-
nomic and financial recovery plan. 
Hundreds  of  political  prisoners 
from  the  old  regime  have  been  rei-
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eased and a start is being made on the 
democratization  of our  political  life 
with  the  imminent  municipal  elec-
tions, the first Mauritania has had for 
more than 20 years. 
So  the  conditions  are  right  for  all 
our people to join in the drive to  re-
build the country and the creative ge-
nius of the  nation  will  pave  the  way 
for a new era of progress and harmony 
in our efforts to improve the lot of all 
Mauritanians. 
I can also assure you that the cam-
paign to reconcile  our people with it-
self and to get  it back on the road to 
emancipation,  progress  and  therefore 
stability  will  be  indefatigably  pur-
sued. 
..,_  The  Mauritanian  economy  has 
had a particularly heavy debt burden to 
bear over the past few years.  What so-
lutions can you see to  this? 
- Correlative  to  what  I  said  just 
now,  our  plan,  over  and  above  the 
idea of righting the economy, is to run 
projects  that  will  reduce  our  depen-
dence on the outside world by produc-
ing the means to further our develop-
ment ourselves. 
The  rest  will  be  achieved  through 
rigorous  management  of  our  goods 
and  resources,  thereby  consolidating 
the confidence we have restored in our 
partners. 
..,._  Mauritania is hoping to be added 
to the UN list of  least developed coun-
tries.  What  do  you expect to  come of 
this listing - which may well look like 
an  admission of  defeat? 
- I do not see it like that. Nor do I  1 
have  any  complexes  about  accepting 
the truth. You haven't overlooked the 
fact that, over the past 10 years, Mau-
ritania has  been hit by  the combined 
effects of the drought, the internation-
al  economic situation and the conflict 
in the  Sahara, all  of which  have con-
siderably  slowed  down  our economic 
1 
and  social  development.  Add  to  that 
the  consequences  of  the  previously 
1 
slack management of our national re-
sources and you will  easily see  why  it 
is  wrong  to ·classify  Mauritania  else-
where than among the LLDCs. 
We  have  a  lot  of  potential,  no 
doubt,  but  it  should  not  lead  us  to 
overestimate our real  possibilities.  In 
this as  in  many other fields,  we  have 
made a realistic assessment of our sit-
uation  since  the  reorganization  of 12 
December  1984.  But we  do not think 
that belonging to the group of LLDCs 
is  our destiny  and  our economic  ac-
tion  is  aimed  at  getting  us  off the 
listO>. 
..,.  Mauritania's  agricultural  future 
very much depends on the development 
of the  Senegal  river  valley.  Can  the 
country afford to  wait for the comple-
tion of  this project,  which  has been hit 
by the vagaries of  international financ-
ing? 
- Farming is still the Achilles heel 
of our economy.  Although cereal pro-
duction was up at 120 000 t in the 60s, 
we  could  only  count  on  20 000 t  in 
1984  and  this  critical  threshold  both 
increased  our  food  dependence  and 
strengthened  our  conviction  that 
priority had to go  to the rural sector. 
So 36.6% of  the projected investments 
in our economic and financial recove-
(1)  The immediate advantage to Mauritania of 
being added to the list of least developed coun-
tries would  be  the wiping off of its debts to the 
OECD countries - which would considerably re-
duce its repayment problems. ry plan for the coming three years are 
going  into  farming.  In  our  country, 
where implacable drought has hit hard 
for more than 10 years, it goes without 
saying  that  we  have  to  control  our 
water resources if  we are to get agricul-
ture off the ground again. That is why 
water  engineering  is  to  get  22.7%  of 
our investments, with  priority on ex-
ploiting  the  potential  of our  under-
ground and surface water supplies and 
the rate of hydro-agricultural develop-
ment,  which  is  still  very  slow,  will 
have to go up. This is why the Nation-
al  Rural  Development  Company 
(SONADER), which had been short of 
cash and very quiet for  several years, 
picked up  again  in  1985.  Other mea-
sures  aimed at boosting output - fix-
ing  incentive  prices,  introducing agri-
cultural credit facilities, improving ex-
tension  services  and  buying  surplus 
production - are also  being run,  with 
the  whole  idea  of  giving  practical 
shape to the importance we  attach to 
farrning.  Most of our irrigable land is 
in the Senegal valley and therefore in-
cluded in the OMVS  programme.  We 
believe in this type of community de-
velopment and we  do not think there 
are any financial problems attached to 
it. 
ltll·  After the terrible cycle of  drought 
of lhe  past  few  years  and the  awful 
effects  it  has had on  your arable land 
and on your cattle,  many people think 
that  Mauritania  has  already  lost  the 
fight  against  desertification.  What  do 
you think? 
-- We  in Mauritania have suffered 
particularly  badly  from  the  climate 
and it  has  diminished our herds  and 
increased our cereal requirements. But 
it  ils  not  just  Mauritania.  It is  the 
whole  of the  Sahelian ecosystem  that 
is under threat. Solving the problem is 
more than any one State can do alone, 
so  we  in the  region  have  formed  the 
CILSS,  our inter-state  Sahel  drought 
control committee. 
It did not take us long to realize that 
this  was  not  a  passing  phenomenon 
and that we  had to set up a structure 
to  coordinate  regional  schemes,  pri-
marily to  control water resources,  re-
plant trees,  run research  and develop 
irrigated crops.  Mauritania is also de-
veloping  special  programmes  of its 
own with the help of the international 
cornmunity.  We  think the  battle  will 
be  hard, but it has not been lost. 
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~  Times in Mauritania are chang-
ing and the  once-nomadic population 
is settling down,  but the economy is not 
keeping pace with  the trend and creat-
ing the jobs  now needed.  How do  you 
plan to rectify this? 
- This is  a very real  phenomenon 
and it follows  on from the scourges of 
drought  and  desertification  which 
have practically emptied our country-
side in recent years and sent people to 
the  towns  and  other  built-up  areas, 
creating the imbalance you are talking 
about. 
But we  have already taken steps  to 
do  something  about  unemployment, 
particularly  by  creating  hundreds  of 
jobs as  part of the projects laid down 
in our economic recovery plan. 
We  also  have  a fund  to  get  people 
back to work (the FIRVA) which pro-
vides help for certain categories of  un-
employed  by  financing  albeit  modest 
projects to create jobs. 
~  Mauritania has launched an eco-
nomic  and  financial  recovery  plan 
which  starts  this  year  and  calls  for 
$ 700  million  over  three  years.  Have 
you found this financing? 
- First  of all,  let  me  say  that the 
plan actually started in  1985  and will 
continue over the next two years. 
I can tell  you  that we  already have 
the support of all our partners when it 
comes to financing.  They have agreed 
to help us run the programme and we 
are  confident  they  will  stick  to  their 
commitments. 
I should like to taken this oportuni-
ty of thanking our partners once more 
and expressing our profound gratitude 
to all  the States,  organizations and fi-
nancial  institutions  which  have  so 
generously responded to our appeal. 
~ Mauritania  is  a  member of the 
Arab League and as such has benefited 
from major Arab financing.  Have these 
been  affected by the oil price drop? 
- Most of the Arab countries that 
produce oil have been forced to review 
their internal investment programmes 
in  many  fields  and  the  drop  in  oil 
prices obviously has  something to  do 
with this. In a difficult economic situ-
ation, it is easy to understand that the 
generosity  of the  past  may  be  rather 
attenuated,  but  we  are  still  pleased 
with the many kinds of assistance we 
get  from  our  brothers  in  the  Arab 
world.  We  very much appreciated the 
brotherly attitude of the Arab funders 
when  we  negotiated  the  rescheduling 
of our external debt and adopted our 
economic  and  financial  recovery 
plan. 
~ Mauritania  cooperated with  Eu-
rope right from the start.  What do you 
think about this cooperation and what 
direction should it take? 
- Our relations with the European 
Community  are  very  sound.  Europe 
understands  our problems  and backs 
up  our  efforts  to  right  the  country's 
economy  and  finances  and  we  are 
committed  to  persevering  with  the 
drive  to  rationalize  our ,management 
and to rationalize our investments and 
to  encourage  the  private  sector  and 
what  we  hope  the  foreign  investors 
will  do  is  exploit the  possibilities  of-
fered  by  the  economic  and  financial 
recovery programme. If our European 
partners continued to provide support, 
they would give us cause for hope and 
for coping with the relaunching of our 
economy.  We  hope that our coopera-
tion expands, in particular through the 
involvement  of various  public  and 
private partners. The field for cooper-
ation between Mauritania and Europe 
is  very  broad.  The  potential  is  still 
immense  and  we  are  convinced  that 
this cooperation will be boosted in all 
fields and that the Community will go 
on giving us its support with our eco-
nomic recovery. 
~  Mauritania  has  curtailed its  in-
volvement in  the Western Sahara con-
flict that is,  alas,  still going on.  Can  it 
and does  it  want  to  mediate  in  this 
war? 
- After  our restructuration  on  12 
December 1984, we loudly proclaimed 
the fact  that we  intended to  establish 
brotherly relations of confidence with 
all  the  countries  in  the  Maghreb  -
just as  we  adopted neutrality towards 
the  Sahara  conflict  which  has  been 
tearing the region apart for more than 
a decade. Yet we are still interested in 
the conflict on our doorstep and, as we 
have  privileged  relations  with  all  the 
parties concerned, we are doing all we 
can to bring peace back to this part of 
the  world  so  that we  can all  concen-
trate on the task of building the Great 
Arab Maghreb.  o  A.T. 
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''What you  have to  look at, 
beyond the present state of SNIM, 
are  our  enormous  reserves of iron  ore'' 
An  interview with  Mohamed Saleck Ould  HEYINE, 
Director-General of the SNIM 
Iron mining completely transformed the Mauritan-
ian economy in the '60s,  with  a tenfold increase in 
the earnings of this country which had scraped a liv-
ing  from  traditional  nomadic  herding  until  then. 
Something  like  CF  AF  70  billion  were  invested  in 
developing the Zouerate iron (average  65  grade)  de-
posit  over  the  1960-72  period  by  MIFERNA,  the 
Mauritanian Mining Company in which most of the 
shares  were  held by  the  State  and French iron and 
steel  companies,  in  association  with  British,  Italian 
and German shareholders. The infrastructure built at 
the time included a 675 km railway between the mine 
and the port of Nouadhibou. 
In  1974,  Mauritania  nationalized  the  MIFERNA 
installations  and  renamed  the  concern  COMINOR 
(the Northern Mining Complex), which became a vi-
tal  part  of the  SNIM  (the  National  Industrial  and 
Mining Company). That year, production reached the 
never-to-be-beaten level of 11.1  million tonnes. It has 
dropped since,  down  to  7.4  million  tonnes  in  1977 
and  '78  when  there  were  constant  Polisario  Front 
attacks on the railway, and now with slight improve-
ments the figure  is  around 10  million tonnes. 
The  high-grade  reserves,  at this  rate,  should  last 
until  1990,  but,  since  1981,  Mauritania has  known 
that the recently operational Guelbs mining concern, 
where  the ore is  lower grade but the  reserves  enor-
mous, will  be there to take over. 
The  Courier  asked  SNIM  Director-General  Mo-
hamed  Saleck  Ould  Heyine  a  few  questions  in  his 
Nouadhibou headquarters. 
,..  How  many people  do  you  have 
working for the SNIM? 
- There  are  5 875  staff,  half  at 
Zouerate and half at Nouadhibou and 
on the railway. 
..,.  They  say  that  iron  ore  prices 
have slumped recently.  What is the av-
erage price at the moment? 
- It fluctuates a lot.  The one sure 
thing is that it has dropped to half the 
price (in constant terms,  that is)  over 
the past 20 years.  In 1983 and 84,  the 
price  dropped  by  20%-that was  in 
only  two  years.  It crept  up  a  bit,  by 
3-4%,  in  1985,  but  in  1986  it  went 
down again,  by  3-7%.  So  it fluctuates 
a lot.  Then there is  another problem, 
of course, an important one for us and 
serious and that is ·that we feel the full 
effect of any currency fluctuations too. 
Our ore is  sold in dollars and the in-
stability of the dollar, especially at the 
moment, is  very unfavourable to us. 
,..  You  must have been fairly happy 
a few  years  ago  when  the  dollar  was 
particularly high ... 
- We  were  indeed.  But everything 
is relative, because although we sold in 
dollars, we got most of  our supplies on 
the European market-at a favourable 
rate  of exchange-and on  the Ameri-
can market too. 
..,.  You  aren't producing  at  a  loss, 
are you,  in  spite of the present  situa-
tion? 
- It's touch and go. 
..,..  How many sites are you working 
at the moment? 
- The old mines and the new one. 
There  were  two  deposits  in  the  old 
mines, I think I can say,  and the new 
mine  was  opened in  1981  and began 
exporting ore last year. The new depo-
sit is  an important one.  In  1985,  the 
new  mine  produced  15%  of the  na-
tional output and the rest came from 
the old mines, which have reserves for 
about  another  10  years.  But  the  re-
serves at our new  site are enormous. 
..,..  But  are  they  more  difficult  to 
process? 
- Yes,  they  are.  The  enrichment was  not there in the old mines and so 
the production costs are higher. At the 
moment, we are increasing output, al-
though  we  are  far  from  reaching  our 
capacity  of  6  million  tonnes.  We 
shan't do that until  1987-88. We  pro-
duced one million tonnes in 1985 and 
we  shall produce 3 million tonnes this 
year. 
•  Does it  seem likely that once the 
old mines are exhausted, Mauritania's 
present production  of around 10  mil-
lion  tonnes will drop? 
- No,  because  the  first  capacity, 
the  6  million  tonnes,  that  Guelbs  is 
turning  out  will  have  doubled  by 
about  1991-92,  so  we  shall  maintain 
an  average  of  at  least  12  million 
tonnes.  Our production figure  is  10.5 
million tonnes at the moment, but the 
facilities  can  handle  more  than  that, 
far  more. 
~·  But that means more very expen-
sive investment for the  '90s,  doesn't it? 
- Absolutely! 
..,.  Have you already obtained the fi-
1  nancing? 
' 
- Not yet.  We  are currently repay-
ing the first  phase financing and this, 
obviously,  will  take  until  the  year 
2005.  But  the  bulk  will  have  been 
reimbursed  by  1990-91-which  is 
when we start looking for financing for 
Phase Two . 
..,_  You  won't  be  able  to finance  it 
yourself? 
- We  have to.  We  have to find at 
least a third or a quarter. So  we  have  ·~ 
to have accumulated some capital by  8 
then to cover our contribution.  ~ 
IJJl- The  SNIM  also  does  research 
and prospection,  doesn't  it.  How far 
has it got? 
- Traditionally,  we  have  mainly 
looked  for  iron  ore,  but  we  have 
slowed  up  lately  as  we  have  discov-
ered some relatively large deposits  . 
..,.  Reserves of  how many tonnes? 
700 million  . 
..,.  What grade? 
38%.  So  we  think that we  have 
our  exits  relatively  well  covered  for 
the next 20 years and then, we think, it  .~ 
won't be so  difficult because our aims  8 
are  already  defined  and  we  know,  if  ~ 
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we  need  to  start further  prospection, 
where to go.  So we have stopped pros-
pecting over vast areas in all  parts of 
the country. Over the last year or two, 
the  SNIM  has  also  prospected  for 
phosphates in the southern part of the 
country,  with  the  collaboration  of 
BRGM,  the  Thies  (Senegal)  phos-
phates  company,  and  a  Romanian 
firm.  We found a deposit in the south 
with  reserves  of an  estimated  130-
140 million tonnes. 
...,..  Don't you plan to  look for cop-
per,  the other ore you used to  work? 
- We pulled out of copper in 1978. 
As you know, a company was set up to 
prospect and mine copper in Akjouit, 
so  someone  else  is  running  the  re-
search  and  will  be  doing  the  actual 
mining.  So  for  the  moment,  we  are 
sticking  to  iron  and  phosphates.  We 
are  taking  a  minor interest  in  urani-
um,  but the  way  energy  prices are  at 
the moment, this project has been put 
on ice. 
~  The  trains  from  Zouerate  are 
supposed  to  be  the  longest  in  the 
world.  How  long  are  they,  on  aver-
age? 
- They are 2 200 m  long and they 
weigh  19 000 t empty. 
...,..  What  are  SNIM's  problems  at 
the moment? 
- In order of importance, the price 
of iron ore,  which  is  low  and getting 
lower all the time. That is the problem 
of  all  mines,  in  fact,  not  just  the 
SNIM's. All  iron mines have been hit 
by the very low ore prices and it's cer-
tainly  a  big  problem.  The  second 
problem is  debt. 
~  How big is  it? 
- $ 350 million. And as  I said, we 
have  to  pay  it  back,  most  of it  by 
1990. If  you add ore prices to the debt, 
it's a lot.  It means that a large part of 
our earnings will have to go to pay our 
external  debts.  The  third  point,  I 
think,  is  the  cost of energy  products. 
We live off oil. It is the only source of 
energy  we  have  and  our  oil  bill  is 
enormous. 
I ron  ore is extracted from huge open-cast mines 
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illl"  There is  talk of  reorganizing the 
SNIM.  What will this involve? 
- There is not really any reorgani-
zation,  properly  speaking,  of  the 
SNIM. You know we  benefitted from 
colossal  modernization  recently  as 
part of the Guelbs project, but it was 
the centre-north site, the iron ore pro-
duction centre that was the main ben-
eficiary.  So the rest of the SNIM, the 
port and  the  railway-the  track  and 
the engines and the wagons, that is-
did not  benefit.  So  you  see  that the 
SNIM  modernization  plan  was  con-
cerned with that particular sector. We 
bought modem equipment because in 
some cases what we had was 20 years 
old and  obsolete,  so  the  moderniza-
tion  drive  will  certainly  involve  an 
improvement in productivity. 
..,.  Doesn't  the  SNIM  have  to  do 
something about the financing that will 
be the responsibility of  the State? 
- No! The financing is  something 
like $ 80 million and the SNIM will be 
providing  half.  The  other  half  will 
come from funders such as the World 
Bank,  the  Saudi  Fund,  the  Kuwait 
Fund and so  on. 
..,.  In the past,  Mauritania got a lot 
of  Community financing through  Sta-
bex,  but iron  is  no  longer covered,  so 
what sort of  aid are you expecting? 
- The best aid we could be given, I 
think, is not aid,  perhaps, but justice. 
It means stabilizing the price of iron 
ore.  That must be the first  thing any 
producer of raw  materials,  especially 
iron ore, will want. 
..,.  I  was  referring  to  Sysmin-I 
think  you  have  made  an  applica-
tion ... ? 
- You certainly know more about 
Sysmin than I do. It's more particular 
than  the  Stabex  because  the  benefi-
ciaries are firms and the main idea is to 
rehabilitate the production apparatus. 
We have indeed made an application 
this year and it is going to be discussed 
.  with the representatives of the EEC. 
"I can't imagine the 
SNIM stopping ...  " 
..,.  Mauritania  has  stopped produc-
ing copper,  so  do  you  imagine that it 
will  stop  producing  iron  too  if the 
things  you  mentioned just  now,  the 
falling  prices,  the  rising  production 
costs and so  on,  continue? 
- You know, I think it would be a 
very  serious  thing  if Mauritania  did 
that.  I  don't think it is  on the cards. 
We  have  lived  through,  and  we  are 
still  living  through,  a  very  difficult 
period,  for  reasons  I  have  just  out-
lined,  prices,  debts  and so  on,  but  I 
feel  that  the  consequences  would  be 
extremely serious for the country. So-
cially speaking first of all, as we  are a 
big employer, the biggest employer in 
Mauritania. 
..,.  5 875 staff,  you said? 
6 000 if you want to round up. 
And  in  terms  of wages  we  pay  out 
much the same as the State does.  So 
that would be the first  serious conse-
quence. The second is that we make a 
contribution  to  the  State  budget 
through  the  taxes  the  Government 
raises on the SNIM. It would lose the 
State  a  relatively  large  source  of in-
come if we stopped our activities. 
..,.  You  are still paying tax in  spite 
of  the situation you are in? 
We have a rather special tax sys-
tern.  It  doesn't  depend  on  how  well 
the firm is doing and if things are go-
ing very well  we  don't get  over-taxed 
either. It's a constant system and rates 
don't alter with performance. 
..,.  How  much  do  you  pay  in  tax, 
roughly? 
- A  percentage  of turnover.  But 
once again,  our firm is  important be-
cause it brings in foreign exchange. It 
is vital for the State. The fisheries sec-
tor is currently working on a turnover 
something like the SNIM's, but it still 
means that the SNIM is bringing in at 
least 50% of Mauritania's foreign  ex-
change earnings.  Our foreign  clientele 
is well-established. They know us well 
and we  do things for them. 
..,.  Where is  this clientele? 
In  Europe.  In  Italy,  Belgium, 
France, England, Germany and Spain. 
So  I  cannot imagine the SNIM stop-
ping its activities. First of all, we have 
not been reduced to that. We wouldn't 
consider such a  thing at all.  It would 
take very little for things to go  well.  I 
think  stable  prices  and  currencies 
would to a great deal for the SNIM. 
..,.  Do you foresee  any stabilization· 
in  iron  ore  prices?  Or  even  an  in-
crease? 
- Unfortunately no! Studies that I 
have  had the  opportunity of reading 
are no cause for  optimism in this re-
spect. But things can change drastical-
ly  from  one day to the next.  Who,  a 
couple  of  months  ago,  would  have 
thought  that  disaster  would  have 
struck  the  oil  producing  countries? 
And what will be the consequences for 
other  raw  materials?  We  just  don't 
know. Things change so. 
The  trucks go  across  a lift bridge to  be  unloaded in  Nouadhibou 
50 ~  Your  clientele  can  always  go 
somewhere else.  Are you sure you can 
hang on  to  your clients? 
Of course we  can! 
"The SNIM is  not 
bothered by  the enormous 
Brazilian project" 
~  Brazil has this enormous Carajas 
project and the ACPs are  waging  war 
against it ... 
- First of all,  Brazil  is  the biggest 
producer  in  the  world,  you  mustn't 
forget  that.  And it is  certainly Brazil 
that determines the iron market on the 
producers'  side-with  Australia.  We 
don't count  for  much.  Then there  is 
always  the  spectre  of the  cartels.  If 
Brazil  and  Australia  agreed  on  iron 
ore production tomorrow, they would 
rule  the sector.  But  I  think the  other 
iron  producers  have  their  place  and 
they  are  even  necessary  to  the  con-
sumers. There is security of supply, to 
start with.  That is  something  impor-
tant. I don't think any of the sellers is 
anxious to smash the prices down, but 
1  there  is  the  security  factor  and  it  is 
,  very  important.  And  when  you  take 
the SNIM, it supplies the EEC market 
the  tune  of 7-10%,  which  is  not 
·  "ble.  We  are not important on a 
scale,  but 7-10%  of the  EEC's 
ly  is  still  something  to  talk 
ut. 
..,.  There  may be Guinea  tomorrow 
- Yes,  and  Senegal  and  Gabon. 
t  is  all  very  fine  for  the EEC  be-
it  means  it  can  diversify  its 
.C'Allri"'C>to  of supply. 
MAURITANIA 
- I think we all have our place. We 
are not being crowded out. But to re-
turn to  Brazil.  The  SNIM  is  not bo-
thered by the enormous Brazilian pro-
ject because we feel  that our ore, qual-
itatively  speaking,  complements  Bra-
zil's ore. Producers who take Brazilian 
ore will be inclined-and I'm not say-
ing  they'll  do it automatically-to  go 
for an additional ore that will comple-
ment it,  as  you cannot load blast fur-
naces  with  just  one  type  of ore-or 
only very rarely-and as ours comple-
ments the Brazilian ore, Brazil's future 
clients may well  come to the SNIM. 
Q; 
·;:: 
~ 
0 
(.) 
~  Might the Arab countries  not be  ~ 
an outlet for you?  t-
- You have to understand the nat-
ure  of the Arab iron and steel  indus-
try-or future  industry,  I  should  say, 
as  it is  very  rudimentary at the  mo-
ment. It will not be based on blast fur-
naces and steel mills such as you have 
in Europe and Japan and so on. It will 
be based more as an energy raw mate-
rial, on gas.  And that means very high 
grade  ore.  This  kind of ore  exists  in 
the world, but there aren't many depo-
sits.  But in the future, we  think, in 10 
or  15  years.. .  we  have  ore  that  can 
easily  be  used  for  this ... obviously it 
calls  for  additional investment, but if 
the market develops, then we have the 
ore and Mauritania is  already bearing 
it in mind. 
~  You don't have any plans to pro-
duce finished products for the regional 
market? 
Not for the moment. 
..,.  How do  you see the SNIM's fu-
ture  in  a  Mauritania  that  is  turning 
into a desert? 
- What you have to look at are the 
"Our ore complements the ore  they 
produce in  Brazil" 
reserves  outside  the  present  SNIM, 
which  is  only  a  small  undertaking in 
comparison  with  those  in  Brazil  and 
Australia. What you have to look at is 
the potential of Mauritania's iron ore. 
It is  enormous.  In  the  area  we  are 
working at the moment, we  have esti-
mated reserves of more than 2 billion 
tonnes. 
..,.  You  mentioned  700  million 
tonnes  ... 
- Those are the reserves on which 
the ongoing Guelbs projects are based. 
But  there  are  more  than  2  billion 
tonnes in the Zouerate region.  And in 
a second sector 60 km as the crow flies 
from Nouadhibou there are reserves of 
an estimated 6 billion tonnes.  It's low 
grade ore, but it is colossal wealth and 
we  shall begin  working these deposits 
in  10  or  15  years,  there's  no  doubt 
about that. We  will be in a more im-
portant  position  and  we  will  have 
greater possibilities. I think it is a sec-
tor which will  develop, even if things 
in Mauritania are not so  good at the 
moment.  o  A. T. 
Conveyor belts then  take the ore straight on  board the ore  carriers 
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Profile of Mauritania 
Area:  1 030 700 km
2 
Population:  1 700 000 
Rate of population growth: 2.4 °/o  p.a. 
Density:  1. 5 per km 
2 
GNP per capita (1983): US$ 475 
Capital: Nouakchott (500 000 inhabitants) 
Other cities: N ouadhibou, Kaedi, N ema 
Head of State: Colonel  Maaouya  Ould  Sid'  Ahmed 
Taya 
Main food  products: millet, sorghum, maize 
Livestock:  cattle  ( 1 million  head),  sheep  and goats 
(  6 500 000 head), camels (770 000 head) 
Main exports: iron ore (10 000 000 t),  fish 
Currency:  Ouguiya  (UM).  1  ECU  =  72.61  UM 
(1/4/86) 
MALl 
The  stranger  is  always  wel-
come in  Mauritania.  Invaria-
bly the welcome is  accompan-
ied  by  "zrig ",  a  mixture 
sour  milk,  water  and  sugar; 
thereafter  he  is  offered  three 
glasses of  mint tea  while he is 
having  a  rest  in  a  corner  oj 
the Moorish  tent,  a  vast can-
vas  structure whose  side flaps 
can  be  raised  or lowered  ac-
cording  to  the  direction  of 
wind and sun. MAURITANIA 
EEC cooperation in  the 
development of Mauritania 
important buyer, as the figures for the 
last two years show: 
By John MACE(*) 
As  is the case with most former co-
lonies  of the  original  EEC  member-
states, Mauritania has been associated 
with  the  Community  since  her  inde-
pendence in 1960, under the 1st Euro-
pean  Development  Fund  and  under 
the Yaounde and Lome agreements. 
Mauritania  entered  independence 
with  most  of the  problems  typically 
besetting all developing countries; but 
she has,  in addition, had to  deal with 
two  others;  first,  the  instability  asso-
ciated  with  the  decolonisation of one 
of her neighbours, the Western Sahara. 
And,  latterly,  the  savage  realities  of 
the  Sahel  drought,  now  in  its  four-
teenth year,  which  has  brought about 
Community 
Others 
Arab  hinge  countries  with  a  mixed 
population, typically found at this lati-
tude  in  Africa.  One  of the  tasks  of 
Mauritania's leaders has been to forge 
these different peoples into a nation. 
· Total 
The country's resources  are  few:  in  ' 
the North, iron ore together with some 
other mineral deposits of lesser impor-
tance; and an extremely rich,  but de-
pleting,  fishing-ground;  in  the  South, 
an important river shared with Sene-
gal  and which offers potential for irri-
gated and flood-recession agriculture. 
Mauritania's lifestyle on the date of 
achieving  independence  was  an  eco-
nomically  fragile  one;  stockrearing, 
traditional  fishing  and  farming,  the 
Total 
In the  case  of fish,  if recent trends 
are  maintained,  the  Community  of 
Twelve  nations  will  account  for  al-
most  a  quarter  of Mauritanian  ex-
ports: 
The  EDF has financed several irrigated bottomland projects along the Senegal river 
an  agonising  conflict  of  priorities. 
When  everything  is  urgent,  what  do 
you do first? And how do you recon-
cile  the  needs  of development  with 
those  of survival,  when the latter be-
comes ever more pressing,  and avail-
able  skills  and  resources  do  not  in-
crease  proportionately? 
Mauritania  is  a  vast  country, 
1 030 700 km  2,  with a very sparse and 
unevenly  spread  population,  1. 7  mil-
lion.  Ethnically,  it is one of the Afro-
(*)  Commission Delegate in  Mauritania. 
latter practised  in  three  forms:  oasis, 
rainfed,  and  flood  recession.  All  of 
these  activities have suffered severely 
in  the  current  situation,  and  have 
made  economic  reappraisal,  and  an 
appropriate response  from  her partn-
ers,  urgently necessary. 
Trade with the 
Community 
The  two  major  commodities  ex-
ported are iron ore and fish.  For iron 
ore, the Community is by far the most 
Aware of this potential, Mauritania 
is  interested in concluding a  fisheries 
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ever,  the  negotiations  for  this  agree-
ment have struck repeated difficulties 
and are still pending. 
Overall, the Community is the most 
important trading  partner for  Mauri-
tania; the Community's share of Mau-
ritania's imports and exports has been, 
of late: 
Imports into  Exports from 
Mauritania  Mauritania 
1980  51.0%  64.0% 
1981  40.92%  47.1% 
1982  32.3%  42.55% 
1983  38.31%  37.7% 
1984  36.43%  47.22% 
It is  noteworthy  that,  apart  from 
one  recent  year,  Mauritania's  trade 
balance with the Community is well in 
her favour. The trade surplus for  1984 
was  32%. 
Community aid 
The other important element today 
in  the  association  between  the  Com-
munity  and  Mauritania  is  the  Com-
munity's  aid  programme,  and  within 
that,  the  most  important  is  the  aid 
made available under the Lome Con-
ventions (see  table opposite). 
To these amounts under two  Lome 
Conventions,  one  can  add,  for  the 
same period,  the Community's grants 
of food  aid and certain  other actions 
financed  from  the Community's bud-
get: 
Direct Food Aid,  1975-1985: 
121,550 t cereals 
8,550 t butteroil 
11 ,400 t milk powder 
Total, at today's prices : 
± ECU 49 000 000 
Environmental Protection: 
ECU 2 335 000 
Emergency Aid: ECU 4 600 000 
Cofinancing  with  Non-Governmental  Or-
ganizations : ± ECU 1 608 000 
which  brings  the  ten-year  total  to 
± ECU 283  million. 
Irrigation and  agriculture 
The weight of the Community's aid 
has gone into agriculture, more partic-
ularly the irrigated sector, which most 
people see as the possibility of the fu-
ture.  Within the country,  in  common 
54 
The  bulk of the  Community's aid has gone  to  agriculture, 
including rice production 
I.  Indicative Programme 
Rural Development 
of which :  Agriculture 
Agric.  Infrastr. 
Livestock 
Infrastructure 
of which :  Roads 
Ports 
Mining 
Fisheries 
Social 
Water 
of which:  Health 
Education, Training 
Techn. Assist., Studies 
II.  Emergency Aid 
III.  Stabex 
IV.  EIB (Loans&Risk Cap.) 
Total available 1.1.1986 
V.  Regional Fund: actions directly 
or indirectly in favour of 
Mauritania (estimated) 
with  most  donors  and  in  conformity 
with  the  Government's  orientations, 
the  emphasis  has  been  on  irrigated 
perimeters in the region of the Senegal 
nver and  the  Gorgol,  beyond  doubt 
the  most important control  structure 
in  this  complex  is  the  dam at  Foum 
Gleita  on  the  Gorgol,  for  which 
ECU 11  512 065  was  made  available 
from  Lome  I  and  II.  In  all,  Foum 
Gleita  will  control  a  reservoir  of 
500 million m3 of water; the perimet-
ers themselves cover currently 550 ha, 
~' 
Lome I  Lome II 
ECU 33 300 000  ECU 43 000 000 
59%  57% 
(25%)  (34%) 
(29%)  (19%) 
(5%)  (4%) 
11%  23% 
(11 %)  (13%) 
- (4%) 
- ,(6%) 
- 4% 
- 4% 
28%  12% 
(17%)  (6%) 
(11 %)  (6%) 
2%  -
ECU 5 427 400  ECU 6 360000 
ECU 37 000 450  -
ECU 28 636 608  ECU 7 '000 000 
ECU 104 364 458  ECU 56 360 000 
ECU 25 000 000  ECU 40 000 000 
"' 
with  an  expansion  target  of 2 400 ha 
by  1987  and 3 600 ha by  1990. 
The main regional effort of the Eu-
ropean  Development Fund  m  favour 
1 
of Mauritania is also in  the domain of 
irrigated agriculture, i.e.  support of the 
Organisation  pour la  Mise  en  Valeur 
du Fleuve Senegal (OMVS). The main 
investment is  in  the two dams of Ma-
nantali and Diama, the former on the 
Senegal  river,  the latter on  one  of its 
tributaries.  The  infrastructure  will  be MAURITANIA 
The proceeds of  food aid sales  would help develop  such projects as  market 
gardening 
shared with Senegal  and Mali.  Of the 
two dams, it is Manantali, upstream in 
Mali,  which  will  have the  major im-
pact  on  Mauritania,  providing 
120 000 ha  of irrigable  land  on  the 
Mauritanian  side  of  the  river  by 
1990. 
The  three  countries  are  having  to 
attack  the  problem  of proper utiliza-
tion of the water which  will  be made 
available when the two dams are com-
pleted (Diama in  1986 and Manantali 
in 1988); at the current rate of invest-
ment  only  10%  of the  developable 
land  would  in  fact  be  developed.  In 
fact,  the  area  under  flood  recession 
culture  will  remain  for  some  time 
greater  than  the  irrigated  area:  be-
tween  1  0 000  and 40 000  ha per year 
currently, (depending on rain and river 
spate)  against  a  maximum  of 
10 000 ha  irrigated  by  1990.  More-
over,  irrigated  agriculture  is  enor-
mously  more  expensive,  and  can  be 
far more harmful to the environment, 
than flood  recession agriculture. 
The social sector 
In the social sector, the Community 
has  financed  many  rural  primary 
schools and many health care projects, 
both basic  health  and  hospitals.  One 
To  help drought  victims  (often  living in  these  shanty towns)  the  EEC regularly 
gives food aid to  Mauritania.  In our photo (right)  Commission's delegate  John 
Mace is handing over to Mohamed Ould Babetha, Deputy Commissioner for Food 
Security,  a load of  foodstuffs 
should  mention  especially  the  exten-
sion of the hospital at Kaedi. Kaedi is 
a small town at the confluence of the 
Gorgol  and the  Senegal  rivers,  at  the 
heart of the irrigated area. In planning 
the extension of the existing hospital, 
it was  decided to develop local build-
ing material, and to base the design on 
tradition,  having  regard  not  only  to 
building style but also local lifestyle. A 
brickworks,  the  first  in  Mauritania, 
was  set  up  by  the  river.  Bricks  and 
tiles were made of river clay, the river 
water  being  drawn  by  a  windpump, 
and  the  bricks  and  tiles  being  fired 
with local ricehusks as fuel.  In general 
the quest for a local building material 
can  be  called  a  success;  we  shall  see 
what long term impact it has on build-
ing  habits.  The  style  of the  building, 
based  on  dome-shaped  units  con-
nected by  curved passages,  is  also  an 
experiment  which  has  brought  forth 
much comment-in truth, not all of it 
favourable. Final judgment can be giv-
en only after the hospital is completed 
and running. 
Lome III 
The  Indicative  Programme  for 
Lome III will be drawn up in July; its 
amount will  be ECU  61  million. 
In  considering  the  orientations  of 
Community  aid  to  Mauritania,  two 
phenomena need to be borne in mind. 
The  first  is  the  devastating  effect  of 
the drought.  It has  brought with  it a 
desertification  problem  which  would 
strain  the  resources  of even  a  devel-
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oped country. The desert advances by 
between 6 and  10 km  a year,  and the 
lifestyle of a whole population is being 
destroyed. 
The  other factor  is  the  current  at-
tempt  by  the  Government  to  take 
stock  soberly  of the  country's  situa-
tion, and to  plan its response to it. 
The drought 
Before the drought,  Mauritania had 
an acceptable degree of self-sufficiency 
in food,  thanks to her combination of 
stockrearing  and  the  three  forms  of 
agriculture  mentioned earlier.  But the  .~ 
repeated  failure  of the  rains,  coupled  ~  u 
with severe overgrazing bringing about  0 
the  impoverishment of the soil,  have  ~ 
destroyed  this  relative  self-sufficiency  a. 
and made Mauritania overwhelmingly  ~ 
dependent on emergency aid and food 
aid.  In  1984  the  Senegal  river,  on 
whose  annual  spate  most  of the  na-
tional grain production depended, had 
its poorest flood  season for  the whole 
80  years  for  which  records  had  been 
kept.  Grain production  fell  to  20 000 
tonnes  (compared  with  between 
80 000 and  1  00 000  tonnes before the 
drought).  In the  1984-85  season Mau-
ritania  grew  7%  of her  total  grain 
needs;  she  was  able  to  buy a  further 
28%  on  normal  commercial  terms, 
leaving a  gap  of 65%  to  be  filled  by 
foreign  food aid grants(*).  To compli-
cate  the  picture,  a  large  part  of the 
population  appeared  to  be  unable  to 
buy  its  essential  food,  even  if such 
were available on the market. 
During  1983,  1984  and  1985  the 
Community gave  repeated allocations 
of emergency  aid  in  most of the  sec-
tors  for  which  it  was  asked,  such  as 
water transport in the North, transport 
of food,  delivery of medicines and vi-
tamins,  delivery of seeds  and fertiliz-
ers,  purchase and distribution of local 
dried  fish,  and support for  local  and 
NGO  rural  medical  teams.  Looking 
back, we should probably have carried 
aut certain  operations differently,  but 
in  the  sense  that  we  undoubtedly 
helped to avert much disaster, we  can 
be  pleased with the result. 
(*)  The  1985-86  season  was  better-indeed it 
saw the best July, August and September for four 
years, as far as rainfall and river spate, and hence 
agricultural  production,  were  concerned  (57 000 
tonnes of grain,  nearly  three  times  the previous 
year's production). 
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The devastating effects of  drought were the central issue during the discussions on 
guidelines for Lome III 
Vital  though  such  operations  are, 
however,  they  have  disturbing impli-
cations.  The  mischievous  effects  of 
continued  free  food  distribution,  for 
example,  are  known  to  all.  During 
1985, a joint working group was set up 
in Nouakchott to work out plans for a 
Food for Work scheme, in response to 
this  problem.  The same group is  set-
ting  up  the  management  of a  Joint 
Counterpart  Fund  into  which  future 
proceeds of food  aid sales,  and out of 
which  certain  appropriate  projects, 
will be paid. The representatives of  the 
Community  Member  States,  and  the 
Commission Delegation, participate in 
these tasks. 
These  two  instruments will  help  to 
bridge  the  gap  between  survival  and 
development, which bridge is essential 
if we  are to keep the accent on devel-
opment.  If we  do  not,  the  survival 
priority will assume dangerous dimen-
sions. 
The economic and 
financial recovery plan 
It is  the  awareness  of this  and  re-
lated problems which no doubt led the 
Government,  in  1985,  to  follow  the 
International  Monetary  Fund's  very 
stringent recommendations as the first 
step  towards  economic  recovery.  A 
series  of austerity  measures  in  public 
spending and subsidy policy has been 
introduced.  With  the  help  of  the 
World Bank, a recovery plan, the Eco-
nomic  and  Financial  Recovery  Plan, 
which reflects the discipline and objec-
tiveness of the conclusions reached in 
collaboration with  the IMF,  has been 
drawn up for  the years  1985  to  1988, 
and all  donors have been asked to fit 
their aid into it. It is  a bold challenge 
which the Government has decided to 
take up,  and it will  need careful coor-
dination to make it work.  The Minis-
ter of Economy and Finance, Moham-
med Salem  Ould Lekhal,  who  is  also 
National  Authorizing  Officer  of the 
EDF, is  determined to follow what he 
calls  a policy  based on  means (politi-
que  des  moyens)  and  not  a  policy 
based  on  needs  (politique  des  be-
soins). 
The  formulation  and  adoption  of 
this plan reflects the quest for realism 
and dialogue  which  are  now  the base 
of the  Government's  approach.  It is 
hoped that this  dialogue  with  Mauri-
tania's friends will lead to aid which is 
both realisable and effective. 
The future 
The Recovery Plan is  a courageous 
step. It is too early to say how much of 
it will be achieved. But we might hope 
that the Lome III doctrine of concen-
trated  effort  will  give  the  maximum 
chance  of success  to  that part of the 
Plan's  realisation  to  which  the  Com-
munity will  contribute. o  J.M. EUROPE 
EEC-ANDEAN PACT RELATIONS 
On  the threshold of a Cooperation Agreement 
In previous issues of  The Courier,  the relations of  the EEC with various 
regional groupings around the world outside the ACP Group  have been 
touched upon,  and the series continues now with a look at EEC-Andean 
Pact relations. 
Latin America, before the accession of  Spain and Portugal,  was not an 
area with strong historic links with the Community, yet for more than 15 
years the EEC has been  weaving a web  of relationships,  cooperating in 
development,  economic  and commercial  affairs,  with  Latin  American 
countries,  among them,  the countries of  the Andean Pact. 
The  Andean  Pact  was  created  in 
1969  and comprises five  countries  -
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela.  It represents  a  novel  and 
ambitious  form  of sub-regional  inte-
gration  within  the  framework  of the 
looser  Latin  American  Free  Trade 
Area  (comprising  the  whole  conti-
nent).  The  Pact  countries  signed  the 
Cartagena  Agreement  which  foresees 
not merely  the  liberalization of trade 
but a  real  economic  union  forged  by 
joint industrial planning and the har-
monization  of economic  policies.  In 
its institutional form,  the Pact resem-
bles-more  than  faintly-the  EEC. 
There  is  a  Commission  - roughly 
equivalent  to  the  EEC's  Council  of 
Ministers,_ and a Junta, which applies 
the decisions of the Commission and 
which has its seat in Lima, Peru. The 
Junta,  headed  by  a  Coordinator,  is 
similar to the EEC  Commission in  its 
tasks and nature. In addition, as in the 
EEC,  the Pact has its own judicial tri-
bunal, Parliament, Consultative Com-
mittee and Economic and Social Con-
sultative  Committee.  The  EEC  has 
cooperated with the Andean Pact since 
its inception in 1969,  but it was on  17 
December 1983,  with the signing of a 
Cooperation  Agreement,  that  hopes 
for  even  broader  and  more  effective 
cooperation  between  the  two  group-
ings  rose.  Only one country, Ecuador, 
needs now to ratify the agreement be-
fore  it comes into force.  That ratifica-
tion is  expected at any moment. 
The  Andean  Pact  Junta  meet  the  Head  of the  EEC Delegation  in  Caracas, 
· Mr Boselli (left). He is shaking the hand of  the Junta Coordinator, Sr Echeverria. 
On  either  side  of the  Coordinator  are  his  colleagues,  Sr Salazar  (centre)  and 
Sr Guillermo (right) 
The economic background 
The  Andean  Pact  countries  are 
large-scale  suppliers  to  the  EEC  of a 
certain  number  of products,  notably 
oil, bananas, coffee, tin and other non-
ferrous  metals.  Their  exports  to  the 
EEC,  while  representing only  1.5% of 
EEC imports, are only in second place 
to their exports to the USA and stand 
at the  level  of 1  7 %.  Venezuela  is  the 
largest  exporter  to  the  EEC  (mostly 
oil)  followed,  in descending order,  by 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. 
The Pact countries' imports from  the 
EEC  are  composed mainly  of machi-
nery,  transport  equipment,  chemicals 
and other manufactured goods. 
Since  1971, the Community has ap-
plied the  Generalised  System  of Pre-
ferences to the Andean Pact Countries 
but several Pact Member States, nota-
bly Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, do 
not make use of the system up to even 
half of its potential. 
In  spite  of this,  the  Andean  Pact 
countries have,  for the last five  years, 
notched  up  surpluses  in  their  trade 
with the EEC, the positive balance ris-
ing  from  $US  1.0 19bn  in  1980  to 
$1. 785bn in  1984. 
Andean Pact Trade Balance 
with the EEC 
(in  Mio US  dollars) 
1980  1079 
1981  768 
1982  291 
1983  2158 
1984  1785 
Development cooperation 
The  development  aspect  of  EEC 
cooperation  with  Andean  Pact  coun-
tries has been without doubt the most 
important  hitherto.  Since  1979,  the 
Member States  and the .Andean  Pact 
Junta  (the  regional  body)  have  re-
ceived  over  ECU  200 m  in  financial 
and  technical  assistance,  food  aid, 
emergency  aid,  and  various  other 
forms of assistance, including EEC aid 
to  NGOs  working  on  the  spot.  The 
Junta  received  a  substantial  amount, 
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Table l: EEC-Aridean Pact'  trade 
Source ;  Eurostat. 
Imports 
Total Andean Pact  5077 
of  which 
Bolivia  231 
Colombia  1477 
Ecuador  253 
Peru  734 
Venezuela  2 382 
Exports 
Total Andean  Pad  4058 
of which 
Bolivia  117  211 
Colombia  781  '730 
Ecuador  419  401 
Peru  581  941 
Venezuela  2160  2178 
largely  in  the  form  of financial  and 
technical assistance, and aid for  trade 
promotion and energy cooperation. 
Development  cooperation  has  thus 
been  carried  on  for  some  time,  and 
under  the  new  Cooperation  Agree-
ment it is expected to continue, at the 
same time placing this cooperation in 
an institutional framework which will 
be  better placed to analyse and exam-
ine  individual  Member  States'  pro-
grammes  as  well  as  joint or regional 
programmes. 
The 1983 Cooperation 
Agreement 
The agreement signed on 17 Decem-
ber  1983  is  a  framework,  non-prefer-
ential agreement renewable  automati-
cally after five  years,  and it has  three 
major aspects:  economic, commercial 
and development cooperation. Devel-
opment cooperation has already  been 
touched upon: although financially the 
most  significant  element  of coopera-
tion,  it will  not be  fundamentally  af-
fected  by  the new Agreement. 
Economic cooperation 
Economic cooperation is  seen as  an 
area of considerable potential. EEC di-
rect  private  investment  in  Andean 
Pact  countries is  only  6 %-8%  of the 
average  of EEC  investment  in  other 
Latin  American  countries.  Plainly, 
there is  much to  be  done in this area, 
in  research,  information  and  promo-
tional activities aimed at the relevant 
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Peru 
Venezuela 
Ecuador 
Bolivia 
JUNAC 
10;29 
16.38 
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46.36 
Signing the Cooperation  Agreement on  17 December 1983 at Cartagena 
in  Colombia 'economic operators' in order to facil-
itate joint  ventures, technology trans-
fer,  licensing  agreements  and  other 
forms  of industrial  cooperation,  par-
ticularly in the mining and energy sec-
tors. 
Commercial cooperation 
It has already been noted that some 
Andean  Pact states  do  not take  even 
50% advantage of  the GSP preferences 
to which they are entitled currently. 
The  Agreement  should  be  used  to 
promote  the  expansion and diversifi-
cation  of commerce  by  reciprocally 
improving  market  access,  expanding 
access  to  the GSP system  and by  in-
tensifying  trade  promotion  measures. 
However,  experts  caution  against  too 
much expectation being placed on this 
since being in many cases, the markets 
are already structured by  other forms 
of agreement-GATT, product agree-
ments,  and so  on,-or offer  products 
of which the EEC  has an excess,  both 
in agriculture or in industrial products 
like steel and textiles. 
Projects 
Although  the  Cooperation  Agree-
ment,  at the  time of writing,  has  not 
carne into force,  the Commission has, 
'in  agreement  with  the  Andean  Pact 
Junta,  already  started  to  take  some 
practical steps in the area of economic 
cooperation. To this end, it financed a 
series of  seminars on Andean Pact reg-
ulations for foreign investors in Milan, 
Paris,  London and Frankfurt between 
29 April and 10 May 1985. And a con-
ference  for  industrial  undertakings 
from  both  groupings,  specializing  in 
agro-industry, is  scheduled to be  held 
in  Caracas  from  1  0-12  September 
1986.  Over 200  participants from  the 
two  sides are expected to attend. 
Until the accession of the two Iber-
ian components of the EEC,  it cannot 
be  said  that  the  Community  had 
strong historic ties  with Andean Pact 
countries. Yet,  in keeping with its ob-
jective of promoting global peace and 
stability, and in harmony with its own 
vocation  as  a  regional  grouping,  the 
Community has developed, over more 
than  15  years,  its  relations  with  the 
Andean  Pact  countries  to  a  point 
where,  with  the  ratification  of  the 
Cooperation  Agreement,  a  new  and 
positive  chapter of the  Community's 
external relations will  begin.  o  T.G. 
IRE  LA 
A  bridge in  time 
Nearly  half a  millennium  after 
Columbus set out from Europe,  La-
tin  Americans  and Europeans  are 
building a  bridge  of understanding 
between the two continents. 
The  name of this  bridge  is  IRE-
LA, the Institute for European-Latin 
American  Relations  which  was  set 
up  through  the efforts  of European 
and Latin American  scholars,  offi-
cials and  journalists, and is run on a 
grant  (of ECU  350 000  for  1985) 
from the EEC. 
In essence,  the argument for set-
ting up the Institute is a simple one. 
Latin  America  and  Europe  are 
growing  increasingly  ignorant  of 
each other in  a world dominated by 
information,  and the first  step  to-
wards a remedy is the creation and 
dissemination  of information.  The 
Institute  was  set  up,  in  its  own 
words,  "to foster and strengthen Eu-
ropean-Latin American relations on 
a practical interregional level,  in or-
der  to  contribute  to  the process  of 
consensus building between  the two 
regions.  IRELA aspires to become a 
linkage institution for an intensified 
dialogue  between  Western  Europe 
and Latin America". 
The way in which IRELA hopes to 
promote this linkage is as follows: it 
plans to organize conferences, semi-
nars  and  colloquia  for  European 
and Latin American officials,  diplo-
mats,  journalists,  politicians,  busi-
nessmen,  trades  unionists and aca-
demics  on  various  aspects of Euro-
pean-Latin  American  relations.  It 
plans to  collect,  systematize and or-
ganize all relevant information relat-
ing to  the  links between  the two  re-
gions. It will furnish advice to official 
institutions  in  both  Western  Europe 
and Latin America.  And,  finally,  it 
plans  to  promote,  coordinate  and 
pursue specific  research  on  relations 
between  the two  regions. 
IRELA is private, independent and 
non-profit  making,  and its  Interna-
tional Council contains names which 
have often been in the news-political 
or artistic: Carlos Fuentes,  the Mexi-
can  novelist,  Graham  Greene,  the 
English  novelist,  Adolfo  Suarez, 
former Spanish Prime Minister,  Piet 
Dankert, former President of  the Eu-
ropean  Parliament  and  Claude 
Cheysson,  Commissioner for  North-
South  Relations  are  among  the 
names on the list. 
The  work  of the  Institute  is  not 
intended to  be wholly political-with 
so  many eminent  men of letters  on 
the  Council,  there  is  bound to  be  a 
strong cultural dimension as well,  but 
industrialists and bankers will not be 
forgotten.  In  an  international atmo-
sphere where debt.  recession and pol-
itical  turmoil  are  still  very  current 
themes,  there  is  much  work for  the 
Institute to do. 
And  Columbus?  With  the  SOOth 
anniversary  of his  voyage  due  in 
1992.  IRELA  expects  confidently to 
be  involved  in  the  planning of that 
commemoration. 
The  temporary address  of IRELA 
in  Europe is: 
IRELA  - Pedro de  Valdivia  10 
Apdo 2600 
E-28006 Madrid 
Espana 
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Fresh data on  firms  in  Benin 
- A SOEC-INSAE <t>  experiment  -
Statistical  services  in  many  of the 
countries  of Africa  have  a  source  of 
information on the  modem industrial 
sector in the statistical and tax decla-
rations that firms  listed with the Tax 
Office have to fill  out each year. 
This  full,  standard  set  of informa-
tion on each of  the firms in Benin is in 
the form of  a set of 19 tables (TSPCN, 
tables  summarizing  the  national  ac-
counting plan) covering all data on the 
structure,  management,  production, 
overheads, assets etc.  of the firm  dur-
ing any given tax year. The firms have 
four  months  in which  to  fill  out the 
tables  and  forward  them  to  the  Tax 
Office,  which  automatically  sends  a 
copy to  INSAE. 
Since  1982,  INSAE  has  received 
TSPCN  for  about  400  firms  (300  in 
1982 and 400 in  1983) in April and it 
has to process them as quickly as pos-
sible.  The  usual  procedure  is  to  pro-
cess  the  data  manually-which  both 
loses time and involves the risk of er-
ror. 
- It  uses  the  microprocessor  as  a 
super calculator,  keeping  the  logic  of 
manual  processing  with  the  operator 
still in visual and logical command of 
the operations. The operator is  an ac-
tive user. 
- Lastly, TSPCN data must be keyed 
in as they arrive in INSAE, as process-
ing  is  continuous and provisional re-
sults are possible. 
This  avoids  some  major  bottlen-
ecks.  The  manager  in charge  of pro-
cessing  has  an  ever-ready  reception 
structure to handle the data. All he has 
to do is enter them and follow the log-
ical  continuation  of the  operations. 
Data are treated on a continuous basis 
and  accounts  can  be  completed  as 
soon as  the last details arrive. 
The  software  was  tested  with  real 
data  recently  when  an  INSAE  staff 
member (a statistician but not a com-
puter  programmer)  produced  and 
printed out a  file  of general  informa-
tion  and  a  production  count  of the 
Buildings  and  Public  Works  depart-
ment for  1983  in one afternoon.  The 
test  was  run  on  different  equipment 
from  that  used  to  produce  the  soft-
ware.  Software  portability  was 
achieved on a minimal basis (256  Kb 
active memory, a 5.25" diskette drive 
and an operating system MS  DOS). 
Machine availability apart, the pro-
cess  only  takes  a  small  amount  of 
money  to  instal.  In  the  case  of the 
Benin  operation,  software  develop-
ment  (standardization  of tables  and 
methods  of  calculation)  took  three 
man-months  and  they  were  spread 
over a year. 
The  software  is  quick  to  instal  (it 
takes about a fortnight)  and it is  par-
ticularly  easy  to  train  people  to  use 
Multiplan. The total cost of the opera-
tion  (equipment,  expertise  and  train-
ing)  is  in the region of ECU  15 000. 
Establishment  of this  inexpensive 
system  can  considerably  reduce  the 
delays in processing firms' data. It can 
speed  up  the  publishing  of national 
accounts  and boost  the  development 
and introduction of the relevant secto-
ral policies. 
The economic leaders in Benin, who 
displayed great interest when  the test 
results  were  disseminated,  can  have 
the information they need to take reli-
able,  efficient and pertinent decisions 
in a much shorter time.  o 
The  time  this  takes,  plus  the  fact 
that the TSPCN usually  arrive piece-
meal and late at INSAE, is one of the 
basic reasons for the delays in produc-
ing  the  national  accounts  and setting 
up the statistical machinery needed to 
devise policies for  the various sectors 
as  laid  down  in  the  aims  of Lome 
III. 
Diagrams of TSPCN processing. 
INSAE  has decided to  remedy this 
and the SOEC has suggested a simple, 
unambitious  but  efficient  and  rapid  , 
solution-micro-processing the data, a 
method which is flexible and will mo-
tivate the national managers. 
The  proposed  procedure  has  three 
main features: 
- It uses Multiplan, which is simple, 
universal  and  well-documented  soft-
ware.  This avoids being dependent on 
a  programmer and makes it easier to 
train the users. 
(l) Benin's  National Statistical and Economic 
Analysis Institute. 
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ACP-EEC TRADE: 
The Kiel  Study 
The development of  trade has always held pride of  place in ACP-EEC cooperation and 
the need to  promote and diversify ACP trade  in  general,  and with  the  Community in 
particular,  has remained one of  the first stated aims of  all three Lome Conventions. 
The question of  trade development-or more often the problem of  trade development-
has,  of  course,  been a recurring theme of  discussion  and examination in ACP-EEC cir-
cles,  not only during periods of  negotiation, but throughout the decade of  the Conventions' 
existence.  This is not the first time, either,  that The Courier has devoted its dossier to the 
subject: an analysis of  EEC-ACP trade for the years  1972-77 featured in  a 1978 issue. 
Now,  however,  a major report on the subject is being drawn up by an ACP-EEC working 
group, for submission to  the ACP-EEC Council of  Ministers,  and one of  the sources on 
which that group will no doubt draw heavily in their deliberations will be a study entitled 
"Effects and Prospects of  EEC-ACP Trade and Trade Policy Relations". 
It is this study,  undertaken by the Institut fiir  Weltwirtschaft at the University of  Kiel 
and published in  1984,  which,  because of  its fundamental interest,  is  reproduced here in 
an abridged form.  The study is divided into two parts,  the first devoted to factual analyses, 
the second exploring exogenous barriers to ACP export growth as  well as both ACP and 
EEC policy-induced barriers  to  the  growth  and diversification  of ACP exports.  If the 
language of  the dossier is rather more academic than is usually the case,  we hope that the 
reader will forgive.  The study, though commissioned by the Community,  is,  of  course,  an 
independent one,  and the opinions expressed in  it are those of  its authors and not neces-
sarily also those of  the Commission. 
I.  Introduction 
The present privileged trade relations between the former 
colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pa-
cific archipelago (ACP countries) on the one hand and the 
European Community (EEC)  on the other are based on a 
long tradition. 
They superseded: 
- reciprocal  preferential trading arrangements negotiated 
between  the  founder  states  of the  EEC  and  their former 
colonies,  mainly  the  francophone  sub-Saharan  African 
countries  in  the  two  Yaounde  agreements  of 1963  and 
1969, 
- an arrangement of  the Yaounde type with the three East 
African  countries  Kenya,  Tanzania  and  Uganda,  the  so-
called Arusha arrangement of 1969, 
- the Commonwealth preferences conceded by the UK in 
favour  of all  member developing  countries  of the  Com-
monwealth, and 
- some other bilateral arrangements such as that between 
the  EEC  and  the  former  Dutch  colonies  in  the  Carib-
bean. 
The merger of these arrangements in the three so-called 
Lome Conventions or ACP agreements of 1975,  1979, and 
1984, meant not only a change in quantitative terms as the 
number  of  privileged  countries  is  now  larger,  but  it 
amounts  also  to  a  qualitative  change.  In  contrast  to  the 
former agreements cited above, the developing countries no 
longer have to grant counter-concessions for imports from 
the EEC  members.  Furthermore, the scope of cooperation 
is  much more far-reaching than before,  comprising finan-
cial aid flows,  technical assistance and export stabilization 
schemes (Stabex). Yet, an open market for the large major-
ity of tariff items remains the core of concessions, though 
the  associates  themselves  seem  to  have  given  a  higher 
priority to aid flows  in the recent Lome III negotiations. 
This shift in priorities may reflect disappointment on the 
meagre trade effects of  tariff concessions. These disappoint-
ments form  the background of this study,  which provides 
evidence and reasons of barriers to success of  these conces-
sions. 
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II.  Past trends in  ACP Country Trade 
1.  ACP Countries in 
world exports 
a.  Overall pattern 
The ACP Group, though comprising a large and increas-
ing number of countries, holds a very small share in world 
trade,  as  shown  in  Table  1.  Between  1970  and  1982  this 
share  fluctuated  between  2.5%  and 2.9%  with  a  peak  of 
3.1% in 1975, mainly determined by Nigeria. If this coun-
try,  which  is  the biggest  oil  producer and exporter in the 
ACP group, is excluded, it becomes obvious that the share 
of total exports of the remaining countries in world exports 
has  been  steadily  receding.  It went  down  from  2. 5%  in 
1970 to 2.1% in 1975 and further to 1.6% in 1982. In 1970 
about four-fifths of  the total exports of  ACP countries came 
from  African  members and it is  their share which  is  pri-
marily responsible for the decline in the total ACP share in 
world  exports.  African  exports went  down  from  2.4%  of 
world exports (1970) to 2% (1982) in spite of the fact  that 
Nigeria was able to more than double its share during this 
period, accounting for more than two fifths of total exports 
from  African  members.  Countries  which  mainly  account 
for  the  decline  in  the  African  share  are  Ghana,  Senegal, 
Sudan,  Uganda, Zai"re  and Zambia, but also  Cote d'Ivoire 
and  Kenya,  the  two  often-cited  African  success  stories. 
Gains  in  shares  like  those  of Cameroon,  Congo,  Gabon, 
Guinea,  Niger  and  Zimbabwe  could  not  outweigh  the 
losses. 
The  share  of Caribbean  members  increased  between 
1970 and 1975 but then declined. The increase in 1975 was 
mainly  because  of the  Bahamas whose  share  registered  a 
tenfold growth. Since then it has declined considerably. The 
total exports of Pacific members amounts to less than 0.1% 
of total world exports. Among these countries Papua New 
Guinea was able to increase her share in  1975 but later lost 
Table  1 
Share of ACP Countries in  World Exports 
%  in percent 
3~--------------------------~ 
2 
1.5 
0.5  f------- - --1  ~African  ACP  Members 
-Caribbean ACP 
Members 
0  =------' ~Pacif i c ACP  Members 
1970  1975  1982 
62 
momentum. More than half of the total exports of Pacific 
members come from  Papua New Guinea. If these exports 
are excluded, the share of Pacific members has continuous-
ly  declined from  1970 to  1982. 
b.  Commodity concentration of ACP 
and world exports: a comparison 
Exports of individual ACP countries are mostly concen-
trated in relatively few  commodities. Pacific members ap-
pear to  have,  on average,  a  higher concentration of their 
exports  on  fewer  goods  than  the  African  members  and 
these  higher than the  Caribbean members.  On the whole 
during  1970s  there  has  hardly  been  any  improvement in 
this respect in any of the three regions.  The concentration 
has  rather increased  drastically  in  some  of the  countries 
(Congo,  Gabon,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Niger,  Nigeria  and 
Rwanda) during this period. A few  exceptions are Liberia, 
Saint  Lucia  and  Antigua  and  Barbuda  which  have  been 
able to diversify their export structure in the past decade. 
A high commodity concentration of exports must,  how-
ever, not necessarily be  harmful for a country. This is  so, 
for  example,  if the  concentration  is  in  goods  enjoying  a 
high  world  demand.  This  holds  for  ACP  oil  exporters 
receiving a large income inflow during 1970s. The majority 
of the ACP countries was, however, not in such an envious 
position. A comparison of their export structure with that 
of world exports reveals  a  very  high  deviation  indicating 
that the goods supplied by these countries do not represent 
the  bulk of goods  exchanged  between the leading trading · 
partners  in  the  world.  This  is  likely  to  have  a  negative 
impact  on  their  prices  and  income  in  most  cases.  The 
deviation is  on average higher in the case of Pacific mem-
ber countries than in the African countries. In comparison 
to both these regions  the  average  of deviation indices  for 
Caribbean  members  is  lower,  although  the  inter-regional 
differences between the three regions are small. To put the 
level  of deviation into perspective,  one may compare the 
ACP countries with  Ireland,  which had the highest  index 
(0.63) in the EEC. There is not a single ACP country which 
could reach this level in any of the selected years. 
c.  ACP performance in leading exports of LDCs 
There are only three commodities, viz. cocoa, copper and 
inorganic chemicals in which ACP countries have leading 
positions in exports of LDCs  (Table  2 0)).  In these  items 
more than two fifths of total LDC exports come from these 
countries. However, during the seventies they lost some of 
their  markets  to  other  developing  countries.  Compared 
with  1970,  their share  of total  LDC exports  in  1980  has 
decreased in the case of cocoa from 77% to 64%, in copper 
from 57% to 40% and in inorganic chemicals from 58% to 
50%.  In cocoa,  ACP countries are  major world suppliers, 
meeting more than half of the world demand. There is  no 
competition from  developed countries.  But in copper and 
(1)  An abridged version of the original table. DOSSIER 
Table  2:  ACP Country Shares in  Leading Commodity Exports of Developing Countries and  World Exports 
(1972, 1977 and  1980) 
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inorganic chemicals developed countries supply the major 
portions of world demand and some of the market shares 
lost by ACP countries have gone to them. 
There are about a dozen commodities in which 20% to 
40%  of LDC exports  originate or used  to  originate  from 
ACP countries and as  such  are of a great importance for 
their balance  of payments.  These are  coffee,  tobacco,  oil 
seeds,  wood  (rough),  cotton,  fertilisers,  iron  ore  and con-
centrates, ores and concentrates of non-ferrous base metals, 
crude vegetable materials, fixed vegetable oils (soft),  pearls 
and  precious  and semi-precious  stones.  In  most  of these 
commodities  ACP  countries  have  been  losing  shares  in 
world exports as well as in LDC exports during the seven-
ties.  In  some cases  it was  halved  (wood,  iron  ore,  crude 
vegetable  materials) and some other reduced to one third 
(oil  seeds)  or  one  fourth  (fixed  vegetable  oils).  The  two 
exceptions  are  tobacco  and pearls  including precious  and 
semi-precious  stones.  In  the latter,  there  has  been  only  a 
minor change. But in the former, ACP countries have been 
able almost to double their share of LDC exports, although 
much of  it may be due to the accession of  Zimbabwe. Other 
goods worth mentioning are sugar and tea. The ACP share 
of sugar has gone down from  12% (  1970) to 7% (  1980) of 
total LDC exports and from  8% to  5%  of world exports. 
World  sugar  market  is  heavily  regulated  with  high  price 
fluctuations  determined  mainly  by  developed  countries' 
surpluses sold on world markets. The sugar-exporting ACP 
countries enjoy purchase guarantee of the EEC  at guaran-
teed prices under the Sugar Protocol.  In economic terms, 
this guarantee amounts to a product-tied income transfer to 
ACP  countries  without giving  impulses  to  trade  creation 
through  price  incentives  and  corresponding  shifts  from 
EEC domestic production to imports from ACP countries. 
In fact, ACP countries lost their share in spite of the Sugar 
Protocol. 
The tea market is,  however,  a stronghold of developing 
countries and in this case ACP members have been able to 
increase their share by  about two  percentage points. 
2.  Regional trade  pattern 
of ACP countries 
a.  Exports 
Table 3 indicates the direction of  exports of  twenty major 
ACP countries. The EEC is the most important export mar-
ket for  these countries, although its share in  their exports 
has gone down from 41% in 1976 to 38.5% in 1982 in spite 
of the intensification  and extension of institutional trade 
relations following  Lome I. However,  as  non-EEC OECD 
members have also granted concessions under the General-
ized  System  of Preferences  (for  instance  the  USA  since 
1976)  and the Commonwealth members among the ACP  ~  c 
countries enjoyed Commonwealth preferences  until  1978,  ~ 
the  Lome I agreement may not have essentially improved  o 
market  accessibility  for  them  compared  with  the  market  ~ 
~  accessibility of other markets outside the EEC  or an EEC  ~ 
sub-market.  c3 
The  change  was,  however,  not  uniform  among  all  the 
countries.  In  12  countries  EEC  shares  decreased  and  in 
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Table  3 
Direction of Major ACP Countries' Exports 
% of Total ACP  Exports 
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1976  1982 
eight countries they increased. Among the former,  changes 
in  Cameroon,  Gabon,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Sudan  and 
Zaire were remarkable in the sense that the EEC lost more 
than 15 percentage points of  their total exports. The sample 
of these countries reveals that mainly those ACP countries 
shifted exports to non-EEC destinations for whom the EEC 
had an overproportionate importance as an export market. 
In  most  of the  above  cases  (Cameroon,  Gabon,  Liberia, 
Zaire)  more exports  were  directed to  the USA.  In Sudan 
and  Madagascar,  however,  almost  the  entire  shifting  of 
trade was  accounted for  by  the  OPEC  countries.  The in-
creases in EEC shares of ACP exports are more pronounced 
in Mauritius, Suriname and Trinidad, and it may be com-
forting to  note that these changes also  occurred mostly at 
the cost of US  shares.  Nonetheless,  the total  US  share of 
ACP exports has increased. 
Trinidad oil: Trinidad, along with Mauritius and Suriname, 
increased the proportion of their exports going to  the EEC I  DOSSIER 
~------------------------------~  M:ost of the negative changes in EEC shares have occur-
red in African  countries and positive ones in Pacific  and 
Caribbean countries. This may indicate that transport costs 
or other trade  resistance  factors  are losing  some  of their 
importance. 
b.  Imports 
The direction of imports of the 20 major ACP countries 
is shown in Table 4. Here also it is apparent that the EEC is 
the main trading partner for these countries, supplying more 
than  two-fifths  of their  total  import  demand.  The  EEC 
share in their total imports has, however, gone down from 
45.6% (1976) to 43.7% (1982). More remarkable is that this 
decline was  spread over all the importing countries except 
Ethiopia,  Suriname  and Trinidad.  Traditionally  Ethiopia 
and Trinidad had non-EEC sources for  covering their im-
port demand so  that the recent development in favour of 
EEC  suppliers  started  from  a  rather  low  level.  Another 
group  of countries  which  lost  ground  in  the  major ACP 
markets is OPEC. Its share suffered a major setback falling 
from  14.5% (1976) to 7.4% (1982).  Most of it occurred in 
the  case  of Ethiopia,  Mauritius,  Tanzania  and  Trinidad. 
They  have  been  able  to  reduce  their  oil  imports  from 
OPEC  members  as  a  result  of their  declining  demand 
and/  or increased supply from  domestic and other sources. 
Excluding  the  EEC  share,  imports  of the  major  ACP 
countries are more evenly distributed among the different 
regions than their exports. The USA absorb about one third 
of ACP exports occupying the place of second biggest mar-
ket for  them.  But in the case  of imports, the USA supply 
only about one tenth of  ACP demand. The American share 
has,  however,  increased by  1.3  percentage points between 
1976 and 1982. The highest growth is registered by imports 
from  the Asian countries which include such good export 
performers as  Hong Kong,  Japan, Singapore,  South Korea 
and Taiwan. 
On the whole it may be concluded that EEC performance 
in both imports and exports of  major African partner coun-
tries  has  been  poorer than  in  other associated  countries, 
though this hypothesis needs a more detailed examination 
for  a final confirmation. 
c.  Intra-ACP trade 
Intra-ACP  exports  of 52  reporting  ACP  countries  in-
creased from US$  1.3 billion in 1976 to US$  1.8 billion in 
1982;  but the share of these exports in their total exports 
remained almost constant at a rather low  level  of a little 
more than 4% (Table  5). 
At country level, however, there have been some changes 
in intra-ACP trade. Its shares increased in 25 countries but 
were  outweighed  by  the  decreases  in  the  remaining  27 
reporting  countries.  More  noteworthy  is  that  intra-ACP 
trade constitutes more than one fifth of the total exports of 
Barbados,  Grenada,  Gambia,  Mali,  Niger,  Burkina  Faso, 
Senegal, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Djibouti. This list includes 
three major exporters (Senegal,  Zimbabwe and Kenya) ac-
counting for  more than one fourth  of the total exports of 
Table  4: Share of EEC and Other Regions in Imports of Major ACP Markets, 1976 and  1982 
Exporting Area 
Country  Oil  USSR,  Rest of  EEC  USA  Canada  Japan  Exporting  Eastern  Asia 
Countries  Europe  World 
1976,1982  1976  f  1982  1976 J  1982  1976,1982  1976  f 1982  1976,1982  1976,1982  1976,1982 
Cameroon  68.5  56.4  7.4  5.1  0.6  1.5  5.9  4.2  0.4  0.2  1.5  0.7  4.4  15.0  11.3  16.9 
Congo  79.4  69.7  4.5  8.0  LO  2.9  1.9  2.7  0.6  - 0.3  0.2  1.9  2.8  10.4  13.7 
Ethiopia  29.8  42.1  19.5  6.9  1.8  1.9  14.3  9.1  14.8  1.0  1.8  21.5  7.5  6.2  10.5  11.3 
Gabon  77.5  65.7  7.1  15.6  0.5  0.3  2.6  6.4  - - 0.2  0.1  1.6  1.7  10.5  10.2 
Ghana  43.7  39.3  15.7  18.8  2.4  1.3  5.1  3.7  12.4  13.1  1.7  4.4  4.8  1.6  14.2  17.8 
Cote~ d'I  voire  62.1  51.1  5.4  5.4  0.6  0.2  5.6  4.1  11.3  18.5  1.4  0.6  1.0  5.1  12.6  15.0 
Jamaica  16.7  12.5  37.0  36.7  5.6  4.5  0.8  1.8  15.8  11.4  0.4  0.2  1.1  22.5  31.8 
Kenya  38.6  36.1  4.8  6.2  1.0  1.3  ll.2  7.1  25.2  32.0  0.7  0.4  6.5  7.0  12.0  9.9 
Libt::ria  43.0  21.4  5.1  4.6  0.2  0.2  0.7  1.6  2.9  2.9  0.4  0.1  11.2  30.0  36.5  39.2 
Madagascar  47.3  42.2  1.9  5.4  0.3  0.4  3.4  5.2  34.8  29.0  0.3  1.3  8.8  11.0  3.2  5.5 
Mauritius  39.2  33.1  2.9  4.1  0.4  0.3  9.0  4.4  8.6  0.3  - 0.5  23.0  21.0  16.9  36.3 
Nigt~ria  58.3  56.0  12.1  10.9  0.5  0.4  9.0  10.1  0.1  0.1  1.3  1.1  4.8  6.4  13.9  15.0 
Papua New Guinea  5.1  5.0  3.4  6.8  - 1.9  16.7  13.0  1.2  - 0.2  - 18.4  17.3  55.0  66.0 
Sen(~gal  60.9  58.3  6.3  3.1  0.3  1.0  0.3  1.4  13.4  13.5  0.2  0.6  4.6  8.3  14.0  13.8 
Sudan  46.9  38.5  10.6  15.3  0.3  0.7  6.3  4.4  11.4  14.8  2.8  1.3  9.6  10.2  12.1  14.8 
Suriname  48.3  58.0  7.9  9.9  - - 7.9  13.0  12.6  - 4.6  - 9.9  4.9  8.8  14.2 
Tan:zania  47.2  43.5  5.5  4.7  2.0  11.7  10.4  13.5  3.7  0.6  1.4  12.9  9.2  6.6  25.0 
Trinidad  6.8  16.9  12.2  31.1  1.5  4.1  2.0  7.4  71.0  24.1  0  0.2  0.4  1.3  6.1  14.9 
Zai'r•e  54.9  52.1  11.8  9.2  1.9  1.8  3.9  5.2  3.0  - 0.2  0.1  3.6  2.9  20.7  28.7 
Zambia  48.4  36.0  8.2  9.2  5.1  0.7  3.4  6.8  12.9  13.9  0.3  0.8  6.0  4.7  15.7  27.9 
Total  45.6  43.7  10.6  11.9  1.1  1.2  6.1  7.0  14.5  7.4  0.9  1.1  5.4  8.3  15.8  19.4 
Sc•urce: IMP. 
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Table  5: Intra-ACP Trade  and  Share of 
Intra-ACP Trade  in ACP Countries' 
Total Exports,  1976 and  1982 
Intra*ACP  Share in 
trade  total exports 
1976  J 
1982  1976  1 1982 
Mill US$  per cent 
Bahamas  0.10  1.80  0.00  0.12 
Barbados  16.28  58.48  18.84  23.24 
Belize  1.78  9.05  4.19  10.68 
Burkina Faso  11.26  22.86  21.21  28.54 
Grenada  0.40  3.77  3.15  22.57 
Guyana  39.32  51.84  14.64  13.36 
Jamaica  43.70  102.10  7.18  11.89 
St. Vincent  0.00  1.53  0.00  7.97 
Suriname  13.86  1.73  5.04  0.47 
Trinidad  11.80  80.90  0.53  2.69 
Benin  6.09  5.17  16.07  15.39 
Burundi  0.78  4.99  1.24  5.70 
Cameroon  57.30  67.40  11.18  3.92 
Cape Verde  0.20  0.50  13.33  17.86 
Central African Republic  2.03  1.13  3.47  1.07 
Chad  1.52  16.86  1.10  16.61 
Congo  3.99  4.62  2.20  0.50 
Djibouti  0.60  11.70  1.99  46.25 
Equatorial Guinea  0.01  0.20  0.08  0.78 
Ethiopia  26.99  0.00  9.61  0.00 
Gabon  145.60  37.50  12.82  1.93 
Gambia  1.70  6.86  4.84  20.66 
Ghana  13.80  7.50  1.67  0.81 
Guinea  10.69  27.17  4.99  6.61 
Guinea Bissau  0.63  0.72  11.89  7.20 
Cote d'Ivoire  144.50  272.70  8.80  11.17 
Kenya  240.80  247.10  30.36  21.97 
Liberia  4.90  9.40  1.07  0.78 
Madagascar  3.57  3.54  1.28  0.82 
Malawi  12.01  27.50  7.23  11.84 
Mali  19.67  11.30  23.28  12.18 
Mauritania  7.64  2.32  3.91  0.90 
Mauritius  2.53  3.98  0.95  1.09 
Niger  34.83  70.68  26.07  23.05 
Nigeria  210.00  261.00  1.95  1.75 
Rwanda  1.56  6.52  1.90  7.91 
Senegal  60.38  119.56  12.32  24.78 
Seychelles  0.20  0.20  2.60  0.59 
Sierra Leone  1.01  1.41  0.99  0.83 
Somalia  1.24  1.11  1.31  0.78 
Sudan  0.60  0.50  0.11  0.09 
Tanzania  47.40  28.00  9.63  5.85 
Togo  6.95  27.24  6.66  12.82 
Uganda  9.99  6.37  2.77  1.72 
Zaire  5.90  9.40  0.73  0.55 
Zambia  25.70  16.00  2.46  1.82 
Zimbabwe  31.10  116.00  22.97  10.98 
Fiji  12.44  30.47  9.10  10.74 
Papua New Guinea  2.10  0.50  0.35  0.07 
Solomon Islands  0.17  1.10.  0.66  1.85 
Vanuatu  0.02  0.02  0.12  0.13 
Western Samoa  0.03  0.12  0.44  0.94 
Total  1297.67  1800.42  4.33  4.28 
Source: IMF. 
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ACP reporting countries in 1982.  However, in five  out of 
the above 11  countries ACP shares moved upwards and in 
four  downwards  showing  that changes  were  more  or less 
equally distributed and no conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to any definite trend. 
Four  of the  above  countries  with  an  upward  move  of 
their intra-ACP exports participated in one or other regional 
integration  scheme  (Barbados  in  CARICOM,  Senegal  in 
•  WAEC,  Gambia and Burkina Faso in ECOWAS)  whereas 
only two of the countries with declining shares had such a 
participation  (Mali  and  Niger  in  W  AEC).  Therefore  an 
attempt was  made to  examine whether intra-trade of the 
various regional integration schemes registered any signifi-
cant growth in intra-ACP trade. In all the cases the contri-
bution of regional integration schemes to intra-ACP trade 
has improved.  Maximum growth took place in the Mano 
River Union, but its intra-ACP trade in the base year was 
too small to allow any far-reaching conclusion. Next to it in 
terms  of growth  are  the  Caribbean  Community  and  the 
Central African Customs and Economic Union. The share 
of the former in intra-ACP trade in 1982 rose by 37% com-
pared with  1976 and that of the latter by  33% during the 
same  period.  The  biggest  of  the  regional  integration 
schemes  among the  ACP  members  is  constituted by  the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOW  AS) 
consisting of 16  countries.  In  1982  it accounted for  more 
than  two  fifths  of the  total  intra-ACP  trade  after  an in-
crease  of 17%  between  1976  and  1982.  The francophone 
West African Economic Community (WAEC)  is  the third 
largest integration organization having six members, which 
form a core group within ECOW  AS.  Its share of intra-ACP 
trade increased by  12%  in  1982  compared with  1976  and 
accounted for  about 17%  of total intra-ACP trade in  1982. 
In total, if the East African Community which has alrea-
dy collapsed,  is  taken out of consideration, about 58%  o 
intra-ACP trade takes place within the individual commu-
nities. Thus, regional integration does appear to have made 
its contribution to intra-ACP trade when measured by this 
share. However, a word of  caution is in order here in so far 
as these regional organizations are still very young and their 
internal relations have been far from being free from distri-
butional conflicts. Further this analysis is based on a com-
parison of two years and some accidental factors may bias 
the above conclusions. It is for example by no means evi-
dent that trade flows  within the schemes are  integration-
induced,  i.e.  influenced by  tax  harmonization or internal 
trade  liberalization.  A  ranking  of top  24  ACP  countries 
according to their shares in intra-ACP imports of 1976 and 
1982  showed  that  occurrence  of erratic  changes  in  their 
regional pattern of trade cannot be ruled out. Bahamas and 
Tanzania  who  occupied  in  1976  first  and  fourth  places, 
respectively, had no ranking at all among the first 24 most 
important ACP import markets in 1982. It seems notewor-
thy that Cote d'Ivoire instead of Nigeria proved to be the 
main absorber of ACP products though Nigeria's absorp-
tive capacity rapidly increased during the seventies. There 
are two possible explanations for this. First, in 1982 Nigeria 
already suffered from severe balance of  payments problems 
and consequently restricted imports drastically.  This may 
have affected imports from ACP countries as well.  Second, 
the  integration  level  within  francophone  West  Africa  is 
much more  advanced than between  anglophone and fran I  DOSSIER  -------------------------------- cophone West  African countries,  so  that Cote  d'Ivoire as 
the fastest growing country in the W  AEC absorbs increas-
ing amounts of imports from her neighbours. 
3.  Structural pattern  of 
ACP exports to  the EEC 
ACP countries supply only about one twentieth of total 
non  -oil  demand  of EEC  satisfied  through  imports  from 
outside the Community. Their share of these EEC imports 
even declined from  6.2% in  1975  to 4.5% in  1982  (Table 
6). The downward trend persists also when non-oil imports 
of EEC  from  third  countries  are  subdivided  into  three 
major  groups:  total  imports  from  developing  countries, 
agricultural imports,  semi-manufactures as  well  as  manu-
factures.  The  maximum  reduction  took  place  in the  last 
category of  goods where they lost one third of their original 
share. The lowest rate of change was in the case of agricul-
tural  goods.  Here  the  ACP  countries  still  supply  a  little 
more than one fourth of EEC imports from all developing 
countries. 
These conclusions hold for  individual national markets 
in the EEC. The only exceptions are agricultural imports in 
West  Germany,  Belgium-Luxembourg  and  Italy,  where 
ACP shares of total imports from all  developing countries 
have increased. The increase was lowest in West Germany 
and highest in Italy. 
The  United  Kingdom  used  to  be  the  most  important 
market  for  ACP  countries  absorbing  about  29%  of their 
total exports in 1976. This share had gone down to 22% in 
1982.  This change was  almost equally distributed on agri-
cultural and manufactured goods.  Now in this context the 
first  place  is  occupied by  France importing one fourth  of 
the  total  ACP  exports.  The  French  market  has  however 
been more receptive for  their manufactured products than 
for agricultural goods. As compared to their former metro-
polises,  ACP countries have  been able to export more to 
the  remaining EEC  members.  Consequently the shares  of 
West Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg and Italy have risen 
in ACP exports to the EEC.  In the case of semi-manufac-
tures and manufactures, West Germany has overtaken the 
United Kingdom absorbing about one fifth of these exports 
of ACP countries into the EEC in  1982. 
One  per cent  growth  of GDP in  the  United Kingdom 
leads to less than!% growth of its imports from the ACP 
countries. Theoretically speaking it is possible that demand 
for imports supplied by these countries is  very inelastic in 
the  UK.  But  the  income  elasticities  for  imports  of both 
agricultural goods and manufactures from the Latin Amer-
ican countries are more than twice as high as for the ACP 
countries, although the former do not enjoy the trade pre-
ferences granted to the latter on account of their association 
agreement  with  the  European  Community.  This  suggests 
that the reasons for a slower growth of exports of the ACP 
members have to be looked for mostly on the supply side. 
It is  true that the growth of imports from  ACP countries 
during 1976 and 1982 has been slowest in the UK, amount-
ing to only 5% per year. But if the British domestic import 
demand was  slack,  exports  of Latin  America  would  not 
have risen by as much as 14% during this period. A similar 
pattern can be observed for the European Community as a 
whole as well as for the other individual members, though 
here differences between the growth rates of imports from 
Latin America and ACP members are not as high as in the 
UK.  Two  exceptions  are  Belgium-Luxembourg  and  Italy 
where the growth of agricultural imports from ACP coun-
tries has been higher than that of agricultural imports from 
Latin American countries. In both of these cases however 
T;:tble  6: Changes in  Market Shares and  Regional Concentration of ACP Exports to the EEC 
and Selected EEC Member Countries, 1975 and  1982 
EEC  West Germany  France  UK  Belg./Lux.  Italy 
1975  11982  1975  11982  197511982  1975  Jt982  1975  11982  197511982 
Import Market Shares 
Share of ACP countries in 
- total extra-EEC non-oil imports  6.2  4.5  3.8  2.9  9.8  7.3  6.8  4.1  9.1  7.4  6.2  4.5 
- total  EEC  non-oil  imports  from  developing 
c:ountries  25.6  19.1  15.6  12.8  34.6  27.6  31.2  19.0  36.6  29.2  24.8  17.0 
- EEC  agricultural  imports  from  developing 
countries  29.1  26.9  19.4  20.0  40.0  33.5  42.7  40.5  13.1  15.0  19.1  25.2 
- EEC  imports  from  developing  countries  in 
semi-manufactures and manufactures  18.6  12.7  IL4  8.5  28.1  22.0  17.4  8.2  30.3  23.0  22.9  13.2 
Regiional Concentration of ACP 
Expruts to the EEC 
Share of individual EEC member 
countries in 
- ACP total non-oil exports to the Community  100  toO  16.5  18.3  24.5  24.9  28.9  21.7  9.8  11.6  11.4  11.8 
~  ACP agricultural exports to the Community  100  100  15.9  19.1  25.6  23.6  36.4  29.2  1.8  2.7  1.6  9.6 
- ACP exports of semi-manufactures 
and manufactures to the Community  100  100  18.9  19.4  26.9  27.9  21.3  15.5  12.8  14.8  13.6  13.6 
Source: Eurostat. 
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the markets are very limited compared with those of the 
other members of the EEC.  Moreover, in the case of man-
ufactured imports the growth for  Latin America has been 
higher  than  for  ACP  members  even  in  these  two  coun-
tries. 
On the whole, in competition with Latin America, ACP 
countries have been able to fare better on the West German 
market than in other EEC  countries.  The poorest perfor-
mances are  registered on the  French and British  markets 
during 1976 to 1982. It is possible that the erosion of some 
exclusive preferential margins enjoyed by the former colon-
ies in their metropolitan countries after the introduction of 
EEC  preferences  and/  or GSP is  responsible  for  this  phe-
nomenon. Likewise one may hypothesize that the tradition-
al ACP exports on their former metropolitan markets have 
approached  saturation  levels  so  that  the  growth  of their 
imports is now determined by their (low) growth of popu-
lation. Scope for growth, however, still exists on non-tradi-
tional markets such as the West German market, and this 
seems to have been done by ACP suppliers in the tradition-
al branches. 
4.  Market accessibility for  the 
ACP major  exports in  the EEC 
At five-digit SITC level 56 products accounted for 87.8% 
of  total ACP exports to the EEC in 1981. The same result is 
obtained also  on the basis of CCT tariff items.  The latter 
disaggregation is however more suitable for an assessment 
of market accessibility of ACP exports to the EEC as com-
pared with  those  of competing  suppliers  from  developed 
and other developing countries. Market accessibility in this 
case  is  broadly  speaking  a  function  of (1)  the  level  of 
GATT  -negotiated MFN tariffs, (2)  the level of unilaterally 
imposed variable levies on products which  are  subject to 
the Common Agricultural Policy,  (3)  the changes of MFN 
tariffs  due  to  the  Tokyo  Round negotiations  and (4)  the 
inclusion of the products in the Generalized System of Pre-
ferences  (GSP). 
Table  7,  which  provides information on these  determi-
nants, yields the following  results: 
First,  in  1982  as  in  1977,  56  tariff items accounted for 
88% of total ACP exports. About 60% of this total in 1982 
was  not dutiable under MFN conditions.  Thus,  for  more 
than the half the ACP exports which consists of  agricultural 
and mineral primary commodities, ACP trade preferences 
cannot be conceded. It is interesting to note that this share 
increased rapidly between 1977 and 1982 because of rising 
oil prices. The share of crude oil in total exports was higher 
in 1982 than in 1977. In 1982 crude oil accounted for more 
than 40% of  total ACP exports to the EEC. Hence, the ratio 
between dutiable and non-dutiable ACP  exports  is  deter-
mined  mainly  by  the  world  market  price  ratios  between 
four products: oil and copper which are non-dutiable pro-
ducts  and coffee  and cocoa  which  are  dutiable  items.  In 
1977,  when  world  market  prices  for  coffee  and  cocoa 
reached their highest post-war levels  and prices for  crude 
oil were not as high as in 1982, coffee and cocoa accounted 
for higher shares in ACP exports and so did their dutiable 
exports in total.  In  short,  the extent to  which  tariffs  and 
hence tariff preferences can have an impact on total ACP 
exports is widely determined by external factors. Trade pol-
icies of  both contracting parties of  the ACP agreement have 
only a minor influence. 
Second, among the dutiable items processed, agricultural 
products and textiles seem to be the core of  non-traditional 
exports, though a clear-cut distinction between unprocessed 
and processed items on the one hand and traditional and 
non-traditional  exports  on  the  other  hand is  difficult  to 
make.  The  share  of dutiable  processed  products  slightly 
increased between  1977 and 1982.  However, what is more 
relevant  is  the  preference  margin  enjoyed  by  these  pro-
ducts.  It emerges  that  this  preference  margin  has  been 
eroded to a large extent vis-a-vis the least developed coun-
tries  outside the ACP group.  The EEC  has granted a full 
exemption from tariffs for products like fish,  coffee, cocoa, 
coffee extracts and cocoa butter originating from  the least 
developed countries.  However,  the adverse impact of this 
preference  erosion  on  ACP  exports  is  likely  to  be  small 
because of  a very low supplying capacity of the least devel-
oped  countries.  Coffee  exports  of Haiti,  which  in  1981 
scored a share of 1  % in total EEC coffee imports, seem to 
be the only exception worth mentioning. 
Third, ACP trade preferences have been eroded further 
by the reduction in tariffs on imports from all GSP benefi-
ciaries.  The  list  of  products  affected  comprises  fish, 
shrimps, cloves, dried bananas, coffee extracts, cocoa paste 
(where tariff quotas exist for  GSP beneficiaries) and espe-
cially  palm  oil.  The  last  product which  is  interesting for 
ASEAN was included in the GSP in order to compensate 
Table  7(1): Major EEC Imports from  ACP Countries in  1977 and  1982 and Tariff 
(1)  Abridged.  Treatment before and  after  the Tokyo  Round 
Percentage of total  EEC  EEC 
Dutiable  EEC imports from  ACP  Pre-Tokyo Round  Post-Tokyo Round  GSP-rate  .  Products  1982 
1977  1982  MFN-tariff-rate  MFN-tariffMrate 
Coffe,  unroasted  16.1  7.8  7.0  5.0  0 
Cocoa, beans  8.2  5.8  5.4  3.0  0 
Iron ore  2.4  2.9  0  0  0 
Crude petroleum  25.8  41.5  0  0  0 
Wood in the rough  3.8  2.8  0  0  0 
Unwrought copper  7.0  5.0  0  0  0 
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Oil palm plantation in Cote d'lvoire 
A CP  trade  preferences for palm  oil  have  been  eroded  by 
reduced tariffs on  imports from all GSP beneficiaries 
countries like  Malaysia and Singapore  for  expiring  Com-
monwealth preferences after the UK entry into the EEC. 
Fourth, within the range of manufactures the GSP pro-
duct  coverage  is  almost complete and this includes  ACP 
exportables such as plywood and veneer, cotton fabrics and 
clothing. 
Again, South-East Asian countries are the most competi-
tive  suppliers.  However, rigid  tariff quotas and strict sur-
veillance regulations for  products with tariff ceilings  have 
been introduced in order to protect both domestic produc-
ers (textiles) as well as ACP exports (plywood,  veneer). 
Fifth,  the  least  important  erosion  of ACP  preferences 
appears to have occurred as a result of mutual tariff cuts in 
the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations, because the major-
ity  of tariff reductions  were  in  manufactures  which  are 
exported by developed countries rather than by developing 
countries.  Yet,  two  agricultural  items (coffee  and cocoa), 
which are  of major relevance for the ACP exporters,  also 
fall  in this category.  However,  changes  in  prices  of these 
commodities affect  the  final  consumer prices  in the  EEC 
only  to  a  lesser extent because  they  are  processed  in  the 
EEC.  Price changes at the later processipg stages may out-
weigh  changes  in  prices  of raw  commodities.  Domestic 
excise duties are much higher than the tariff and products 
originating from ACP and non-ACP countries (coffee,  tea) 
are  often blended with imports from  other countries thus 
reducing their substitutability. On the whole, there is up to 
now little evidence that the erosion of  ACP preference mar-
gins  for  raw  coffee  and raw cocoa by  about 2 percentage 
points has caused any trade diversion, which means that it 
has not resulted in shifting import demand from  ACP to 
non-ACP suppliers. 
To  summarize  the  overall  preference  margins  of ACP 
countries, it seems that the EEC  maintained them mainly 
by  strictly limiting the tariff quotas and ceilings  for  non-
ACP developing countries rather than by keeping the tariff 
margins constant. 
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This leads us  to  an  evaluation of specific (ACP)  prefer-
ences versus general (GSP) preferences. In this respect it is 
necessary to compare actual ACP exports in dutiable items 
receiving  a  complete  preferential  treatment  with  prefer-
ence-receiving exports of non-ACP beneficiaries under the 
GSP regime.  In  1981  duty-free  imports of industrial pro-
ducts  (including  textiles)  originating  from  non-ACP  and 
Mediterranean countries  under the  GSP  were  more  than 
five  times as  high as  the corresponding duty-free imports 
from ACP countries. This ratio is in the opposite direction 
in the three agricultural categories,  where  the MFN rates 
have mostly been reduced only partly (not fully exempted) 
by the GSP so that ACP countries still enjoy positive pre-
ference margins. In the industrial categories such preference 
margins have been fully eroded. What is more important is 
that the preference-receiving exports of non-ACP develop-
ing  countries  accounted  only  for  about  38%  of the  total 
exports of these countries in GSP-covered items. It means 
that dutiable exports from  Latin America and Asia worth 
about ECU 13.-3  billion  were  charged  the  full  MFN rates 
before entering the EEC market though formally they were 
eligible for GSP treatment. Tariff quotas, ceilings and res-
trictive rules  of origin  prevented them from  receiving ac-
tual preferential treatment and thus helped maintain a size-
able part of ACP preferences. 
Noteworthy also is the diverging pattern of specialization 
in the non-traditional export supply of ACP countries and 
other  developing  countries.  Whereas  in  the  former  case 
processed agricultural goods eligible for the GSP accounted 
for  60%  of  exports,  in  the  latter  case  such  exports 
amounted to  only  18%.  Hence,  there  is  not  much  trade 
overlap between the two kinds of suppliers in general. They 
are rather complementary trade partners and compromise 
between GSP and ACP preferences should be  feasible  for 
them. 
5.  ACP non-traditional textile 
exports to  the EEC: more  room 
for  hope than  for  fear? 
There are several reasons why ACP non-traditional tex-
tile  exports to  the EEC  provoke both hopes  and fears  in 
respect of their future growth. First, there is room for hope 
since ACP export growth rates at the end of the seventies 
and the beginning of the eighties were much higher in this 
sector than in other sectors.  They were  even higher than 
those  of the  rest  of developing  countries.  However,  the 
ACP share in total developing countries' textile exports to 
the Community remained small (1.5% in 1975 and 1.8% in 
1982,  Table 8). 
Second,  there  is  room  for  fear  since  textiles  (including 
clothing)  represent  the  nucleus  of  EEC  protectionism 
against  third  country  producers  of manufactures.  Strong 
domestic protectionist forces in all the EEC member coun-
tries keep a close watch on the growth of import penetra-
tion of their domestic markets regardless of who penetrates 
their markets, which have been growing slowly.  Since  the 
origin of imports does not matter for loss of  jobs, this sur-
veillance is also effective against those developing countries 
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Table  8 
Share of Individual  ACP Countries 
in  Total ACP Textile and 
Footwear  Exports to  the  EEC 
1975 
['L'J Cameroon 
~Senegal 
- Rest of ACP 
1982 
which are not contracting parties to the Multifibre Agree-
ment because of their special trade relations with the EEC. 
Mediterranean countries and the ACP Group in  particular 
are  such  special  trade  partners  of the  EEC  whose  textile 
exports are under permanent surveillance both in order to 
prevent  the  circumvention  of the  multifibre  quotas  via 
indirect imports through ACP countries and to keep endo-
genous export-oriented textile production in ACP countries 
under control. 
The first target is  achieved by means of restrictive rules 
of origin,  the  second  one  by  facultative  ceilings  ("ACP 
ligne ") and not by  obligatory quotas. The latter serve as a 
first warning, even before the start of any consultations, not 
to  invest  excessively  in  sensitive  textile  items  to  be  ex-
ported to the Community. 
Third, there is room for further fear because ex-ante ceil-
ings in the very few  items where ACP countries proved to 
be relatively competitive can provoke uncertainties and can 
thus have a discouraging effect  on export-oriented invest-
ments in other sectors. 
In  detail,  export-oriented  textile  processing  is  concen-
trated  in  a  few  ACP  countries,  viz.  Mauritius  (clothing), 
Cote d'Ivoire (fabrics) and Madagascar.  In  1975,  the three 
countries accounted for  68%  of the  total ACP  non-tradi-
tional textile exports to the Community (Table 8).  By  1982 
they  accounted  for  even  92%  as  Mauritius  and  Cote 
d'Ivoire were  able during this period to  raise  their shares 
from  38%  to  52%  and  from  14%  to  26%,  respectively. 
Compared to the rest of developing countries, especially to 
the  MFA  countries,  in  1981  Mauritius  held  but  the  fif-
teenth rank among the third-country suppliers in its export 
domain,  that is  knitwear,  and the  thirty-seventh  rank  in 
other clothing products. 
However,  even  this  comparatively  minor  threat  to 
domestic jobs in the EEC  textile industry from  the ACP ex-
ports did not deter the Community from  introducing na-
tional safeguards  against individual ACP exporters in  the 
late seventies (knitwear exports of Mauritius to the UK, for 
instance). Later on the Community went further by estab-
lishing  a  similar  network  of intra-EEC  member  country 
ceilings  on  overall  ACP  exports  as  it  was  fixed  for  each 
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The latest on the Multifibre Agreemenl{Ed.) 
The present Multifibre Agreement (MFA),  whichregulates the sale of 
textile products from developing to industrialized countries, expires on}l 
July 1986; As far as the European Community is concerned,  it is hoped 
that the Agreement will not only be  extended,  but made more flexible, 
and it  is  in  this  spirit  that  the Community's ·representatives  have  ap-
proached the negotiations for a new Agreement which have been taking 
place  in  Geneva  in  the framework  of GATT (General  Agreement  on 
Trade  and Tariffs).  The  Community hopes  that, eventually,  a gradual 
and balanced  liberalization  of the  textiles  and clothing  trade can be 
achieved,  and therefore aims to·  slow down  European  imports of  textl1e 
products,  so as to give a breathing-space to its own,  troubled,  textile sec7 
tor,  enabling it to  modernize and regain its  competitivity~ with()ut, how-
ever,  neglecting the interests of  developing countries seeking to  become 
industrialized. 
The Community is proposing the following measures: 
- to renew the MFA for a period of  4-5 years,  with  as the final objective 
a return to free trade; 
- to  extend the cover of  categories of  products foreseen .  in the present 
MF.!/.; 
~ to calculate the quantity limits on the basis of  1986  levels;< 
- .  to foresee an overall reduction of  25% in  the total number of  quotas 
imposed on suppliers, ·in  so far as  concerns·  poorly used quotas; 
- to make the annual increases granted for imports as well as the prow 
visions regarding flexibilityfor imports of  textiles and clothing depend on 
the wealth and relative importance of  the supplier country,  which would 
mean  harsher  treatment for  dominant  countries  such  as  Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea; 
- to make certain clduses more flexible,  such  as that concerning auto-
matic transfer in the case of  regional quotas. 
Alongside this,  the Community seeks a commitment on the part of  all 
participating countries (exporters) to bring to the textile trade a contribu-
tion, ·in  relation  to their level of  development arzd their economic situa-
tion, in the form of  an opening of  their markets and of  the creation the, 
bases of  fairer competition. 
MFA  signatory  country  in  "hyper-sensitive"  items  on  a 
quota basis. At Community level ceilings were exceeded by 
the actual exports only in cotton yarn.  In the case of pul-
lovers, which includes knitwear from Mauritius, the ceiling 
was almost fully utilized. The fact that synthetic fibres ceil-
ings were fixed though ACP countries did not export under 
this category is  a strong evidence for the prophylactic nat-
ure of the "ACP ligne" and for the prevailing uncertainty 
with  regard to  the potential competitiveness of ACP sup-
pliers. Utilization rates for the EEC are, however, averages 
with considerable differences between the performances in 
individual EEC countries. Since it is at national level where 
restrictive measures are introduced first,  the differences of 
utilization rates deserve attention. It seems that a country 
like Italy, which primarily imports intermediate goods and 
processes  them  further  domestically,  is  less  inclined  to 
introduce restrictive measures once a ceiling has  been  ex-
ceeded than countries like France or the UK whose imports 
from  ACP  countries (and  other developing countries)  are 
concentrated on finished goods.  Further, the differences in 
utilization  rates  between  EEC  members  provide  a  strong 
incentive  to  import  via  those  member  countries  which 
have not yet exhausted their shares. Theoretically, in a cus-
toms union which allows free circulation of goods internal-
ly  there is  no sense in  having quotas for  individual mem-
bers.  Such  quotas imposed on a  relatively  small  exporter 
like the ACP group, mirror a serious setback in the internal 
integration process of the Community. The relative small 
size of the ACP Group as an exporter of"  hypersensitive" 
goods is evident from  the share of ceilings in MFA nego-
tiated quotas. In 1982, these ceilings did not exceed 10% of 
the MFA quotas and amounted to 4% on average. III.  Exogenous barriers to  ACP export growth 
1.  Drought and  desertification 
Sahelian  as  well  as  some  ACP  countries  south  of the 
Congo basin have suffered and are currently suffering sev-
erely again from a succession of  drought years. The ecolog-
ically  very  fragile  and  vulnerable  character  of these  arid 
areas and the extreme variability of Sahelian rainfalls make 
it rather difficult to detect a "normal" pattern and hence a 
long-term trend of climatic conditions. Nonetheless, it can-
not be denied that the droughts have at least reinforced-if 
not partly caused-long-term tendencies of  food production 
shortages and changing human fertility habits. 
This pattern has been relatively uniform with only a few 
exceptions such as the recovery of food production in Nig-
er.  The actual  situation might have been  even  worse  be-
cause within the category of arable land some areas have 
deteriorated to fallow  land after shifting cultivation. 
The reasons  for  such a  serious development are  mani-
fold.  They encompass, apart from natural shocks, internal 
policy  failures  resulting  in distorted urban-rural  terms of 
trade  to  the  detriment of rural  production,  inappropriate 
incentives to give up nomadism, or traditional habits such 
as  extensive livestock production, which does not react to 
market signals. Furthermore, drought effects have been ex-
acerbated by factors such as changing economic habits (for 
example the reliance on food aid), water development pro-
.  ects facilitating the salinization and alkalinization of land, 
post-harvest food losses, and the lack of generally accepted 
property rights  either on  a collective or on a  private lev-
el. 
One  of the  principal consequences  of natural shocks  is 
labour migration. It is the mobile and relatively skilled part 
of labour which is  leaving the arid areas and migrating to 
the  climate  belt  south  of the  Sahel.  Senegal  and  Cote 
d'Ivoire have been the most attractive destinations, with the 
result  that the  inherent tendency  of inter-state  migration 
during  the  harvest  season  in  the  tropical  areas  has  been 
intensified. Whereas in 1974 only 60 000 non-Ivorian Afri-
cans  worked  in  the  formal  Ivorian  sector,  this  number 
increased to about 78 000 in 1979. It is rather evident that 
expatriate employment in the formal sector is  only the tip 
of  the iceberg since the majority ofunskilled people migrat-
ing from desertificated areas is  illegally employed or settled 
in the informal sector. The loss of embodied entrepreneur-
ship, initiatives and stimulants in the Sahel countries due 
to the exodus is hence the most disturbing economic con-
sequence  of natural  shocks.  Furthermore,  water  scarcity 
will  also  have the impact of higher production costs  and  ~ 
hence of deteriorating competitiveness compared to neigh- :2 
~ 
bouring countries which do not face such incremental costs.  a 
In the case  of francophone  Sahelian  countries  which  are  ~ 
members of the Franc Zone, the adjustment to deteriorating 
competitiveness  against  southern  neighbouring  countries 
through currency depreciations is not possible. Thus, unless 
real wages are reduced, Sahelian countries will lose in rela-
tive competitiveness. 
Droughts will  also  have repercussions  on the contribu-
tion of both imported and local food to apparent domestic 
consumption.  It is  possible  that  due  to  rising  shares  of 
imported food  (food aid or food  bought at market terms) 
the attitude of  the remaining population will change from a 
risk-bearing to a transfer-receiving conduct. Again, together 
with  the loss  of human capital  because of migration and 
with impaired physical health conditions in the remaining 
labour  force,  export  orientation  towards  non-traditional 
goods will depend on the inflow of foreign risk capital and 
entrepreneurship. Since such investments face  high oppor-
tunity costs because of the poor environmental conditions, 
it is rather unlikely that the inflow of non-risk capital (aid) 
and the other options of the Lome Conventions can com-
pensate drought-affected countries for these environmental 
disadvantages. 
Drought: a Ghanaian woman despairs at her meagre crop of 
legumes and millet 
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To conclude, long-term worsening environmental condi-
tions in some ACP countries suggest that they should focus 
on strategies which strengthen local individual entrepreneu-
rial initiatives at every level. Without such initiatives furth-
er drought periods will have disastrous effects.  By guaran-
teeing a minimum income level the EEC can diminish pol-
itical  fears  about  the  exploitation  of immobile  and  uns-
killed people by local entrepreneurs. Viewed against a situ-
ation of a general idleness of resources based on transfers 
from  abroad,  however,  economic growth and inequalities 
through  exploitation  appear  to  be  the  less  controversial 
alternative. 
2.  Plant and  animal  diseases 
As  with  droughts,  plant  and  animal  diseases-besides 
their unquestioned character of a natural shock -cannot be 
separated  from  the  social  and economic  environment  in 
which they occur. The environment can contribute to exa-
cerbating  the  spread  of inherent  diseases  of export  crop 
monocultures through the lack of established and generally 
accepted property rights.  On the other hand, it may facili-
tate controlling pests effectively if  property rights are clear-
ly defined and if  governments do not provide disincentives, 
for instance through excessive export tax or state interven-
tions in private sales  decisions to economically profitable 
plant production. 
The fact that agriculture and livestock in African coun-
tries have been most susceptible to plant and animal dis-
eases during the last two decades is illustrated by the plant 
disease outbreaks recorded by FAO and by the resurgence 
of trypanosomiasis in the seventies.  At first' glance  it ap-
pears that export crops have been more frequently affected 
by  plant diseases  than local  crops  such as  cassava,  yams, 
millet or sorghum. This coincides with the observation that 
the genetic uniformity of new high-yield crop monocultures 
provide  ecologically  ideal  environments  for  pathogens  to 
evolve and to attack plants. With regard to the presence of 
tsetse flies and the resulting disease of  trypanosomiasis, it is 
estimated that this disease hinders the use of some 10 mil-
lion square kilometres for livestock or agricultural produc-
tion. The payoff for increased investments in pest controls, 
disease research and tsetse eradication mainly depends on 
the  additional  income  earned  from  the  new  "cleaned" 
areas under permenent cultivation. Here again the crucial 
role  of government's  influence  on  internal  rural-urban 
terms of  trade is very important. If  additional income to be 
gained from employing resources in sectors other than the 
eradication of plant and animal diseases is  higher, private 
investments in  the latter sector will  not be launched.  Fi-
nancing of public investments by  internal and/or external 
non-risk capital will also be facilitated if  price ratios are not 
distorted.  Investments in  maintenance of the quality and 
volume of export crop production are indispensable since 
export crops are,  besides mineral raw materials,  the most 
important source of traditional export earnings for most of 
the ACP countries. Further, they are needed for export div-
ersification in the field of agricultural processing industries 
such  as  canned  food  or  cotton  manufacturing.  Such  at-
tempts  have been  made  successfully  for  instance in Cote 
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d'Ivoire and Cameroon. However, it should be  noted that 
they proved successful because of new high-yield varieties 
of the "green revolution" (bananas, coffee,  cocoa,  pineap-
ples, etc.) which were both suitable for profitable processing 
and fitted  into  demand  patterns  of developed  countries. 
But just these varieties are also vulnerable to diseases. Giv-
en  this  trade-off between  profitability  and  vulnerability, 
external financial assistance to research, control and eradi-
cation of plant and animal diseases on a regional  scale is 
necessary  (i)  to  maintain  the  export  basis  of many  ACP 
countries in terms of agricultural primary commodities, (ii) 
to promote export diversification strategies in agricultural 
processing and (iii) to  stabilize the local livestock produc-
tion. Yet, without the establishment of clearly defined pro-
perty rights on land and its use,  such an assistance will be 
less  efficient.  Thus,  an  incentive system  through  property 
rights must be introduced and controlled by the local gov-
ernments. 
3.  Transportation  costs of 
seaborne  trade 
Transportation costs are frequently assumed to be major 
barriers  to  ACP  trade  in  general  and to  their exports  in 
particular. While this is evident for landlocked ACP coun-
tries suffering from  inadequate transportation facilities  for 
surface trade, transportation costs for seaborne trade must 
not necessarily be higher for other ACP countries than for 
the remaining developing countries. The recent moderniza-
tion  of ACP  countries'  ports,  together  with  technological 
innovations of roll-on/roll-off ships, container services, etc. 
should facilitate their participation in international trade if 
the  volume  of trade  to  and  from  these  countries  would 
allow  for  an  economically  viable  utilization  of available 
transportation  capacity.  The  often-cited  chicken-and-egg 
problem of low trade volume and high transportation costs 
does  not exist in  reality:  once  there  is  demand for  goods 
"The problem of  low  trade  volume and high  transportation 
costs does not exist in reality: once there is demand  .•. trans-
portation costs  will disappear" I  DOSSIER 
~------------------------------~  supplied by ACP countries, transportation barriers will dis-
appear within a relatively short time.  The rapid construc-
tion  of modem  port  facilities  in  oil-exporting  countries 
bears witness to this argument. 
A discussion of the incidence of transportation costs on 
ACP exports in detail, faces conceptual as well as statistical 
problems. Costs are different according to products, trans-
portation media, frequency of shipping, but not necessarily 
according  to  distance.  A  remoteness  factor  in  seaborne 
trade can be outweighed by economies of scale induced by 
a large trade volume and subsequently by the utilization of 
a transportation technology which reduces costs per mile. 
a.  Cif/fob ratios as transportation 
cost proxies for  ACP imports 
\Vith respect to ACP countries three statistical indicators 
are introduced in order to highlight the incidence of trans-
portation costs.  There  is  at first  the cif/fob  ratio  of ACP 
countries' imports assessed by the IMF. To find some evi-
dence  for  ACP  exports  implies  the  assumption  that  the 
san1e  ratios hold for  the export side.  This is  questionable 
since the structure of  their imports differs from that of  their 
exports.  This  has  implications  for  their  transportation 
costs. ACP countries import manufactures, which are gen-
eral cargo  in freight  terms,  and they export primary com-
modities, which are in form  of liquid or dry bulk trade. 
The former trade is  influenced by liner conferences and 
other interventions and hence  is  more regulated and less 
competitive  than bulk trade  where  outsiders can  operate 
more easily.  This could mean that transportation costs of 
ACP countries' imports are systematically higher than the 
costs of their exports. 
The comparison between costs for landlocked ACP coun-
tries  and  their  neighbouring  sea-located  transit  countries 
indicates  the  importance  of surface  transportation  costs. 
Imports for the CAR via Cameroon, for instance, imply the 
doubling of transportation costs compared to those of Ca-
meroonian imports. CAR imports via Congo  on the other 
hand reveal lower mark-ups on costs prevailing for Congo-
lese  imports which,  however,  are  higher than the costs of 
the  Cameroonian  imports.  Trans-shipment  costs  are  ob-
viously  a  source  of freight  rate  increases,  and trans-ship-
ment by  using  railways,  river transport and trucks  is  the 
rule  rather  than  the  exception  in  intra-ACP  countries' 
transportation networks. 
To summarize, the IMF ratios have systematic mistakes 
so  that only a comparison of import freight  rates between 
individual ACP  countries may  be justified.  However,  be-
cause  of distinct  differences  in  the  composition  of ACP 
imports  and  exports,  no  conclusion  can  be  drawn  with 
regard to absolute or relative (vis-a-vis non-ACP competi-
tors) levels of  transportation costs charged on ACP exports. 
Such conclusions necessitate the availability of import sta-
tistics on a cif and fob  basis for countries importing goods 
from ACP countries. There are, however, only three coun-
tries publishing such data, viz. the US, Brazil and the Phil-
ippines. Being a minor importer of  ACP products, the Phil-
ippines have been dropped from  further calculations.  Ta-
bles 9 and 10 therefore illustrate the ad valorem incidence 
of transportation costs of the two other countries' imports 
from  ACP countries and their major competitors. 
Table  9: Ad valorem Incidence of Transportation Costs of US Imports 
from  ACP Countries  and their Major Non-ACP Competitors,  1982 
US Imports from  Product  Ad valorem  Share in  Competing  Ad valorem  Share in 
Incidence  US Imports  Supplier  Incidence  US Imports 
Cote d'Ivoire  Cocoa beans  8.7  30.0  Brazil  9.9  20.8 
Madagascar  Vanilla beans  2.3  69.8  Malaysia  0.7  7.0 
Liberia  Rubber, milk  16.2  36.5  Malaysia  20.0  39.7 
Sudan  Raw cotton  9.8  22.4  Egypt  5.1  46.4 
Jamaica  Crude bauxite  12.4  44.6  Brazil  37.3  4.6 
Mauritius  Wool sweaters, knit  7.0  5.6  Hong Kong  4.6  40.4 
Source: US Department of Commerce. 
Table  10: Ad valorem Incidence of Transportation Costs of Brazilian Imports 
from  ACP Countries and their Major Non-ACP Competitors,  1981 
Brazilian Imports from 
Nigeria 
Liberia 
Zaire 
Product 
Crude oil 
All products 
Natural rubber 
All products 
Copper 
All products 
Source: Ministerio de Fazenda, Comercio Exterior de Brazil. 
Ad valorem 
Incidence 
3.6 
3.7 
8.8 
8.8 
4.4 
4.4 
Competing Supplier  Ad valorem 
Incidence 
Saudi Arabia  6.4 
Singapore  14.5 
Chile  4.4 
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b.  Cif/fob ratios as transportation 
cost proxies for  ACP exports 
Given the structure of the ACP export supply, the items 
are  nearly  exclusively  primary  commodities.  Two  major 
findings  emerge from  the US  data.  First, generally freight 
costs  have  not been  higher  on  imports  originating  from 
ACP countries compared to other origin countries.  In the 
majority of cases  they have been even lower.  Second,  the 
product structure of transportation costs charged on ACP-
originating products is  strongly correlated with  the  struc-
ture of US  imports from  non-ACP sources.  These results 
are  more  surprising  as  non-ACP countries  export mostly 
much larger volumes in specific items to the US  than the 
ACP countries.  In only a few  goods  (vanilla beans,  cocoa 
beans, sisal,  crude bauxite and gum arabic) did individual 
ACP countries occupy top ranks as a third country supplier 
on the  US  market.  Thus,  one could expect economies of 
scale in transportation to be more relevant as brakes to cost 
increases  for  non-ACP exporters than for  ACP exporters. 
However, this does not seem to be the case. 
In general ACP exporters of bulky goods do not seem to 
face serious transportation cost disadvantages on the Amer-
ican  market  against  non-ACP  suppliers.  The  prevailing 
structure of ACP exports does not allow for  testing these 
conclusions for general cargo, viz. finished goods. The only 
case  worth  mentioning in  Table  9 is  of clothing  exports 
from Mauritius to the US which face higher transportation 
costs than those from the leading exporting countries, viz. 
Hong Kong. 
However, there is evidence that ACP non-traditional ex-
ports are  charged higher transportation costs per unit be-
cause of  the small volume which makes liner services unre-
munerative  and  hence  exports  through  trans-shipment 
costly. 
Similar conclusions  emerge  from  the  analysis  of trans-
portation costs for the few ACP originating items imported 
by  Brazil {Table  10 0)).  The most important items,  crude 
oil  exported  by  Nigeria,  copper  exported  by  Zaire  and 
Zambia, natural rubber supplied by Liberia and crude alu-
minium exported by Ghana and Suriname, are not discrim-
inated against competing exports from  Saudi Arabia,  Ca-
nada, Singapore, or Chile. In the case of crude oil and rub-
ber  the  ACP  countries  are  even  better  off.  The  reverse 
holds  for  small  portions  of ACP  exports  like  cinnamon, 
graphite or seeds.  Low-value products such as bauxite rev-
eal  higher  freight  cost  components  than  processed  goods 
(aluminium oxide). Since this holds for non-ACP exporters 
as  well,  domestic  exploitation  of commodities  receives  a 
natural rate of protection and may inhibit both ACP and 
non-ACP exports. 
To conclude,  bulk exports shipped from  ACP countries 
to the US and Brazil seem to be subject to similar freight 
cost-induced  mark-ups  on  export prices  as  they  exist  for 
exports  from  non-ACP  sources.  Instead of transportation 
costs in bulk seaborne trade, attention should be devoted to 
surface trade and its costs and to seaborne trade in general 
cargo.  The  rapid containerization  of the latter trade  will 
evidently  reduce  costs  of trans-shipment where  liner ser-
(I) Abridged version of original table. 
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vices are not economically viable and hence will be  to the 
benefit  of ACP  exporters  of small  volumes  of manufac-
tures. However, the surface trade problem will continue to 
exist. Improving the road network by aid financing cannot 
promote trade unless other export disincentives which have 
their roots  in  the  factor  endowment and factor  prices  of 
landlocked countries are eliminated. 
4.  Travel and  communications 
costs 
The national and international division of  labour crucially 
depends on the media for  communication, i.e.  telephone, 
telex,  other postal services,  air and surface  transportation 
networks. Though it is true that a fully developed commu-
nication network is not a strong prerequisite for economic 
market activities,  it is  likewise  true that, without a mini-
mum availability of infrastructure, natural barriers to mar-
ket activities can become prohibitive. The result of prohi-
bitive barriers to market activities is that traditional know-
how which otherwise would face  adjustment pressures re-
sulting in productivity increases receives maintenance rents 
and impedes the development process. 
The experience  of the development process  throughout 
the  world,  has,  however,  taught that the  chicken-and-egg 
view of poor economic performance and bad infrastructure 
is  misleading.  The development of infrastructure runs pa-
rallel  to the growth process,  and it is  the alliance of eco-
nomic subjects forecasting profits from entering new fields 
of division of labour which either builds up infrastructure 
networks itself or urges  for  governmental financing of in-
frastructure. It conforms to the economic rationale that the 
nature and direction of infrastructure is  closely related to 
the needs of those who have been economically active. For 
instance, African railways were built either for military pur-
poses by the colonial powers or in order to transport natu-
ral  resources  to  the  nearest  port.  Local  needs  dominated 
interregional  targets.  Since  the  financing  of railway  net-
works  depends almost exclusively  on foreign  sources,  the 
cost-benefit analyses  are  made by  them in terms of their 
measurable profitability rather than in terms of social  re-
turns  to  "intangible"  factors.  Under  these  premises  the 
denial by the World Bank to finance  railways  of regional 
dimensions such as the Tanzam-railway or the Chad trunk 
of the  Transcamerounais  or even  local  railway  networks 
such as the Transgabonais whose private remunerativeness 
is  doubtful,  is  logical.  Private  profitability has  also  ruled 
the establishment of unique transportation systems such as 
the  trunk from  the Congolese  Ocean-railway to  M'Binda, 
which is the terminal of the Gabonese cable-car system for 
transporting manganese ore. 
The same holds for ports and the main roads. Both topo-
graphy  and  climate  pose  considerable  engineering  costs 
whose pay-off depends on the prices of low-value and bul-
ky  primary products. 
Likewise,  the  telecommunications network  is  based  on 
colonial structures linking the ACP countries to their form-
er metropolitan countries but not to  each  other.  Further, different  technical  standards  inherited  from  metropolitan 
countries impede links between ACP countries. They face 
additional problems and costs also because of unfavourable 
climate.  The  low  population  density  and  the  enormous 
space  dimensions impede efficient and regular postal  ser-
vices as  well.  The efforts to economize on  funds  by nego-
tiating regional communications networks on a multilateral 
basis  have proved to  be  of little  success  as  shown by  the 
failures  of the  East  African  Common  Services  and  the 
Agence  Transequatoriale  des  Communications  (Congo, 
CAR, Chad). Given the scarcity of public foreign funds, the 
overall  stagnation  of ACP  countries'  economic  develop-
ment on a very low level, and the high investment costs per 
capita for almost any transportation medium in ACP coun-
tries,  there  is  no  hope  that the  already  overproportional 
share of transport and telecommunications in IDA lending 
to sub-Saharan Africa (about 30% compared to 17% for all 
developing  countries)  will  be  significantly  increased.  Nor 
can it be expected that private funds can be raised in such 
amounts which would in  any way  be  enough to solve the 
problem. 
There  is  only  one  transportation  medium,  that  is  air 
transport, in which ACP countries are not in a worse situ-
ation than other developing countries.  The colonial  heri-
tage and natural disadvantages have not put barriers to the 
establishment of an air traffic  network which is  locally  as 
well  as  regionally  fairly  well-developed  given  the  income 
level  of the  countries  concerned.  It is  this  medium  on 
which  export diversification  should be  based.  This  holds 
because processed goods are more viable for air transport 
than  bulky  and  low-value  commodities  because  of their 
value-added content. 
However, in spite of this relatively favourable situation 
i  ACP countries have to cope also with locational disadvan-
tages in air transport. In 1980,  the average passenger fares 
per  km  were  higher  for  flights  within  Africa  as  well  as 
between Africa and Europe than between Europe and Latin 
America  or between  Asia  and Europe.  Average  rates  for 
general cargo,  however, hardly differed on a per km basis. 
"There is only one transportation medium, that is air trans-
port,  in  which  A CP countries  are  not in  a worse  situation 
than  other developing countries" 
DOS.S.IER 
Since  these  data are  recorded  for  scheduled  flights,  price 
differences  may  be  larger  for  non-scheduled  flights  with 
special  tariffs  which  are  more  often  supplied  in  services 
between Europe and Asia than between Europe and Africa 
or within Africa.  In other words,  competition resulting in 
downward  pressures  on  fares  is  more  intensive  on  non-
African flights. 
In  general,  operating costs  per passenger-km  for  routes 
within Africa exceeded those of world total routes by 45% 
(10  US  cents compared to 6.9  US cents). Compared to the 
alternative destinations viz., Asia or Latin America, flights 
between Europe and Africa (including Middle East) are also 
more expensive.  Differences in competition intensities are 
reflected in net revenues of flights  which amount to 4% in 
Africa and to zero or less on other routes. Thus, it appears 
that profits are  squeezed  on  competition-intensive  routes 
such as Europe-Asia and Europe-Latin America rather than 
within  Africa  and  between  Africa  and  Europe  where  a 
much smaller number of airlines operates. 
Upward deviations in costs are determined mainly by the 
relatively short distances in  intra-African flights  which in-
fluence the choice of aircraft in favour of smaller size with 
relatively  high  operating costs  on km  basis.  Furthermore, 
prices of aircraft fuel  are higher in Africa than elsewhere. 
On the other hand,  neither exorbitant airport charges  nor 
high idle capacities (vacant seats) can be observed in flights 
within Africa, whereas the latter factor explains one third of 
upward deviations in Europe-Africa flights.  Here commer-
cial and socio-economic conditions (costs of booking agen-
cies and all passenger-related services such as catering, tele-
communications, booking, reservation, etc.)  emerge as  the 
major source of higher operating costs. 
To  summarize,  relative  air transport  disadvantages  for 
travelling to and within Africa are modest. They are deter-
mined by both economic factors such as the obvious lack of 
competition between the carriers and natural determinants 
(length  of flight  stages).  Such  disadvantages are,  however, 
easier  to  surmount  than  the  heritage  of  a  colonially-
oriented network and the costs of unfavourable climate and 
topography.  Given  the  situation  of landlocked  countries 
and  the  economies  of scale  of regionally  integrated  net-
works,  regional  cooperation  aiming  at  the  reduction  of 
travel  and communications  costs  seems  to  be  indispens-
able. However, conflicts on voting rights in the multilateral 
administration of joint services and on the distribution of 
net gains have prevented some regional arrangements from 
operating over a longer period. On the other hand, success 
of cooperation in air transport by groups such as  Air Afri-
que allow for  more optimistic expectations in future. 
5.  Oil price  shocks 
Some  of the  ACP  countries  (Congo,  Gabon,  Nigeria, 
Trinidad and Tobago) belong to the category of oil-export-
ing  countries.  Their export earnings  increased as  a  direct 
consequence of sudden increases in oil prices in the seven-
ties.  Nigeria,  particularly,  was  able  to raise  its  oil  exports 
tremendously.  The  following  observations  on  oil  price 
shocks as an exogenous barrier to export growth are there-
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fore confined to those ACP countries which are net import-
ers  of oil and had to face  highly inflated import bills and 
rising  costs  of production  as  a  result  of increased  oil 
prices. 
The rise of oil prices had two  major contrary effects on 
the  exports  of non-oil  developing  countries.  On  the  one 
hand  they  were  adversely  affected  through  the  resulting 
relapse of economic activity and hence of import demand 
for  their goods  in their main export markets of industrial 
countries.  On the other hand,  the demand for  their goods 
and  in  some  selected  cases  also  for  services  in  the  oil-
exporting countries increased due to rising exchange earn-
ings of the OPEC countries. 
In addition to these two major effects, exports of non-oil 
ACP  countries  may  have  been  adversely  affected  by 
domestic inflation, the worsening of  international competi-
tiveness of their goods and the shortage of imported inputs 
resulting from  the import restrictions introduced in  these 
countries to  face  the balance-of-payments problem arising 
from  higher  oil  prices.  The  non-oil  developing  countries 
tried to solve  these  problems on the  supply side  through 
various export promotion measures including devaluation 
of their currencies.  A detailed analysis  of these  issues  for 
many non-oil developing countries showed a considerable 
effect  of oil  price  shock  on domestic  inflation,  though  it 
varied  from  year  to  year  and  from  country  to  country. 
Their international competitiveness suffered in the case of 
mineral tar and crude chemicals but not elsewhere because 
in the  competing countries,  also,  the  relative  prices  were 
affected  by  the  oil  price  shocks.  In textiles,  travel goods, 
clothing and footwear they were even able to improve their 
competitive positions. This could not be considered, how-
ever, as an effect of  the oil price shock because the trend for 
this  improvement  had  begun  already  before  the  massive 
increase  of prices  of oil  in  1973.  Nonetheless  this  is  an 
indication of the fact that the import restrictions in devel-
oping countries were selective to avoid some of their nega-
tive effects on the export sector. 
The oil price shock induced the developing countries to 
raise the priorities of exports promotion measures in order 
to  pay  the  increased  bill  of imported oil.  The  success  of 
these measures was  marked more for Latin American and 
especially  Asian  developing  countries  than  for  African 
countries. Cote d'Ivoire and Congo constitute however ex-
ceptions. They were successful in raising their total exports 
as  compared to  many other African countries.  This large 
majority of oil-importing countries adjusted to the oil price 
shock by  reducing  their imports through decrease  in eco-
nomic growth rates and through import substitution. This 
especially was  true for  low-income sub-Saharan countries, 
to a lesser extent for middle-income countries which could 
mobilize additional external savings. 
To return to the effect of oil  price shocks on exports in 
industrial countries,  it is  sure that the import demand of 
these countries decreased relatively more than that of the 
remaining world.  How much the ACP countries were also 
affected  by  this  demand shrinkage  depended  very  much, 
among other things,  on their market shares of these coun-
tries. The estimates for Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Sen-
egal  alone amounted to  a loss  of US$ 829 m during  197 4 
and  1978.  However,  only about  27%  of this  loss  can  be 
attributed to the oil price shock which was  about 18%  of 
their estimated exports  (trend  values).  The other African 
countries were  not affected  so  much because  of their low 
market  shares  in  the  industrial  countries.  Such  detailed 
estimates for the period after the second oil price shock are 
Table  11 : Exports of major non-oil ACP countries to OPEC < 1> members,  1970-1982 
1970  1976  1982 
Total  OPEC:  Per  Total  OPEC  Per 
Total  OPEC  Per 
Mill. US$  cent  Mill. US$  cent  Mill. US$  cent 
Cameroon  231  2·  0.87  513  7  1.36  1721  6  0.35 
Ethiopia  123  7·  5.69  281  22  7.83  400  25  6.25 
Ghana  458  1  0.22  829  6  0.72  929  4  0.43 
Cote  d~Ivoire  469  4  0.85  1642  21  1.28  2441  57  2.34 
Jamaica  340  1  0.29  608  15  2.47  858  33  3.85 
Kenya  305  4  1.31  793  8  1.01  1125  48  4.27 
Liberia  236  - - 457  - - 1200  7  0.58 
Madagascar  145  1  0.69  278  9  3.24  433  84  19.40 
Mauritius  71  - - 265  - - 365  - -
Papua New Guinea  105  - - 594  I  0.17  727  1  0.14 
Senegal  152  - - 490  - - 482  8  1.66 
Sudan  298  8  2.68  544  22  3.97  583  171  29.33 
Suriname  134  - - 275  - - 370  7  1.89 
Tanzania  261  2  0.77  492  8  1.63  480  45  9.34 
Zaire  735  - - 809  - - 1713  - -
Zambia  1001  2  0.20  1044  1  0.10  880  10  1.14 
Total (ACP Sample)  5064  32  0.63  . 9924  120  1.21  14707  506  3.44 
Total (a11  LDCs) (2)  36258  879  2.42  142454  8095  5.68  309216  24266,  7.85 
(1)  Including Nigeria. (2)  Excluding OPEC. 
Source: IMP. 
-
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not  available,  but the  shares  of some  of ACP  countries 
(Cote  d'lvoire, Kenya,  Sudan,  Tanzania, Zambia) in total 
world exports in the years  1979 to  1981  do show that their 
exports  suffered  mainly  due  to  depression  in  industrial 
countries which was caused to some extent by this oil price 
shock.  During  this  period the  protectionist tendencies  in 
the developed countries gained further strength.  The ACP 
countries  have,  however,  not  been  affected  by  them  as 
much as some other developing countries like South Korea, 
Taiwan,  Singapore,  India,  Pakistan,  Brazil,  Argentina and 
Malaysia because they enjoy a more favourable preferential 
treatment for their goods in the EEC than the rest of devel-
oping  countries.  Moreover,  most  the  goods  exported  by 
them were raw materials and therefore not subject to pro-
tectionist measures. 
The positive side of the oil price shock was characterized 
by a massive increase in the import demand of oil export-
ing countries as a result of their increased export earnings. 
These  earnings  rose  in  the  case  of OPEC  countries from 
US$  25  billion in 1972 to  US$ 140 billion in 1978 and by 
1981 they again almost doubled due to oil price increases of 
1979  and  1980.  The total imports of the OPEC members 
rose from US$  14 billion to about US$  93  billion in 1978 
and. then to US$  131  billion in 1981. Developing countries 
as a group were able to benefit from this demand expansion 
only proportionately in the sense that their share of OPEC 
imports remained at about 12% constant during  1972 and 
197 8.  In the  following  two  years  however it increased to 
17%.  OPEC imports from developing countries amount to 
about one third of OPEC exports to these countries where-
as for the industrial countries import/export ratio is around 
one  half.  The  fundamental  explanation  for  this  is  that a 
greater  part of OPEC  import demand and  its  expansion 
since the first oil price shock has been for industrial goods 
supplied mainly by the developed countries. 
Total exports of major non-oil ACP countries to OPEC 
are  given  in  Table  11.  It shows  that  they  were  able  to 
increase  their exports to  OPEC  countries  more than pro-
portionately among the developing countries. The share of 
OPEC  members  in  total  exports  of major  non-oil  ACP 
countries increased during 1970 and 1982 more than five-
fold,  whereas for  the developing countries as a whole this 
ratio comes to a little more than three, although the supply 
structure  of ACP  countries  was  not much  different  from 
that of  the rest of  developing countries. Most of  this success 
is  attributable to  Madagascar,  Sudan and Tanzania. Their 
geographical proximity to some of the domestic markets of 
OPEC members seems to have been partly responsible for 
this  success.  This point should,  however,  not be  overem-
phasized because the exports of ACP countries in the base 
year were  comparatively very low.  Further comparison of 
shares  of ACP  countries  in  total  imports  of OPEC  with 
those  of other  developing  countries,  especially  of some 
Asian ones,  does not allow a very favourable comment. 
To  summarize,  the  net effect  of decreasing  import de-
mand in industrial countries and increasing import demand 
in  OPEC  countries  seems  to  have  been  negative  for  the 
majority of ACP net importers of oil. This result is almost 
exclusively  determined  by  their  export  supply  structure 
based on primary commodities. 
IV.  EEC trade  policy-induced barriers to  ACP 
export growth and  export diversification 
1.  Product coverage  in  ACP 
trade  preferences  and 
preference  redundancy 
About 60% of total exports of ACP countries in the EEC 
was  accounted  for  in  1982  by  20  primary  commodities 
which  are  freely  importable  in  the  Community  from  all 
countries.  Thus  there  is  no  preferential  treatment  of the 
imports of these goods from the associated countries in the 
EEC.  ACP exports of an additional 37  items amounted to 
about 28% of total imports of the  EEC  from  these  coun-
tries. In these items the ACP imports enjoyed tariff prefer-
ences  of varying  degrees.  A third group  of ACP  exports 
consisting almost solely of agricultural products constituted 
approximately 4% of these exports. In many of these pro-
ducts  also  the  ACP  exports were  given  preferential treat-
ment within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
meJmber countries (Table  12). 
An important question which arises in this connection is 
whether the  preferences  granted  to  the  imports from  the 
ACP countries are necessary to promote their exports in the 
Community  or  whether  they  are  redundant  in  this  re-
spect. 
A rather simplified approach has been used here for ana-
lysing this question. It is  assumed that the ACP exporters 
face  competition on  the  Common  Market  only  from  the 
exports of  the non-associated developing countries and that 
products are  homogeneous (Law  of One  Price).  As  long  as 
the  import  price  of a  product  of ACP  countries  is  lower 
than the  import price  of a non-ACP product,  a preference 
margin in favour of the former is not necessary to promote 
its  exports  in the  Common Market. If in spite  of that a 
preference margin is introduced, the ACP import becomes 
still cheaper than the import from  the non-associated de-
veloping countries and in this case the preference margin is 
considered to be positively redundant. That means that the 
actual preferential rate conceded to the ACP countries ex-
ceeds the rate which would be necessary to compete with 
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Table  12: ACP Agricultural Goods Having 
No or· Less Than Full Preference 
in the EEC in 1982 
EEC Imports 
from ACP 
Product  Countries 
in  1982~ 
ECU 1000 
Meat of bovine animals,  frozen  15 952 
Meat Qf swine  370 
Manioc roots  2 818 
Sweet oranges  1 103 
Mandarins and other citrus hybrids  2269 
Apples  146 
Strawberries  250 
Maize  165 
Rice,  milled  844 
Grain sorghum  2897 
Other starches  219 
Sausages  339 
Raw sugar for  refining  526 742 
Raw sugar not for refining  22303 
Molasses  43 302 
Fruit prepared or preserved  560 
Fruit mixtures prepared or preserved  261 
Rum  44 725 
Residues of cereals  22054 
Total  687 349 
Source : Eurostat. 
non-ACP suppliers. Quite contrary to this is the case where 
the ACP price is so high that even a tariff discrimination of 
non-ACP imports does  not change  the  price  relation  be-
tween the ACP and non-ACP imports as much as to reduce 
it to unity or below unity.  This is  called here as  negative 
preference redundancy. In other words, the preferential tar-
iff is  not effective because it is  not high enough to enable 
the ACP exporter to become competitive in relation to oth-
er  exporters  in  the  donor  market.  The  third  possibility 
where a preferential tariff is not considered as redundant is 
constituted  by  those  items  in  which  it  enables  the  ACP 
exporters  to  compensate for  their price  disadvantage and 
become competitive on the Common Market in compari-
son  to  exporters  from  other  developing  countries.  Such 
cases are however less  frequent.  Out of 16  selected  items 
only  four  items (vanilla,  cocoa  butter,  canned  pineapples 
and bovine meat prepared) in  1977  and only one (canned 
pineapples)  in  1982  proved  to  have  had  zero  preference 
redundancy.  In  some  other  products  (palm  oil,  vanilla) 
exported  by ACP countries  in  1982,  for  instance,  prefer-
ences helped to converge higher ACP prices and lower non-
ACP prices to almost unity ratios.  In these  cases  the im-
ports from the ACP countries were dearer than those from 
the  remaining developing countries before tariffs  but pre-
ferential tariffs made the former cheaper or almost equal in 
price than those of non-ACP exporters. It is  in these cases 
where preferential trading is supposed to be effective. In the 
other  two  cases  where  a  positive  or  negative  preference 
redundancy can be  observed, either it is  not at all needed 
for enabling the ACP exporters to become competitive with 
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the exporters from other developing countries or it is inef-
fective  because  it is  by  far  lower  than  the  difference  be-
tween the prices of the two competitors. 
In both the years (1977 and 1982) for which the data on 
import prices and preferential tariffs were  examined there 
were  equal numbers of import goods  having positive and 
negative preference redundancy available to ACP exporters 
in the EEC.  Goods for which preferential tariffs were found 
positively redundant in  1977 as  well  as  in 1982 were can-
ned tuna, cocoa paste,  aluminium oxide, goat skin leather 
and tropical hardwood. Here the ACP exports had a defin-
ite  price  advantage  over  the  non-ACP  exports  from  the 
Third World and even  the  removal of preferences  would 
not have impaired their competitiveness. Goods where tar-
iff preferences could by no means outweigh price disadvan-
tages  of ACP exporters in both of the years  were  prawns 
and shrimps, beans and cloves.  In the first three products 
the ACP prices were  sometimes twice  as  high as  those of 
other  developing  countries.  Without  tariff increases  im-
posed on non-ACP exporters such big price disadvantages 
could not have been compensated. The fact that in spite of 
the ineffectiveness of preferences in these cases ACP coun-
tries  could  nevertheless  export  to  the  EEC  indicates  that 
either additional quantitative regulations (tariff quotas) ex-
ist or that the products are not homogeneous. 
ACP competitiveness measured in this sense is, however, 
not  a  function  of preferential  tariffs  only.  This  is  quite 
obvious in the cases of molluscs and tropical hardwood. In 
both of them the EEC preferential tariffs for ACP exporters 
remained  constant  between  1977  and  1982.  But  in  the 
former case its position changed from a negative redundan-
cy in 1977 to a positive redundancy in 1982 as  a result of 
independent changes  in the  prices  of ACP  and non-ACP 1 
exports.  Quite  the  contrary  happened  in  the  latter  case. 
Tropical hardwood offered  by  the ACP suppliers in 1982 
was more expensive than in 1977, whereas that supplied by 
the other developing countries became much cheaper dur-
ing the same period.  As  a result the preferential tariff for 
the  ACP  exporters  became  ineffective.  Whether  one  is 
worse than the other cannot be  decided ipso facto.  None-
theless, both kinds of preference redundancy characterize a 
waste of  resources, in so far as they are either not needed or 
fail to fulfill their function of promoting the exports of the 
beneficiaries. 
Since ACP preferential margins which are mostly equal 
to GATT  -negotiated tariffs remain usually constant over a 
period of many years,  it is  the relative prices of the ACP 
and non-ACP exporters and their changes which influence 
the  ACP  competitiveness  on  the  Common  Market.  In 
order to improve it, therefore, attention has to be paid to 
those factors which  have an impact on the price level of 
ACP exports such as  availability and cost of inputs, pro-
duction techniques,  marketing,  transportation,  warehous-
ing and the level of exchange  rate vis-a-vis the competi-
tors. Most of  these fall in the domain of  domestic econom-
ic  policy  of the ACP  countries and are  discussed  in the 
following  chapter.  This  should,  however,  not  leave  the 
impression that ACP exports are significantly more expen-
sive than competing exports from other developing coun-
tries. C:~------------------------------------•n•o._s.s.IE•R._ 
2.  Erosion of preference margins 
a.  (;SP-induced erosion 
ACP countries frequently complain about the erosion of 
their special  preferences  resulting  from  the  broader pro-
duct coverage and tariff cuts in the Generalized System  of 
Prefl~rences (GSP)  as  well as  from the implementation of 
MF1~  tariff cuts negotiated in the Tokyo Round. No doubt 
both these sources of preference erosion do exist. Howev-
er, it is important to note that they are related more to the 
legal  conditions of market access  than to their effective-
ness. 
W'ith regard to GSP, the main area of preference erosion 
lies  in the realm of processed agricultural products which 
have been increasingly included in the list of GSP-eligible 
products.  Whereas  in  1971  only  145  items  were  granted 
GSP treatment, in 1983 there were as many as 338. Most of 
the increments in product coverage were achieved between 
1975  and 1977 (296  items), which reflects the intention of 
the Community to compensate the seven Asian Common-
wealth countries for the loss of Commonwealth preferences 
which  expired  by  1978  due  to  the  accession  of the  UK. 
Parallel to the enlarged product coverage in processed agri-
cultural items, GSP preferential tariffs were partly reduced 
so  that the depth of tariff cut became larger. 
Except for plywood and veneer, where tariff quotas in the 
GSP have been introduced in order to  protect ACP trade 
interests,  the  manufacturing  sector  is  a  field  where  ACP 
preference  margins  have  been dismantled  not because  of 
GSP improvements but because of the implementation of 
the  GSP  itself.  However,  neither anglophone  ACP  coun-
tries  under  the  relatively  liberal  Commonwealth  prefer-
ences on the UK market prior to 197 5 nor the francophone 
Yaounde  associates  under the  reciprocal  Yaounde prefer-
ences on the EEC  market could make effective use of pre-
ferences  for  manufactures.  Therefore  the  GSP  cannot  be 
sup]posed to have contributed to the reduction of the share 
of ACP countries in EEC  manufactured markets.  In fact, 
the  erosion issue centres on tropical agricultural products 
and their processing, and here the ACP countries compete 
mainly with the ASEAN countries. It is the ASEAN group 
to which improvements in agricultural product coverage of 
the GSP were granted, and it is this group which increased 
its agricultural exports of competing products during 1974 
and 1980 to the Community by a higher rate than did the 
ACP group. 
Thus the question of whether ACP  preferential  market 
access suffered from erosion of their tariff preferences can 
best  be  answered  by  calculating  ACP  preference  margins 
vis-a-vis  competing  ASEAN  suppliers  and  their  changes 
befi)re and after the first  Lome Convention. For this pur-
pose  the  core  group  of ACP  countries  consisting  of the 
Yaounde associates were  chosen as reference countries for 
ASEAN  suppliers.  Commonwealth  preferences  were  not 
taken into account and the comparison was confined to the 
remaining eight EEC members. The results of  weighted pre-
ference  margins with and without GSP treatment in  1974 
and 1980, respectively, denote the GSP-induced erosion of 
ACP  preferences  in  the  two  reference  years  (Table  13). 
% 
Table  13 
Weighted Average  Preference Margins 
of ACP Agricultural Exports vis-a-vis 
Competing ASEAN 
Products on  EEC 9 Markets 
8.-----------------------------. 
7 +-------.~--- o=.---------------
b+--~-- -100~------ ----
~Indonesia 
~  Malays1a 
- Ph1llpp1nes 
~  Smgapore 
---'='--......J  ~  Thailand 
EC  GSP  Treatment 
They show that in  1974  ACP preferences vis-a-vis Singa-
pore  in about  30  sample items would  have amounted at 
most to 5.1% without the GSP but were diminished by 3. 7 
percentage  points  or  73%  because  of the  GSP.  Erosions 
emerged  also  vis-a-vis  the  Philippines  by  1.6  percentage 
points or 47% of the MFN rate without GDP application. 
In the  case  of Malaysia  the  GSP  effect  was  considerably 
smaller, and it did not exist in the cases of Indonesia and 
Thailand. 
The 1980 figures reveal that during the second half of the 
seventies MFN rates decreased except in the cases  of the 
Philippines and Thailand where MFN rates and hence hy-
pothetical  ACP  preference  margins  slightly  increased  be-
cause of a changing export composition. On the whole the 
GSP has dismantled ACP preference margins. At most pre-
ferences were eroded fully  (Singapore); at least by 0.5  per-
centage points or 11% of the MFN tariff (Indonesia). 
b.  GATT tariff cut-induced erosion 
The change in average weighted  preference margins be-
tween  1974  and  1980  is  the combined effect of three fac-
tors:  changes  in MFN rates  ("without GSP") due  to  the 
GATT negotiations, changes in GSP preferential tariffs and 
changes in weights (product composition effect). Disregard-
ing the latter effect, which is relatively small, the contribu-
tion of the MFN tariff cut to the shrinkage of ACP prefer-
ence margins is  denoted by the tariff changes during  197 4 
and 1980 "without GSP" (Table  13). This effect has dom-
inated the erosion of the ACP preferences vis-a-vis Indon-
esia and Malaysia and comprised such goods as tea, cocoa 
beans  and coffee  beans.  As  sources  of erosion,  the MFN 
cuts  and the  GSP  improvement  were  balanced  vis-a-vis 
Singapore, whereas for the Philippines GSP improvements 
were important solely vis-a-vis Thailand, whose agricultu-
ral exports depend mainly on tapioca. In this case the ACP 
countries did not suffer from preference erosion. Since ex-
clusive  MFN tariff cuts  in the  Tokyo  Round were  nego-
tiated for  a  much  smaller number of tropical  items than 
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GSP preferences, one may be inclined to give the GSP con-
cessions a higher weight  as  a source of erosion.  However, 
such a view neglects that the three "classical" tropical pro-
ducts  (tea,  coffee  and  cocoa  beans)  which  were  excluded 
from the GSP but enjoyed MFN cuts are important export 
items  for  the  ACP  and  have  become  sizeable  items  for 
ASEAN  competitors.  For example,  Indonesia's coffee  ex-
ports to the EEC amounted to 12% of the ACP export vol-
ume in  1980 compared to only 7%  in  1974.  Similar gains 
can be  observed in the share of Malaysia's cocoa exports. 
However,  as  opposing  trends can  be  observed  for  tea,  it 
remains  open  whether  the  unquestioned  erosion  of ACP 
preferences  had a  negative  incidence  on  ACP  exports  or 
not.  Other supply-induced factors  which  became effective 
at the  same time when  preferences  were  dismantled may 
have been important as  well.  Neither unit value compari-
sons  and  their changes  nor the  performance  of Yaounde 
associates  on  the UK market after the  end  of Common-
wealth  preferences (1)  provide convincing evidence for  the 
conclusion  that  it  was  the  erosion  of preferences  which 
worsened the competitive position of  ACP countries on the 
EEC  market compared to that of developing countries en-
joying either MFN cuts or GSP preferences. The relatively 
low initial level of  tariffs and the market imperfections may 
have suppressed an effective incidence of shrinking prefer-
ence  margins. 
3.  Origin rules and  their 
impact on  ACP exports 
a.  Implementation of origin rules 
Origin  rules  are  a  complement  to  unequal  treatment 
through regionally specified tariff quotas. Once an import-
ing  country starts dividing its  trading  partners into more 
privileged, less privileged and non-privileged ones, as mea-
sured by degrees of deviations from the MFN tariff, origin 
rules  have to be  introduced.  Otherwise  a trade deflection 
occurs  which  means  imports  from  countries  which  have 
already  exhausted  their quotas  via  countries  which  have 
not  exhausted  their  quotas  or  which  enjoy  open-ended 
market access. This would make special preferences ineffec-
tive and would open additional export outlets for advanced 
developing  countries,  thus  putting domestic  producers  of 
the  importing  country  under  enhanced  adjustment  pres-
sure. 
The relevance of  trade deflection is obvious in the case of 
ACP countries. They enjoy duty-free and open-ended mar-
ket access for  nearly all products in the EEC  and are to a 
large extent unable to use it. On the other hand, advanced 
developing countries of Latin America and particularly of 
(1)  In the heat of  discussion of  ACP preference margins and their erosion 
it has often been forgotten that a reverse situation happened after the end of 
Commonwealth preferences in the sense that the francophone ACP countries 
gained a duty-free access to the UK market due to the UK accession. Thus, 
after 1978 the comparative tariff treatment of Asian Commonwealth devel-
oping  countries  and  francophone  African  countries  on  the  UK  market 
turned to the advantage of the latter. This reversal to the detriment of the 
former could not be outweighed by the extension of  the EEC GSP scheme to 
the UK replacing the Commonwealth preferences. 
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Asia can use  the options of duty-free treatment under the 
GSP only to the extent fixed  by  the Community through 
general safeguards, ceilings and tariff quotas. Furthermore, 
successful non-ACP suppliers are subjected to quantitative 
restrictions. The existence of highly competitive and non-
competitive suppliers facing different conditions of market 
accessibility provides strong incentives to trade deflection. 
This would practically lead to a shift of "finishing touch" 
activities  to  ACP  countries  in  order to  profit from  ACP 
preferences. These activities may contribute to employ re-
sources  in  ACP  countries which  would  otherwise  remain 
idle and may thus support the developmental targets of the 
Lome Conventions. Yet the protection of its own domestic 
industries has been given priority by the EEC.  Thus, mini-
mum  requirements  of domestic  value  added  content  in 
gross  output  have  been  fixed  which  are  widely  identical 
with  requirements  set  for  other preferential  arrangements 
(GSP, Mediterranean preferences). Basically, the Commun-
ity has set implicit as  well  as  explicit minimum domestic 
value added content requirements. The explicit ones deter-
mine  that  the  cif value  of imported  materials  does  not 
exceed an upper limit fixed as a percentage of the ex-facto-
ry value of the exported product (percentage criterion). The 
implicit requirements constitute specific processing opera-
tions  to  be  carried out in the  ACP  country  on  the  non-
originating materials (process criterion). The jump from  a 
4-digit CCCN heading to another one mostly serves as the 
criterion of substantial processing, but not always.  The so-
called regulation lists A and B of the rule  of origins enu-
merate the cases where  the tariff jump does not qualify a 
product  for  preferential  treatment  because  of insufficient 
processing and where even without a tariff jump origin rule 
requirements are met because of substantial processing.  In 
contrast to origin rules fixed for GSP beneficiaries the ACP 
countries have been granted two cumulation options which 
basically reduce the restrictive nature of origin rules. Value 
added  contents  of several  ACP  countries  can  be  added 
together which encourages vertical specialization and intra-
ACP trade and second, inputs imported from the Commu-
nity are considered as  originating products (donor content 
rule). Whereas the former option is not likely to have much 
impact  because  of the  low  industrialization  level  of the 
countries  concerned  and  because  of low  level  of trade 
among each other, the latter may be more important. How-
ever, it has the stigma of "tied aid". No doubt the donor 
country content reduces  the  options of ACP countries to 
buy from the cheapest sources of supply. However, the pre-
ferences  are a non-negotiable unilateral concession and no 
recipient can complain about the real value of the conces-
sion which is deflated by its tiedness. 
b.  Domestic value added  content: 
implications for  ACP countries 
It has been concluded from an UNCT  AD study in which 
the  implicit  value  added  requirements  for  garments  and 
woven cotton fabrics were  transformed into explicit value 
added shares (86 and 76% of  the finished product) that less 
advanced ACP countries are unable to meet such criteria. 
For 12% ACP countries at the end ofthe seventies it was 
shown that the recorded value added shares in gross output ~----------------------------------~D~O~,S~S~I~E~R~ 
of rnanufacturing  industries  did  not  exceed  50%  for  the 
majority of cases  (73%).  This proportion was  even worse 
some  years  ago.  Out of the two  most industrialized ACP 
countries, Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya, only one industry (bev-
erages) in the former exceeded the 50% limit. 
There are several factors responsible for this result. First, 
the ACP countries at their given stage of industrialization 
hardly possess vertically integrated processing chains which 
would raise the domestic value added content. Second, the 
import substitution policies  pursued by  most of the ACP 
countries inhibit the establishment of local industries pro-
ducing intermediates. Third, the distortion of factor prices 
in ACP countries through  minimum wage  legislation  and 
interest  rate  ceilings  favour  capital  intensive  techniques 
which  lead to  a  high  share of non-originating inputs im-
ported  from  industrialized  economies.  Fourth,  the  goods 
prices are also distorted through tariffs and subsidies. Tar-
iffs  are  highest  in finished  goods  and lowest  for  primary 
commodities.  Capital  goods  can  often  be  imported  duty 
free  because of tax holidays conceded to foreign  investors. 
In terms of world market prices the domestic value added 
sometimes turns out to be negative. Fifth, the donor coun-
try  content  provision  enhances  the  existing  tendency  of 
investors from EEC countries to apply the same labour sav-
ing techniques in ACP countries with which they are fam-
iliar in their home countries.  The above price  policies  as 
well  as  the application  of technical  standards and norms 
used  in the home countries of foreign  investors reinforce 
this tendency. 
Under these conditions one could expect that most of the 
ACP non-traditional exports have been denied preferential 
treatment in the EEC because of their not being in confor-
mity with its rules of origin.  But this is  not true.  Though 
data on ACP exports to the EEC market under MFN con-
ditions are not available, it seems that full tariff exemption 
has been conceded to all  ACP exports in privileged items. 
This is indicated by a few ACP exports which are classified 
as  GSP-receiving imports in the German import statistics 
because  the  importers  of these  goods  filled  in  the  GSP 
Form A instead of  the movement certificate for preferential 
trade between the EEC and the ACP states. Hence, instead 
of special preferences, the GSP was applied. Though origin 
rules  are  even  more  rigid  in  the  GSP  (lack  of donor 
content),  ACP  exports  could  obviously  jump  over  this 
hurdle. 
\Vhy  this was  possible in spite  of the  low  value added 
content in gross output can be explained by making ·refer-
ences  to  derogations from  the rules.  In specific cases  and 
under various conditions to  be  approved by the Customs 
Cooperation Council established under the ACP agreement 
exe1nptions from the rules of origin can be granted. 
c.  Effects of the donor 
country content rule 
The donor country content provision combines both. a 
short-term derogation as  well  as  a long-term  impasse for 
ACP exporters. 
Are the rules of origin protectionist tools of the Commu-
nity  in the sense that they inhibit ACP exports and if so, 
against whom are these tools used by the Community? As 
long as no distinction can made between preference-receiv-
ing  imports  on  the  one  hand and preference-eligible  im-
ports  from  ACP  countries  which  did not receive  prefer-
ences on the other hand, there is  no direct answer to this 
question.  But  even  if preference-eligible  and  preference-
receiving  imports  from  the  ACP  region  were  identical, 
there is evidence that rules of origin are protectionist tools, 
not against ACP countries but against those third countries 
which  are  excluded  from  both  of the  cumulation  provi-
sions. Such countries are the non-EEC industrialized econ-
omies and particularly the non-ACP advanced developing 
countries. Fabrics cannot be exported from Asian countries 
to ACP members in order to be processed there to clothing 
even if wage  costs in the ACP group would make  such  a 
trade profitable. Since this holds generally,  ACP countries 
are cut off from transfers of technological and commercial 
know-how originating from advanced developing countries 
and this is exactly what they need.  Instead incentives are 
provided  by  the  donor  country  content  rule  to  import 
advanced technologies from the highly developed countries 
of the Community which do not correspond to the factor 
endowment of ACP countries. 
d.  Implications for  ACP exporters 
Whereas cost differentials between inputs from the EEC 
and cheaper  substitutes  from  non-EEC  sources  may  give 
rise  to  concern  in  the  short run as  they  are  equal  to  an 
income transfer from the ACP group to the EEC,  the long-
run implications of the donor country content provisions 
are more serious. The use of  inadequate technologies is fos-
tered, the abundant unskilled labour remains unemployed 
and  the  discrimination  of domestic  producers  of inputs 
through the red tape of the investment codes is  not coun-
tervailed. Furthermore, ACP countries become increasingly 
dependent on the EEC for their exports because inputs ori-
ginating only from the EEC can be considered as  originat-
ing products if the finished goods- are to be exported to the 
EEC.  Rules  of origin  of potential  third  markets  such  as 
Japan or the USA will deny preferential treatment to these 
ACP  exports  under  their  GSP.  Finally,  the  division  of 
labour  with  non-ACP  advanced  developing  countries, 
which  might  be  crucial  as  a  development  stimulant  for 
ACP countries, is  impeded. 
To  conclude,  as  long  as  discriminatory  preferences  do 
exist,  rules  of origin  are  indispensable  for  separating the 
beneficiaries from  the non-beneficiaries. In the ACP case, 
non-competitive ACP countries are neighboured by compe-
titive non-ACP countries whose labour-intensive industries 
threaten vulnerable domestic industries of the EEC.  In this 
respect rules  of origin,  which require  substantial transfor-
mation with value added contents of more than 50%, have 
the principal objective of reducing incentives for trade de-
flection.  Proceeding along this line means to close possible 
loopholes  for  indirect  exports  of advanced  developing 
countries  via  ACP·  countries,  but  unfortunately  it  also 
hampers potential ACP exports.  In order to achieve both 
targets, viz.,  the prevention of indirect exports from NICs 
and the promotion of ACP exports, the donor country con-
tent rule serves as a way out of this impasse. However, it is 
a rather selfish solution of tlie problem. 
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V.  ACP policy-induced barriers to ACP 
export growth and  export diversification 
Internal price distortions are probably the most serious 
bottleneck to the integration of ACP countries in the world 
economy because they inhibit domestic producers in pro-
ducing  goods  with  a  factor  mix  which  is  commensurate 
with  the  country's factor  endowment.  The costs  of these 
distortions increase, however, with the degree of openness 
of an economy. The smaller ACP countries are open econ-
omies par excellence, but they seem to have adopted price-
distorting policies more than proportionately. A sample of 
31  developing countries ranked by the World Bank accord-
ing to to the degrees of their price distortions in the seven-
ties,  denotes  six  ACP  countries  in  the  lower  half of the 
sample,  viz.,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Senegal,  Jamaica,  Tanzania, 
Nigeria and Ghana. The latter three countries together with 
Bangladesh had the highest amount of price distortions. 
Price distortions in developing countries are a result of 
administered prices  for  production factors  through which 
labour  is  usually  made  more  costly  and capital  cheaper 
than they would be under market conditions. Further deter-
minants  of distortions  in  developing  countries  lie  in  the 
realm of product pricing (tariffs and inflation) as well as in 
the lack of adjustment of exchange  rates  to  the  changing 
differentials between domestic and international inflation. 
The latter determinant often results in overvalued nominal 
exchange  rates  and hence in an  appreciation of the  local 
currency in real terms. 
1.  Factor price  distortions 
a.  Minimum wages 
(i)  Labour abundance and labour aristocracy 
A relative abundance of unskilled labour is  a common 
feature  of Third World countries  and especially  of those 
which  are in the early stages  of development such as  the 
ACP members. According to the traditional theory of  inter-
national trade these countries can improve their welfare if 
they specialize in the production and export of those goods 
which make ail intensive use of this factor.  Yet, in almost 
all of  these countries the employment of unskilled labour is 
subject to some form  of minimum. wage  regulations.  Ob-
viously  the  protection  of the  most  vulnerable  group  of 
workers  has  considerable  political  appeal  because  it is  a 
visible expression of declared targets of many governments 
to achieve a greater degree of social justice and to improve 
the  distribution  of national  income.  However,  whether 
minimum wage  fixing  is  an adequate method of reaching 
these targets is a controversial issue. The main objection to 
the  use  of this  policy  instrument  is  that  it  will  raise 
labour/capital price ratios and will foster the introduction 
of labour-saving techniques. While offering wage rents to a 
relatively small group of already employed workers, which 
is defined here as labour aristocraty, minimum wage fixing 
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reduces  employment  opportunities  for  a  majority  of the 
unskilled labourers. 
Evaluation of the economic impact of minimum wages, 
however,  faces  considerable empirical hurdles.  Its impact 
on labour costs,  prices,  employment, investment and eco-
nomic growth largely depends on their level and effective-
ness,  especially  in the  long  run  when  adjustments  to  in-
creases in labour productivity and general price level have 
to be  made.  Nonetheless,  some general  comments on the 
importance of minimum wage legislation for economic de-
velopment  in  the  ACP  countries,  especially  the  African 
ones, are possible. 
(ii)  Minimum wage  legislation in ACP countries in 
historical perspective 
Minimum wages  are administered in almost all African 
ACP  countries,  where  they  were  introduced  first  by  the 
colonial powers. At the end of the colonial period the lead-
ership of  labour price was in the hands of  the public sector. 
Here the wage level was relatively very high and character-
ized by a big difference between wages  of skilled and uns-
killed  labour.  This  difference  was  caused  mainly  by  the 
efforts  of the  colonial  powers  to  facilitate  recruitment of 
administrative staff from their own countries. For the same 
reason a similar wage  structure existed also in the private 
sector which was  dominated by foreign  firms. 
After  independence  it was  easier  to  meet  the  political 
pressure for reducing the massive income disparities within 
the already employed labour force  by raising wages  at the 
bottom of the pay  scale  than by  reducing  salaries  at the 
higher levels. As a result, during the first decade after inde-
pendence  earnings  of workers  in  the  modem  sector  in-
creased substantially. 
However this wage  policy resulted in some adverse eco-
nomic consequences  which  soon  became  perceptible  and 
can be summarized as follows: 
- With  rising  minimum  wages  the  already  existing  in-
come differences between rural and urban areas increased 
leading to a massive migration into towns and to increasing 
urban unemployment and poverty. 
- In most of these  countries the  public  sector was  (and 
still  is)  the  largest  single  employer.  High  and  increasing 
minimum wages often followed by corresponding increases 
in wages and salaries of  the upper grade employees resulted 
in a  swelling  of government current expenditure and de-
crease of government savings and investment. Further, this 
increased the pressure  on private enterprises to  raise  the 
level of their wages-and salaries. 
- In the  private sector minimum wage  regulations  have 
tended to increase the substitution of unskilled labour by 
capital.  Thus,  while  ensuring a  relatively  high  standard of 
living for  a comparatively small number of urban workers, 
minimum  wages  have  harmed the  majority  of unskilled I  DOSSIER 
~~-------------------------------- labourers  because  of their  adverse  influence  on  employ-
ment creation. 
- Last,  but not least,  increasing  unit labour costs  called 
for  increasing protection of the nascent industries. This in 
turn biased industrialization in favour of import-substitut-
ing  activities  while  competitiveness  of export  industries. 
suffered. 
Studies on wages  in some anglophone African countries 
(e.g.  Zambia) confirm that wages paid by foreign firms did 
have  an  influence  on  the  wages  in  the  rest  of economy. 
Usually these firms are engaged in manufacturing and min-
ing  and therefore tend to use highly capital-intensive tech-
nologies.  This  implies  a  high  factor  productivity,  a  low 
weight of labour costs in total costs and therefore a greater 
willingness of  the employers to concede high and increasing 
wages  above the minimum levels. 
Thus,  at  the  end of the  seventies  most  of the  African 
ACP members were  still maintaining the colonial heritage 
of a relatively high wage level. In the following section the 
development of wages during the seventies is discussed on 
the basis of some quantitative information. 
(iii)  Minimum and real wage  rates 
in the seventies 
During the seventies, especially after the first oil shock in 
1973 (see chapter V, 2c below) inflation in the African ACP 
Table  14: Indices of Nominal and Real Wages 
per Worker in the Manufacturing Sector 
of Selected ACP Countries,  1970-1980 
1970  1973  1977  1980 
Ethiopia  nominal  100  113  152  175 
real  100  111  85  71 
Gambia  nominal  - - 104  261 
real  - - 93  189 
Ghana  nominal  100  - 309  -
real  100  - 42  -
Cbte d'lvoire  nominal  - 100  158  265 
real  - 100  84  94 
Kenya  -nominal  100  100  157  235 
real  100  83  73  76 
Malawi  nominal  100  99  - -
real  100  84  - -
Mauritius  . nominal  100  - 371  501 
real  100  - 170  129 
Rwanda  nominal  - 100  194  -
real  - 100  93  -
Somalia  nominal  100  82  112  -
real  100  80  61  -
Zimbabwe  nominal  - 100  148  -
real  - 100  103  -
·p~ji  nominal  100  143  317  -
real  100  111  158  -
Jamaica  nominal  - 165  332  -
reill  - 132  149  -
- : no data available. 
Source: UN. 
countries sharply accelerated. In almost all countries mini-
mum wages were adjusted to rising prices as shown by the 
increases  in  the  nominal  minimum  wages,  through  they 
were  not always  sufficient to compensate for inflation. 
Besides the real minimum wages,  the real wages paid in 
the manufacturing sector also declined in a number of  Afri-
can ACP countries {Table  14). 
(iv)  Wage costs in ACP countries 
in international comparison 
ACP countries face a number of locational disadvantages 
in export-oriented production compared with  many other 
developing countries. Among other things, what determines 
the desire of foreign investors to establish production facil-
ities  in  ACP  countries  is  not  the  wage  cost  difference 
between the EEC and the ACP countries but the difference 
between the  latter and other LDCs.  This is  because  ACP 
countries  compete  with  non-ACP  developing  countries 
where unskilled labour is abundant as well. 
The  comparison  between  wage  costs  in  ACP  countries 
and  other  LDCs  yields  a  fairly  homogeneous  result  but 
should  be  interpreted  with  due  caution  (Table  15).  The 
average  wage  cost  content  in  gross  output  was,  roughly 
speaking, higher by more than 30% in ACP countries than 
in the reference countries. This difference remained stable 
during  the  seventies  in  spite  of technology-induced  de-
creases in the wage cost content in both groups of countries 
over time. The only exception was Mauritius, which is the 
most successful  ACP exporter of textiles and where  wage 
costs per unit of output declined in line with the reference 
countries. 
·Table 15 
Wages per Output in ACP Countries 
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Nonetheless, it may be concluded that while ACP coun-
tries have a lower per capita income than their competitors 
and  while  unskilled  labour there  seems  to  be  at least  as 
abundant as in the reference countries, there is no evidence 
that ACP countries could be  more attractive as  an invest-
ment location than other developing countries because of 
lower wages. 
Two observations underline this conclusion. First, "gen-
erous" labour legislation in francophone African countries 
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seems to have led to a shorter weekly working time than in 
other developing countries.  Second,  it has been estimated 
that for instance in Cote d'Ivoire additional social charges 
on wages amounted to 45% of wages for African labour in 
1975.  Indeed,  it  seems  to  be  also  a  colonial  heritage  in 
some ACP countries that social fringe  benefits granted to 
the  labour aristocracy  have  reached  an  amount which  is 
incompatible with the overall income level of  the countries 
and  which  the  countries  can  afford  only  by  shifting  the 
costs  to  the mass of unemployed people in the rural and 
urban areas. 
b.  Low  interest rate policies 
(i)  The case for interest rate ceilings 
Physical capital is  a scarce factor of production in most 
of the ACP countries. Domestic savings are-given the low 
income level-too low. Opportunity cost of savings is often 
relatively high because of  high inflation. Domestic financial 
markets are narrow, rudimentary and not open to everybo-
dy.  Access  to  private short-term world capital  markets is 
very  limited  because  of insufficient  creditworthiness  of 
ACP countries. In many cases the flow of private long-term 
capital from abroad (foreign investments) is confined to the 
exploitation of natural resources. Consequently it does not 
lead to much employment in the secondary sector. Finally 
the availability of development aid, especially of soft loans 
(IDA credits), is conditioned by unforeseeable political dis-
putes on "burden sharing" between  the  donor countries. 
Thus,  one would expect higher interest rates  on the local 
markets than abroad in order to 
- counteract the  outflow of expatriates' remittances and 
savings, 
- give incentives to increased domestic savings, 
- reduce the import intensity and hence the physical capi-
tal  intensity  of local  industrial  production  in  the  long 
run, 
- discourage the introduction of labour saving technolog-
ical progress, 
- stop the drain of  financial assets into unproductive phy-
sical assets in the case of inflationary pressures, 
- attract the financing of foreign investments through ex-
ternal funds and hence to shift the risk of failure entirely to 
the investor instead of allowing the host country to partici-
pate in the risk through subsidized local funds, 
- avoid  credit  rationing  because  of excess  demand  for 
capital at interest rates below equilibrium level, 
- foster  viable export industries which employ the most 
abundant production factor,  i.e.,  unskilled labour. 
But in reality all these countries have followed low inter-
est  policies  which  have  been justified  on  these  grounds. 
First, to promote investment and thus growth; second, to 
avoid  the  destabilizing  effects  of frequent· interest  rate 
changes  on  small  credit  markets;  and  third,  to  keep  the 
debt services low.  Like elsewhere in low-income countries 
the  public sector is,  in ACP countries,  usually the  major 
borrower. Therefore low debt services are justified with the 
argument  to  limit  budget  deficits  and  to  maintain  the 
state's flexibility in financing development programmes. 
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(ii)  Empirical evidence and consequences 
of interest-rate rigidities 
These  arguments  have  been  attacked  by  economists as 
frequently as they have been defended and implemented by 
politicians in developing countries in general and in ACP 
countries in particular. A recent study on interest-rate pol-
icies  of the  seventies  in  West  African  countries  provides 
evidence for what the World Bank admonished the franca-
phone African countries and Kenya, i.e. interest rates have 
been generally fixed at a lower level than in France and the 
UK, which are the  major trading partners and the  major 
sources of capital inflow.  Furthermore, interest rates have 
remained relatively stable. Only recently they were adjusted 
upward in line  with  the  higher nominal interest rates  on 
world capital markets. Domestic inflation is higher than the 
nominal interest rates so that real interest rates (lending as 
well as savings deposit rates) tum out to be negative. What 
is most crucial, however, is that such an outcome does not 
emerge episodically but over a longer period. 
The implications  of such  long-term  distortions  for  the 
export activities  of the  ACP  countries  concerned can  be 
summarized as  follows. 
1.  The capital intensity of production  is  fostered  by  low 
interest rate  policies  over a  long  period  which  results  in 
deterioration  of competitiveness  of exportables  on world 
markets.  This  seems  to  have  happened  in  the  West  and 
Central African ACP countries. 
2.  Lower rates of interest in the long run favour imported 
investment goods  because  they  tend  to  be  of longer  life 
than .  similar  domestic  investment  goods  and  hence  are 
financed by long-term lending. As already discussed, this is 
an incentive to decrease the share of originating inputs and 
to apply a labour saving technology which is inappropriate 
given the abundance of unskilled labour in ACP countries. 
Excess capacities and a protection structure which provide 
additional shelter to the scarce factor,  viz. capital, are then 
inevitable consequences. 
Lending rates which in real terms are lower than the rates 
of return on the majority of projects requiring capital will 
result in a crowding-out of viable projects because of credit 
rationing.  Thus,  export  diversification  strategies  are  im-
peded by wasting scarce  resources.  Instead of the market, 
the administration takes decisions on the allocation of the 
funds which may be misleading because of distorted price 
signals. The inflow of foreign equity capital for new export 
oriented and labour-intensive branches and the promotion 
of domestic  savings  are  widely  accepted  targets  for  ACP 
countries.  However, just the opposite case  has happened. 
The inward looking and relatively capital as well as import 
intensive  branches  financed  through  subsidized  loans 
raised on local financial  markets have received  strong in-
centives from low interest rate policies in a number of  ACP 
countries. While many other developing countries seem to 
have  been  aware  of the  incompatibility  between  interest 
rate subsidization and export diversification strategies and 
have consequently liberalized  their financial  markets,  the 
ACP countries as shown above implicitly impose taxes on 
their exports through an inappropriate level of interest. ~~  ...........................................  n.o._s•s•I•E•R• 
2.  Goods price distortions 
a.  Tariffs 
(i)  The role of tariffs in industrialization 
poliicies  of low-income countries 
Tariffs play an important role as an instrument of indus-
trialization  policy  in  virtually  all  developing  countries. 
Since import tariffs raise the domestic prices of tariff-rid-
den  products,  they  reduce  the  domestic  demand for  im-
ports and provide an incentive to engage  in the domestic 
production of substitutes for imports. 
This  holds  in  general.  Tariffs  in  the  context  of low-
income  developing  countries,  however,  have  a  special 
meaning  to  be  derived  from  their  industrialization  level 
and budget constraints. To begin with the industrialization 
levd, low-income countries in the early stage of industrial-
ization have a very small and less diversified manufactur-
ing sector. Production focuses on the final stage of process-
ing  (i.e.  assembling  activities)  with  strong  backward  lin-
kages to foreign suppliers of inputs. Domestically produced 
finished goods  replace imports of competing goods facing 
cost  disadvantages  because  of transportation  costs  and 
higher labour costs if they originate from highly developed 
countries. Tariffs imposed on competing imports are often 
redundant but are levied for revenue purposes. The same is 
the case with tariffs imposed on imports which do not com-
pete  with  local  production.  This  stage  of inward-looking 
industrialization based on infant industry arguments is oft-
en called "natural" import substitution and implies a few 
distortions  only.  However,  because  of small  market  size 
this  stage  does  not last very long and import substitution 
becomes a part of the policy with systematic distortions in 
favour of  import-competing domestic industries. This stage 
may  be  called  import  substitution  or  "policy  excessive 
import substitution". This policy has thus become an in-
gredient  of development policies,  in which tariffs  change 
their functions from being mainly budgetary to protection-
ist tools. Under this policy costly tariff protection is granted 
to  old  industries,  which  do  not  have  the  productivity 
growth of competing imports, and to new industries having 
excess  capacities and relatively high absorption of capital 
for the protected market. At this stage the structure of tar-
iffs--as it will be shown below-becomes at least as impor-
tant  a  tool  of protection  as  the  average  level  of tariffs. 
Many ACP countries are in this stage of  economic develop-
ment. 
(ii)  Nominal and effective rates of tariff protection 
in ACP countries 
The tax burden on imports in ACP countries in many 
cases is higher than is shown by the import duties. This is 
due to the fact  that a number of additional fiscal  charges 
are !levied on them. On the other hand, however, a study on 
the difference between average nominal tariff rates and the 
rates of effective duty collection (share of collected import 
charges  in  total  value  of imports)  in  19  ACP  countries 
yields that effective duty collection amounted only to 46% 
of average tariffs in the mid-seventies with a range between 
71% (Malawi) and 10% (Bahamas). This large discrepancy 
stems from tax holidays for investors which are allowed in 
many  ACP  countries  to  import  inputs  free  of import 
charges  under  the  various  investment  codes.  Such  tariff 
exemptions widen the gaps between tariffs on intermediate 
and finished goods which are an integral part of tariff sche-
dules (tariff escalation) in all  the ACP countries.  Both the 
tariff structure and the practice of tariff exemptions point 
out one of the main elements of import substitution poli-
cies in ACP countries, viz.  the high amount of protection 
given to the domestic value added process. This is defined 
as effective rate of protection. The higher the tariffs on fin-
ished goods compared to those on inputs, the higher will be 
the effective rate of protection in comparison to the nomi-
nal tariff rate. Such a difference between value added mea-
sured at domestic prices (plus tariffs) and at world market 
prices is furthermore an increasing function of the share of 
inputs in gross output. As discussed in Chapter IV.  5, most 
of the ACP countries are still in the stage of low domestic 
value added content in gross output, which is itself a result 
of discrimination against domestic intermediate industries 
through tariff escalation. 
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that many 
studies on nominal and effective rates of  protection in ACP 
countries  show  a  rather  homogeneous  pattern  of higher 
effective rates of protection. 
(iii)  Implications of tariff protection on 
resource allocation in ACP countries 
The empirical evidence confirms that tariff structures, at 
least in African ACP countries,  tend to end up in higher 
effective rates of protection than is indicated by the nomi-
nal rates.  In other words the excess  costs of the domestic 
production in ACP countries resulting from the protection 
are higher than those indicated by the nominal tariff rates 
or  by  the  excess  of domestic  over  world  market  prices. 
Apart from  this there are  other well-known following  ad-
verse  effects  of extensive and selective  use  of tariffs  as  a 
tool to foster industrialization: 
- Protection of the  manufacturing  sector implies  a  dis-
crimination  against  all  other activities  in  ACP  countries 
which are not protected. Of special importance is that the 
internal terms of trade tum against the unprotected agricul-
tural sector. This impedes investment and therefore growth 
of output  of that  sector.  In  return  the  protected  sector 
absorbs scarce resources which otherwise would have been 
allocated to sectors with higher factor productivities. 
- Within  the  manufacturing  sector,  intermediate  indus-
tries  are  impeded  so  that  industrial  production  remains 
biased towards "early" industries like food,  tobacco, bev-
erages and textiles. 
- As  in the case  of agricultural production tariff protec-
tion  discriminates  also  against  export  industries.  While 
their prices are broadly determined by the world market, 
inward-looking industries can shift excess costs to the con-
sumer and attract resources  away  from  export industries. 
Furthermore, high rates of effective tariff protection lead to 
balance-of-payments pressures,  foster  currency overvalua-
tion  and import licencing  and thereby  hinder non-tradi-
tional exports. 
- Existing tariff structures also  tend to increase  physical 
capital intensity of domestic production because they make 
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the use of imported capital goods more profitable than it 
would be  in a  situation under freer  trade.  Thus,  employ-
ment  of the  relative  abundant  factor,  labour,  on  which 
comparative advantages of  these countries are based, is dis-
couraged. 
To sum up, there is much evidence from country studies 
that it is a distorted tariff structure rather than the nominal 
tariff level which determines tariff protection as an impor-
tant element of the import substitution policy pursued in 
many  ACP  countries.  In  this  respect  tariff  holidays 
launched through the investment legislation seem to have 
had a decisive influence on high rates of effective protec-
tion in finished goods and on the poor record of non-tradi-
tional export-oriented industries. 
b.  Quantitative restrictions 
(i)  Non-tariff measures as a 
substitute for  tariffs 
Parallel to the reduction of tariff barriers (TBs) in inter-
national trade because of  both GATT  -negotiated MFN cuts 
and the  introduction of unilateral tariff concessions,  non-
tariff barriers {NTBs) have gained importance. As the cur-
rent  discussion  on  trade-impeding  measures  outside  the 
GATT framework highlights, NTBs in the form of volun-
tary export self-restraints have proved most controversial. 
The number of NTBs ranging from quantitative restric-
tions to import deposit requirements, health and technical 
standard regulations and government procurements in fa-
vour of  domestic suppliers-to mention only a few-makes 
it ambitious,  if not impossible,  to  quantify NTBs and to 
make  them  comparable  to  TBs.  However,  exactly  this 
problem confronting trade policy analysts simply illustrates 
the advantage of NTBs for protectionist purposes vis-a-vis 
TBs.  For example, they are not transparent and therefore 
difficult to dismantle in international trade policy negotia-
tions;  they  are  selective  according  to sectoral application 
and can be handled very flexibly; and they are effective in 
restricting the import volume since,  unlike tariffs,  they do 
not allow domestic purchasers to satisfy additional import 
demand by paying the world market prices plus the tariffs. 
Any rise in the case of quantitative restrictions in domestic 
demand will therefore raise the domestic price and simul-
taneously the costs of protection giving rise  to misalloca-
tion of domestic resources. 
(ii)  The spread of quantitative 
restrictions in ACP countries 
Attention to NTBs has mostly been devoted in only one 
direction of  world trade, that is exports of  developing coun-
tries  to  developed  countries.  However,  developing  coun-
tries  in  general  and  ACP  countries  in  particular  apply 
NTBs as well. With regard to the latter group, a distinction 
should be made between those NTBs which the countries 
inherited from their former metropolitan countries in terms 
of technical  standards  and  those  which  they  introduced 
after independence.  The former are left out of discussion 
here, and so is a sub-group of  the latter category comprising 
short-term NTBs for balance of  payments purposes (import 
deposit requirements,  for  instance).  The remaining NTBs 
include one of the most important of them, viz.  quantita-
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tive restrictions which are applied as a permanent comple-
ment to tariffs. However, even if the analysis is confined to 
quantitative restrictions, their pattern remains diffuse and 
widely spread. ACP countries apply the full  scale of quan-
titatative  controls  encompassing  automatic  or  facultative 
licensing for import surveillance, facultative and obligatory 
quotas and import prohibitions. The import regime  sche-
dules are highly selective in order to give an effective shelt-
er to import-competing industries. 
(iii)  The incidence of non-tariff 
distortions in ACP countries 
Transforming the non-tariff measures into an equivalent 
of tariffs in order to make NTBs comparable and negotia-
ble is  a delicate task. 
What is relevant is that tariffs cannot solely explain dif-
ferences  between domestic and world market prices.  This 
suggests that NTBs are probably more important for price 
distortions of goods than TBs. NTBs are apparently strong 
components of  policies biased in favour of  import substitu-
tion in ACP countries, and they therefore heavily discrim-
inate against non-traditional exports of these countries. 
c.  Inflation 
(i)  Effects of inflation in low-income countries 
Inflation defined broadly as  an  upward trend in prices 
distorts the relation between current and future  consump-
tion  of goods.  It is  often  used  to  finance  expansionary 
development strategies  in Third World countries.  This is 
especially true for the low-income countries where domes-
tic  savings  are  insufficient  to  finance  capital  formation. 
While the Keynesian approach to inflationary development 
finance stresses the redistribution of  income within the pri-
vate sector (from wage earners to entrepreneurs), the quan-
tity theory approach emphasizes the  fact  that inflation is 
like a government tax on the holders of  cash balances. Thus 
both the theories suggest a shift in income distribution, in 
the first case to the detriment of wage  earners and in the 
second case to the detriment of  cash holders. Observed pat-
terns of reactions by those who are negatively affected are 
of two kinds: the emergence of parallel currencies and the 
substitution of financial assets by unproductive real assets 
(durable  consumer  goods,  cattle,  land,  gold).  Supply  of 
lending capital has thus been frustrated, whereas the depen-
dence  on  foreign  savings  (aid,  private  capital)  has  in-
creased. Such adverse effects of inflation are exacerbated if 
nominal interest rates are not allowed to adjust. A number 
of ACP countries pursue such a policy of putting low ceil-
ings  on nominal  interest  rates  for  loans  and deposits  at 
banks and other institutions in the organized financial mar-
ket (financial repression).  Real interest rates thus are very 
low or even become negative in several ACP countries. 
As  a result,  both inflation and financial repression pro-
vide  survival  rents  for  the  non-monetized  sector.  This 
means that structural changes in the economy in the sense 
that this sector shrinks over time are impeded. Given the 
poor income on financial assets in some ACP countries-as 
discussed above-it is  therefore  not surprising  that espe-
cially in African and Pacific ACP countries non-monetary 
activities are of considerable importance. As  inflation en-Inflation  means price policy dilemmas: if  food prices  rise, 
the community suffers; if  they don't, production and invest-
ment drop 
courages  people  to  adhere  to  subsistence  production  the 
vicious circle  of low domestic capital formation,  low pro-
ductivity, low growth and hence  low savings continues to 
exist. 
Apart from these adverse effects there are additional rea-
sons why inflation retards economic growth: 
- While  inflation  raises  the  nominal  rate  of return  on 
capital, it reduces the real rate of interest (especially in the 
context of a  low  interest rate  policy).  This amounts to a 
waste of capital because it makes projects profitable which, 
in  a  situation  of price  stability,  would  be  qualified  as 
unproductive.  Credit rationing is  then a further source of 
efficiency losses. 
- During inflation,  governments try to control prices  of 
specific  goods  and services  (e.g.  prices  of basic  food  and 
public utilities) to protect parts of the community (especial-
ly  the urban population) from losses in real income. How-
ever, if food prices are not allowed to rise in an inflationary 
situation,  production  and  investment  in  the  agricultural 
sector  and  thus  rural  development  is  impeded.  Further, 
administered prices  of public  utilities  imply a  subsidy to 
consumers  and  therefore  a  loss  of government  resources 
which could be used for  investment. 
- Finally, inflation increases the need for  adjustments in 
exchange rates. 
(ii)  Empirical evidence of inflation 
in ACP countries 
Table 16 provides some information on the development 
of consumer prices in the ACP countries during the period 
from  1965 to 1980. In the African member states the aver-
age  rate of inflation rose from  4.2% in 196 5-70 to 6. 7% in 
1971-73 and then sharply to  17.4% in 1974-79. 
However,  differences  in  inflation  rates  of the  African 
ACP members have increased considerably.  This is  indi-
cated by  the coefficient of variation which rose from  0.21 
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(1974-79)  to 0.47  (1980-81).  Some of this divergence  may 
reflect the fact  that in 19  out of 45  sample countries-sta-
bilization programmes supported by the IMF were carried 
out in  1980 and 1981. 
Table  16 : Average Annual Inflation RaJes 
in ACP Countries, 1965-1980 
(Based on ·Consumer Prices) 
' 
1965-70  1971-73  1974-79  1980-82 
' 
Mrican ACP countries  ,, 
Benin  3.8  2.7  10.5  11.9 
Botswana  n.a.  . n.a.  11.5  13.9 
Burundi  2.7  4.5  17.6  11.5 
Cameroon  1.7  7.5  12.4  11.1 
Cap Verde  n.a.  12.1  .18.0  13.1 
Central African Republic  3.9  7.2  11.3  17.4 
Chad  4.8  4.8  9.7  n.a. 
Congo  2.1  5.8  10.4  12.2 
Ethiopia  2.3  1.1  15.1  5.5 
Gabon  2.9  4.5  15.5  12.6 
Gambia  1.7  ;  6.2  13.3 
;  7.9  ,. 
Ghana  8.3  12.5  58.0  63.0 
Cote d'Ivoire  4.7  3.3  16.3  10.3 
Kenya  2.2  6.3  ·,  14.7  15.3 
Lesotho  3.4  7.2  12.9  15.3 
Liberia  4.5  7.6  10.6  9.4 
Madagascar  I  2.6  5.7  9.8  24.4 
Malawi  5.2  5.6  9.9  12.8 
Mali  n.a.  15.7  16.4  n.a. 
Mauritania  3.4  7.8  10.9  14.2 
Mauritius  2.8  6.4  14.8  22.8 
Niger  4.1  8.6  12.8  14.9 
Nigeria  5.6  8.1  19.9  16.1 
Rwanda  1.4  4.3  18.5  8.6 
Senegal  2.3  7.1  12.3  10;6 
Sierra Leone  4.7  3.2  15.4  21.8 
Somalia  3.3  1.0  16.1  42.3 
Sudan  2.8  10.0  19.9  23.9 
Swaziland  ;  2.8  6.0  13.7  16~6 
Tanzania  11.5  7.6  14.9  28.3 
Togo  1.8  6.0  12.2  14.4 
Uganda  5.5  12.4  51.8  n.a. 
Burkina Faso  1.4  2.2  12.1  10.4 
Zai're  19.9  12.4  60.6  38.1 
Zambia  6.5  6.0  13.8  12.7 
Zimbabwe  2.0  3.0  10.2  9.8 
' 
Average  4.18  6.67  17.73  17.37 
1  Coefficient of variation  0.85  0.52  0.72  0.66 
Caribbean ACP countries 
Bahamas  5.8  5.6  7.7  9.7 
Barbados  6.1  12.0  16.5  13.1 
Guyana  2.6  4.5  12.6  19.4 
Jamaica  5.0  9.7  21.1  20.0 
Suriname  5.3  5.5  11.5  10.2 
Trinidad and Tobago  3.5  9.2  14.4  14.5 
Average  4.72  7.76  13.97  14.48 
Coefficient of variation  0.29  0.38  0.33  0.31 
; 
Pacific ACP countries 
Fiji  3.4  9.0  10.1  10.9 
Papua New Guinea  n.a.  7.3  9.6  8.6 
Samoa  2.2  8.1  11.1  26.8 
'  Source : IMF; World Bank. 
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The  Caribbean  ACP  countries  also  suffered  from  high 
rates of inflation during the seventies which increased from 
an average of 7.8% in 1970-73 to 14.0% in 1974-79. As in 
the African ACP countries, the sharp increase in inflation 
rates however did not continue in the early eighties.  Data 
on inflation in the Pacific ACP countries are available only 
for  three  countries,  namely  Fiji,  Papua New Guinea and 
Samoa.  In none of these countries are  such  high  rates of 
inflation  observed  as  in  the  other  two  groups  of coun-
tries. 
(ii)  Inflation in ACP countries 
in international comparison 
Inflation is,  however, not confined to the ACP countries 
and a comparison with inflation rates in other areas is  in 
order,  especially  for  the  seventies.  In  the  industrialized 
countries the average inflation rate declined from 11.2% in 
1971-73 to 9.3% in 1974-79.  Unless exchange rates in the 
countries were allowed to depreciate in accordance with the 
differences  between  their inflation  rates  and those  of the 
industrialized countries, competitiveness of the ACP man-
ufactured exports suffered losses on their major markets. It 
is interesting to note that, for example, in the Asian devel-
oping countries (excluding the oil-exporting countries) the 
average  rate of inflation (16.3%)  in  1971-73  rose  by  only 
0.2 percentage points in 1974-79. Compared with the accel-
eration  of inflation  in  the  African  and  Caribbean  ACP 
countries during the late seventies, this negligible increase 
suggests that inflation in ACP countries cannot be regarded 
to be a result of only external shocks like that of oil prices 
after 1973. 
(iv)  Price change variability and administered prices 
in ACP countries 
While a steady rate of  inflation makes it easier for people 
to adjust to inflationary processes, erratic inflation does the 
contrary,  and increases  uncertainty.  Uncertainty impedes 
the development of  local capital markets even if  the current 
inflation  rate  is  low  simply because  of the loss  of confi-
dence in the steadiness of monetary policies. It is notewor-
thy that it is  the relatively inexperienced local  population 
rather than the expatriates who  can deposit their savings 
overseas  who  have  to  cope  with  uncertainties.  Table  17 
shows that even in member countries of  the UMOA, where 
inflation rates did not increase as dramatically as in other 
ACP  countries,  fluctuations  in the  annual  inflation  rates 
were  considerable during the seventies.  In food,  which is 
the  most  important  expenditure  item  of African  house-
holds,  the fluctuations  in price increases were  very much 
more pronounced.  Given the  high  weight  of food  in  the 
goods basket of African households, changes in the indices 
of consumer prices seem to be determined to a great extent 
by changes in food  prices. 
Fluctuations in price increases may be especially noticed 
in  those  products  whose  prices  are  controlled  or  deter-
mined by governments. During times of inflation prices of 
these goods tend to lag behind the prices of goods in gen-
eral.  This calls for occasional adjustments with correspon-
ding price pushes. 
To conclude, though inflation in ACP countries in gener-
al has not been as excessive as for instance in Latin Amer-
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Table  17: Cost of Living in 
Selected ACP Countries, 
African Households, 1973-81 
(Annual Percentage Changes) 
African household 
Total  I 
Food 
Cote d'Ivoire 
1973  11.1  16.6 
1974  17.4  17.6 
1975  11.4  10.3 
1976  12.1  7.3 
1977  27.4  39.7 
1978  13.0  11.5 
1979  16.6  21.8 
1980  12.2  18.9 
1981  11.2  5.2 
Average  14.71  16.54 
Standard deviation  5.29  10.30 
Codficwntofvariation  0.36  0.62 
Senegal 
1973  12.2  19.8 
1974  16.7  13.3 
1975  30.6  39.5 
1976  2.8  0.2 
1977  10.2  11.8 
1978  2.9  4.1 
1979  9.5  8.8 
1980  8.8  8.3 
1981  5.9  0.8 
Average  11.07  11.84 
Standard deviation  8.55  12.09 
Coefficient of variation  0.77  1.02 
Togo 
1973  3.6  3.7 
1974  12.8  10.8 
1975  18.1  22.2 
1976  11.6  16.8 
1977  22.2  21.7 
1978  0.5  -4.6 
1979  7.5  7.4 
1980  12.3  11.7 
1981  19.7  24.7 
Average  12.03  12.71 
Standard deviation  7.28  9.65 
Coefficient of variation  0.61  0.76 
Source : Banque Centrale des Etats de 1' Afrique de rOuest. 
ica,  its adverse  effects  in  low-income countries with  high 
shares of subsistence economies should not be underrated. 
It hampers the monetization of the economies,  formation 
of local savings and the growth of capital markets in these 
countries. In addition, fluctuations in inflation rates caused 
partly by discretionary adjustments of administered prices 
seem to discourage mainly local households from  keeping 
their  savings  in  financial  assets.  As  the  development  of 
non-traditional  export  activities  crucially  depends  on  a 
sizeable domestic capital supply and its efficient allocation 
to local private borrowers, both inflation and the variabili-
ty of  its rates tend to retard changes in economic structures 
of ACP countries. Cost of  living fluctuations in  African households are  largely determined by changes in food prices 
3.  Exchange rate  policies 
a.  Purchasing power  parity exchange 
rates of ACP countries 
Trade  preferences  are  expected  to  stimulate  exports  of 
the preference-receiving countries because they give them a 
price  advantage  vis-a-vis  the  non-beneficiaries.  However, 
in  those cases  where  the difference  between the prices  of 
the  preference-receiving countries and those on the world 
market is higher than the preference margin, the preference 
must fail  to stimulate exports of the beneficiaries. 
As  already  shown,  one  can  find  a  strong  tendency  for 
inefficient high-cost production in ACP countries due to a 
variety  of policy-induced  distortions  in factor  and goods 
markets. As a consequence, official exchange rates become 
overvalued. To compensate this competitive disadvantage 
on foreign markets depreciations would be necessary. In an 
inflationary context, where domestic inflation is  higher in 
its trend than inflation in major trading partner countries, 
this means that a country wishing to improve its competi-
tive position on world markets would have to depreciate by 
more than the inflation rate differential,  that is  to depre-
ciate in real terms. 
However, in many ACP countries, exchange rates during 
the seventies had a tendency to appreciate in real terms, i.e. 
depreciations  were  less  than the  differentials  between the 
inflation rates. According to World Bank estimates for sub-
Saharan Africa, real exchange rates appreciated on average 
by 44% during 1973-1981. One has to bear in mind that if 
exchange rates at the beginning of the period were already 
overvalued,  this  rate of appreciation would  indicate  only 
the additional loss in competitiveness during the seventies. 
It also  suggests that, on average,  at least the African ACP 
members could not have taken much advantage of the pre-
ferences  conceded by the EEC. 
b.  Effects of exchange rate  distortions 
on  sector output 
There are further indicators of exchange rate overvalua-
tion.  Since an overvalued exchange rate implies an excess 
demand  for  foreign  exchange,  governments,  especially  in 
Africa,  have increasingly resorted to import restrictions to 
cope with the limited supply of foreign  exchange.  On the 
export  side,  currency  overvaluation  reduces  competitive-
ness of the ACP countries on foreign markets and is there-
fore a serious barrier to their exports in general and export 
diversification towards manufactures in particular. In com-
bination with other policy measures it is an important fac-
tor in explaining the poor export performance of the ACP 
countries. These measures refer to the treatment of  the agri-
cultural  sector as  well  as  to  industrialization  policies.  Of 
course, not all of the ACP countries pursue the same poli-
cies  but one can find  for a number of them the following 
two common characteristics: 
First, exchange rate overvaluation means low proceeds of 
domestic currency for  producers of traditional agricultural 
exports whose prices are determined on the world market 
and  are  fixed  in  convertible  currencies.  Further,  export 
crops are heavily taxed especially in Africa.  So  in several 
African countries the price actually paid to farmers did not 
even cover their costs of production. Discrimination of the 
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agricultural  sector via  heavy  taxation  and  an  overvalued 
exchange rate provided thus strong disincentives to farmers 
to engage  in the production of agricultural exports. 
Second, what might be of  greater importance for the long 
term development prospects of ACP countries is  that the 
exchange  rate  overvaluation  should  not  be  allowed  to 
hamper the process towards export orientation in manufac-
tured goods. 
By  maintaining overvalued  exchange  rates,  ACP  coun-
tries  cut  themselves  off from  the  fastest  growing  part of 
international trade and discourage potential foreign  inves-
tors who have to pay more for local factors of production 
than  under  equilibrium  exchange  rates.  The  bias  against 
exports is reinforced if  industrialization is attempted main-
ly  by  import  substitution.  Here  an  overvalued  exchange 
rate enables relatively cheap imports of capital goods and 
raw materials. 
An exchange rate depreciation in this context could pro-
vide the necessary price incentive to switch resources in the 
production of manufactured exports.  At the same time it 
would make import restrictions superfluous and contribute 
to a more efficient allocation of  imports allowing for a bet-
ter use  of the existing factor endowment. 
c.  Cases against exchange rate adjustments 
and  their validity 
Since  depreciation  is  an  effective  measure  to  promote 
exports  the  question  arises  why  ACP  countries  in  many 
cases did not make use of this policy instrument. Two oft-
en-cited arguments against the usefulness of a depreciation 
should be  mentioned. 
First, foreign  exchange earnings of many ACP countries 
depend  heavily  on  the  export  of agricultural  products 
and/or industrial  raw  materials.  Price  elasticity of export 
demand  in  these  products  is  low.  A  depreciation  is  ex-
pected to  reduce total export earnings because the loss  of 
earnings from traditional exports could not be compensated 
by the possible increase in export earnings from non-tradi-
tional manufactured products.  The elasticity of supply of 
exports is also expected to be low. Such an argument, how-
ever, is based on given economic structures and underesti-
mates, if not neglects,  structural changes. 
Second, depreciation is feared to end up in a vicious cir-
cle of accelerated inflation and further depreciation. Over-
valued  exchange  rates  are  hence  taken  as  a  tool  to  fight 
inflation. In evaluating this proposition one has at first to 
bear in mind that it is often an inflationary domestic policy 
that causes balance-of-payments problems and thus a pres-
sure for devaluation. In the course of such a policy, import 
demand will rise and worsen the trade balance. At the same 
time the price of non-traded goods will  rise in relation to 
the  price  of traded goods,  the latter being broadly deter-
mined by the world market. This will induce resources to 
move  in  the  production of non-tradeables  while  demand 
switches to traded goods; the trade balance will deteriorate 
further.  Flight of capital might also be encouraged because 
of higher real interest rates abroad and because of the extra 
profit to capital owners if expected depreciation does  ac-
tually take place. 
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A depreciation in this context must be seen as a measure 
to compensate the adverse effects  of such a policy on the 
country's external position. 
To sum up, arguments against the policy of  exchange rate 
changes in a flexible,  predictable and coherent manner are 
based on the given and presumably unchangeable predom-
inance  of primary  commodities  in  the  export  supply  of 
ACP countries. Such attitudes are self-defeating since they 
preserve  a  short-sighted  pessimistic  view  of  structural 
changes. 
4.  Disincentives to  the  formation 
of indigenous  entrepreneurship 
a.  Size and  pay of government 
Human capital embodied in managerial, commercial and 
technical  know-how  is  scarce  in  developing  countries  in 
general and in low-income developing countries in particu-
lar.  Thus ACP countries also  suffer from  the  shortage  of 
this production factor which is indispensable for economic 
progress both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
The larger the size of  a government in an economy is, the 
greater will be the impact of its activities on the economy 
as  a  whole.  In  the case  of ACP  countries  this  impact is 
indeed sizeable  in terms of government share in employ-
ment in the non-agricultural sector. On average, the public 
sector absorbed more than fifty per cent of total employees 
outside agriculture in  13  ACP countries at the end of the 
seventies.  This  is  higher  than  the  average  of non-ACP 
developing countries. 
What,  however,  raises  the  ACP  average  above  that of 
other developing countries is government pay. The latter is 
measured as the share of  wages paid by central government 
in total wages  (on average 22% in the sample ACP coun-
tries)  and  as  the  ratio  between  the  average  government 
wage and the per capita income which is almost 6: 1 com-
pared to 3: 1 in other developing countries. 
The government size and pay in ACP countries provide a 
very strong incentive towards a brain drain from private to 
public employment. 
b.  Administration of justice 
and  government control 
Many efforts have been made to build up nation states in 
post-colonical Africa.  One of them was  the imposition of 
state controls on private economic activities and was based 
on the colonial heritage of  paternalism and public interven-
tion in order to cope with economic problems. Yet,  while 
controls may be adequate in the legal framework, they can 
be self-defeating and costly if the state considers itself to be 
a better entrepreneur than the private investors. Apart from 
public enterprises, state participation in the private sector 
is widely spread in many ACP countries. One shortcoming 
of direct state control is that it lowers the necessity of pri-
vate equity holders to finance their investments on private 
capital markets and that it shifts the risk of  investment fai-I  DOSSIER 
-~------------------------------~  lure to the public sector. The state is not likely to be neutral 
to gains and losses  and will  thus provide security at zero 
costs for the private shareholders. The emergence of entre-
preneurship which includes risk assessment and managerial 
responses will thus be suppressed rather than supported. 
c.  Discrimination of entrepreneurship 
in  the informal sector 
The urban informal sector in ACP countries is the main 
source of indigenous local entrepreneurship. It is the basis 
for  upgrading  managerial  skills  and  for  employment  of 
non-family members also. Its two most noteworthy charac-
teristics are its inaccessibility for state controls by its nature 
and its need for  capital for  improvement. These two  ele-
ments form a trade-off. Capital is usually only lent to those 
who can meet security requirements, have legal and perma-
nent accounting  systems  and maintain at least  minimum 
standards of buildings, health and safety. This is just what 
the urban informal sector fails  to meet.  By its very nature 
its activities are nonlegal (not necessarily illegal) and much 
of its attractiveness for small scale entrepreneurs is derived 
fron1 the freedom of operating outside wage legislation and 
other regulations. Bringing the managerial skills developed 
in the informal sector to  an upgraded level, that is  to for-
mal activities for future export-orientation, requires a com-
prmnise on both sides. 
Entrepreneurs have to obey laws if they do not want to 
be  cut off from  private and public capital  markets.  ACP 
governments, on the other hand, should reconsider regula-
tions under the criteria that they should not frustrate infant 
entrepreneurial activities and that they are not superfluous 
for  the mass of African households supplied by the infor-
mal  sector.  That means  that credit allocation  should  not 
systematically  discriminate  against  informal  activities.  If 
private capital should assess the risk of lending capital to 
non-legally working entrepreneurs as too high, public capi-
tal should fill  the gap  in order to  facilitate  the upgrading 
process  and bring local  entrepreneurs in  conformity with 
local laws. 
Though most ACP governments have recognized the ne-
cessity of mobilizing local indigenous entrepreneurship and 
though  small-scale  business  lending  has  improved,  credit 
allocation rules in many ACP countries are still counterpro-
ductive  for  the  emergence  of local  entrepreneurs:  enter-
prises which can borrow abroad have every incentive not to 
do  so,  whereas  for  those  enterprises  which  must  borrow 
domestically banks have no incentive to lend. By easing the 
access to local capital markets for the latter group the gov-
ernments would remove one of the major obstacles to local 
entrepreneurship. 
Whereas ACP governments can easily act as "entrepren-
eurs"  on  well-protected  local  markets,  they  fail  on  the 
export markets, where a complete shift of losses to the pur-
chasers is  not possible.  Governments adhering to market-
oriented stimulants would therefore be well-advised to con-
centrate their skills to guarantee fair chances for everybody 
to  become an entrepreneur. o 
The nzain conclusion of  the Kiel Study-and it is a disappointing one on which to have 
to reflect-is that the pe1:{onnance ofACP countries in world trade in general and in EEC 
trade  in  particular has been poor over the past fifteen  years and this despite  relatively 
generous preferences.  Both growth  rates of  export and the speed of their divers(fication 
have tended to lag far behind those of  non-A CP developing countries.  However.  while the 
few exceptions to  this pattern appeared to be due n1ore  to cmn1nodity bonan~as than to 
the ecmzonzic policies of  the countries concerned.  it see1ned also to be the case that coun-
tries  whose  econmnic policies  were  bringing about growth  were  becoming increasingly 
vulnerable to factors outside their control. such as the policies of  neighbouring countries or 
natural disasters. 
Given  this background.  the study concludes.  the influence of  privileged 1narket access 
had,  necessarily,  to be s1nall.  The export prmnoting influence of  ACP preferences could 
inzprove if  tlze  Conznzunity were  to  re1nove  uncertainties with  respect  to  its future trade 
policies,  not only for the ACP countries,  but also vis-a-vis third countries with  whmn the 
A CPs conzpete for direct investlnents. However.  this can only be labelled low-prqfile ther-
apeutics. Even a free access with constant preference rates will be ineffective (f the incen-
tive systenz in ACP countries renzains as it is  now.  i.e.  against the opening of  1narkets for 
goods  and factors.  T:Vhile  hnprovements in  1narket  access  can  1nake things  easier.  the 
definition and actual inzple1nentation qf new econmnic policies by the ACP countries is 
the only way to success. 
There are.  of  course, factors (currency fluctuations.  natural disasters)  which  nzay radi-
cally affect econonzic pe1:{onnance over which  neither the EEC nor the ACP can hope to 
exert an_v  i1~(luence.  There are also.  however,  as  the Study points out.  de_finite  areas  in 
which policy changes, on the part either qfthe EEC or q(the ACP. or qf  both. could give a 
real inzpetus to growth.  Such changes may not be easy to bring about. 
The task qf the ACP-EEC Sub-Connnittee on  Trade  Cooperation  (whose  lVork  The 
Courier will fol!Olt)  H'ill be to exa1nine those various options open to the Lonze partners, 
in  the lzope,  ultinzately,  of ensuring greater success  in  EEC-ACP trade  in future years 
than lzas  been the case in years past.  o 
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In the  autumn of 1987,  if works  go  to  schedule  as  they  have  every 
appearance of  doing,  the final sleeper will be placed on the final stretch of 
the railway line linking Douala in the south to Ngaoundere in the north 
of  Cameroon.  Strictly speaking, the Transcam  - as the line is popularly 
known - has been complete for more than ten years,  but the building of 
the  Yaounde-N  gaoundere stretch,  opening up  the north  of the country, 
generated such  traffic that realignment of  the old Douala-Yaounde line 
became imperative.  With  the completion,  next year,  of  a final short,  but 
extraordinarily  challenging,  25-kilometre  section  between  Eseka  and 
M aloume,  one of  independent Cameroon's great development ambitions 
will have been fulfilled: a railway network linking north and south, acting 
as a catalyst to economic prosperity for the country and forging a greater 
sense of  national unity in  its people. 
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The  economic  justifications  for 
building the line  were  clear from  the 
start,  and indeed it did not take long 
for  the  economic  benefits  to  Came-
roon to manifest themselves. The vol-
ume  of freight  transported  has  risen 
steadily each year. 
In 1969-70 a total of 887 000 tonnes 
was  carried;  a decade later the figure 
had  reached  1 323 000  tonnes,  and 
five years after that, in 1984-85, a ton-
nage  of 1 983 000  was  recorded,  with 
the total tonnage on the Transcam and 
the  Western  line  (Douala-Nkongsam-
ba)  exceeding  the  2-million  mark for 
the first time ever. The main products 
carried  are  timber,  petroleum  pro-
ducts,  alumina, cotton and cocoa and 
building materials.  As  for  passengers, 
the  figures  have  swollen  from 
1 253 000  in  1970-71  to  2 196 000  in 
1984-85.  Those  who  dreamed  of the 
Transcam had not only economic and 
developmental benefits in mind, how-
ever: they also  saw  the railway as  ce-
menting the unity between the peoples 
of northern, central and southern Ca-
meroon,  which,  hitherto,  for  lack  of 
communications, had been tenuous. 
Both these aspects were  highlighted 
by Cameroon's then President, writing 
in November 1964, when construction 
work was just beginning. "What", he 
asked, " is  the meaning of the expres-
sion  ' the  Transcameroonian ',  this 
construction  project  which  will  soon 
be under way in the very heart of our 
country and which  has become a slo-
gan  full  of hope and promise for  our 
young State? It is  the name given  to 
the railway which, starting at Yaounde 
(which  is  already  connected  with 
Douala by  rail),  will  link  the  port of 
Douala with central and northern Ca-
meroon,  regions  which  have  up until 
now  been  handicapped  and  retarded 
in their development because of their 
distance from  the sea. 
With  this  railway,  which  will  run 
from  south  to  north,  transporting 
goods  and  bringing  life  to  our econ-
omy, we foresee the establishment of  a 
strong  and  permanent  link  between 
the people of our country, the creation 
of closer ties and unity among Came-
roonians and the laying of an essential 
foundation-stone  in  our nation-build-
ing and our search for  unity." 
To the concepts of  development and 
unity,  the  President  added  a  third, 
however:  that  of friendship,  and  in tunnel  being  built  at  the  exit  to 
Yaounde 
particular  the  friendship  built  up 
through the Transcam project between 
Cameroon  and  the  principal  donors. 
France,  the  United States of America 
and  the  European  Community.  For 
the  Community, which  has lent its fi-
nancial  support  to  the  railway  for 
more than 20 years, contributing some 
30%  of total  funds  (see  table  3),  the 
Transcam  is  a  development  success 
story  with  which  it  can  be  proud  to 
have been associated. 
The  building  of railways  in  Came-
roon  dates  back  to  1906  when  the 
country  was  still  in  the  hands  of the 
German administration. The intention 
even in those early days was to build a 
railway  to  the north.  Given the diffi-
culties of the terrain, however, and the 
primitive means at the labourers' dis-
posal  (picks  and  shovels  only),  pro-
gress  was  slow  and the resulting rail-
way was, by modern standards, appall-
ingly slow and sinuous, with the trains 
crawling  up  and  down,  around  and 
about, the endless hills as much as was 
possible  for  a  train  to  do.  Neverthe-
less,  by  1914,  when  war  in  Europe 
stopped the Germans' work,  a stretch 
of  some  200  kilometres  between 
Douala  and  Eseka  had  been  com-
pleted. 
After  the  war,  the  French  military 
resumed the work-still using the Ger-
man  plans!-and  by  1927  the  so-
called  central  line  had  been  com-
CLOSE  UP 
Table 1 : Passenger traffic 
Western  Line  Transcam  Total 
Average  Average 
Number  distance  Number  distance  Number 
travelled  travelled 
1961-62  691  040  49  689 648  94  1 380 705 
1970-71  658 868  66  1 253 839  145  1912707 
1976-77  351  830  77  1 373 820  167  1 725 659 
1978-79  148 560  76  1 258 170  181  1 406 730 
1980-81  89 140  75  1 138 980  199  1 228 120 
1982-83  138 520  71  1 727 483  220  1 866 003 
1984-85  283 610  62  2 196 881  221  2 480 491 
Table 2: Freight traffic 
T  onnes carried  Tonnes/Kilometre (millions) 
Western  Transcam  Total  Western 
Line  Line  Transcam  Total 
196f-62  189 449  612 330  802 269  22.8  11I.2  134 
1975-76  150 077  1 I41 265  I 291  342  20.5  417.6  437.3 
I978-79  93 750  1 263 260  I 357 010  9.95  540.5  550.4 
1980-81  59 650  1 465 120  1 524 770  5.99  663.9  669.9 
1982-83  47 830  1 750 850  1 798 680  5.52  822.4  827.9 
I984-85  45 790  1 983 230  2 029 020  4.43  980.5  984.9 
pleted,  linking the  309  kilometres be-
tween  Douala and Yaounde,  together 
with the northern line,  stretching  172 
kilometres  out  of Douala  to  Nkong-
samba.  It  was  not until  independence 
in  1960, though, that the old dream of 
a  nationwide  network  was  to  become 
reality. 
The  Transcam  railway,  which  was 
to be the central link of a major trans-
Dozens of  bridges had to be  built crossing the many rivers and tributaries of  the 
Adamaoua plateau 
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portation route-part rail,  part road-
linking  Douala  on  the  Atlantic  to 
Fort-Foureau in  the north,  was  to  be 
built  in  two  main sections.  The  first, 
296  kilometres  in  length,  was  to  join 
Yaounde  to  Belabo  - a  tiny  village 
with  perhaps a dozen inhabitants be-
fore it became the terminus of Phase I 
of the Transcam and which, less  than 
five  years later,  had developed into a 
thriving  town  with  a  population  of 
some  three  thousand.  This  section, 
while not the most challenging in engi-
neering  terms,  nevertheless  involved 
the  building  of a  number  of major 
bridges,  including  the  40-50  metre 
constructions  crossing  the  Assamba, 
Nia and  Sele  rivers,  in  addition  to  a 
whole series of shorter reinforced con-
crete  bridges  at  various  points  along 
the  line.  Once  the  rail-bed  had  been 
prepared by  the bridge-building crews 
and  earthmoving  and  excavation 
units, the track-laying itself (track sec-
tions  having been  preassembled)  pro-
ceeded  as  fast,  sometimes,  as  1500 
metres a day.  Here, as throughout the 
building of the Transcam, local mate-
rial  was  used  wherever  possible  (in 
particular  timber for  the  sleepers)  as 
well,  of course,  as  local  unskilled and 
skilled labour. 
By  1969,  barely  four  months  after 
the  date  fixed  for  completion  of the 
work,  the  Yaounde-Belabo  stretch  of 
the  line  was  actually  in  service  and 
work immediately began on Phase II, 
which  was  to  extend the  line  327  ki-
lometres  north  to  Ngaoundere.  Here 
the  terrain  was  truly  daunting,  with 
the line crossing practically the entire 
breadth  of the  Adamaoua  plateau,  a 
virtually  unbroken  chain  of densely-
wooded  hills,  with  four  great  slow-
flowing  rivers  and  countless  streams 
and tributaries,  hugely  swollen  in the 
rainy  season,  crossing  and  recrossing 
the line. 
By  February  1974  one  of Africa's 
great  development projects  was  com-
plete, and on December 1Oth that year 
the  Transcam  was  officially  inaugu-
rated at Ngaoundere. 
This, though, was not the end of the 
Cameroon  railway  story.  With  the 
Transcam built, and its passenger and 
freight  traffic  increasing yearly,  it be-
The  "Trinqueballe" which allowed track to be laid at the rate of  1500 metres a day 
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came clear that the network as a whole 
would greatly benefit by a realignment 
of the old Douala-Yaounde line. 
Clearly the pioneering spirit was not 
present in this enterprise to  the same 
degree  as  with the Transcam, but the 
realignment was  no less of a technical 
feat.  While  the work consisted essen-
tially  of laying  new  track  parallel  to 
the old one (the gauge of both the old 
and  the  new  lines  was  as  for  the 
Transcam-one metre), the" parallel" 
line  was  nevertheless  at  an  average 
distance  of two  kilometres  from  the 
existing  track.  It was,  therefore,  vir-
tually  a  question  of building  a  new 
line.  By  1978  the  Yaounde-Maloume 
stretch  had  been  realigned,  by  1981 
the Douala-Edea stretch, and the year 
later, the penultimate section, that be-
tween Edea and Eseka was completed. 
The  final,  exceptionally  difficult  sec-
tion,  between  Eseka  and  Maloume, 
where  the  line  goes  up  a  cliff,  rising 
from 250 m at Eseka to 600 m only 25 
kilometres further,  is  now under con-
struction. 
This  stretch  is  requiring  as  much 
earth to be shifted as  for the previous 
74-km  section  (some  6 m  m
3
)  and 
calls  for  the  building  of three  major 
tunnels  (including  one  1500 m  long) 
and  of five  viaducts.  Small  wonder 
that  the  cost  per  kilometre  will  be 
more  than  three  times  that  on  the 
Edea-Eseka stretch! 
Nevertheless,  the light  is  now liter-
ally  at the  end  of the  tunnel  and by 
1987  the  politicians'  and  engineers' 
dreams will  have  come  true.  A great 
development  ambition-perhaps  the 
one that most caught public imagina-
tion-will have  been  fulfilled,  to  the 
eternal  credit  of those  Cameroonians 
who,  over  a  quarter  of  a  century, 
moved heaven and earth to find  don-
ors for the project, and to the gratifica-
tion of those donors such as the Euro-
pean Community who can bask inCa-
meroon's reflected glory.  o  M.v.d.V. Hidden  treasure : 
the literature of black Africa 
When a Belgian NGO, Coopera-
tion  through  Education  and  Cul-
ture,  decided  to  organize  a three-
day seminar in Brussels on African 
literature,  they  were  beginning 
what  they  themselves  admitted 
later  to  have  been  "an  obstacle 
race". The objectives of the semi-
nar were  straightforward  enough: 
they  were  to  assemble  a  good 
number of African literary figures 
and to introduce them, their work 
and  the  literature  of their  conti-
nent  to  whoever  might  want  to 
lend  an  ear.  Beyond  that,  in  a 
more durable vein,  the  organizers 
hoped to make known to  a wider 
public both the classics of African 
literature and lesser-known works, 
indicating also  the  names of pub-
lishers,  libraries  and  booksellers 
specializing  in  such  works.  The 
"obstacles"  were  of  a  practical 
nature-the search for patrons and 
subsidies-obstacles only too fam-
iliar, it is true, to NGOs and socio-
cultural organizations at all  times, 
but perhaps  especially  difficult  to 
overcome in times of famine when 
culture  tends  to  be  regarded  very 
much as  a luxury item. 
The  seminar,  entitled  "Black Afri-
ca's  writers,  unrecognized  writers?" 
(the  original  French  title  sounded 
more  elegant)  duly  took  place,  nev-
ertheless, with the backing of, amongst 
others,  the  European  Community 
(there is, after all, a whole chapter giv-
en to Cultural Cooperation in the new-
est  Lome  Convention)  and  few  of 
those  who  participated,  whether  ac-
tively or passively, can have been dis-
appointed  with  the  results  of the  or-
ganizers'  efforts.  The breadth of sub-
ject covered was ambitious-from the 
birth of African literature (in the "co-
lonial" languages)  in the early part of 
the century to the themes of contem-
porary works;  from  the  philosophical 
dilemmas of language to  the practical 
problems  of getting  published;  from 
the particular barriers confronting wo-
men  writers  to  those  facing  black 
South African writers ... While discus-
sions centred principally on the litera-
ture  of francophone  Africa,  one  full 
day was  set aside for  the  literature of 
the rest of the continent, enabling en-
lightening comparison to be made on, 
for example, the varying impact of co-
lonial  education  systems  on  franca-
phone,  lusophone  and  anglophone 
African literature. 
With so much of interest,  The Cou-
rier  has  limited  itself to  a  word  on 
Africa's young literary tradition and to 
highlighting one or two aspects of the 
Brussels  seminar.  Those  aspects  (see 
boxes)  consider,  on  the  one  hand, 
Feminism  and  Nigerian  literature, 
and,  on  the  other,  literary  questions, 
examined at two Round Tables, which 
affect the whole of the continent-the 
impact of literature on society and the 
difficulties  and dilemmas facing  pub-
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lishers-or  would-be  publishers-of 
African works. 
*  *  * 
"A  Guide  to  African  Literature", 
published  in  1979  by  the  Paris  pub-
lishers  Harmattan,  lists  some  250 
writers  in  francophone  Africa  alone. 
Yet ask the averagely well-educated-
or even highly-educated-European to 
name a single African poet or novelist, 
and the chances  are  that he  couldn't. 
He  (or  she)  might  have  heard  of 
Senghor (but if he had not been Sene-
gal's  President  as  well?)  Of Chinua 
Ache be?  ...  Just  possibly.  Of Mongo 
Beti ?. . .  doubtful.  And  yet,  though 
young, Africa already has a heritage of 
written  works-poetry,  drama  and 
prose-in French,  English  and Portu-
guese. 
The francophone  tradition,  in poe-
try  especially,  had  its  origins  in  the 
Paris of the  1930s, where young Afri-
can and French West Indian intellec-
tuals  (Cesaire,  Damas,  Senghor,  Ous-
mane  Soce  and  .  Birago 
Diop  among  them)  met 
and  shared  their  condi-
tion  as  oppressed  peo-
ples,  the  descendants  of 
slaves  or subjects  of co-
lonial regimes.  The liter-
ature born of this  meet-
ing of minds and of peo-
ples  was  dominated  in 
the  early  days,  not  sur-
prisingly, not only by the 
theme of denunciation of 
colonial  injustices,  but 
also  by  that  of  'negri-
tude', the affirmation of 
traditional values and of 
Africa's  own  cultural 
identity. Often romantic, 
and  emotional,  lament-
ing  the  solitude  of exile 
and expressing  nostalgia 
for  Mother  Africa,  'ne-
gritude' was-and still is, 
to some extent-a major 
inspiration  to  the  litera-
ture  of ex-French  West 
Africa,  in particular, but 
found little echo  outside 
francophone  circles.  It 
even inspired some ridi-
cule,  as  witness  the  fa-
mous  rejoinder  of Wole 
Soyinka on the notion of 
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'negritude': "un tigre ne proclame pas 
sa tigritude-il bondit" (a tiger doesn't 
proclaim his  'tigerness'-he  springs!). 
While  the  African  novel  did  not 
properly flourish until the 1950s, with 
the  human  condition,  on  the  eve  of 
independence,  emerging  as  its  princi-
pal preoccupation, one novel, publish-
ed  in  1921,  had  nevertheless  suc-
ceeded  in  penetrating  the  barriers  of 
the  Establishment  and  in  forcing  re-
flection in metropolitan France on the 
legitimacy  of colonial rule.  The book 
in question, Batouala, written by a co-
lonial administrator of Martini  can ori-
gin,  Rene Maran, depicts the humilia-
tions  of colonial  power and  calls  for 
greater  respect  of negro  cultures.  It 
might have passed unnoticed, let alone 
heralded,  but for  the fact  that it hap-
pened  (to  the  distress  of  the  then 
French government,  no  doubt)  to  be 
thrust into the public eye in the most 
assertive  manner  possible-by  win-
ning the Prix Goncourt. 
Of post-independence  Africa,  "Le 
Soleil des Independances" (the Sun of 
Independence),  by  the  Ivorian  Ah-
madou Kourouma, published in 1970, 
is probably the first great work in the 
French language of modern, free  Afri-
ca.  Much  of the  literature  from  the 
1960s  to  the  present  day  is  marked, 
however, by disillusion and by fear for 
the  future.  Death  is  also  a  recurring 
theme,  as  are  hunger  and  infirmity, 
Round  Table on  the impact and  limitations of 
African literature as an  instrument of social change 
This round table, which was led by 
Congo's Mr Bern ba, defined the lim-
itations  of African  literature  rather 
than its impact on social change. Im-
pact  is  of course  very  difficult  to 
measure,  particularly  as  situations 
vary  widely  from  one  country  to 
another.  The  press,  for  example,  is 
far more important in English-speak-
ing areas than it is  in French-speak-
ing ones,  yet the  print-runs and re-
ports in the media-and the way cer-
tain  authors  are  ostracized-suggest 
that impact there is. But it is limited, 
first of all,  obviously, by the limited 
readership and then by the language 
problem,  on which  a great deal  has 
been said. Opinions are divided into 
two  main  camps.  There  are  those 
who  maintain they have to sell  and 
therefore have to write in a language 
in  which  they  are  sure  to  be  read, 
which  has  to  be  a  widespread  one 
which  will  make the reality and the 
culture of Africa known on the out-
side.  "A writer's strength is his pub-
lic",  said  the  Guinean  writer  Wil-
liams Sassine, "so don't blame us for 
writing in French". 
But  someone  else  said  that  an 
African  writer  should  not  seek  his 
legitimacy  other than at home,  that 
culture  should  not  be  expected  to 
make  a  profit  and  that the  way  to 
salvation is  to  write in the  national 
language  and  try  to  have  as  many 
public  readings  as  possible.  "N  oth-
ing  will  change  while  our  writings 
stay  amongst  us  literates",  even  if 
this means financial sacrifices for the 
author, as  a book written in a local 
language  may  well  only  run  to  2-
3 000 copies, if that. Mr Bemba con-
cluded  by  emphasizing  that  each 
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country needed "a national cultural 
plan, in agreement with the Govern-
ment", particularly since the State's 
cultural  spending  was  one  of the 
most productive of its outlays. 
Publishing and 
distribution 
Marc Rombout (Belgium) outlined 
his experience in making African au-
thors  known  in  Europe.  "It is  very 
difficult, "he said" to write critiques 
of African works in European papers 
and magazines. First of all, you have 
to come to  terms with  the fact  that 
Europeans  read  very  little,  apart 
from  the odd prize-winning novel". 
European  literary  criticism  is  also 
guided by specific editorial demands 
(fashion,  aesthetic  trends  and  pat-
terns of trade) and by  the difficulty 
of accepting  differences.  Publishers 
come up against the European  pub-
lic's indifference to, and maybe even 
rejection of,  African literature.  Even 
an  educated  member  of the  public 
will often imagine that Africa has no 
past or react in the light of a Third 
World myth and,  "denied his  revo-
lutions,  demand  what  the  African 
writer may well not be willing to give 
him" rejecting  him either due  to  a 
"bad  bourgeois  conscience"  or  a 
"bad  intellectual  conscience".  In-
stead of taking an interest in the aes-
thetic aspects of creation, "he looks 
at  the  mythology  of African  writ-
ing". In short, a writer's legitimacy is 
viewed  differently  in  Africa  and in 
Europe. To a European faced with an 
African poet, "being a poet does not 
look good". 
Lilyan  Kesteloot  (Belgium)  spoke 
along similar lines. In the 1960s, she 
said,  critics  used  all  African  writers 
for  anti-colonial  purposes.  A  little 
later, they went so far as to tell writ-
ers why and how to write. "The ter-
rorism  of the  university  took  over 
the  militant  outlook  of negritude". 
Lastly,  more  recently,  this  critical 
dictatorship mercifully dissolved be-
fore  the  freedom  of the  intellectual 
and the diversity of Africa. Mrs Kes-
teloot felt that the most serious prob-
lem  in  literature  is  the  oral  factor. 
"Editors  are  allergic  to  oral  litera-
ture, especially where it is bilingual", 
she  said,  "in spite of the enormous 
wealth  and value  of culture  of this 
genre". But she remained optimistic 
overall.  "Literarily speaking,  Africa 
is  doing  well",  she  said,  "it is  in 
intellectual ferment  and literature is 
very much alive and diversified". 
Paul Dakeyo (Cameroon) and Em-
manuel Dogbe  (Togo),  both African 
publishers, were much less euphoric. 
As Emmanuel Dogbe, who runs Ak-
pagnon in Lome said,  a young pub-
lisher just cannot find  any  financial 
support, so  publishing is more a vo-
cation  than  a  profession.  Paul  Da-
keyo,  whose  Silex  was  founded  in 
Paris  in  1980  and  has  brought  out 
120  titles  since,  said  there  was  an 
area here in which anything was pos-
sible. 
Both critics and publishers agreed 
on  the  problems  of  distributing 
books  in  Africa  itself.  There  is  no 
highlighting  of African  works  and 
this  may  well,  the  Round  Table 
thought, be due to the absence of  any 
cultural policy on the part of many 
Governments. o  M-H.B. Feminism and  Nigerian literature 
The  Nigerian  writers  expected  at 
the seminar having failed to respond 
to  the  invitation  because  of other 
commitments,  the  organizers  pro-
duced  Buchi  Emecheta,  a  Nigerian 
ferninist writer, partly based in Lon-
don, as a stand-in. A graduate in so-
ciology,  Mrs  Emecheta  came  into 
public  attention  in  1972  when  her 
first  book  The  Joys  of Motherhood 
was published. It was a personal sto-
ry that turned out to be an important 
social  documentary  on  the  condi-
tions  of black  women  in  England. 
Buchi  Emecheta  had  lived  in  En-
gland for  over  17  years  bringing up 
all alone five children. Since the pub-
lication  of that  book,  other  works, 
most of which  deal  with  the condi-
tion of women in Nigeria, have seen 
the light of day. 
It therefore did not come as a sur-
prise  when  she  indicated her inten-
tion to speak during the seminar on 
Nigeria's literature  from  a  woman's 
po:lnt  of view.  Nothing  wrong  with 
that, it was thought, at least it would 
provide the audience with the oppor-
tunity to gain  some  insight into the 
history  of Nigerian  literature,  what 
the:  dominant  themes  were  in  the 
past and are at present and the diffi-
culties facing  writers (particular wo-
men) in terms of  publishing and rela-
tioltlship with government. 
Buchi  Emecheta  did  touch  on 
the break-up of the nuclear family and 
the  abuse  of political  power.  Africa's 
literature in the 1980s is as closely an-
chored to the social and political real-
ity of the continent as  it ever was. 
*  *  * 
Many  of Africa's  greatest  literary 
works,  and  some  of its  lesser  ones, 
were  on sale  during the seminar,  and 
interest in them was considerable. In ad-
dition to the lists of  publishers special-
izing  in  African  works,  mentioned 
above,  the  seminar's  programme  in-
cluded  names  of admired  novelists, 
poets and dramatists, principally from 
francophone  Africa,  but  from  other 
parts of the continent as well. Of Afri-
ca's  novelists  the  following  were  re-
commended: Sony Labou Tansi (Con-
some  of these  topics  but  devoted 
most of her time to what amounted 
to an attack on Nigerian menfolk in 
general  and  the  foremost  Nigerian 
writers  in  particular-Chinua 
Achebe,  Wole  Soyinka,  Cyprian Ek-
wensi-for the manner in which, she 
said,  they  debased  women  in  their 
works and for withdrawing from the 
literary  scene  at  a  time  when  they 
were most needed. 
The good black women in the Ni-
gerian  society  today,  according  to 
her,  is  the  one  that  is  dying  or is 
already  dead.  This  is  a  theme  that 
Buchi must elaborate on if she is  to 
be  understood. 
Discrimination 
Surely,  as  she said, women in Ni-
geria have suffered discrimination in 
education  as  a  result  of the  policy 
pursued by  many parents for  a long 
time  of sending  only  their  sons  to 
school.  This does explain why there 
are  few  Nigerian women writers to-
day.  The  situation,  however,  has 
changed.  Women  are  entering  the 
educational  system  at  all  levels  in 
great numbers and we  are  likely,  as 
she said, to see many women writers 
in the near future. 
Mrs  Emecheta ignored  the  domi-
nant role that women play in Niger-
ian  traditional  societies  when  she 
go), Williams Sassine (Guinea), Malick 
Fall  (Senegal),  Ahmadou  Kourouma 
(Cote  d'Ivoire),  Pierre  Bambote 
(CAR),  Oumarou  Ide  (Niger)  and 
Massa  Makan  Diabate  (Mali).  Of 
those who have already become "clas-
sics",  Mongo  Beti  and  Ferdinand 
Oyono  (Cameroon),  Bernard  Dadie 
(Cote  d'Ivoire),  Sembene  Ousmane 
and Cheikh Hamidou Kane (Senegal) 
were amongst those cited, as were Bi-
rago Diop (Senegal) and Djibril Tam-
sir Niane (Guinea),  the latter two  for 
their graceful adaptations of the spok-
en  word  into  the  written  word.  Of 
Africa's many poets David Diop (Sen-
egal),  Tchicaya U Tam'si (Congo) and 
Edouard Maunick (Mauritius) were re-
commended,  and,  of its  dramatists, 
Abdou  Anta  Ka  (Senegal),  Senouvo 
Agbota Zinsou (Togo)  and Guillaume 
tried  to  see  things  more  from  the 
perspective  of oral  tradition.  Even 
here she appeared to get entangled in 
contraditions.  Oral  tradition,  she 
said,  has  now been left to rural wo-
men and oral literature is  no longer 
considered as literature at all judging 
from current definitions of literature. 
Definitions or no definitions, there is 
hardly an African writer today who 
does not extol the virtues of oral li-
terature.  Buchi  Emecheta  defended 
the  use  of the  English  language  in 
Nigeria  because  it is  the  only  me-
dium  of  communication  for  the 
country's 200 tribes. If oral literature 
is to come out of  its tribal ghetto and 
reach  out  to  other  tribes  and  the 
world at large, it has to be in English 
and  written.  What  matters  are  the 
message,  the image and the need to 
remain faithful  to  the oral tradition 
in style when expressing these in En-
glish.  It is  precisely  for  this  reason 
that many will agree  that she,  Buchi 
Emecheta,  acted  rightly  in  disagre-
eing  with  her publisher over a  sen-
tence which  the latter considered to 
be  bad  English  but  which  she  in-
sisted  on  retaining  on  the  grounds 
that it expressed  her thought better 
and depicted  the  image  she  wanted 
to convey better. 
Nigeria's  literary  life,  one  of the 
richest  and  most  varied  in  Africa, 
cannot be  reduced to  feminism  and 
woman in oral literature. It is a pity 
that none of the Nigerian writers in-
vited could make it.  o  A.O. 
Oyono-Mbia  (Cameroon).  As  for  the 
anglophone  literary tradition,  the  Ni-
gerians W  ole Soyinka, Chinua Ache  be 
and  Amos  Tutuola  and  the  Kenyan 
Ngugi  Wa  Thiong'o  were  named  as 
four  of  the  many  possible  recom-
mended  authors  from  English-speak-
ing  Africa.  Of the  literary  figures  of 
Portuguese-speaking  Africa,  the  Mo-
zambican poet Luis Bernardo Honwa-
na was cited as being of particular in-
terest. 
To  the  uninitiated  at  the  seminar, 
these names will now be recognizable, 
and what is recognizable today should, 
with luck, be familiar tomorrow. Afri-
ca has hidden literary treasures, and it 
is one of the tasks of cultural coopera-
tion to put them on display.  o 
M.v.d.V. 
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The CT  A's Question and 
Answer Service : 
for whom and for what? 
By Thiendou NIANG  (*) 
One of the  things  that has  created 
the  development challenge  facing  the 
countries of Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific is their poor scientific and 
technical potential and especially their 
minimal store of information. 
The  CT  A  was  set  up  under  the 
Lome  Convention  to  make  it  easier 
for  the  ACP countries to obtain agri-
cultural and rural information, which 
is an essential factor of production in 
the pursuit of their objectives, particu-
larly self-sufficiency in food. 
Its  main  purpose  is  to  be  a  relay 
between the countries of the Commu-
nity  and  the  ACP  Group  which  can 
mobilize the know-how of one and ad-
apt it for the other and encourage the 
transfer of technology within the ACP 
countries themselves-without under-
estimating  the  job  of scientific  and 
technical organization. 
Lastly,  the  CTA  has  tried  to  im-
prove its services to the ACP States by 
opening  a  question  and  answer  ser-
vice,  a  vital complement to  its  other 
activities  (conferences,  seminars,  stu-
dies,  publications and the  translation 
of reference  books)  and  one  which 
should  make  it  easier  to  disseminate 
information  on  agricultural  and rural 
development. 
For whom? 
Users of the question-answer service 
come  from  a  variety  of professions 
and jobs.  They vary in  origin,  in the 
subjects that interest them, in the nat-
ure of the requests and in the reasons 
underlying them. 
Our correspondents are, in descend-
ing order of frequency of writing,  stu-
dents, researchers, international organ-
izations, teachers, farmers, agricultural 
extension  staff,  ministers,  ambassad-
ors,  company  directors,  resource 
centres, economists, and sociologists. 
(*)  Head of the CT  A Information Service. 
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Many of the requests come from the 
ACP  countries,  but  there  are  many 
from  the Member States of the Com-
munity as well, and we have had ques-
tions from  such  countries as  Senegal, 
Cameroon, Burundi, Cote d'lvoire, Li-
beria, the Netherlands, Tonga, Mauri-
tius,  Ghana,  Belgium,  France  and 
Luxembourg. 
The commonest subjects are agricul-
tural  products  (pineapples,  cow-peas, 
coffee,  manioc,  cashew  nuts  and 
wheat), appropriate technology, farms, 
Sample questions 
1.  A research  worker needed an 
exhaustive  bibliography  on  Ensete 
bananas.  The  CT  A  service  found 
him  the  titles  and abstracts  of all 
such  works  published in  the  West 
up  to  1984,  within  the  prescribed 
time. 
2.  An institute working on asex-
ual  vegetable  production  needed 
the  addresses of researchers  work-
ing on this in the Netherlands. The 
CT  A produced the list. 
3.  A  farmer  in  Burundi  wanted 
to  know how to  grow  manioc and 
what to do with it after harvesting. 
The  CTA  gave  him  practical  ad-
vice. 
4.  A  university  student  wanted 
financial  details  of losses  incurred 
after the harvesting of tropical fruit 
imported to the EEC.  This was his 
thesis  subject.  The  CT  A  was  able 
to provide this information. It also 
encouraged  him  to  contact  CO-
LEACP,  an  organization  of ACP 
exporters  and  EEC  importers  of 
fruit  and  vegetables,  which  pub-
lishes  up-to-the-minute  informa-
tion  on  the  market  in  these  pro-
ducts every week. 
These are  the  sorts  of questions 
we  receive every day. 
vegetable  crops,  fertilizer  (and  com-
post  especially),  animal  production 
(biology and cattle-feed),  seed and ru-
ral economics. 
Whom should we  contact? What is 
published  on  what?  Who  does  what 
where? What data is available? These 
are some of  the fundamental questions 
the CT  A has to  answer every day. 
People  ask  us  questions  because 
they are involved in running a devel-
opment  project,  preparing  socio-eco-
nomic  studies  or  theses,  monitoring 
agricultural research operations or do-
ing market surveys on farm  produce. 
Stimulating demand 
Many people in the field could ben-
efit from  CTA assistance if they knew 
about it.  The organization is  aware of 
the need to boost the real or potential 
users'  consumption  of  development 
information  and  has  therefore  chan-
nelled a lot of resources into stimulat-
ing ACP demand. Experts provide de-
tails of the CT  A when they go  out on 
mission  and  in  the  CT  A  technical 
meetings in which 378  ACP nationals 
were involved. 
The  CT  A  section  of The  Courier, 
the various articles in Spore (1) and the 
schemes to make people aware of  what 
the CT  A does to disseminate informa-
tion on agriculture  which  the ambas-
sadors  and  contact  cells  in  the  ACP 
States have run  have no  doubt made 
their  contribution  to  increasing  de-
mand-although  it  is  still  relatively 
small in relation to actual capacity. So 
we  have to go  on stimulating demand 
as  well  as  ensuring  the  constant  im-
provement of what we  have  to  offer. 
In particular, the service tries  to give 
answers that are fully  in line with the 
requirements  of those  who  ask  the 
wide range of questions it regularly re-
ceives. 
Sources of information 
This sort of work means having ac-
cess  to  many  sources  of information. 
So  the  CTA has  introduced  a  multi-
purpose data access system comprising 
a  link  to  agricultural  data banks,  the 
(1)  This  is  the  CTA's  two-monthly  scientific 
and technical information distribution bulletin. establishment of contact  units  in  the 
ACP-EEC countries, cooperation with 
research and other networks,  creation 
of a tropical agriculture resource bank 
and a reference library. 
First of all, the CT  A is connected to 
the  main  agricultural  data  bases,  in-
cluding AGRIS (2),  and the systems of 
the  FAO  and  the  Commonwealth 
Agricultural Bureau, AGRICOLA (the 
Agricultural On-line Access of the Na-
tional  Agricultural  Library  of  the 
USA),  AGRALIN in the Netherlands 
and TROPAG (the Royal Tropical In-
stitute, Amsterdam, Netherlands). 
Alongside  this,  it can  obtain infor-
mation  for  its  users  from  data bases 
that are not on-line-including the Sa-
hel Institute RESADOC. 
It also  has  working  relations  with 
the main suppliers of primary agricul-
tural documents and, in particular, the 
British Lending Library and the Com-
monwealth Agricultural Bureau (UK), 
the  Centre  National  de  la  Recherche 
Scientifique  (France),  PUDOC  (Ne-
therlands),  the  CIRAD  documentary 
information  services  (France) (3),  the 
Bureau  pour le  Developpement de  la 
Production Agricole  (France)  and the 
FAO's David Lubin Library. 
What is  more,  the CT  A has  set up 
liaison  committees in  the  EEC  coun-
(2)  AGRIS  =  the  International  Agricultural 
Science  and  Technology  Information  System 
(Rome, Italy). 
(3)  CIRAD  =  the  International  Cooperation 
Centre  for  Agricultural  Research  for  Develop-
ment (Paris, France). 
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tries  and  networks  of relations  with 
the ministry departments of agricultu-
ral  research  and  development  in  the 
ACP  States.  It  has  also  established 
working  relations  with  regional  and 
sub-regional  organizations  in  the 
ACPs,  including  CILSS (4),  IRETA (5) 
and the liT  A (6). 
It has  set  up  a  tropical agricultural 
data base comprising addresses of peo-
ple  who  specialize  in  research,  train-
ing,  agricultural  extension  and  rural 
development planning and of institu-
tions, research and other networks and 
information services. 
A series of CTA studies and publi-
cations  and  the  reports  of seminars 
and  conferences  it  has  organized  or 
supported complete the range. 
So  the  organization  undeniably 
makes a proper job of being a  cross-
roads where producers, suppliers, con-
sumers  and  users  of information  can 
meet. 
Free services 
When the CTA receives a question, 
it  performs  four  complementary  but 
differently motivated services. 
- An orientation service channels the 
question  to  the  appropriate  specialist 
(4)  CILSS  = ICDCS  = the Interstate Perma-
nent Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel 
(Ouagadougou,  Burkina Faso). 
(5)  IRETA =  Institute for Research Extension 
and  Training  in  Agriculture  (Apia,  Western  Sa-
moa). 
(6)  liT  A  =  International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (Ibadan, Nigeria). 
or to other, more pertinent, sources of 
rural development information. 
- A  technical  support  service  gives 
practical  advice  on  implementing  a 
development project. 
- A  bibliographical  service  which 
supplies references is involved in sup-
plying  primary  documents  (copies  of 
articles,  originals and microfiches). 
- A facts and figures service provides 
statistics on the main agricultural pro-
ducts and information on scientific ac-
tivity  such  as  conferences,  training 
programmes and research that may be 
of interest to  the ACPs. 
So  what the CT  A does  here is  pro-
vide the Group with free  and reliable 
access to information. 
Answers  are  usually given  by  letter 
or by telephone or, in very rare cases, 
by telex. The average time that elapses 
between  receipt  of the  question  and 
despatching  of  the  answer  is  two 
weeks. 
This picture of the operational natu-
re of this service should not, however, 
mask the problems. 
Expressing  demand  can  sometimes 
be a problem. For example, a student 
may ask  how  to  develop  a  village  in 
Niger,  but  without  mentioning  the 
population  (number  of  inhabitants, 
composition, literacy rate), the natural 
resources, the agricultural and ecologi-
cal context, the infrastructure, the spe-
cific problems etc. 
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How to get an answer 
from  the CTA 
We supply information to five main categories of peo-
ple (researchers, instructors, development experts, plan-
ners and extension workers) and we  are open to others 
too. We need the following information in order to rep-
ly: 
Identity of applicant 
N arne, forename 
Qualifications 
Occupation 
Working languages 
Address 
Information on the project 
Title 
Aims 
Use to which the information to be put 
Stage of project to which the requested information 
applies (prospection, start, continuation, evaluation) 
Applicant's experience in this field 
- Beneficiaries of the information requested 
Constraints 
- Agro-meteorological data on the region or country in 
question 
- Type  of information/documentation  requested  (bi-
bliography,  statistical  data,  addresses,  articles,  mono-
graphs etc.) 
Date by which information to be supplied 
Sources of information already investigated 
Period of interest of the research 
A knowledge of these parameters means we  can pro-
vide  services  that  are  more  precise  and  more  in  line 
with the user's needs. 
The list of details required is not limitative. It simply 
gives an idea of how to make an application. Use it as a 
reminder rather than a  questionnaire.  The clearer and 
more  specific the  question,  the  better the service  pro-
vided will  fulfil  your particular requirements. 
CT  A  Information Service, 
Postbus 380, 
6700 AJ  Wageningen, 
Netherlands 
Tel.:  8380 20484 
Telex:  30196 
This shows that there is a problem in question formula-
tion that the  CTA has  to  solve.  Note,  too,  that demand 
increased sharply with the CTA promotion campaign and 
that it  could well  overburden  the  services,  which  would 
have to be extended, in time. 
SPORE 
~;,e;;er~~~:~~~~!;o years.  the amount of land used for our-of-season crops has doubled m 
A  m~jor  operation to promote out-
of-season crops was established  in 
1984 in Niger to help people over-
come the worst of the drought. It 
generated  considersbiB  popular 
support:  many government agen-
cies  and  departments,  NGOs 
(non-governments/ organizations). 
and agricultural oHicisls all coordi-
nated their efforts in order that the 
most  appropriate  sites  for  such 
crops could be identified and used. 
grammes to develop out-of-season 
crops.  Such  cultivation  is  now 
considered  to  be  the  best  way  of 
exploiting  groundwater  sources 
whose  often  hidden  potential  has 
only lately  been recognized 
After  operating  for  two  years,  a 
preliminary  evaluation  can  now be 
made of this  approach. When first 
launched in Niger, its promoters not 
only saw it as a means to deal with 
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by many with Niger, it is not restric-
ted  to  this  country.  In  Senegal, 
market gardens flourish even in the 
dry  season.  In  Mali.  government 
programmes have  strived for years 
to diminish climatic risks by promo-
ting  out-of-season  vegetable  pro-
duction.  But  in  Niger the  « renais-
sance »  of  this  kind  of  cultivation 
was particularly innovative and well 
organized.  At  the  same  time.  the 
drought over the past few years also 
PROMOTING OUT-OF-SEASON CROPS 
F 
oreign aid, such as that from 
UNICEF (1 ). the World  Bank, 
the  European  Development 
Fun?, the French Cooperation 
Minrstry,  and  the  French 
Caisse  Centrale  de  Cooperation 
Economique, helped to finance  the 
operation, notably for the necessary 
inputs such as seeds and the impro-
vement of water sources for irriga-
tion.  At  the  same  time,  other 
drought-stricken  countries  in  the 
Sahel  also  launched intensive pro-
the immediate crisis but also as part 
of  a  long-term  development  pro-
cess. But with the return of more or 
less  « normal»  rainfall  patterns, 
have  these crops  been  abandoned 
as emergency measures that are no 
longer  necessary ?  Or  have  they 
been  integrated as  part of the per-
manent farming practices in the re -
gions concerned ? 
Although this type of out-of-season 
cultivation  is  often  associated 
tended  to bring  to  the  fore  a form 
of  traditional  cultivation,  practised 
mostly  by  women,  that  had  never 
been given  much importance 
Over the last two years, the amount 
of land used for out-of-season crops 
increased by between two and three 
fold  in  some  of these countries. In 
Niger,  for example,  it  is  estimated 
that  62,000 ha  were  under  out-of-
season crops in 1985 as  opposed to 
only 29,000 he  in  1983. It is  still too 
However,  experience in  development over the past de-
cades has shown that boosting national capacity is  one of 
the fundamentals of national development and also a  sine 
qua non of the success of any regional or international coo-
peration  scheme.  So  the  CTA  has  come  up  with  a  pro-
gramme  to  support  the  ACP  agricultural  documentation 
centres which,  once they are properly organized  and run, 
should in turn take over the dissemination of development 
experience, the results of research and the other technology 
their countries need, in the light of the socio-economic and 
ecological  situation  of  each.  This  programme  includes 
training for  librarians and users,  the production of biblio-
graphies for each subject and each region and the opening 
of a  primary document storage and distribution centre,  a 
vital support and an efficient way of partially solving the 
problems outlined above. 
In conclusion,  let us  say  that there is a  great  challenge 
involved in disseminating scientific and technical informa-
tion to the ACP countries in view of the diversity and nat-
ure  of the information required for  agricultural  and rural 
development. By  creating its question and answer service, 
the CT  A is making for better dissemination of the informa-
tion the ACPs need for their rural and agricultural develop-
ment. o 
Technical Centre for  Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), "de Rietkampen ", Galvanistraat 9, 6716  AE  Ede, 
Postal address: P.O.B. 380, 6700 AJ Wageningen, The Netherlands, Tel.: (0) 8380 20484 / Telex  30169 
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THE CONVENTION AT  WORK 
Foundation  for  ACP /EEC  Cultural 
Cooperation established 
in  Brussels 
After a long period of gestation, the 
Foundation  for  ACP-EEC  Cultural 
Cooperation was  finally  brought into 
being on  19  June.  The acknowledged 
brainchild  of the  Mauritian  Ambas-
sador to  the  EEC,  Raymond Chasle, 
the  creation  of the  Foundation  was 
marked  by  a  prestigious  Academic 
Session in which many of the leading 
lights of the ACP-EEC world-Secre-
tary of State van Eekelen,  Ambassad-
ors  Giama  and  Seydina  Oumar  Sy, 
Giovanni  Bersani  and  Edgard  Pisani 
to name.  but a few- took the floor. 
The  aims  of the  Foundation  are 
closely linked to the provisions of Ti-
tle  VIII  of the  latest  Lome  Conven-
tion-devoted  to  cultural  and  social 
cooperation-provisions  which  Am-
bassador Chasle,  in his  capacity as  a 
Lome negotiator, had vigorously sup-
ported. 
Through  the  Foundation,  Ambas-
sador Chasle  and the  other founding 
members hope to put cultural cooper-
ation, as enshrined in the Convention, 
into practice.  The project is an ambi-
tious one: it aims at promoting better 
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understanding between the peoples of 
the ACP and EEC countries; at devel-
oping  ACP  cultural  productions  and 
preserving and enriching their cultural 
attainments;  at  backing  ACP  States' 
efforts  at greater self-reliance  in their 
development,  based  on  their  social 
and cultural  values,  and a  great  deal 
besides.  In doing so,  it will  centre its 
activities around the  audio-visual  in-
dustry (cinema, T.V., photography, ra-
dio),  the  press,  the  publishing  world 
and the world of science and technolo-
gy. It will also support or organize ex-
hibitions and activities connected with 
music,  theatre  or dance.  In  addition 
(and  the  above  is  by  no  means  an 
exhaustive  account  of  the  Founda-
tion's aspirations),  it  aims to  support 
all  actions  taken  with  a  view  to  im-
proving the economic, social and civic 
rights of students and migrant workers 
in the Community. 
The Courier will be returning to the 
subject of the new Foundation and of 
its work in a future issue.  o 
LOME III 
PROGRAMMING 
For a  year  now,  programming  for 
Lome III's Sixth EDF has been in pro-
gress  and,  as  of the  date  of publica-
tion,  59  countries  have  agreed  their 
indicative  programmes.  The  Courier 
has reported the details in its Nos. 93, 
95,  96 and 97.  The list continues here-
with. 
It should  be  remembered  that  the 
sum  indicated  for  each  country  does 
not include additional resources which 
could be made available to ACP coun-
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in the form of non-programmable aid 
administered by the Commission such 
as  Stabex  transfers,  emergency  aid, 
food  aid, etc.  On the other hand,  the 
EIB  could  contribute,  from  the  re-
sources  which  it  manages,  to  the  fi-
nancing of  productive investment pro-
jects which meet the criteria and con-
form to the statutory rules of  the Bank 
and the provisions of the Convention. 
If,  in the case of certain countries, an 
indicative amount is shown as regards 
loans,  the  sum is  nonetheless  subject 
to ·the funding of projects already pre-
sented and accepted before becoming 
definitive. 
Djibouti 
Djibouti will be receiving ECU 8 m, 
of which ECU 7 m will be in the form 
of  grants and ECU 1 m in the form of 
risk capital managed by  the EIB. 
85%  of grants  will  be  spent in  the 
areas  earmarked  as  priority,  namely 
development and urban development. 
The assistance to the rural sector will 
concentrate  on improving the  life  of 
pastoral and semi-pastoral population 
groups  by  developing  livestock  man-
agement in such a way as to ensure the 
necessary  balance  between  conserva-
tion of vegetation and the fight against 
desertification  on  the  one  hand  and 
the development of the livestock sec-
tor on the other. 
The Community pointed out that a 
sum of ECU  185 m was  available for 
regional  projects  in  the  East  African 
region, which should prove a substan-
tial  support  for  the  take-off  of 
I  GAD  D. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed on 4 March 1986 in Djibouti by 
M. Bahdon Farah on behalf of the Re-
public  of Djibouti,  by  M.  Giovanni 
Livi on behalf of the Commission of 
the European Communities and by M. 
Seiller for matters under the responsi-
bility  of  the  European  Investment 
Bank. 
Jamaica 
Jamaica's  overall  financial  package 
of  programmable  resource  will  be 
ECU  39 m,  of which  ECU  29 m  will 
be  in  the  form  of grants  and  ECU 
10 m in the form of special loans. This 
aid will go primarily towards rural de-
velopment  to  underpin  the  Govern-
ment's  strategy  for  improving  living 
conditions  in  the  countryside  with  a 
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view  to  increasing  production  and 
providing jobs. 
Jamaica will also be eligible for part 
of  the ECU 72 m available for regional 
coop~ration in the Caribbean region. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed on 6 May in Kingston by Prime 
Minister  Edward  Seaga  on  behalf of 
Jamaica, by Michel Hauswirth on be-
half of the Commission of the  Euro-
pean  Communities  and  by  Justin 
Loasby in respect of matters under the 
responsibility of the European Invest-
ment Bank. 
Bahamas 
Bahamas  will  receive  ECU  3m as 
programmable  resources,  of  which 
ECU 2 m will be in the form of grants 
and ECU  1 m  in  the form  of special 
loans. 
Aid  will  be  concentrated  on  eco-
nomic infrastructure in the Family Is-
lands,  and  will  include  provision  of 
electricity supplies. 
Bahamas will be able to tap into the 
ECU  72 m  earmarked  for  regional 
cooperation in the Caribbean region. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed  on  8  May  at  Nassau  by  Sir 
Lynden Pindling,  Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance  on behalf of the 
Bahamas, by M.  Michel Hauswirth on 
behalf of  the Commission of  the Euro-
pean Communities and by  Mr Justin 
Loasby in respect of matters under the 
responsibility of the European Invest-
ment Bank. 
Cameroon 
Cameroon  will  be  rece1vmg  ECU 
96 m as total programmable resources, 
of which  ECU  66 m  will  be  in  the 
form  of grants and ECU  30 m in the 
form  of special loans. 
Aid  will  be  concentrated  for  the 
most  part  on  two  sectors :  develop-
ment of the  rural  world  and  support 
for  small-and  medium-sized  enter-
prises.  The  aim  is  to  provide  a  firm 
base  for  food  self-sufficiency,  moder-
nise agriculture, stem the rural exodus 
and fight  desertification,  and  to  pro-
vide the country with a class of  indige-
nous entrepreneurs. 
In  addition,  the  EIB  could  contri-
bute to the financing of productive in-
vestment projects  in  the  manufactur-
ing industry, in the area of infrastruc-
ture  or  support  for  small- and  me-
dium-sized  enterprises  by  the  provi-
sion of technical assistance. Taking all 
the  means  of financing  into  account, 
the Bank indicated that a sum of the 
order of ECU  80 m  could  be  consid-
ered. 
Furthermore, Cameroon will be able 
to  benefit from  the ECU  80 m which 
will  be  made  available  for  regional 
cooperation in the Central African re-
gion. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed of 10 May in Yaounde by Sad-
ou Hayatou, Minister of National and 
Regional Planning, on behalf of  Came-
roon, by Dieter Frisch, Director Gen-
eral for Development, on behalf of the 
Commission  of the  European  Com-
munities  and  by  Jacques  Sylvain  in 
respect of matters under the responsi-
bility  of  the  European  Investment 
Bank. 
Suriname 
Suriname will receive ECU 23 m as 
programmable resources  under Lome 
III, of which ECU  1  7 m will  be in the 
form  of grants  and  ECU  6 m  in  the 
form  of special loans. 
Priority  will  be  given  to  improve-
ment of the  conditions of life  in  the 
rural sector,  with  particular emphasis 
on  the  upgrading,  rationalisation  and 
development of the rice-growing sub-
sector. 
Suriname would be eligible, in addi-
tion,  to take part in regional  projects 
and programmes for which ECU 72 m 
had been reserved. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed on 13 May, by Wim Udenhout, 
Minister-President  of  Suriname,  by 
Michel  Hauswirth,  Deputy  Director 
General on behalf of the Commission 
of  the  European  Communities  and 
John Ainsworth in respect of matters 
under the  responsibility  of the  Euro-
pean Investment Bank. 
Belize 
Belize  will  be  rece1vmg  a  total  of 
ECU  8 m  under  Lome  III,  of which 
ECU 4 m will be in the form of  grants, 
ECU 3 m in the form  of special loans 
and ECU 1 m in the form of risk capi-
tal managed by the EIB. 
The  bulk of the  Community assis-
tance will be used for economic infras-
tructure  (80%)  and  much  of the  re-
mainder  for  community  develop-
ment. -
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The EEC  stated that an amount of 
ECU 72 m  would be available for  re-
gional development in the Caribbean 
region. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed on 1 May 1986 in Belmopan by 
Prin1e  Minister Esquivel on behalf of 
Belize,  by M.  Hauswirth on behalf of 
the  Commission  of  the  European 
Con1munities  and  by  Mr Ainsworth 
for 1matters under the responsibility of 
the European Investment Bank. 
Cote d'I  voire 
Cote  d'Ivoire  will  be  receiving  as 
programmable  resources  ECU  52 m 
grants and ECU 23 m special loans, a 
total of ECU 75 m (CFAF 25.5 bn). 
Community  aid  will  be  concen-
trated on the rural sector, particularly 
in supporting  the  country's  policy  of 
food  self-sufficiency  and  improving 
the  conditions  of,  especially,  young 
farn1ers. 
In addition, the EIB can contribute, 
front  the  resources  at its  disposal,  to 
the  financing  of  productive  invest-
ment projects in the industrial,  agro-
industrial, telecommunications, energy 
and  productive  infrastructure  sectors 
up to a provisional amount of the or-
der of ECU 80 m. 
Cote d'lvoire will also benefit from 
participation  in  regional  projects  in 
West Africa, for which the EEC has set 
asid.e  the sum of ECU 210 m. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed at Abidjan on 20  May by Ab-
doulaye  Kone,  Minister  of Economy 
and Finance, by Maurice Foley, Depu-
ty  Director General on behalf of the 
Cornmission and by Robert Comez in 
respect of matters under the responsi-
bility  of  the  European  Investment 
Bank. 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago will be receiv-
ing  ECU  15m (±  TT $52 m)  in pro-
graJnmable  aid.  This comprises ECU 
9 rn  of grants  and  ECU  6 m  in  the 
forrn of soft loans. Funds will be con-
centrated on agricultural development, 
the conservation of natural  resources 
and tourism. 
The country will  also  benefit from 
regional  cooperation  programmes  in 
the Caribbean for which an overall al-
location of ECU 72 m is foreseen. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed in Port of Spain on 16 May by 
Errol Mahibir, Trinidad and Tobago's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Michel 
Hauswirth,  Deputy  Director-General 
for Development, for the Commission 
and by John Ainsworth for the EIB. 
Guinea 
Guinea  will  be  receiving  ECU 
114 m  as  programmable  resources, 
ECU 96.5 m of which in the form of 
grants,  ECU  5 m  as  soft  loans  and 
ECU  12.5 m  as  risk capital.  Aid will 
be devoted principally to rural devel-
opment and in particular to stimulat-
ing cash and subsistence crop produc-
tion, and to helping build up environ-
mental  protection  and  restoration 
units. 
Guinea will also be entitled to parti-
cipate  in  regional  cooperation  pro-
grammes,  for  which  ECU  210 m  has 
been  set  aside  for  the  countries  of 
West Africa. 
The  indicative  programme  was 
signed  in  Conakry  by  Edouard  Ben-
jamin, Guinea's Minister of Planning 
and  International  Cooperation,  by 
Maurice Foley,  Deputy Director-Gen-
eral  for  Development,  for  the  Com-
mission and by Robert Cormez for the 
EIB. 
Kenya 
Kenya will receive the sum of ECU 
122  million  (equivalent  to  Kshs 
1.903 m)  as  programmable  resources, 
composed of ECU  112  million (Kshs 
1,747  million)  in  the  form  of grants 
ECU 10 million (Kshs  156 million) in 
the form of special loans. 
The Community's aid would be fo-
cused  on  rural  development  centred 
around  self-reliance  in  food,  and an 
adequate rural-urban balance. 
Furthermore,  the  European  Invest-
ment Bank will  contribute  to  the  fi-
nancing of projects in agro-processing, 
manufacturing, and in the energy and 
communications sectors.  To this end, 
the Bank envisages an amount of the 
order of  ECU 70 m from the resources 
under its mangement. 
Kenya  will  also  benefit  under  the 
regional  programme  allocation  for 
which  a  sum  of ECU  185  million 
(Kshs 2,885  million) is earmarked for 
operations in the sub-region. 
The  Indicative  Programme  was 
signed in Nairobi on 5 June  1986  by 
John Cithuku, Permanent Secretary at 
the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development, by Dieter Frisch, Direc-
tor-General for  Development,  for  the 
Commission  and by  Thomas Oursin 
for the BEL  o 
EDF 
Following a favourable opinion from 
the EDF Committee 21lst-213rd meet-
ings), the Commission has just decided 
to finance these projects. 
Somalia 
Technical assistance 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU  1 875 000 
This project has been specially  de-
signed  to  improve  and  support  tax 
management  at  the  Ministry  of Fi-
nance, the Central Bank and the Com-
mercial and Savings Bank, so they can 
administer  public  debt  properly  and 
introduce the relevant tax measures, in 
particular  to  boost  local  and  foreign 
investments. 
Burundi 
Faculty of Agriculture in Bujumbura 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 5 000 000 
The project is to put up and equip 
buildings (classrooms and student ac-
comodation) on the Mutanga (Bujum-
bura) campus with a view to improv-
ing working conditions in the Faculty 
of Agriculture and expanding training 
possibilities  to  meet  the  demand for 
agricultural  engineers  in  Burundi,  an 
essentially agricultural country. 
Malawi 
The  Mwansambo  rural  development 
centre 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 900 000 
The  Mwansambo  rural  develop-
ment centre  is  part of Malawi's  na-
tional  programme  of  rural  centres 
(PNCR), which is  aimed at providing 
selected areas with an integrated series 
of facilities  and installations  to  meet 
the fundamental needs of the popula-
tion and boost agricultural production 
and trade in rural areas. Mwansambo, 
the  first  project after  the  German-fi-
nanced pilot phase,  will  reach  25 000 
people living in a 45 000 ha region. 
It will  provide a certain amount of 
infrastructure  (village  roads  and 
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) for econom-
ic,  social and administrative purposes 
in  Nwansambo  and  the  surrounding 
area. 
Botswana, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe 
Regional  railway  personnel  training 
project 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 2 000 000 
The idea here is to train Botswanan 
nationals in preparation for  the Gov-
ernment's purchase of Botswana Rail-
ways from National Railways of Zim-
babwe  in  January  1987  and  to  train 
Swazi nationals for the opening of the 
new northern line in 1986. It is also to 
cater for the change from steam to die-
sel.  Courses are to be run in national 
centres  in  Botswana  and  Swaziland 
and high-level training will  be offered 
in regional centres, especially in Zim-
babwe.  One technical assistant will be 
sent to  Swaziland and six  to  Botswa-
na. 
This  project  follows  on  from  the 
successful  Lome  I  scheme  which 
paved the way with a detailed study of 
railway labour and the creation of lo-
cal  training  centres  in  Botswana  and 
Swaziland. 
Malawi 
Fish-farming in the north and south 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 2 927 500 
This covers research and the draft-
ing of technical and economic criteria 
for  fish-farming in  northern and cen-
tral Malawi where the intake of fish is 
only 50% of  what it is elsewhere in the 
country.  A  particular  aim  is  to  im-
prove the diet and the income of the 
small fishing communities. Phase one, 
which lasts three years,  is a pilot pro-
ject  involving  studying,  developing 
and  demonstrating  the  feasibility  of 
fish-farming in the region.  Phase two, 
which will be run if an assessment of 
the first three years of  applied research 
and development  reveals  it  has  been 
successful,  involves providing the ne-
cessary extension services and training 
to  encourage  and boost  the  develop-
ment  of fish-farming  in  the  region. 
The project is in line with the develop-
ment targets  of the  Malawi  Govern-
ment and the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities. 
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Papua-New Guinea 
Project  to  build  mini-HE  stations  in 
Tari 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 2 700 000 
This is the first project on the diesel 
installation replacement programme. 
The  Tari  sub-station,  which  serves 
more than 2000 people, will thus have 
a continuous and more reliable supply 
of electricity  and the national budget 
will  save  on  diesel  fuel  imports.  A 
more reliable electricity supply should 
improve the standard of living of the 
rural population and could even put a 
brake on the rural exodus. 
Mauritania 
Technical  assistance  for  maintaining 
hospital facilities 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 540 000 
This  project  follows  two  years  of 
EDF-financed technical assistance and 
training in the maintenance of  hospital 
facilities.  Recent results have been ex-
tremely satisfactory. This new  project 
will  be  an  apportunity  to  train  new 
hospital  technicians,  provide  ad-
vanced  training  for  those  already  on 
the job and extend the hospital main-
tenance service to hospitals in the re-
gions  instead  of keeping  it  concen-
trated in the capital, Nouakchott. 
Guinea Bissau 
Village water engineering 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU  1 400 000 
The idea here is to sink 85  wells in 
villages  in  north-eastern  Guinea-Bis-
sau where water supplies are a particu-
larly critical problem. 
The project is  part of the rural de-
velopment drive which is the Govern-
ment's  top  priority  and  aims  to  im-
prove  supplies  and  thus  improve 
health and hygiene in the villages. 
Cameroon 
Rural development in the Bafut area 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU  1 500 000 
This project follows on from the vil-
lage  structure and activity promotion 
schemes  financed  as  an experimental 
operation (Bafut I).  The idea is to im-
prove  the  living  conditions  of  the 
35 000  people in the district of Bafut 
and boost agricultural output with the 
participation of the local population. 
Project  intervention  is  geared  to 
producing and distributing plant stock, 
promoting  draft  animals,  rehabilitat-
ing hydro-agricultural facilities, devel-
oping  prairies  for  intensive  herding 
and introducing  measures  to  develop 
fish-farming and poultry, pig and goat 
breeding  and  extend  the  improve-
ments to the socio-economic and rural 
infrastructure in the region. 
The programmes will be run by the 
peasants themselves-who will be or-
ganized into village  communities and 
have  the  support  of technical  assis-
tants  and  standard  back-up  services 
locally. 
Netherlands Antilles 
Installations for veterinary service and 
slaughterhouse in  Cura~ao 
Fourth EDF 
Grant: ECU 2 900 000 
The existing slaughterhouse in Wil-
lemstad,  Cura~ao, was built in 1933. It 
no longer satisfies the most elementa-
ry  health standards. 
In view  of the state of decrepitude 
and  disrepair  of  the  buildings  and 
plant,  renovation  is  ruled  out,  and a 
new  slaughterhouse  must be  built.  It 
will  be  located in the same port area 
and will  mainly comprise a  slaughter 
hall,  chill  rooms,  lairage,  offices  and 
various technical installations. 
Senegal 
Development  of  artisanal  sea-fishing 
in Casamance 
Fifth EDF 
Special loan : ECU  1 600 000 
The project is to develop sea-fishing 
in the Casamance (departments of Big-
nona  and  Oussouye)  with  a  view  to 
job creation,  curbing  rural  depopula-
tion and improving the supply of fresh 
and processed fishery  products to the 
internal market. 
The project will  provide fishermen 
and  small  traders  with  bank  credit, 
thereby  enabling  them  to  purchase 
fishing  gear  (pirogues,  engines  and 
nets)  as  well  as  the  facilities  to  store 
and sell fresh and processed products. 
The project also includes a large train-
ing component, notably for the benefit 
of the  young  unemployed,  and  in-
volves instruction and advice on fish-
ing methods as well as technical exten--
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sion services. The project includes the 
provision of  technical assistance in the 
form  of a  deputy  project  leader,  an 
exp~:rt  on  credit  and  an  expert  on 
training. 
Benin 
Abomey Hospital 
Fourth EDF 
Grant: ECU 1 500 000 
This. supplementary  project  should 
make  the  provincial  hospital  of 
Abomey,  opened at the beginning  of 
1985  but with only the general medi-
cine section working,  fully  operation-
al. 
In addition to the extra equipment 
needed  for  the  operation  of the  five 
other  specialized  departments,  the 
hospital  dispensary  is  to  be  supplied 
with an initial stock of medicines and 
other  expendables  for  medical  use, 
and technical assistance is to be pro-
vided for  the  hospital administration 
and for the specialized medical depart-
ments. 
Ghana and Cote d'lvoire 
Axim - Elubo - Aboisso Road 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 5 900 000 
Special loan : ECU 4 500 000 
To  complete  the  Axim-Dlubo-
Aboisso Road, which is the last miss-
ing  link  in  the  Trans  West  African 
Highway  Lagos-Cotonou-Lome-Ac-
cra-Abidjan,  linking  five  ECOW  AS 
countries, a  supplementary finance of 
ECU 10 400 000 is requested. 
The increase is needed for the con-
struction  of the  Axim-Elubo  section 
(82 km)  of the  Axim-Aboisso  Road 
(153 km). 
Tanzania 
Co-operative  and  Rural  Development 
Bank 
Fifth EDF 
Grant: ECU 3 150 000 
The  objectives  of the  project  are 
firstly  to strengthen the Co-operative 
and  Rural  Development  Bank 
(CRDB)  through  the  provision  of 
training and equipment, and secondly 
to overcome some of  the worst current 
bottlenecks  in  the  agricultural  sector 
by providing lorries and gunny-bags to 
co-operatives, through a line of credit 
to the CRDB. 
The training for CRBD will be car-
ried out primarily through links with 
similar institutions in Kenya and Zim-
babwe.  Together with the equipment, 
it will  improve the ability  of CRDB 
staff  to  appraise  and  monitor  the 
Bank's activities.  The total allocation 
to these elements is ECU 0.6 million. 
The credit line of ECU 2.55 million 
will be used to meet application from 
co-operatives  in  specified  regions 
which  are  appraised  by  the  CRBD. 
The co-operatives are responsible for 
the  transport  of  agricultural  inputs 
(such  as  fertilisers,  seeds  and  pesti-
cides) and of  export and food crops. 0 
FISHERIES 
New  EEC-Guinea Bissau 
agreement 
The  EEC  signed  a  new  three-year 
fishing agreement with Guinea Bissau 
on May 22. The agreement, negotiated 
by the European Commission, will not 
only cover the fishing rights of French 
and Italian operators but also include 
Spanish and Portuguese boats, making 
this  the  first  agreement  between  the 
Community  of 12  and  a  developing 
country. 
The  agreement,  which  came  into 
force  on June 25,  will  give  the Euro-
Nile Perch -
correction 
Following  the publication in  our 
March/  April issue of an article on 
the Nile Perch ("Big fish threaten 
Africa's  great  lakes"),  written  by 
experts from the International U ni-
on for  Conservation of Nature and 
Natural  Resources  (IUCN),  the 
FAO  has  asked  us  to  point  out 
inaccuracies  concerning  their  in-
volvement in the Lake Victoria pro-
ject. 
After the Courier went to press in 
February, the IUCN itself publish-
ed a  feature  on the Nile Perch, in 
which it was emphasized, correctly, 
that the F AO had had no  involve-
ment in the introduction of the Nile 
Perch  into  Lake  Victoria  in  the 
1950s, that its involvement with the 
Lake  began  in  1966/68  only,  and 
then in the form of a project which 
did not concern the Nile Perch. 
pean boats a right of access of 11  000 
GRT  (Gross  Registered  Tonne) 
against  7,500  GRT  in  the  previous 
agreement, 45 tuna-freezing vessels, 25 
cargo boats and 6 Spanish vessels spe-
cialising in sword-fish fishing are also 
granted access.  In return, the EEC will 
pay Guinea-Bissau a compensation of 
ECU 2.5 m  per year.  Each  EEC  boat 
must also have a government observer 
on  board  when  in  Guinea  Bissau's 
waters.  o 
VISITS 
Botswana's President 
Dr Quett Masire 
visits the Commission 
Dr Quett  Masire,  the  President  of 
Botswana,  visited  the  EEC  Commis-
sion on 6 June. He was accompanied 
by  his  Foreign  Affairs  Minister,  Dr 
Goasitwe Chiepe, and a  large  delega-
tion of top officials from  the govern-
ment  departments  most  concerned 
with  cooperation  with  the  EEC.  Dr 
Masire held talks  with  vice-president 
Frans Andriessen,  representing Presi-
dent  Jacques  Delors,  on  cooperation 
between the Community and Botswa-
na  and  regional  cooperation  in 
SADCC,  which  Dr  Masire  currently 
chairs. The situation in southern Afri-
ca was also discussed. 
The national indicative programme 
for Lome III was signed in December 
last year. It is worth ECU 32  million, 
stresses  rural  development  and  the 
protection  of natural  resources  and 
takes account of the European Parlia-
ment's concern expressed in a  recent 
resolution on the ecological balance in 
Botswana. The Commission is backing 
the national strategy to protect natural 
resources  which  the  Government  of 
Botswana has introduced. 
President Masire drew the Commis-
sion's attention  to  the  current  situa-
tion  in  his  country,  which  is  exper-
iencing  its  fifth  consecutive  year  of 
drought.  Frans Andriessen confirmed 
that the  Commission had decided to 
allocate an extra ECU 3 million-worth 
of aid to Botswana as part of the plan 
to rehabilitate the countries which had 
suffered  most  from  the  drought.  He 
also  announced  that emergency  food 
aid  (  4 000  t  maize  and  400 t  milk-
powder) would be going to Botswana 
on  top  of the  annual  food  aid  pro-
gramme  (  4 000 t  maize  and  200  t 
milkpowder). 
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President  Masire  is  welcomed  at  Commission  headquaters  by  Vice-President 
Frans Andriessen (centre)  and Director-General of  Development Dieter Frisch 
In  his  capacity  as  chairman  of 
SADCC,  Dr  Masire  pointed  out  the 
main  aims  and  priorities  of regional 
cooperation  in  southern  Africa.  The 
Commission then stressed the impor-
tance it attached to  the  EEC-SADCC 
regional  cooperation  programme 
(ECU  110  million) for which a memo 
had been signed in Harare in January 
1986. 
Dr Masire also mentioned the situa-
tion in South Africa and the negative 
repercussions it had on the neighbour-
ing countries.  He called on the Com-
munity and the Member States to pro-
vide  economic  and  political  support 
for  the  SADCC  countries  so  they 
could  stand  up  to  the  major  crisis 
threatening the whole of the south of 
the continent. 
of  the  Member  States  shall  be 
weighted as follows: 
Belgium  8 
Denmark  5 
Germany  52 
Greece  4 
Sp~n  14 
France  48 
Ireland  2 
Italy  26 
Luxembourg  1 
Netherlands  12 
Portugal  3 
United Kingdom  34 
The EDF Committee shall act by  a 
qualified majority of 145  votes.  o 
EMERGENCY AID 
The Commission has just decided on 
the following  emergency aid  pursuant 
to  Article 137 of Lome II. 
Fiji : ECU 400 000 
Hurricane  Martin  hit  Vanua  Levu 
and the other islands in the Northern 
Division of Fiji on the night of 12-13 
April. The flooding and the landslides 
killed  12  people,  destroyed  1200 
houses and left more than 20 000 peo-
ple  without food  or shelter. 
The aid is to buy and distribute lo-
cal food  to the stricken populations. 
Uganda : ECU 500 000 
The  recent  events  in  Uganda  and 
the  stopping  of medical  programmes 
which  resulted  have  generated  out-
breaks of some diseases. 
The  aid  is  intended  for  organiza-
tions working locally (AMREF, Mede-
cins sans Frontieres and LICROSS) to 
help them run health programmes and 
provide first aid. 
Jamaica: ECU 400 000 
This aid is in response to the Jamai-
can Government's appeal for help fol-
lowing the torrential rain which fell  at 
the  end of May and caused  such  de-
struction.  There  were  31  dead  and 
40 000  people  are  otherwise  affected, 
1200  houses  were  destroyed or dam-
aged and roads and bridges are no lon-
ger usable. 
Ethiopia:  2 740 t  cereal  and 
170 t milkpowder 
This is a contribution to the World 
Vision  programme,  which  is  helping 
people in the W  ollo area. 
Madagascar :  200 t  cereal  and 
100 t milkpowder 
This is for victims of the recent ty-
phoon Honorinina and will  be distri-
buted by the NGO "Association Aide 
au Tiers-Monde ". o 
Vice-president  Andriessen  went 
over  the  Community's  positions  as 
they emerged from the declaration on 
European political cooperation in Sep-
tember 1985  and the joint declaration 
of front line and EEC countries in Lu-
saka in February. o 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
EDF COMMITTEE 
Following  the  enlargement  of the 
EEC to Spain and Portugal, the Coun-
cil  has  modified  the  Internal  Agree-
ment,  on the  financing  and adminis-
tration of Community aid (see Courier 
no 97 page V).  It has also decided that 
within the EDF Committee, the votes 
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STABEX for non-Lome LLDCs 
The Commission has just approved 
a draft regulation from the Council on 
setting up a system to compensate for 
losses  in export earnings for least ad-
vanced countries which are not Lome 
signatories. 
At the  1 October session  last year, 
the Council approved the principle of 
machinery  of this  sort  and  an  an-
nouncement  along  these  lines  was 
made later in the month in the half-
way report of  the NSAP (new substan-tial action programme) adopted at the 
Paris Conference on the under-devel-
oped countries in  1981. 
The  proposed  system  reflects  the 
Stabex aims as laid down in Lome III, 
i.e.  to  help  stabilize  the  export earn-
ings  from  agricultural  commodities 
sent to the Community from  the ben-
eficiary countries by  making financial 
transfers to  make up for  at least part 
of the losses  attendant on  fluctuating 
prices, quantities or both. 
As with Stabex, the money transfer-
red  has  to  be  used  for  schemes  and 
programmes  in  the  sectors  in  which 
the  losses  were  incurred.  In  some 
cases, however, when it does not seem 
wise to go on intervening in these sec-
tors, the transfers may be made to oth-
er areas of the economy with a view to 
diversification. 
The  products  covered  are  those 
mentioned in Lome III, plus jute. The 
countries covered are those on the UN 
least developed list which are not sig-
natories  of Lome  (Afghanistan,  Bhu-
tan,  Maldives,  Arab  Republic  of Ye-
men, Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
Bangladesh, Haiti, Laos and Nepal). 
The  Council  declaration  makes  it 
clear that the criteria of the system do 
not currently apply to Afghanistan and 
that,  for  the  moment,  exports  of the 
relevant  products  from  Bhutan,  Mal-
dives  and  the  two  Yemens  are  still 
within the dependence threshold. This 
means that the immediate beneficiar-
ies of the system are Bangladesh, Hai-
ti,  Laos and Nepal. 
The cost  to  the  budget  of the  sys-
tem  as  the  Council  approved  it  in 
prin'ciple in October last year,  is  esti-
mated at ECU 50  million for the five 
years from the  1987 to the  1991  mar-
keting years.  o 
Corrigendum 
The  article  in  no  97  (May-June 
1985)  entitled  "Anti-apartheid 
Days:  keeping  international  pres-
sure  up" mistakenly reported that 
Mr van den Broek, the Dutch For-
eign  Affairs  Ministers  and  Presi-
dent-in-Office  of  the  European 
Council  of Ministers,  was  repre-
sented by Mr Rutten (Netherlands), 
the Chairman of the Committee of 
Permanent  Representatives,  when 
in  fact  he  was  represented  by  Mr 
van  der Klaauw,  the  Netherlands, 
Ambassador to  Belgium.  We  apo-
logize for this error. 
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The Hague summit: the EEC gives  the South African 
gouvernment three months to  change its policy 
After two days of tough discussions 
the European Summit, meeting in The 
Hague  on  26  and  27  June,  decided 
against taking any immediate sanction 
against South Africa while at the same 
time  unanimously  condemning  its 
apartheid regime. 
The South African crisis dominated 
the meeting- the  highest-level politi-
cal  meeting of the Twelve - in which 
for the first time in two years,  no ma-
jor  obstacles  in  community  policies 
were encountered. 
The  Community's  reaction  in  the 
face  of the  developments  in  South 
Africa  would  appear to  indicate  that 
the Community is not yet in a position 
to take a firm  stand, for reasons both 
of political  realism  and  of economic 
interests. 
The  Community  was  nevertheless 
anxious to send South Africa a "clear 
signal", to make President Botha real-
ise  that the  outcome  of the  Summit 
should  not  be  interpreted  as  giving 
him a free hand to continue his policy, 
as  the  West-German  Chancellor Hel-
mut Kohl emphasized. 
Britain and Germany, supported by 
Portugal,  voiced  their points  of view 
strongly. According to them, automat-
ic  and  genuinely-applied  sanctions 
would be ineffective in bringing down 
apartheid  and  would  harm  both  the 
black  majority  in  South  Africa  and 
Europe,  whose  economy  depends  on 
certain  strategic goods  exported  from 
South Africa. 
Mr Kohl  underlined  his  view  that 
there had been "no example in history 
whereby economic  sanc,~ions had had 
any measure of success  . 
The Council's condemmed the Pre-
toria government strongly and warned 
of the  danger  of increased  repression 
of the  black  majority  leading  to  a 
bloodbath. 
The Twelve adopted a 6 point reso-
lution  in  which  they  called,  within 
three  months,  for  the  "unconditional 
release"  of the  black  leader,  Nelson 
Mandela,  and of"  other political pri-
soners",  together with  an  end to  the 
ban  on  anti:..apartheid  movements. 
They also called for an end to the ban 
on the activities of the ANC in South 
Africa. Meanwhile, the EEC will begin 
discussions  with  other  western  bloc 
countries- the  USA  and  Japan  in 
particular - on  the  new  measures 
which will be required to put pressure 
on  Pretoria,  notably  the  ban  on  new 
investment and the embargo on  coal, 
iron,  steel  and  Krugerrand  imports 
from  South Africa. 
The Twelve decided to ask the new 
chairman  of the  Council  of Foreign 
Ministers, Sir Geoffrey Howe,  to  visit 
The  Heads of State and Government of the 12,  their Foreign  Affairs Ministers 
and the President of  the Commission 
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plaining  the  European  Community's 
view and of working towards a dialo-
gue between the black and white com-
munites there. 
The  Council  also  decided  to  in-
crease its financial and other aid to the 
victims of apartheid and more partic-
ularly  to the 60 000  homeless inhabi-
tants  of Crossroads  and  to  political 
prisoners. 
The Council's decisions appear very 
mild compared with the expectations 
of some of the Member States (Den-
mark, Greece, Ireland, Spain and The 
Netherlands), who would have like to 
see  the  Community  come  out  for 
tough,  immediate and effective  mea-
sures against Pretoria.  o 
MEDITERRANEAN 
The Commission states 
its aims for  financial 
and technical cooperation 
The Commission has just approved 
a  communication to  the Council  lay-
ing  down  the arrangements for  its  fi-
nancial and technical cooperation pol-
icy  with  countries  south  and east  of 
the Mediterranean (Algeria,  Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt,  Israel,  Lebanon, Syria 
and Jordan). 
The  Council  approved  the  main 
lines  of this  policy  on  25  November 
last year. They were: 
- to reduce food dependence; 
- too  see  greater economic  comple-
mentarity between the countries north 
and south of the Mediterranean; 
- to support regional and multilater-
al  cooperation. 
These  new  priorities  should  be 
translated into the financial  protocols 
to  be concluded with  these  countries 
for the period 1 November 1986 to 31 
October 1991. 
Where to put priority? 
The new protocols should put prior-
ity on: 
- agricultural  projects,  especially 
those  concerned with  producing food 
that is in short supply and diversifying 
production as part of good strategies; 
- projects  in  the  industrial and ser-
vice  sectors  which  are  part of indus-
trial strategies defined by the Mediter-
ranean countries and which contribute 
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to strengthening the economic ties be-
tween them and the Community; 
- schemes making for greater region-
al  cooperation. 
What financial techniques? 
The  Commission  proposes  to  do 
away  with  the  special  loans  which 
came  from  the  Community  budget 
Loans,  in fact,  tended to  increase the 
countries'  foreign  exchange  commit-
ments  and  so  the  Commission  pro-
poses they be replaced by grants. 
The  proposal  on  EIB  loans  is  that 
there  be  a  differentition  according  to 
sector  (agriculture,  industry  and eco-
nomic  infrastructure)  of the  interest 
rate rebates of up to 3 %. 
What new  project 
implementation techniques? 
The Commission proposes that calls 
to  tender  launched  for  projects  that 
are to be financed under the financial 
protocols should be open to develop-
ing  countries with  global  cooperation 
agreements with the Community. This 
is  what  already  happens  with  Lome 
projects. 
Lastly,  it proposes that the acceler-
ated procedure for  calls  to  tender be 
improved  and  local  firms  be  encou-
raged to supply. This also happens un-
der Lome. 
The  Commission  has  not  at  this 
stage  made  any  proposals  about  the 
amounts to be written into the finan-
cial protocols. It will take the necessa-
ry steps to see they are adopted before 
the current financial protocols run out 
on 31  October later this year.  o 
RACISM 
A  Community  declaration  against 
racism and xenophobia was  signed in 
the hemicycle of the European Parlia-
ment in Strasbourg on  11  June by the 
President-in-Office of the Council, the 
Netherlands' Foreign Affairs Minister 
Hans Van den Broek, by Pierre Pflim-
lin, the President of  the European Par-
liament,  and  by  Jacques  Delors,  the 
President of the EEC  Commission. 
The declaration was an initiative of 
the  Commission  which,  in  March 
1985,  had sent the Council guidelines 
for  a  Community policy  on  migrants 
in which one of the ideas was to adopt 
a common declaration against racism 
European flag 
Europe's new flag, with its twelve 
gold  stars  on  a  blue  background, 
was  solemnly flown  from  the EEC 
Commission  mast  on  the  last 
Thursday in  May. This first show-
ing was an opportunity for Commis-
sion President Jacques Delors, Eu-
ropean Parliament President Pierre 
Pflimlin and the Dutch permanent 
representative  for  the  Council  of 
Ministers to  stress  that the  latest 
flag was a symbol of peace and uni-
on  and  not  of  heightered  nation-
alism. 
and xenophobia.  This  was  the  Com-
mission's way of responding to the xe-
nophobic  attacks  against  migrant 
workers  and their families  in  several 
countries  of  the  Community  that 
roused the indignation of public opin-
ion. 
Both  Council  and  Parliament  wel-
comed the Commission initiative and 
associated  themselves  with  the  work 
that had led to the drafting of the de-
claration, which is  printed below: 
"The  European  Parliament,  the 
Council,  the  Representatives  of the 
Member  States,  meeting  within  the 
Council, and the Commission: 
- recogmzmg  the  existence  and 
growth of  xenophobic attitudes, move-NEWS ROUND-UP 
Omar Khalifa off  on  his symbolic Sport Aid race  to draw attention to the worrying situation in Africa. President Jacques 
Delors and Vice-President Lorenzo Natali look on 
ments  and  acts  of  violence  in  the 
Community which  are  often  directed 
against immigrants; 
- whereas  the  Community  institu-
tions attach  prime  importance to  re-
spect  for  fundamental  rights,  as  so-
lemnly proclaimed in the Joint Decla-
ration of 5 April1977, and to the prin-
ciple of freedom of movem'ent as laid 
down in the Treaty of Rome; 
- whereas respect for human dignity 
and the elimination of forms of racial 
discrimination  are  part  of the  com-
mon cultural and legal  heritage of all 
the Member States; 
- mindful  of the  positive  contribu-
tion  which  workers  who  have  their 
origins  in other Member States or in 
third  countries  have  made,  and  can 
continue to make, to the development 
of the  Member  State  in  which  they 
legally reside and of the resulting ben-
efits for the Community as  a whole, 
1.  vigorously  condemn  all  forms  of 
intolerance,  hostility and use  of force 
against  persons  or groups  of persons 
on the grounds of  racial, religious, cul-
tural,  social or national differences; 
2.  affirm  their  resolve  to  protect the 
individuality  and  dignity  of  every 
member of society  and to  reject  any 
form  of segregation of foreigners; 
3.  look upon  it as  indispensable  that 
all necessary steps be taken to guaran-
tee  that  this  joint  resolve  is  carried 
through; 
4.  are  determined  to  pursue  the  en-
deavours already made to  protect the 
individuality  and  dignity  of  every 
member of society  and  to  reject  any 
form  of segregation of foreigners; 
5.  stress  the  importance  of adequate 
and  objective  information  and  of 
making all  citizens aware of the dan-
gers  of racism  and  xenophobia,  and 
the need for  constant vigilance to en-
sure that all acts or forms of discrimi-
nation are  prevented or curbed". o 
NORTH-SOUTH 
Publicity campaign on 
North-South relations 
A  broad  European  publicity  cam-
paign  on  North-South  interdepen-
dence and solidarity will be organized 
jointly by  the Council of Europe (the 
21) and the European Community (the 
12) in 1988. 
The European organizing committee 
that  met  for  the  first  time  in  Stras-
bourg on 9 and 10  June suggests  that 
the  aim  of the  campaign  is  to  make 
the European public aware that the fu-
ture of Europe is intimately bound up 
with the future of the countries of the 
Third World. 
The idea is  to  make the sometimes 
complex concepts of North-South re-
lations more accessible  to  Europeans. 
The campaign will be run in the differ-
ent  countries  by  national  organizing 
committees in which non-governmen-
tal  organizations  will  probably  be  a 
driving force.  These committees are to 
be  set  up  in  the  21  countries  of the 
Council of Europe very shortly. 
In  1987,  there  will  be  a  major de-
bate on North-South relations  organ-
ized by  the European Parliament and 
this could be the political impetus the 
campaign needs. The debate will prob-
ably be  held in Strasbourg during the 
February  session  and will  be  accom-
panies by an exhibition and films and 
lectures  on  development.  The  10  to-
pics  to  be  covered in the debate are: 
- development and disarmament; 
- the debt problem of the developing 
countries; 
markets and trade; 
policy coordination; 
hunger-food strategies-prospects; 
food  aid reform; 
fisheries  cooperation; 
desertification; 
EEC-NGO cooperation; 
Community  policy  for  refugees 
from developing countries. o 
OCT ASSOCIATION 
TO THE COMMUNITY 
A new regulation on the association 
of the  OCT,  which  applies  until  28 
February  1990,  came  into force  on  1 
· July. 
It  is  very  similar  to  the  arrange-
ments  for  the  ACP  countries  under 
Lome III and is  based on three deci-
sions which the Council adopted on 30 
June. 
Areas of cooperation 
The texts adopted are a faithful  re-
flexion  of the  ideas  and  plan  of the 
Convention. They start by  listing and 
illustrating  the  various  areas  of coo-
peration  between  the  EEC  and  the 
OCT.  They are: 
- agricultural and rural development 
and the protection of  natural resources 
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problem of desertification in the ACP 
Group  are  not  included,  since  the 
OCT are not concerned); 
fisheries development; 
- industrial development; 
- development of mining  and ener-
gy; 
transport and communications; 
- regional cooperation; 
- cultural and social cooperation. 
The idea in these various fields is to 
take  account  of the  experience  ac-
quired in placing greater emphasis on 
closer  cooperation,  not just  between 
the  EEC  and the  OCT,  but between 
the OCT themselves. So there is syste-
matic reference  in the different areas 
of cooperation to reciprocal exchanges 
of information and the mutual possi-
bilities  of training  in  the  OCT  and 
ACPs.  The  integration  of these  two 
groups  of  countries,  territories  and 
States in regional  cooperation  is  also 
greater. 
Instruments of cooperation 
The  instruments  of  cooperation 
with the OCT are as  follows. 
A  system  of trade,  which,  as  before, 
offers more or less free access of OCT 
goods and is absolutely parallel to the 
system for products originating in the 
A  CPs. 
Rules of origin determinig which pro-
ducts are eligible for the trade system. 
These are all included in Lome III. 
There  is  a  special  system  for  rum 
and bananas. However, there is no re-
ference  to  sugar  this  time,  as  all  the 
OCT  sugar  producers,  who  used  to 
benefit  from  the  Protocol,  have  now 
become independent and joined Lome 
III. 
An  export  earnings  stabilization  sys-
tem  for  commodities  (Stabex)  and  a 
special  financing  facility  for  mining 
products  (Sysmin)  are  also  provided 
and  the  rules  are  similar  to  those 
which  Lome  III  lays  down  for  the 
A  CPs. 
Financial  and  technical  cooperation, 
for  which  the Council has earmarked 
ECU  120  million  (ECU  20  million 
from  the  EIB  and  ECU  100  million 
from  the 6th EDF).  The same princi-
ples as  Lome hold good here too,  al-
though this time there is the possibili-
ty of greater integration for the OCTs 
and  ACPs  in  Community-financed 
contracts.  The idea here is to make a 
better  response  to  the  development 
needs of both OCTs and A  CPs and so 
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it is  proposed that the ACPs can ten-
der  for  services,  works  and  supply 
contracts  in  projects  which  the  EDF 
finances in the OCTs. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the 
characteristics  of most  of the  OCTs 
and  with  experience,  provision  has 
been  made  for  the  OCTs - if an  ad 
hoc  financial  contribution  is  made 
from  the  resources  earmarked  for 
them - to benefit from the services of 
the CDI and the CT  A,  the joint ACP-
EEC institutions that have so far only 
helped the ACP Group. 
The Council decisions provide Bri-
tish,  French  and  Dutch  OCTs  with 
ECU 100 million (6th EDF) and ECU 
20  million  (EIB  loans  from  own  re-
sources).  ECU  15  million of the ECU 
100 million is risk capital, ECU 5 mil-
lion is for Sysmin and Stabex, ECU 4 
million  for  emergency  aid  and  ECU 
2.5  million for  interest rate subsidies. 
The programme resources  amount to 
ECU 73.5  million. 
The  amounts  are  broken  down  as 
follows:  French OCTs ECU 26.5  mil-
lion,  Dutch OCTs ECU  26.5  million, 
British  OCTs  ECU  10.5  million  and 
regional projects ECU  10.0 million. 
The  remainder  of the  sums  ear-
marked  for  the  OCTs  from  the  5th 
EDF Stabex  funds  is  ECU  3 742 944 
and it is being reallocated to the OCTs 
as  programme  monies,  as  follows : 
French  OCTs  ECU  1 100 000,  Dutch 
OCTs  ECU  1100 000  and  British 
OTCs ECU  1 542 944.  o 
NUCLEAR SAFETY 
Commission outlines action 
plan for  nuclear safety 
The disaster at the Chemobyl nucle-
ar reactor in the Soviet Union has em-
phasized how vital it is to take action 
at the international level to cope with 
nuclear  accidents.  The  aftermath  of 
the  accident  has  also  underlined  the 
necessity  for  an effective Community 
framework of legislation in the whole 
field of nuclear power, building on the 
existing  provisions  of  the  Euratom 
and EEC Treaties and introducing new 
measures  where  they  are  needed  to 
protect  the  people  and  the  environ-
ment of Europe. 
Until now,  the  individual  Member 
States of the European Community -
like all other countries throughout the 
world - have developed their nuclear 
industries on a mainly national basis. 
In a communication to the Council 
of Ministers,  the  Commission  pro-
poses  a  plan  of action  covering  five 
areas of policy : 
- protection of health; 
- safety  of nuclear  installations  and 
safety in use; 
- procedures  to  be  followed  in  the 
event of crisis; 
- new  measures  at the  international 
level; 
- research. 
Protection of health 
The  Commission  puts  the  highest 
priority  on  Community  measures  to 
ensure  the  protection  of  people's 
health  and  effective  controls  on  the 
safety  of nuclear  installations.  It has 
already  begun  an  enquiry  to  see 
whether the basic standards set under 
the  Euratom  Treaty  against  the  dan-
gers  of ionising  radiation  should  be 
revised.  These  standards  lay  down 
limits  of environmental  radiation  to 
safeguard the general public and work-
ers  in  the  nuclear  industry  and were 
last revised in 1984. 
Specific proposals will  be  to put to 
the Council before the end of Septem-
ber for establishing tolerance limits for 
radioactive  contamination  of  food-
stuffs.  Some  short-term  figures  have 
already  been  agreed  for  caesium  fol-
lowing Chemobyl, but these expire on 
30  September.  The  Commission  is 
seeking  a general  system  for  the long 
term. 
Safety of nuclear installations 
No Community rules currently exist 
for limiting radioactive emissions into 
air  and  water.  The  Commission  is 
considering  whether  emission  stan-
dards should be applied to nuclear in-
stallations  in  addition  to  basic  stan-
dards,  as  they are  already  for  certain 
types  of industry  and  certain  pollu-
tants. 
The safety criteria for nuclear plants 
vary  between  Member  States,  while 
national  markets  are  shut  off  from 
each other. However, it should be pos-
sible to a large extent to bring together 
the  safety  criteria  on  a  Community 
basis,  while  the  increasing concentra-
tion on  particular types  of reactor in 
Europe  should  make  it  feasible  to 
agree on common criteria for concep-
tion, construction and component de-
sign.  o Centre for the Development of Industry 
(ACP-EEC  Lome Convention) 
rue  de  l'lndustrie 28,  1040 Brussels,  Belgium 
Telephone:  (322)  5134100 (10  lines)  Telex:  61427cdib 
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ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1985 
YEAR OF CHANGE  AND ACHIEVEMENT FOR CDI 
The year 1985 was marked by the transi-
tion from the Lome II to the Lome Ill Con-
vention which led to a number of events 
of  considerable  significance  for  the 
future  of CDI.  Despite  the  uncertainty 
imposed  by the  transition  period,  CDI 
registered  a  slight  increase  in  the 
number of its interventions. The Annual 
Report  for  1985,  summarised  in  this 
article,  regrets  that  while  CDI's  role 
occupies a growing and  indispensable 
niche in the process of ACP-EEC indus-
trial cooperation, its financial capacity to 
extend the scope ofthis role is diminish-
ing. 
The  reconstitution  of CDI's  Directo-
rate for Lome Ill was put into effect from 
May 1985. In a reversal of roles, Dr.lsaac 
A. Akinrele (Nigeria) took over as Direc-
tor and  Mr.  Jens  Mosgard  (Denmark) 
became  Deputy Director.  Other events 
which followed during the transition to 
Lome Ill are: 
•  The  creation  of  a  Joint  Governing 
Board, with decision-making powers, to 
replace the former CDI  Advisory Coun-
cil; 
•  A new organisation chart (see illustra-
tion on page 2); 
•  New priorities for CDI,  including the 
rehabilitation of ACP industries, the pro-
cessing  of local  raw materials and the 
concentration  of  assistance  on  small 
and medium-sized industries; 
•  The addition to CDI's responsibilities, 
of assistance for the marketing of ACP 
manufactured products; 
•  A  new  working  method  with  its 
emphasis  on  planning  CDI's  interven-
tions rather than simply reacting to ad 
hoc requests for assistance- this plan-
ning is based on industrial potential sur-
veys  and  project verification  missions 
undertaken in every ACP country. 
The  Report comments on the grow-
ing  indebtedness of many ACP  States 
which continues to cripple efforts to pro-
mote new industrial investments. How-
ever, many ACP countries, have signific-
foreign capital  by revising their invest-
ment  codes.  For  instance,  some  ACP 
countries  now  make  it  possible  for 
foreign investors to repatriate their pro-
fits through retaining a portion of their 
export earnings.  The  Report adds that 
implementation of the innovative chap-
ter on  investment in  the Lome Ill  Con-
vention, should give a boost to ACP-EEC 
industrial cooperation. 
The important role the private sector 
can play in the industrial development of 
ACP States has been long recognised by 
the  Lome  Ill  Convention.  During  1985, 
CDI  brought into contact  no  less  than 
500 industrialists, investors, consultants 
and project promoters from the private 
sector.  In  the ensuing discussions, CDI 
played  a  mediative  and  confidence-
bridging role and lent its moral authority 
to joint venture agreements. 
PROJECTS IN PRODUCTION 
In 1985, there was a substantial rise in 
the  number of projects which  entered 
the  production  stage  (23  in  all,  com-
pared to 16 in 1984). Although some of 
these projects are relatively small-scale 
while others cannot be accurately quan-
tified, information at our disposal shows 
that they generated  investments total-
ling Ecu  5.9  million and  resulted in the 
creation of some 450 extra jobs. 
The cost of investment per job drop-
ped  from  Ecu  47,000  in  1984  to  Ecu 
13,000  in  1985.  This  is  indicative of a 
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swing  to  projects  which  are  more 
labour-intensive. 
The  following  projects entered  pro-
duction in 1985: 
•  Coffee  roasting and  packaging  plant 
(Burkina Faso) 
•  Biscuit factory (Burundi) 
•  Roofing tile plant (Burundi) 
•  Manufacture of pasta (Cape Verde) 
•  Manufacture  of sweets  and  snacks 
(Fiji) 
•  Meat processing plant (Ghana) 
•  Furniture  production  (Guinea  Con-
akry) 
•  Bicycle Manufacture (Ivory Coast) 
•  Soap Manufacture (Ivory Coast) 
•  Weaving Factory (Kenya) 
•  Repair  and  assembly  of  television 
sets (Mali) 
•  Manufacture of sandals (Mauritania) 
•  Small-scale  paper-making  plant 
(Mauritius) 
•  Biscuit production (Niger) 
•  Furniture production (Nigeria) 
•  Egg trays produced from waste paper 
(Senegal) 
•  Quarry expansion (Sudan) 
•  Bicycle manufacture (Togo) 
•  Sawmill and joinery (Togo) 
•  Tyre retreading (Vanuatu) 
•  Fibre-cement roofing tile plant (Van-
uatu) 
•  Honey processing (Western Samoa) 
•  Boatyard (Za'ire) 
Continued on page 2 Continued from page 1 
A  further  17  projects  entered  the 
implementation stage  during the year. 
More  details  on  all  projects  may  be 
found in the Annual Report. 
REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE 
The  rehabilitation of existing indus-
tries  occupies  a high  priority in  many 
ACP  States.  Productive  enterprises 
which  may  represent  substantial  past 
investments  can  decline  through 
changes  in  technology  or  markets  or, 
more frequently,  from  a  lack  of spare 
parts  and  inadequate  maintenance, 
leading  to  breakdowns  and  losses  of 
production. 
In such cases COl is able to give prac-
tical help towards the rehabilitation of a 
company, or its expansion and diversifi-
cation into new products. 
During  1985,  30  such  interventions 
were undertaken for an  estimated cost 
of  Ecu  403,000.  Twenty  one  of these 
interventions were diagnostic missions 
by experts to analyse the  problems of 
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particular industries; and the balance (9  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
interventions)  represents  implementa-
tions of the experts' recommendations. 
TRAINING ASSISTANCE 
A  record  number  of trainees  (321) 
benefitted from in-plant training assis-
tance during 1985,  an  increase of 11% 
over 1984. In all, CDI was able to respond 
to requests from 31  companies based in 
18 countries. 
As in  previous years, the number of 
requests  for  training  was  far  greater 
than the capacity of COl to respond. 
The  funds  committed  for  training 
assistance  in  1985  amounted  to  Ecu 
450,000.  This  figure  represented  an 
increase of 29% over 1984 but was still 
insufficient  to  meet  the  demand  for 
training. 
The  results  of  on-site  training  are 
often  seen  immediately.  For  example, 
the  production  of  envelopes  in  Zim-
babwe doubled as a result of work car-
ried out by two German technicians who 
trained 13 people. 
Where it is not practicable to train on-
site,  trainees are  sent to training  loca-
tions outside their own countries.  Dur-
ing 1985, 24 people spent periods rang-
ing from a few weeks to three months in 
a number of overseas training locations. 
OTHER ASSISTANCE 
•  Implementation  assistance.  This 
involves the  provision  of expertise  to 
move projects (new plants or improve-
ments to existing ones) into the produc-
tion  stage.  In  1985,  34  interventions 
were carried out under this heading. 
•  Feasibility  studies.  CDI  contributed 
50% of  the foreign exchange costs for 22 
feasibility studies in 1985. 
•  Adapted  technologies.  Under  its 
programme  for  the  promotion  and 
implementation of proven technologies 
suited to ACP conditions, COl handled 36 
projects  of which  3 went into produc-
tion. 
•  Information service. The demand for 
technical, marketing and other informa-
tion continued to grow and,  wherever 
possible, COl's response was tailored to 
enable projects to be implemented as a 
result of the information supplied. In all, 
369  substantive  enquiries  from  ACP 
States were dealt with in 1985. 
•  Promotion  meetings.  CDI  co-
organised meetings in France, and  Bel-
gium to promote investment in ACP pro-
jects. It likewise played an important role 
in  the first Industrial  Forum  of Central 
Africa (held in Libreville, Gabon) and the 
ACP-EEC  Conference  of  Chambers  of 
Commerce and  Industry (held  in  Thes-
saloniki, Greece). 
•  Joint  venture  promotion.  In  all,  70 
ACP  projects were promoted by COl  to 
find  EEC  joint venture partners and  17 
letters of intent were signed as a result. 
In addition, COl  publicised 54 proposals 
from EEC firms for joint venture produc-
tions in ACP countries. 
•  Travel assistance.  CDI contributed to 
the  travel  expenses  of  54  ACP 
entrepeneurs  and  3  prospective  EEC 
investors,  to  facilitate  the  promotion, 
creation  and  implementation of indus-
trial projects. 
ANTENNA ORGANISATIONS 
In  1985, COl  had antennae (field rep-
resentatives) in 62 ACP States. 
The  services  required  from  an 
antenna include the indentification and 
substantiation of new project proposals; 
the provision of information on projects 
presented  to  COl  for assistance;  pros-
pecting for local  entrepeneurs for pro-
ject proposals from EEC  investors; and 
assisting  COl  staff  in  organising  mis-
sions to the antenna's country. 
In  1985,  antennae  provided support 
for at least 60 interventions. 
Within the framework of COl's indus-
trial  promotion  attache  programme, 
senior officers from its antenna organi-
sations came to Brussels in 1985 to work 
for six weeks in COl's office. They came 
from Burundi, the Economic Commun-
ity  of  the  Great  Lakes,  (CEPGL), 
Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Lesotho, Niger, 
Rwanda and Za'lre.  During their periods 
with COl  they actively promoted a total 
of 40 projects. 
INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL SURVEYS 
In  1985,  CDI  undertook  industrial 
potential surveys of Botswana, Congo, 
Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Liberia,  Malawi  and 
Sudan in continuation of a programme 
initiated under Lome  II.  (All ACP coun-
tries  will  have  been  surveyed  by  July 
1986). 
The  most important aspect of these 
surveys  was  the  identification  of pro-
jects for COl's assistance. 
Seventeen  senior  staff  members 
undertook missions to 19 ACP countries 
in 1985. Mostofthesewereaimedatver-
ifying  data  concerning  projects  being 
considered  for  assistance.  Some  of 
these  projects were already in the CDI 
pipeline,  others were  identified during 
the industrial potential surveys. 
The full Annual Report for 1985, will 
be printed and available in August. 
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OFFERS FROM ACP ~PONSORS 
* EE 0~~ t_N :Q  WSTR$ 1AL PM\ RiriE R~SWAf\J ,:fEQ  • 
E  "ndustriaUsts are ·invited to contact COl, quotin  e refereoce number, in respoJlSe tp any offer,outlined in 
this s  ion. Ffd9iever, COl; will reply to enquiries on  I  ;  ,  ~C  indo  stria  lists  ~give brief  8escripti@lf! of  t~ekcurrent 
operations and are prepared to provide the kinds of cod'peration requested'6y  the ACP sponsors:,.  . . 
r  t  ~ 
BRASS CASTI(NGS 
ZJtMBIA  w  ~  • 
A  private company manufacuturing aluminium holloware 
and  enamelware~ ··wishes  to·diversify into the production of 
s~ti~~,  rounds.  and pipes j~,coppet and copper alloys, f 
various*  fndustri~t applications. This project would use  loc~ 
ally avStilable supplies of  copper and zinc. The capacity envis· 
age~  is 1,300 tpn,D.es a year. 
,An ~e~~  tech,ri'tal partnEtr~:.requiredJo  provid~ , '8,ccess . 
workJ a: e~port  mark~ts, to help arrange tfle necess~ry  cred1ts 
for the purchase of plant and equipment in additionJ prefera-
bly, to~~pplying  equipment and training an engineer. 
w  ~  ••  . 
SACKS FROM WASTE PAPER 
MABP.GA~CAR  662.MAD.3.CHE7' 
!J:  i  ~·'#t  T  .  ·•.·  .  ••,.  ..~ 
Tne  Malagasy  developm'ent  bank; "'the  Fonds  National" 
d'lr}vestissement lFNI), is promoting a projectforthe  produc~ 
tion.,tr.qm wast~ , paper of:  .  ,. +t 
•  9,t0~0  tonnes*a&Ye~~of  k;raft paper aqd'  ,  & ::. 
•  J6 r;nmion heavy duty paper sacks ,~fma1nly fariflackagin· 
cement). 
.  A ~asibility study for this·project js currently being com"' 
P letlS'~+. w  ·.·· ..  · ·  . ···~••  .  ..··  ,,  ·~.  J  .  • ..  '·  .  :%/& 
M:  ~ '~#':  ,;<;.:.':':@:;~ _  ,  ,  ____  4,  --~  w::~'-\,  (,':~·;'@-~,  ~--~\-·* , .  ,  _  >.§:f{t 
.  Th~ lllpromoters .*are  seeki~g"an eec partner~  . .  can prO'-*" 
Vide second-hand equipment, assist wjththe elaboFation Of 
the project, take a~Share  of  th,e equity and help to obtain credit. 
facilt.  .  . •  .  . .  .  ...  ,  .  .  ....•....  ~·.···  . 
TH  roject'lf,Uf be  impl~mented iL1 ·cooperatfrJn  with a 
firm based on the .French island of Reunion. This firm wiU . 
$ 
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. CHAR~OAL BR. IOUETTES,  FROM  VEGETABLE 
M WASJE 
MADAGASCAR  *'.&62.MAD~4.TIM. 
The  Malagasy. development  bank,  the  Fonds  National 
~'lnvesti~sement  '(~NIJ, is p~~.moting  a project  fort~.~ annual 
,  production of  6,600 tonnes'avear of  charcoal briquettes from'' 
vegetable waste. The output would be for ~ househOld use in 
the capital, Antananarivo. 
Th'e 'tqc· al  proje~t  s~onsor,~,incluatn-g •iiNI, wiH  c~ntribute 
60% of  the equity. An EECte~n* ~ical partner.  is reqtJrr~tfforthe 
elaboration and implementation of  the project and to assist 
, in  completing the financial  package.  This project may be 
HQk~d,tql~e  follo'tving one (660.MAD.5  .. . 1  ).  •  . 
CHARCOAL FROM WOOD. 
li  w: 
MADJfSASeA.R  :r6§2.MAQ.5.TIM.  .  * 
The *Malagasy·  development  bank,  the  Fonds  National 
d'lnvestjssement (fNI), is pro.motlng,a project to sup~y  the 
tJomfJ~~ic .  q;J  ..  ~rke~,:'fHh ·  20,69,, ton'l~s .a year  of charcoaJ 
deriveq from woop. (for 198q~the  chaicoal~hee,Ps ot  the cap-' 
ital, Antananarivo,>alone amount to 97,000 tonnes.  "' 
An  EEC  partner  is  required  for  the  elaboration  and 
·implemept~tion of the praiecta~p to as~lst in obtcining the 
necessa(y export•  credits for plaotand e~I!J!pment. Jllis pro-
ject may be linked to the preceding one (660.MAD.4.TIM). Ghana:  recent measures promise improved 
investment climate 
Ghana boasts a wealth of mineral and 
other  exploitable  natural  resources,  a 
well-educated  and  "amazingly cheap" 
labour force, a sizeable domestic market 
for industrial products and a reasonably 
developed infrastructural base- roads, 
railways  and  ports  - according  to  an 
industrial survey of the country which 
has been  carried out by COl-sponsored 
consultants. 
While acknowledging that during the 
past decade the economy suffered from 
a  shortage  of foreign  exchange,  high 
inflation,  social  unrest,  underemploy-
ment of labour and industrial capacities, 
as well as a high degree of government 
regulation, the report maintains that the 
economic  recovery  programme 
launched  in  1984 - "backed  by  heavy 
international financial assistance"-can 
go a long way towards eliminating these 
development constraints. 
"The  programme  is  linked  with the 
introduction  of an  equilibrated  official 
parity of the Cedi  that should progres-
sively ease the shortage of foreign cur-
rency*  and  the  publication  of  a  new 
investment code which will contribute to 
the  creation  of a relatively favourable 
investment climate for foreign capital." 
FISCAL INCENTIVES 
The  analysis  points  out  that  the 
investment code "sets a clear priority for 
export-oriented  industries  and  indus-
tries  based  on  local  raw  materials." 
Moreover, Article 14-which for the first 
time officially gives companies the right 
to  dispose  of  their  foreign  exchange 
earnings- "has setthe signal for a better 
investment  climate  and  removes  the 
strongest  impediments  to  industrial 
development." 
Other incentives offered by the code 
include  import  duty  exemptions  and 
corporate  tax  concessions  for  firms 
located outside the Accra-Tema area.  It 
also contains a specific statement to the 
effect that investors shall not be exprop-
riated.  In  a  significant  break  with  the 
past,  a  majority equity stake  need  no 
longer be retained by local interest in the 
case of most industries. The survey con-
cludes:  "As excellent  business  oppor-
tunities do exist in  Ghana,  foreign  pri-
vate  capital  will  certainly  be  again 
attracted to this country." 
PRIORTY AREAS 
While regretting the "lack of a consis-
tent industrial  policy", the survey out-
lines  the  priority  areas  for  industrial 
development  contained  in  the  1984 
recovery  programme:  manufacturing 
for export; industries that process local 
raw  materials;  industries that produce 
agricultural  equipment,  machinery, 
spare parts and machine tools. 
Priority areas are those for which tax 
incentives  may  be  granted  and  which 
will  have  pnonty  in  the  allocation  of 
foreign exchange. 
On  the  basis  of  this  and  having 
selected the sectors in which profitable 
business  opportunities  are  likely  to 
exist,  the  report  lists  production 
activities  "which  appear  particularly 
recommendable": 
•  finished  or semi-finished wood pro-
ducts 
•  charcoal briquettes 
•  fishing,  preparation  and  freezing  or 
canning of tuna fish 
•  small-scale brick production 
•  gold and diamond mining 
Also recommended, are manufactur-
ing activities based on minerals and fine 
woods. These raw materials are not for 
export. The intention is that they should 
be processed locally. 
CONDITIONS FOR VIABILITY 
The  survey  maintains  that  most of 
these  activities  will  be  viable  only  if: 
local  raw  materials are  used  and  they 
generate  considerable  value-added; 
they are competitive when compared to 
conditions elsewhere; they require little 
foreign currency investment and simple 
technologies;  they  are  either  export-
oriented or help fill  an  obvious supply 
gap  in  the  domestic  market,  thereby 
earning or saving foreign exchange. 
It points out that projects in the field 
of fish processing, processing of agricul-
tural products, timber and pharmaceuti-
cals will be  open to joint ventures with 
European partners. 
* When  the  survey  was  drafted (July 
1985) the US dollar was equivalent to 53 
Cedis. At  the time of  writing, it is equiva-
lent to 90 Cedis. 
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Mauritania is facing  many problems 
with its new phenomenon of industrial 
development. Not the least of its prob-
lems  is  the  restrictive  size  of the  local 
market. However, the country can count 
upon its enormous fishing potential and 
its numerous mineral resources, accord-
ing to a survey of Mauritania's industrial 
potential carried out for CDI  by Belgian 
consultants. 
Nouakchott,  the  capital,  is  teeming 
with  industrial  projects.  The  National 
Investments Commission (Commission 
Nationale des lnvestissements) is inun-
dated with projects for Nouakchott rang-
ing  from the establishment of a metal 
packaging  plant  to the  semi-industrial 
production of hollow glass. 
This recent dynamism is the result of 
the efforts of the Mauritanian business 
community to  launch  its  export  drive 
from a sound base in the local market. It 
is also the result of  various tax and finan-
cial  benefits  granted  in  1979.  This 
dynamism  enabled  the  industrial  sec-
tor's share  of the  gross domestic pro-
duct  to  grow in  the  years  preceeding 
COl's survey, although it is still modest 
(6.3% in 1982). 
ENCOURAGEMENT FOR INVESTORS 
Industrialisation  is  a  fairly  recent 
phenomenon in Mauritania. Indeed, the 
first industrial plants were set up in only 
1969. At first, larger scale projects were 
favoured (e.g. the Nouadhibou oil refin-
ery,  a sugar  refinery,  a mini electrical 
steelworks),  but  these  turned  out  -
financially speaking -to be bottomless 
pits. Since 1981, therefore, the govern-
ment  has  placed  more  emphasis  on 
developing  small  and  medium-sized 
industries (SMis). 
These  now  have  access  to  credit 
facilities through the National Develop-
ment  Fund  (Fonds  National  de  Devel-
oppement - FND)  and  the Mauritanian 
Bank  for  Credit  and  Development 
(BMDC). Both organisations, apart from 
financing projects, play a major role in 
industrial promotion and in undertaking 
feasibility studies. The  FND,  in  particu-
lar,  employs  an  extremely  competent 
team of economists and financial advis-
ers. 
In  1984,  when  the  CDI  survey  was 
being conducted, the government was 
considering the establishment of a third 
organisation  (SEPIM)  to  be  called  the 
Industrial  Study  and  Promotion  Com-
pany,  specifically  to  assist  small  to 
medium-sized industries. 
The benefits granted under the 1979 
Investment Code  to  both  national  and 
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foreign enterprises are far from negligi-
ble.  For  modest  projects  with  invest-
ments above 10 million ouguiya*, it pro-
vides for exemption from customs duty 
on  imports of up  to 3 years for equip-
ment and 7 to 12 years for raw materials 
and  spare  parts.  It  also  allows  for 
exemptions from export duties and from 
income tax (on profits) for 3 to 5 years. 
The larger projects with investments 
above 200 million ouguiya, benefit from 
a fixed rate of income tax for 20 years, or 
a concessionary "setting-up contract". 
These  concessions are  granted only 
to  projects  approved  by  the  National 
Investments  Commission.  Obtaining 
approval  is  a  process  which  takes  at 
least  6  months  (and  up  to  2  years  in 
some cases). 
The Investment Code singles out the 
following as  priority areas:  agro-indus-
try, fisheries and related sectors, energy 
and water supply projects, production of 
the main consumer items, construction 
(low-cost housing) and tourism. 
RESOURCES CERTAINLY ... 
Fishing  could  constitute  a  major 
plank for development, provided that a 
consistent  policy  be  introduced. 
Mauritania  possesses  great  fishing 
potential which is still largely untapped 
-except by foreign fishing vessels. 
Its  shores  are  capable  of  yielding 
annually about 1.3 to 1.5 million tons of 
fish, shellfish and molluscs; but the total 
catch of the small-scale local fishermen 
is  only  35,000  tons,  while that  of the 
more industrial national fishing fleet is 
merely 40,000 tons (1983 figures). 
Since  1980  the  Mauritanian 
authorities have made efforts to develop 
the  latter, as  well as  the national ship-
building industry (i.e. the shipyard pro-
ject  at  the  important  port  of 
*73.43 ouguiya (UM) =  1  Ecu 
Nouadhibou).  They  have  also  been 
attempting to improve the  inadequate 
fish processing infrastructure. 
However, there are many obstacles to 
be  overcome,  such  as  the  isolation  of 
Nouadhibou  port  from  the  rest  of the 
country (as well as from the outside world 
through  inadequate  telecommunica-
tions), the high cost of air freight, lack of 
technical  and  management  know-how 
and a shortage of bank credit facilities. 
The country's other major resource is 
unquestionably  its  mineral  deposits  -
iron, copper, gypsum, limestone, sand, 
clay,  phosphate,  and  perhaps  oil  (re-
search is under way). The iron deposits 
have been mined for a long time and the 
new deposits  at  Guelbs  represent 386 
million tons of reserves. Copper mining 
at the Akjoujt mine should recommence 
in 1987/88. Studies are being carried out 
on  the  possibilities  of  exploiting  the 
huge deposits of phosphate (100- 120 
million tons) in the Senegal river region. 
From these materials, glass and fer-
tilizers can  be made. But, in order to be 
worthwhile,  the  manufacture  of such 
products must cater for regional needs, 
given the restrictive size of the Maurita-
nian  national  market.  For  example,  a 
glass factory needs to produce at  least 
3,000 tons a year to be able to cover run-
ning  costs  (about  4  million  Ecu),  yet 
Mauritania  imported  only 250  tons  of 
glassware in 1982. 
... BUT A LIMITED MARKET 
The local market is restricted as much 
by the small number of consumers (out 
of a population  of 1.7  million inhabit-
ants, only 500,000 can afford to buy con-
sumer  goods),  as  by  low purchasing 
power. These factors constitute a major 
stumbling block to the country's indus-
trial growth. 
Furthermore, a scattered population 
and  poor  communications  mean  that 
markets  are  small  and  isolated.  The 
biggest  market  is  Nouakchott  with 
300,000 inhabitants (compared to only 
10,000 in 1962!). 
Other constraints aggravate the situ-
ation: the high cost of industrial sites in 
Nouakchott (the creation of an industrial 
zone is being considered), the high cost 
of linking  up  with electricity grids and 
water supply systems, the slowness of 
administrative  procedures,  a  shortage 
of qualified manpower and a weak bank-
ing sector. 
The lack of savings by clients means 
commercial  banks  rarely  grant  loans; 
but here too, reforms were under con-
Continued on page 6 Continued from page 5 
sideration when the  survey was  being 
undertaken, in 1984. 
On  top of all this, the over-valuation 
of  the  ouguiya  makes  it  difficult  for 
Mauritanian industries to compete com-
petitively with imported products. 
However,  despite  this  rather 
unfavourable  economic  climate, 
Mauritania has had some industrial suc-
cesses  e.g.  mineral water manufacture 
(SOMEP),  confectionary  production 
(COGITREM),  and  a  mechanical  work-
shop.  The  quasi-monopoly granted  to 
these new industries had a lot to do with 
their success. Such successes have been 
achieved  despite  the  occasional 
attempts of importers to sabotage new 
industries, by  hoarding up  stocks with 
which they flood the market once local 
production begins. 
In  short,  Mauritania's  industrial 
potential  depends  primarily  on  the 
exploitation  of its  fishing  and  mineral 
resources;  and  industrial  production 
must necessarily be integrated into reg-
ional marketing arrangements. 
c  PROVISIONAL  COUNTRY  PROGRAMMES  FOR  LOME  Ill 
Here we list most of the projects in the provisional programmes already agreed for 
CDI's initial assistance to Ghana and Mauritania. These projects are based on the 
industrial potential surveys and project verification missions which have been 
undertaken in both countries. 
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ACP ENTREPENEURS, PLEASE REPLY  . 
c~~~~are~j~~i~=~~:a~!lrs~7~n ·~:JP~~l.l~t~e~~~i~~::~r~1~=~~~~~~~~~JQ1~~r~;::lrg~~~il~~~~ ·~~~i~  IR~~~~~Cti~Q~ ·;  ·~:] I 
ACP e11trepeneurs interested in any pr(tpo~sal are~Jn,vit•~d 1to  "'•••+.i~:t> +·,. ·· 
CDf~iU  not be in a  .. position to act ~pon  letters  recteiV .E~a Ulllle~;s . ~,~~ 
reque~ted  in the.box at th~  ~Ott()m  pJthe.page; It  ~ot,.l .lcl ~1 .l$d  beu$-~fl.ll 
including the latest  balance sheet. 
Please ALWAYS mention thf! (;DI reference numbers when reoJrOdi'JCiri,fJ 
All equipment costs are quoted in Ecu(European cur,rem~v  Ltnm,YJt'Je 
otherEuropean currencies. Thus, on 2.JuneJ986: 1  Ecu=  £0.628:336tfFI~6.~~67~t3: · JDM 
AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 
FRENCH PROPOSAL 
A French manufacturer wishest() setupprod~ction  o!  ~ircoh"' 
ditioners of the window or  split-systemtype,unde ~ jointven " 
ture, franchising or licencing arrangements, in ACPcountries. 
The company.isalready involved.in manufacturing such pro~ 
ducts ih West and Central Africa~ 
The minimum production  capacity depends on the extent 
of thep.r?tection allowed by fiscal and. excise measures. How-
ever, it  would·  not  be less.than 2,0QO .  .andshoufdideally.be a. s 
high as 4,000 to 5,000 units ayear. 
The investment  in equipment required for assembly operaJ 
tions alone, would amount to around  Ecu 440,0Qp . .!his figure 
wouldriseto about Ecu 800,000 ifasheet metal works were to 
be integrated into the plant. 
MANUFACTURE OF SPRINKLING IRRIGATION EQUIPMENT .. 
GREEK OFFER 
A  leading  Greek metallurgical  company  is  interested in 
manufacturing  sprinkling  irrigation. equipment under joint 
venture agreements with ACP partner§. The  product; using 
quick,.cpupling galvanised steel  pipes, can be  used in many 
types of cultivation, even by unskilled farmers. 
The minimum plant capacity for  the production of quick~ 
coupling  pipes ·(70mm  indiameter)  \Nould  be J,5  milliq(1 
metres a year, foran investment in newequipmentof abo.ut 
Ecu 1.12 million. 
Such a plant operating one shift would require 2,450 tons of 
steel strips and 4  {5  tons of zinc, per year. 
The Greek company, in addition to its equity contribution; 
can provide plant, training and assistance with export market-
ing. It is experienced in the installation of turn.:key plants and 
its proqi..Jcts have been expor;te(j for twenty years to North 
can and Middle Eastern countries. 
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CALL TO EEC 
INDUSTRIALISTS 
Use your production know-how to expand 
via an ACP country. 
Let CD/ promote your production 
prof"osals. 
CDI encourages EEC firms to come forward with 
proposals for setting up production in any of  66 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
CDI can promote suitable proposals from EEC countries, 
free of  charge, through its many lines of communication 
to the ACP business world. This can have the following 
advantages for EEC companies: 
•Entry to new markets, which may otherwise be closed 
to them. 
•  Access to local sources of raw materials. 
•  Relocation of labour-intensive operations and/or 
existing plant to ACP country. 
•  Access to additional financial plus fiscal and other 
incentives, through an ACP partner. 
The investment required of EEC firms in such joint 
ventures can be low in relation to the overall financial 
input. An EEC firm may also include good second hand 
equipment as a contribution to the overall investment. 
EEC companies who want CDI to promote their 
proposals should, ideally, be small or medium-sized. 
They should be willing to take a minor share of the 
equity in a joint venturewith an ACP partner, or to enter 
into franchising or licencing arrangements. 
REQUEST A PRODUCTION PROPOSAL FORM 
FROMCDI NOW CONSULTANTS AND THE CDI 
by Jean-Marie Delchambre, Adviser in COl's Industrial Operations Division
1 
COl  aims to further the development of 
viable industrial enterprises within ACP 
countries.  In  pursuit  of this  goal,  COl 
works  with  industrialists  rather  than 
consultants. Nevertheless, as this article 
will show, consultants can still forge an 
active and effective role for themselves 
in the Centre's activities. 
Experience has  proved that creating 
an  enterprise  requires  more than  just 
setting  up or restoring a plant.  Further 
services such as management and mar-
keting, knowledge of raw materials, etc., 
are vitally required. These are services 
that consultants or machinery suppliers 
do not necessarily provide, but which a 
European  industrialist is  likely to bring 
automatically to an ACP project in which 
he invests as a joint venture partner. 
For this reason, the Third Lome Con-
vention  places  particular emphasis on 
the encouragement of joint enterprises 
or "joint ventures" between ACP prom-
oters and EEC industrialists. 
The co-financing of  feasibility studies 
is one form of assistance which COl pro-
vides to facilitate  the  creation  of joint 
ventures. For this reason many consul-
tants register with COl  in the hope that 
they  will  be  asked  to  undertake  such 
studies 
2
• 
Unfortunately, we often have to dis-
appoint  them  because  relatively  few 
studies  are  contracted  out  directly  to 
consultants;  and  the  awarding of con-
tracts for studies is always subject to a 
tendering procedure. 
CONSULTANTS AND FEASIBILITY 
STUDIES 
COl  very  rarely  awards contracts to 
independent  engineering  consultants 
for wide-ranging studies to examine var-
ious alternatives, prior to the establish-
ment  of  sizeable  industrial  projects. 
Such  studies  are  usually  too  costly, 
given the limitations of COl's budget. 
Generally,  COl  prefers to co-finance 
feasibility studies undertaken by indus-
trialists themselves.  Such  studies  help 
potential European partners to take deci-
sions  regarding  joint  venture  invest-
ments in  ACP  countries. They are  also 
used  to  substantiate  submissions  to 
financial institutions, for project funding. 
Where the industrialist undertaking a 
study is  also a machinery supplier, COl 
offers the ACP partner an evaluation by 
an  impartial  expert  of the  equipment 
proposed  in  the  study.  COl  does,  of 
course,  rely  upon  specialised  consul-
tants for such expertise. 
EEC industrialists who approach COl, 
represent  for  the  most  part  small  to 
Jean-Marie Delchambre 
medium-sized  industries  (SMI's);  and 
although  these  industrialists  may  be 
perfectly  conversant  with  their 
technologies,  they  are  not  necessarily 
well-equipped  to  compile  a  complete 
feasibility study. For this purpose, they 
may call  upon consultants of their own 
choice. 
However,  the  financial  contribution 
granted by COl  for feasibility studies, is 
paid  directly  to  the  European  indus-
trialist who will pass it on, as he sees fit, 
to any consultant whom he employs. It is 
therefore apparent that COl awards very 
few  contracts  for  feasibility  studies 
directly to consultants. 
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS 
However, it must be pointed out that 
COl  does call upon the services of con-
sultants for special assignments. These 
include: 
•  identifying  industrial  projects  and 
promoters in ACP countries; 
•  identifying potential European indus-
trial partners for specific projects; 
•  providing  independent assessments 
of second-hand equipment; 
•  training ACP industrial operators; 
•  undertaking  diagnostic  studies  of 
ACP factories; 
•  providing short-term technical know-
how to ACP industrial enterprises. 
Moreover,  there  are  other ways  in 
which  dynamic consultants can  play a 
valuable  self-generated  role  in  COl's 
operations. Let us  look now at some of 
these. 
CONSULTANTS AND THE EUROPEAN 
INDUSTRIALIST 
In Europe, consultants may have con-
tacts  with  industrialists  whose 
technologies are perfectly suited to ACP 
countries.  But these  industrialists may 
not have any lines of communication to 
ACP  promoters in  search  of such tech-
nologies. They may also, in  some cases, 
require some encouragement before they 
will consider becoming involved in indus-
trial cooperation with ACP countries. 
Consultants  may  therefore  play  a 
positive role in COl's operations by iden-
tifying  European  industrialists  whose 
technologies  are  appropriate  to  ACP 
countries  and  by  persuading  them  to 
participate in ACP projects. Consultants 
are  invited  to  introduce  such  indus-
trialists to COl. 
In  such  cases,  COl  will  respond  by 
ciculating suitable technologies through-
out the industrial and business milieux of 
all66 ACP countries. 
In  the  event  of  a  positive  response 
from a suitable ACP promoter, the consul-
tant who started the  process  rolling will 
have a good chance of being retained by 
the European  industrialist as  an  adviser. 
He  could, for instance,  be  asked  to  col-
laborate with the industrialist in undertak-
ing any eventual feasibility study. 
CONSULTANTS AND THE ACP 
PROMOTER 
Many consultants (both European and 
ACP)  travel  regularly  to  ACP  countries 
where  they  meet  countless  promoters 
with whom they may elaborate good pro-
ject  ideas.  They  could offer a service to 
these  promoters in  presenting their pro-
jects to COl. 
They could simultaneously sound out 
potential European industrial partners to 
see whether they would have any interest 
in the projects. COl may also undertake or 
share this activity. 
Once  again,  consultants  who  lend 
impetus to such ACP projects may have a 
good chance ofbeing_retained in an advis-
ory capacity  by  the  future  partners  and 
may  be asked to participate in feasibility 
studies. 
Therfore, although COl  can  offer very 
few  contracts  directly to  consultants,  it 
does nevertheless warmly welcome con-
sultants who come to it with industrialists 
and  promoters  interested  in  ACP-EEC 
industrial cooperation. 
Finally, it may be worthwhile to recall 
that  COl  is  always  prepared  to act  as  a 
neutral mediator at any stage of an indus-
trial  project  involving  ACP  and  EEC 
partners. 
1 Jean-Marie Delchambre, is a Technical Adviser in COl's Industrial 
Operations Division. He deals with feasibility studies, rehabilitation 
diagnoses and in-plant training. 
2  Forms are available, upon request, to those consultants wishing 
to register with the CD I. 
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EEC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC  devel-
opment schemes prior to their implementation. It is  set out as  follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is  divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy : 
- the  ACP  countries  (Africa,  the  Caribbean 
and  the  Pacific),  which  signed  the  multilateral 
conventions  of  Lome  I  (28  February  1975), 
Lome II  (31  October 1979) and  Lome Ill  (8  De-
cember  1984),  plus  the  OCT  (overseas  coun-
tries and territories) of certain member states of 
the EEC,  which get the same type of aid as  the 
ACP  countries; 
- the  Mediterranean  countries  (Maghreb  and 
Mashraq),  which  signed  cooperation  agree-
ments with the EEC  in  1976 and  1977; 
- the  non-associated  developing  countries  of 
Asia  and  Latin  America,  beneficiaries  since 
1976 of annual  aid  programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given  by  recipient  country  (in  alphabetical  or-
der). 
Note 
As the  information provided is  subject to 
modification  in  line  with  the  development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid  down by the au-
thorities  empowered  to take  financial  deci-
sions,  the  EEC  is  in  no  way bound  by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be  given for 
each development scheme : 
the title of the project; 
- the administrative body responsible for it; 
- the estimated sum  involved (prior to financ-
ing  decision)  or  the  amount  actually  provided 
(post financing decision); 
- a  brief  description  of  projects  envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, tech-
nical assistance, etc.); 
- any methods of implementation (internation-
al  invitations to tender, for example); 
- the stage the project has reached (identifica-
tion, appraisal, submission for financing, financ-
ing  decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp.  Auth.: Responsible  Authority 
Int.  tender:  International invitation to tender 
Ace.  tender:  Invitation  to tender  (acceler-
ated procedure) 
Restr.  tender: Restricted invitation to tender 
T A : Technical assistance 
EDF : European Development Fund 
mECU : Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to : 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
(ARCH.25/1-2) 
200, rue de Ia  Loi 
B-1 049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
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Irrigation  and  soil  development,  infras-
tructures, improvement 
Coffee,  tea,  tobacco,  cereals,  coconuts, 
ground-nut,  maize,  sugar,  cotton,  palm-
nuts, rice,  rubber, potatoes, citrus fruit 
Seed  and  crop protection, environment 
Agro-industry 
Forestry 
STOCK  FARMING-
FISH! NG-PISCICUL  TURE 
Improvement 
Veterinary projects 
Processing industry 
RURAL HYDRAULICS 
Wells, bores, pumps, pipes, small dams 
TOWN WATER  SUPPLY 
AND SEWERAGE 
Sectoral Index 
Burundi, Cameroun, Chad, COte d'lvoire, Ghana, Guinea,  Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, India, Bhutan, Mozambi-
que, Thailand, Pakistan, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,  Ecuador, Colombia, Peru,  Bolivia, Hunduras 
Equatorial  Guinea,  Ghana,  Jamaica,  Malawi,  P.N.G.,  Rwanda,  Solomon  Islands,  Somalia,  Suriname,  Zimbabwe, 
CILSS,  Tunisia, Bangladesh, Thailand, China  (People's Rep.) 
Botswana, Burundi, Mali, Rwanda,  Somalia, Tanzania,  Niger Basin  Authority, CILSS,  Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Ban-
gladesh, Nepal, China  (People's Rep.),  Yemen, Panama.  Costa Rica.  Honduras. El  Salvador, Guatemala 
Liberia, Rwanda, Solomon Islands. Togo, Zambia, Thailand 
Burundi, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Togo, New Caledonia, Niger Basin  Authority 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Botswana.  Burkina  Faso,  Central  African  Rep.,  Comoros,  COte  d'lvoire,  Djibouti,  Ghana. 
Kiribati, Jamaica. Malawi, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Trinidad and Tobago, Somalia, Zaire, Congo, Gabon, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Equatorial Guinea.  Angola, Indian Ocean ACP  Countries 
Kenya,  Zambia, Suriname.  African Countries. Eastern  Africa,  ICIPE.  Malawi-Zambia-Zimbabwe, Egypt,  Mozambi-
que 
Guinea. Tonga, Neth. Antilles. French Polynesia, Angola 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Lesotho, Liberia, Senegal. Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Montserrat. Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Bhutan. China  (People's Rep.) 
Water supply, pipes, drinking water  Djibouti, Tanzania,  Zimbabwe 
Sewerage,  waste  water,  collectors,  Cyprus 
pumping stations, treatment 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
Houses,  schools,  hospitals,  buildings, 
laboratories 
TRANSPORTS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Roads,  bridges, airports, railways, ports 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Radio,  telephone, satellites, hertzian 
ENERGY 
Power stations, dams, electrification 
NEW AND  RENEWABLE  ENERGY 
Belize. Benin, Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Falkland Islands, CEAO, Maritime Transport Confer-
ence, UDEAC, MRU,  Eastern  Africa, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Colombia, Mexico, Nepal 
Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Chad,  Dominica,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ghana,  Grenada,  Liberia,  Malawi,  Mozambique, 
P.N.G .• Somalia, Suriname, Tanzania, Tonga, Uganda, Zambia, Zaire, Guyana-Suriname, Niger-Nigeria, Eastern Afri-
can Countries, Pakistan, Pacific ACP Countries. Tanzania-Zambia 
UAPT, Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea,  Ethiopia, Mauritania, P.N.G., Somalia, Suriname, Zaire,  Zambia, O.M.V.G. 
Solar, wind-wills, biomass, gas, geother- Guinea, Senegal. Suriname. Pacific OCT 
mics 
MINING 
Soil  survey,  research,  geophysical  sur- Botswana. Nigeria 
vey, 
Infrastructure,  production,  processing  Ghana.  Rwanda,  Zaire.  Zambia 
plants 
MAPPING 
Soil-Air 
INDUSTRY 
Plants, productions 
TRADE,  INDUSTRY,  TOURISM,  IN-
VESTMENT  PROMOTION  - MAN-
AGEMENT  - MARKETING  - S.M.E. 
TRAINING 
II  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY 
Guinea,  Malawi 
Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda. Somalia, Sierra Leone, St. 
Lucia, Swaziland. Trinidad and Tobago. Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, Botswana-Swaziland, Neth. Antilles. Pacific ACP 
Countries. Algeria. Tunisia, Banco Centro-Americano. Andean Pact  .• China (People's Rep.), Thailand, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador PABLI - Blue page informatics 
Direct access to the blue pages via on-line terminal or telex 
M. A. BOLDRIN 
As from January 1986 the blue pages will be 
on  computer and available either directly via a 
terminal or micro-computer. 
In addition they will be available by telex. 
The subscription to PABLI  is temporarily free 
of charge. 
.. Data base Section" - B9/69 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
200, rue de Ia  Loi 
To  obtain  further  information  for  access  to 
PABLI  please  write,  specifying  the  option 
chosen (terminal or telex) to: 
1  049 Brussels 
Belgium 
~"CP STATES  * Denotes new projects 
AN430LA 
Assistance to the fishing and fish-pro-
ces:sing industry in the Namibe Province. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministerio  das  Pescas.  EEC 
4.2!50 MECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
Project in  execution. 
ALA ANG  8415  A3d 
Rural Water supply. Resp.  Auth.: Minis-
tare  de  l'lndustrie et des  Ressources  Natu-
relle·s.  HYDROMINA.  Parallel  cofinancing 
with UNICEF.  EEC contribution 2.250 mECU. 
Study,  T.A.  and  supply  of  hand-pumps, 
tubE1s, drilling equipment, vehicles. Project in 
execution. 
ALA ANG  8425  A2b 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Livestock  development  - Phase  I. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of  Agriculture.  Esti-
mated  cost  1.8  mEGU.  Works,  supplies, 
T.A. T.A.: Darudec (OK).  Project on apprais-
al.  Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd 
half 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  AB 5003  A3a 
BEL.IZE 
B~elize  College  of  Arts,  Science  and 
Technology (BELCAsn. Resp.  Auth.: Min-
istry of Education.  Estimated  cost 7 mECU. 
Works and supplies. T.A. for tender dossier 
and  plans: short-list already drawn up.  Pro-
ject on appraisal. 4th and  5th EDF. 
EDF  BEL -5001  A6b 
BE~UN 
Upgrading of health service infrastruc-
turE!  in Porto Novo Hospital. Resp.  Auth.: 
Miniistere  de  Ia  Sante  Publique.  Estimated 
cost 10 mECU : renovation and construction 
of the hospital building and equipment. Pro-
ject on  appraisal.  Works :  Int.  tender  with 
prequalification,  launched  (conditional)  in 
Aug1ust  84. 4th and  5th EDF. 
EDF  BEN  5010  A7a 
Parakou  polytechnical  complex.  Resp. 
Auth. : Ministere de  I'Enseignement Moyen, 
General,  Technique  et  Professionnel.  Total 
estimated  cost  6.9 mECU.  Construction  of 
8 000 m2  of pedagogical and  administrative 
buildings  and  hostels.  Supplies  and  equip-
ment.  Technical  and  architectural  study : 
Arch.  VINOU  (Local).  Project  on  appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 
86. 4th EDF. 
EDF  BEN  40  11  A6b 
Support to the Abomey Hospital. Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministere  de  Ia  Sante  Publique.  1.5 
mECU. Supply of equipment and furniture by 
int. tender launched in  April 86 (conditional). 
Date financing  decision June 86. 4th EDF. 
EDF  BEN  4015  A7a 
BOTSWANA 
Village  water  supplies.  Resp.  Auth. : 
Ministry  for  Mineral  Resources  and  Water 
Affairs. Planning  Study: DECON-FLOTO  (D). 
Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BT  5017  A2b 
Services  to  livestock  owners  in 
communal areas (SLOCA), Phase II. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4.100 mECU. 
Works  by  ace.  tender,  supply  of vehicles 
and  equipment  by  int.  tender.  T.A.  T.A.: 
B.M.B.  (NL).  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BT 5003  A3a 
Wildlife  tourism  environment.  T.A.  in 
the area of Tourism and Wildlife. 2.1  mECU. 
Short-list  done  for restr.  tender.  Project  in 
execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BT 5019  A8f 
Geophysical exploration of the Ncojane 
and  Nosop  sedimentary  basins.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministry  of  Mineral  Resources  and 
Water  Affaris.  Estimated  cost  1.6  mECU. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing decision July 86.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BT  5020  A2b 
* Initial measures for the conservation 
of the Kalahari ecosystem. T.A. and  sup-
ply of equipment. Monitoring and protection 
of the  natural  reserves.  Estimated  cost  2 
mECU.  Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen 
for financing  decision July 86. 6th EDF. 
EDF  BT  600  1  A3a 
BURKINA FASO 
Drinking water supply in the Yatenga 
region. Phase II. Resp.  Auth.: Ministere de 
I'Eau.  5  mECU.  Boreholes  and  wells.  Sup-
plies.  All  by  int.  tenders.  T.A.:  BURGEAP 
(F).  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BK  5016  A2b 
Improvement of halieutic production in 
Burkina  Faso.  Resp.  Auth. :  Ministere  de 
I'Environnement et  du  Tourisme.  Estimated 
total  cost  3.850 mECU.  EDF  2.850 mECU, 
local  1 mECU.  lnfrastructural  works,  build-
ings, supply of equipment and vehicles, T .A. 
and  training.  Works by  direct  labour,  sup-
plies by int. tender, T.A.: restr. tender. Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BK  5018  A3a 
Ouagadougou-Kaya  railways.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministere  Promotion  Economique. 
5.5  mECU.  Supply  of rails,  equipment  and 
ballast. Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BK  5019  A2d 
BURUNDI 
lnstitut  Universitaire  de  Sciences  de 
!'Education (IUSE).  Resp.  Auth. : Ministere 
de !'Education Nationale  - 0.  7 mE CU.  Con-
struction and equipping of educational build-
ings  (general  teaching classes,  laboratories, 
workshops).  Int.  tender  dossier:  TETRA 
Consultants  (Lux).  Project  on  appraisal.  4th 
EDF. 
EDF  BU  4124  A6b 
Faculty of agronomy.  Resp.  Auth.: Min-
istere  de  !'Education  Nationale.  Estimated 
cost  5 mECU.  Supervision  of works.  BRU-
SA-PASOUE  (1).  Works: int.  tender (condi-
tional)  launched  in  December 85.  Project in 
execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BU  5017  A6b 
Social-economic  development  of  the 
Kirundo  Province.  Resp.  Auth. :  Ministere 
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Works:  springwales  catchment,  wells  bor-
ing,  buildings, feeder roads.  Supply of agri-
cultural  inputs,  equipments,  vehicles,  T.A. 
and training. Works by ace. tender, supplies 
by int. tender or direct agreement. T.A. and 
training  by  restr.  tender.  Short-list  done. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  BU  5005  A3a 
*  Support to " Departement des Eaux et 
Forets ".  Resp.  Auth. :  Departement  des 
Eaux  et  Forets.  Estimated  cost  3.350 
mECU.  Reafforestation  works,  supply  of 
equipment, T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal.  Date foreseen for financing decision 
September 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  BU  5020  A3c 
CAMEROON 
Yaounde  - Ayos  Road  - Technical 
study.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  des  Trans-
ports. Estimated cost 0.860 mECU.  Techni-
. cal  study for the execution and  preparation 
of the tender dossier.  Restr.  tender.  Short-
list  drawn  up.  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  CM  5019  A2d 
Community  rural  development  in  the 
BAFUT region. Phase II. Resp.  Auth.: Gou-
verneur de  Ia  Province  du  Nord-Ouest.  1.5 
mECU. Rural inputs, drought farming, hydro-
agricultural  rehabilitation.  Works  by  ace. 
tender. Supplies by direct agreement. T.A.: 
Short-list already drawn up.  Project in  exe-
cution. 5th EDF. 
EDF  CM  5020  A3a 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
* National  livestock  Programme.  Sup-
ply of agricultural inputs, monitoring training, 
T.A.  Feeder  roads.  EDF  part  estimated 
5.543 mECU.  Cofinancing with France,  EIB, 
local,  IFAD.  Project on  appraisal.  6th EDF. 
EDF  CA 600  1  A3a 
CHAD 
Priority actions programme in the edu-
cational  field.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  du 
Planet de Ia  Reconstruction. Estimated cost 
5.2 mECU.  Works,  supplies,  scholarships 
and T.A. T.A.: short-list done for restr. ten-
der.  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  CD  5003  A6a 
Agricultural  programme  in the  Sudan 
zone.  Estimated  cost  5.5  mECU.  Various 
actions for: organizing the peasantry, stock-
ing  and  marketing,  utilization  of improved 
seeds  and  production  techniques.  T.A.: 
Short-list done for restr.  tender.  Project on 
appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for financing  deci-
sion 2nd half 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  CD  5010  A3b 
Rehabilitation  of  hospital  and  health 
sector.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  du  Travaux 
Publics, de Ia  Sante et Medecins sans Fron-
tieres  (MSF-B).  Estimated  total  cost  5.590 
mECU.  EDF  4.560  mECU,  MSF(B)  0.505 
mECU,  Aviation  sans  Frontiere  (F)  0.100 
mECU,  local 0.425 mECU.  Works by direct 
agreement or direct labour.  Supply of medi-
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cal  equipment,  supplies,  medicines  by  int. 
tender.  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  CD  5011  A7a 
Renovation  and  equipment of "Lycee 
Technique Commercial" in Technique de 
Bangui.  N'Djamena.  Resp.  Auth.:  Minis-
tare du  Plan  et de  Ia  Reconstruction. Works 
and  supply  of  equipment  by  ace.  tender. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing decision July 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  CD  5015  A6d 
* Road  maintenance  brigades.  Esti-
mated cost 20 mECU.  Project stage: identi-
fication.  6th EDF. 
EDF  CD  6001  A2d 
COMOROS 
Small stock-farming promotion in An-
jouan. Estimated cost 0.200 mECU.  Supply 
of  equipment.  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  COM  50  1  0  A3a 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Prawn farming pilot farm. Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministere du Dev. Rural.  Estimated total cost 
1.875 mECU.  EDF  0.850  mECU.  Works, 
supplies, T.A. and training. T.A.: SEPIA Int. 
(F).  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  IVC 50  19  A 3d 
Rural  development  of the  central  re-
gion. Resp.  Auth.: Ministere du  Dev.  Rural. 
Development  of  irrigated  rice-growing. 
Works,  supplies  and  T.A.  Project  on  ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  IVC  5021  A3a 
DJIBOUTI 
Administrative  training  centre.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministere  de  Ia  Fonction  Publique. 
Construction  of  two  buildings.  Estimated 
cost 0.560 mECU.  Cofinanced  by  EDF  and 
France.  EDF  0.270 mECU.  Works and  sup-
plies. Works by int. tender. Project in execu-
tion.  5th EDF. 
EDF  Dl  5004  A6e 
Ranch construction.  Resp.  Auth.: Minis-
tare  de  I' Agriculture.  Studies  and  Works. 
Works by int. tender.  1.030 mECU.  Int. ten-
der dossier prepared by Dubois (ACP).  Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  Dl  5005  A3a 
Djibouti  water  supply.  Estimated  cost 
0.800  mECU.  Watermain  in  the  region  of 
Damerjog  Atar.  Project  on  appraisal.  Date 
foreseen for financing decision July 86. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF  01  500  1  A2b 
DOMINICA 
Feeder  Roads  Project.  Estimated  cost 
3.8 mECU.  Improvement of existing feeder 
roads and construction of new ones. Works 
by  direct  labour.  Project  on  appraisal.  6th 
'EDF. 
EDF  DOM  600  1  A2d 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Rural interventions. Project stage : iden-
tification. 5th EDF. 
EDF  EG  A3a 
Rural development in the Bata district. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  de  I'  Agriculture,  de 
I'Eievage  et du  Dev.  Rural,  Ministere  de  Ia 
Sante.  1.350 mECU. Study by BDPA (F). Su-
pervision  of works:  short-list  done.  T.A.: 
Short-list already drawn up for restr. tender. 
5th EDF.  Project in  execution. 
EDF  EG  5004  A3a 
Malabo's  electrification  (Phase  II). 
2. 7  mECU.  Purchase  of generator sets, re-
pairing of the power-station and town mains 
extension. 2 int. tender launched in June 85. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing decision 2nd half 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  EG  5003  A2ai 
Cocoa-tree plantations rehabilitation on 
Bioko  island.  Estimated  total  cost  19 
mECU.  EDF  0.900 mECU.  World  Bank  11 
mECU. OPEC  1.2 mECU, BADEA 3.3 mECU, 
local 2.6 mECU.  EDF part: supply of fertiliz-
ers.  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  EG  5008  A3a 
Assistance  to  the  road  maintenance 
service  in  Rio  Muni.  2nd  phase.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministere  des  Travaux  Publics. 
1.1 mECU.  T.A.,  training  and  purchase  of 
road  equipments.  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  EG  5009  A2d 
ETHIOPIA 
Construction  and  equipment  of  one 
agricultural research station in Bale-Arsi. 
Resp.  Auth. :  Institute  of  Agricultural  Re-
search  (I.A.R.).  Special  hunger programme. 
1.5 mECU.  Project in  execution. 
958-ET 5015  A3c 
Rural Water Supply. Resp.  Auth.: Ethio-
pian  Water Works Construction  Authority. 
1.9 mECU.  Supply of. equipments. T.A.: J. 
Taylor and Son  (UK)  and  GITEC  (D).  Project 
in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ET  5016  A2b 
GAMBIA 
Brikama College, phase II. Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministry  of  Works  and  Communications. 
1.925 mECU.  Construction  and  equipment 
of  academic  and  residential  buildings. 
Works by mutual agreement. Equipment for 
phase  II:  int.  tender,  2nd  half  1986.  4th 
EDF. 
EDF  GM  4005  A6b 
GHANA 
Central and Accra Regions  Rural lnte-
: grated  Programme  (CARRIP).  Resp. 
AtJth.:  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic 
Planning.  Prefeasibility  study  for  potential 
projects within the two regions, with the aim 
of improving the food situation in Accra and 
other  coastal  towns.  Halcrow-U.l.G.  (UK). 
Study : rehabilitation irrigation project : HED-
ESELSKABET  (OK).  5th EDF. 
EDF  GH  5025  A3e Aveyme  livestock development.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministry  of Agriculture.  3.2  mECU. 
Works,  supply  of vehicles  and  equipment, 
T.A.: ORYX  (I)  5th EDF. 
EDF  GH  5015  A3a 
Second Line of Credit to the  National 
lnv~!stment Bank (NIB).  Resp.  Auth.:  De-
velopment  Service  Institute  of  NIB.  2.9 
mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A.: 
P.E.  Int.  (UK).  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  GH  5013  B3a 
Liine of Credit to the Agricultural Devel-
opment  Bank.  Resp.  Auth.:  Agric.  Dev. 
Bank (ADB) 6mECU. Purchase of marine die-
sel  engines,  spare  parts,  fishing  nets,  and 
T.A. Int. tender for engines launched in June 
86. Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  GH  5009  A5a 
Agricultural Rehabilitation through the 
Rural Banks Scheme. Phase II. Supply of 
equipment to small scale farmers and fisher-
men.  T.A.  8.760 mECU.  T.A.:  short-list 
done for restr.  tender.  Project in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  GH  5004  A5a 
Supplementary  finance  for  Twifo  Oil 
Palm Development. Resp.  Auth.: Twifo Oil 
Palm  Plantation  Ltd.  (TOPP).  5.043 mECU. 
lnfn:~structure,  housing  construction  by  di-
rect labour.  Supply of crop inputs, vehicles, 
tractors  and  T .A.  Int.  tender  for  supplies 
fore1seen in July 86. Project in execution. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF  GH  5003  A3a 
Twifo  smallholder  Oil  Palm  Project. 
Resp.  Auth.: TOPP.  3,715 m  ECU.  Works, 
supplies and T.A. 5th EDF. 
EDF  GH  5021- STA  A3a 
Takoradi  harbour  rehabilitation.  Resp. 
Aut  h. : Ghana Ports Authority. Estimated to-
tal cost 16.7 mECU.  EDF  9.7 mECU,  World 
Bank  5  mECU,  local  2  mECU.  Works and 
supply  of  equipment.  Prequalification 
launched in February 86. Project on apprais-
al.  lith EDF. 
EDF  GH  5028  A2d 
GRIENADA 
* Eastern  Main  Road.  Phase  Ill.  Resp. 
Auth. :  Ministry  of  Communications  and 
Works.  EDF  3.5  mECU.  Strengthening  the 
road  base  by coal  mix  surface  course  and 
improving drainage structures. Works by di-
rect  labour.  Supply  of equipments  by  int. 
tender.  Project on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen 
for financing decision July 86. 6th EDF. 
EDF  GRD  6001  A2d 
GUINEA 
Li:md  development in Kankan and Labe 
regions.  Phase  II.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere 
de  !'Agriculture et des  F.A.P.A.  Valuation: 
Mac: Donald and Partners (UK).  Project on ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  GUI  5030  A3a 
New energy  research  and test.  Resp. 
Auth. :  Ministere  de  I'Energie  et  du  Kon-
koure.  Study  on  hand  by  A.I.D.R.  (B).  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  GUI  5006  A2a 
Assistance to the « Ecole Nationale des 
Arts et Metiers-ENAM-Conakry,,.  2.265 
mECU.  Building  renovation  and  supply  of 
equipment. T.A. 5th EDF. 
EDF  GUI  5028  A6d 
Go into production for the plastic plant 
"SOGUIPLAST".  Resp.  Auth.:  Guinea 
Government.  5.4  mECU.  Prequalification 
launched in  April 86 to set up with Guinean 
authorities  a joint-company for plant  man-
agement and for a T.A. (12 months). Supply 
of  row  materials  (plastics)  by  int.  tender 
foreseen in May or June 86. All int. tenders 
will  be  conditionals.  Project  on  appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing decision July 86. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  GUI  5022  A2a 
* Semi-industrial  fishery  project  "SO-
GUIPECHE".  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  du 
Planet de Ia Cooperation lnternationale. Se-
cretariat d'Etat a  Ia  peche. Estimated cost 8 
mECU.  Rehabilitation  and  renovation  of the 
existant plants and buildings. Supply of spe-
cialized equipment. Project on appraisal. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF  GUI  A3d 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Health  infrastructures.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Commissariat d'Etat au  Travaux Publics. Es-
timated  cost  1.9 mECU.  Construction  and 
equipment  of 2  district  hospitals,  4  health 
centres and  staff housing.  Supply of equip-
ment : int. tender launched in June 86. T.A.: 
Short-list  done.  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  GUB  5006  A 7  a 
North-East forestry development. Resp. 
Auth. : Commissariat general  au  developpe-
ment rural.  Study under way by Atlanta (D). 
5th EDF. 
EDF  GUB 5004  A3c 
* T .A.  to  the  " Direction  General  du 
Plan".  Resp.  Auth.:  Direction  general  du 
Plan.  Estimated  cost 0.910 mECU.  To pre-
pare and to implement the national develop-
ment  plan.  Training.  Project  on  appraisal. 
Date  foreseen  for  financing  decision  Sep-
tember 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  GUB  501 0  A3a 
IVORY COAST 
(See  COte  d'lvoire) 
JAMAICA 
Citrus  fruit  production  improvement. 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministere de I' Agriculture. Esti-
mated  cost 3.5 mECU.  Equipment,  training 
and  T.A. Credit line.  T.A.: VAKAKIS (GR). 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF JM 5004  A3a 
Coffee development. Resp.  Auth.: Minis-
try of Agriculture.  Estimated total cost 3.7 
mECU.  EDF  3.5  mECU.  Local  0.2  mECU. 
Supply  of equipment,  T.A.  and  credit  line. 
T.A. : Short-list already drawn up for restr. 
tender.  Int.  tender for supplies  launched  in 
March 86. Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF JM 5005  A3a 
Bee-keeping  Development  Project. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of  Agriculture. 
1.270 mECU.  Supply of vehicles,  T.A.  and 
line of credit. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. 
tender.  Project  in  execution.  4th  and  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  JM 5013  A3a 
KENYA 
Line of credit to the "Small Scale En-
terprises  Finance  Company''  (SEFCO). 
Resp.  Auth.: Development Finance  Compa-
ny of Kenya.  0.500 mECU.  Project  on  ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  KE  5020  A4b 
Reinforcement  of the  medical  infras-
tructure  in  the  district  of  Machakos. 
1.100 mECU.  Works and  supplies.  Date fi-
nancing decision March 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  KE  5022  A7a 
KIRIBATI 
Fishing-boats. 2.8 mECU.  Purchase of 2 
boats, 26m. each. T.A.: Jan Macallan (ACP) 
Int.  tender  launched  in  June  86.  Project  in 
execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  Kl  5002  A3d 
LESOTHO 
"Highlands Water Scheme"  Project. 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and 
Mining.  Estimated  EDF  contribution  9.5 
mECU.  Final  planning  study  on  hydraulics 
and T.A. to the Lesotho Highlands Develop-
ment  Authority.  Project  on  appraisal.  Date 
foreseen for financing decision July 86. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF  LSO  600  1  A2b 
LIBERIA 
Rural Water Supply. Resp.  Auth.: Minis-
try of Rural  Dev.  Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing decision Septembre 86.5th EDF. 
EDF  LBR  50  18  A2b 
Monrovia  Port.  Resp.  Auth.:  National 
Port  Authority.  Estimated  cost  1  .  9  mECU. 
Management assistance. Project on apprais-
al.  Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd 
half 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  LBR  50  19  A2d 
MADAGASCAR 
Assistance to the Malagasy handicrafts 
industry. Resp.  Auth.: Ministere de l'lndus-
trie. Estimated cost  1 mECU.  Supply of raw 
materials  for  handicrafts  by  int.  tender. 
T.A.: APRODI  (F).  Project in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  MAG 50  17  A4d 
MALAWI 
Salima Lakeshore Agricultural Develop-
ment Division  (SLADD)  Phase  IV.  Resp. 
Auth. :  Ministry  of  Agriculture.  Estimated 
cost:  19.1 mECU.  EDF  9.5 mECU.  Local 
The Courier no. 98 - July-August  1986  V 9.6 mECU.  Works,  Supplies  and  T.A.  Pro-
ject in  execution. T.A.: restr. tender, short-
list drawn up. Int. tender for the supply of 6 
steel  bridges  launched  in  June  86.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  MAl 5001  A3a 
Central and northern region fish farm-
ing development, training and  research. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of Agriculture.  Esti-
mated cost: 3 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing decision 2nd half 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  MAl 50  19  A3a 
Strategic fuel reserve.  Resp.  Auth.: Of-
fice of the President and Cabinet. Contingen-
cy Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU.  Construction of 
tanks farm for gasoil, petrol, ethanol. Asso-
ciated  infrastructure  and  equipment.  T .A. 
Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAl 5020  A2a 
Small Enterprise Development Organi-
zation of Malawi (SEDOM)  - Phase  II. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Sedom  secretariat.  EDF 
4.8 mECU.  Works by direct labour.  Supply 
of vehicles and  equipment by int.  tender in 
'86. T.A.: Short-list done for restr.  tender. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAl 5021  A4e 
Mwansambo  Rural  Growth  Centre. 
Resp.  Auth.:  OPC,  Rural  Development Divi-
sion.  0.900  mECU.  Works,  supplies  and 
T.A. Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAl 5028  A3a 
Blantyre-Lirangwe  M1  Road.  Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Works. 21.5 mECU. Road 
construction  and  rehabilitation.  Works  by 
int. tender (conditional) launched in February 
86. T.A.: Rhein-Rhur (D).  Project on apprais-
al.  Date foreseen for financing decision July 
86. 6th EDF. 
EDF  MAl 600  1  A2d 
Mpherembe Smallholder Tobacco Pro-
ject.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of Agriculture. 
EDF 4.680 mECU.  Works and supplies. Pro-
ject on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
decision July 86. 6th EDF. 
EDF  MAl 6002  A3a 
MALl 
Strengthening of sanitary infrastructure 
in the Nioro region. Resp.  Auth. : Ministere 
de Ia  Sante et des Affaires Sociales et Min-
istere des  Transports et T.P.  2.570 mECU. 
Buildings,  equipment, training.  Architectural 
and  technical  studies:  GOUSIER  (F).  T.A.: 
Short-list already drawn up.  4th EDF. 
EDF  MLI  4016  A7a 
Rural hydraulics programme. 5.8 mECU. 
300 wells and pumps. T.A.: Geohydraulique 
(F).  2. int. tenders launched in April 86. Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MLI  5017  A2b 
Support to establish undertakings and 
to insert young graduates. EDF 2.8 mECU. 
Supply  of T.A.  training  and  line  of credit. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing decision July 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  MLI  5021  A4e 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY 
MAURITANIA 
Extension  of  Kaedi  regional  hospital. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  de  I'Equipement. 
0.815 mECU.  Construction,  equipment  and 
TA for  Kaedi  hospital  (100  beds).  Works 
under way. Medical-technical equipment int. 
tender, foreseen in the 2nd half 86. 3rd, 4th 
and  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAU 5018  A7a 
Small dams construction in the Hodhs 
region.  Resp.  Auth. :  Ministere  du  Devel-
oppement  rural.  Estimated  cost  2 mECU. 
Study under way : Binnie and  Partners (UK). 
Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAU 500  1  A3a 
Aioun El  Atrouss hospital. Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministere de I'Equipement. 1.050 mECU. Re-
novation  and  supply  of  equipment  for  3 
buildings. Works by ace. tender. Supplies by 
int. tender.  Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAU 5012  A7a 
"Centre de  Formation  Professionnelle 
Maritime  de  Nouadhibou  (C.F.P.M.). 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministere de I'Equipement. 2.5 
mECU.  Construction,  supply  of  equipment 
and  purchase  of  a  wooden-trawler,  T.A. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAU 50  14  A6d 
T.A.  and  training  for  hospital  equip-
ment maintenance. Resp.  Auth.: Ministere 
de  I'Equipement.  0.540 mECU.  T.A.: CHE-
MA (B).  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAU 5011  A7a 
MAURITIUS 
Development  of  lie  Rodrigues.  Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Agriculture. 3 mECU.  De-
velopment  centred  on  agricultural  produc-
tion.  Economical  and  technical  study  under 
way. T.A. : Luxconsult (Lux.).  5th EDF. 
EDF  MAS 5001  A3a 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Rural development in the Moamba Dis-
trict. Resp.  Auth.: Ministerio da Agricultura. 
Estimated  total  cost  9.15 mECU.  EEC 
7. 5 mECU.  Supply of equipment, rural inputs 
and  T.A. Project in  execution. 
ALA MOZ 8333  A3a 
Fishery development and rehabilitation. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Secretariat  d'etat  pour  Ia 
p@che.  Total  estimated  cost 8.885 mECU. 
EEC  7.4 mECU.  Supply  of equipment  and 
T.A. Project in  execution. 
ALA MOZ 8507  A3d 
* Nacala  Railway  Rehabilitation.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Government  of  Mozambique.  EDF 
part  25  mECU.  Cofinancing  with  France, 
Portugal, Italy, Canada  and  Finland.  Int. ten-
der (conditional) foreseen  in  July or August 
86. Project on  appraisal.  6th EDF. 
EDF  MOZ 600  1  A2d 
NIGER 
Air  Valley  development.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministere  du  Dev.  Rural.  Estimated  cost 
2.052  mECU.  Hydro-agricultural  works. 
Construction and  equipping of wells.  Equip-
ping  and  operation  of nurseries.  T.A.  and 
training.  Works and  equipment: int. tender. 
T.A.: VAKAKIS  (GR).  Project  in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  NIR  5002  A3a 
Training for Cooperatives. Resp.  Auth. : 
Ministere  du  Dev.  Rural.  Estimated  cost 
2.8 mECU.  T.A.  and  supply  of equipment. 
T.A.  by  restr.  tender  short-list done.  Sup-
plies by int. tender or direct agreement.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  NIR  5004  A3b 
Traditional wells reparing in the Oual-
lam Region. Resp.  Auth. : Ministere de I'Hy-
draulique. 3.1  mECU.  100 wells. Works, su-
pervision  and  training.  Supervision  of 
works: M. Botz (F)  and M. Motte (B).  Project 
in execution.  5th EDF 
EDF  NIR  501 0  A2b 
NIGERIA 
Kaduna  afforestation  project.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Federal  Department  of  Forestry. 
9.4 mECU.  Works,  supplies  and  T.A.  Pro-
ject in  execution. T.A.: restr.  tender, short-
list done.  5th EDF. 
EDF  UNI  5001  A3c 
*  Abakaliki Zinc Feasibility Study. Resp. 
Auth.:  NMC  (Nigerian  Mining  Corporation). 
1.220  mECU.  T.A.  by  restr.  tender  after 
short-list.  Supply  of equipment by int.  ten-
der.  Project on  appraisal.  Date foreseen for 
financing decision September 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  UNI  5007  A2b 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Magi highway. Resp.  Auth.: Department 
of  Transport.  3.5 mECU.  Upgrading  and 
sealing of a road section. Works: int. tender 
foreseen 2nd half '86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  PNG  5006  A2d 
Diesel  Power  Replacement  Pro-
gramme. Resp.  Auth.:  Electricity Commis-
sion (ELCOM).  Estimated cost 4.850 mECU. 
4  small  hydroelectric  power  plants  with 
transmission  line  extensions  from  existing 
grids.  1st int.  tender (conditional)  launched 
in  October  85.  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDf PNG  5011a  A2a 
Kim  be-Talasea  Road.  Resp.  Auth.:  De-
partments  of  Works  and  Transport.  Esti-
mated total cost 9.5 mECU.  EDF  7  mECU, 
local  2.5  mECU.  Upgrading  of ±  35 km  of 
the road. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for financing  deci-
sion July 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  PNG  50  13  A2d 
RWANDA 
Development of the small-scale tin in-
dustry.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  de  l'lndus-
trie,  des  Mines  et  de  I'  Artisanat. 
2.840 mECU.  Sysmin.  Works,  supplies, 
training and T.A. T.A.: Short-list done. Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  RW 5016  A4a 
Support to the:  "Centrale Comptable 
et Organisation". Resp.  Auth.: Presidence 
de Ia  Republique.  3.1  mECU.  T.A. and train-
ing.  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  RW  5014  A 1b T.A.  to  "OCIR-THE".  Continuation  of 
the T.A. 0.300 mECU.  Project on appraisal. 
Datt9 foreseen for financing decision July 86. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  RW  5024  A 1b 
New energy research and test in rural 
regi:on.  Resp.  Auth.: Secretariat d'Etat a Ia 
Recherche Scientifique.  1.5 mECU.  Creation 
of pilot unit for solar energy,  biomass and 
wind energy.  Studies,  T.A. and  equipment. 
Studies: AGIP-AFOR (1).  Equipment: int. ten-
der in 86. Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SE  5005  A2a 
cll)nsolidation of the livestock develop-
ment programme.  Resp.  Auth.:  SODESP. 
Estimated cost 1.6 mECU.  Study under way 
by Bessel  Ass.  (UK).  Project  on  appraisal. 
5th  EDF. 
EDF  SE  A3a 
A:rtisanal  fishery  development  in  the 
Casamance Region. Resp.  Auth. : Secretar-
iat  d'Etat  a Ia  Peche  Maritime.  EDF  1.6 
mECU.  Works,  supplies  and  training.  Date 
financing decision June 86.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SE  5024  A3a 
SIEI~RA LEONE 
K;:~mbia  Fishery  Development.  Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and  Forestry. 
0.6fi0 mECU.  Construction  of  2  buildings 
and  a  boatyard,  supply  of boats,  motors, 
vehicles  and  T.A.  T.A.:  MacAiister,  Elliot 
and Partners (UK). Project on appraisal. Date 
fore:seen for financing decision July 86. 5th 
EDF  .. 
EDF  SL  5019  A3d 
Rt!habilitation  of the  Telecommunica-
tions Network. Resp.  Auth.: Post and Tele-
communications  Dept.  Estimated  cost 
±9.5 mECU.  Study  to  prepare  technical 
spec:ifications and int. tender dossier : short-
list  done  for  restr.  tender.  Project  on  ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SL  5024  A2c 
Port  Loko  rural  development  pro-
grarnme.  6 mECU.  Infrastructures,  T.A., 
training  and  supplies.  T.A.: Short-list done 
restr.  tender. Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SL  5006  A3a 
Support to the Geological Surveys De-
partment.  1.30 mECU.  T.A.  and  training, 
supply  of equipment.  Project  in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  SL 5016  A4a 
Creation of regional  centres for small 
ente·rprises.  Estimated  cost  1.25 mECU. 
ProjEtct  stage: identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF  SL  5017  A4d 
Rural health development programme. 
Estimated cost  1.5 mECU.  Buildings,  equip-
ment  and  training.  Works  by  ace.  tender 
already launched.  Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing decision July 86. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF  SL  5025  A7a 
Tourism  development  project.  Esti-
mated cost 0.850 mECU.  T.A. for Ministry 
of Tourism and supply of equipment. Project 
stage: identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF  SL  5026  A5c 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Coconut industry development project. 
Resp.  Auth. :  Ministry  of Land  and  Natural 
Resources.  Study under way by  Agrar und 
Hydrotechnik  (D).  Project  stage:  identifica-
tion.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SOL  5009  A3a 
SOMALIA 
Bardheera Dam. Resp.  Auth. : Bardheera 
Dam  Authority  (BOA).  600 mECU.  (Esti-
mated)  Dam  Project  500 mECU.  Powerline 
to Mogadishu 100 mECU.  Funding: EDF, Ita-
ly,  Germany,  France,  Saudi  Arabia,  Abu-
Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, lsi. Dev. Bank. 
Local. Power and river regulation for agricul-
tural  development.  Construction  of a  con-
crete gravity dam with hydro-power station, 
associated  infrastructure  and  electrical 
transmission  lines.  The  dam  will  provide 
water, flood protection and  power for up to 
223 000 ha  of  irrigated  agriculture  in  the 
Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Civil 
works:  first  int.  tender  launched  in  1984. 
Transmission  lines  int.  tender  in  1986. 
Equipment :  powerhouse  main  equipment 
and  auxiliary  equipment,  int.  tenders  in 
1987. Gates,  valves,  intake  equipment,  int 
tender in  1987. Int. tender with prequalifica-
tion  launched  in  February  86  for hydraulic 
tests. Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SO  5003  A2a 
"Aula  Magna"  Mogadishu  National 
University. Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works.  ±2.5 mECU.  Project  on  appraisal. 
4th EDF. 
EDF  SO  4015  A6b 
Upgrading  of the  road  Afgoi-Shalam-
bot-Goluen. Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works. Works by int. tender in 86. Supervi-
sion of works. Studies:  AIC.  PROGETTI  (I). 
Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SO  5017  A2d 
Grapefruit Development Project.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministry  of  Agriculture.  3.8 mECU. 
Works  supply  of vehicles,  equipment  and 
rural inputs. T.A.: Agriconsulting (I) and lsti-
tuto  Sperimentale  per  I' Agricoltura  (I).  Int. 
tender  for vehicles  launched  in  March  86. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SO  5009  A3a 
Food  Early  Warning  System.  Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated to-
tal cost 4 mECU. EDF±3.1 mECU. Supply of 
meteorological  and  office  equipment  and 
T.A.: Transtec (B).  Project in execution. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF  SO  5015  A8f 
North-West  agricultural  development 
project.  Estimated  total  cost  36 mECU. 
EDF:  7.6 mECU,  World  Bank  14.9 mECU, 
IFAD 9.9 mECU,  local 3.6 mECU.  lnfrastruc-
tural  work  and  supply  of  equipment  and 
T.A. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SO  5016  A3a 
T .A.  to  the  Ministry of  Finance,  the 
Central  Bank  and  the  Commercial  and 
Savings Bank. Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Fi-
nance.  1.875  mECU.  Project  in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  SO  5019  A 1b 
SUDAN 
Nuba  Mountains  Rural  Development 
Project. Interim phase. Resp.  Auth.: Minis-
try of Agriculture.  2.200  mECU.  Supply of 
equipment and  vehicles by int. tender, T.A. 
and  training.  T.A.: Halcrow-ULG  (UK).  Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SU  5019  A3a 
SURINAME 
Rice  project  at  Coronie.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministerie van  Landbouw,  Veeteelt,  Visserij 
en  Bosbouw.  7.650 mECU.  Rice  production 
developments.  T.A.:  EUROCONSULT  (NL). 
Project in execution.  3rd and  5th EDF. 
EDF  SUR  5002  A3a 
Biomass  energy  project  at  Wagenin-
gen. Resp.  Auth.: Government.  Installation 
of an  energy generator on  the  basis of rice 
husks.  Project  stage:  identification.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  SUR  5009  A2a 
Artificial  Insemination  Project.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Fisheries. 
0. 72 mECU.  Building  of a new station  and 
provision of equipment and material. Project 
in execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  SUR  501 0  A3a 
Rehabilitation of the road Burnside-Wa-
geningen. Resp.  Auth. : Ministry of Finance 
and  Planning.  Estimated  total  cost 
5.5 mECU.  Study  to  be  done:  technical 
methods for the implementation of the pro-
ject :  Delft  Universteit  (NL).  Project  on  ap-
praisal.  4th and  5th EDF. 
EDF  SUR  5011  A2d 
SWAZILAND 
Rural  hydraulics.  Resp.  Auth. :  Rural 
Water  Supply  Board.  Estimated  cost 
2.456 m  ECU.  Study  construction,  works 
supervision.  12  villages.  Supply  of equip-
ment and  material.  Study and  works super-
vision: Carl  Bro  (OK).  Project  in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  SW 5001  A2b 
Smallholders  Support  Project,  Credit 
and  Marketing.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of 
Agriculture.  3.550 mECU.  Works,  line  of 
credit,  T.A. and  training.  T.A.: Cooper Ly-
brand  (ACP  branch).  Project  in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  SW 5005  A4e 
Matsapha Vocational Training College. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of  Education.  EDF 
3.9 mECU.  Construction  and  equipping  of 
the  college.  Project  in  execution.  ber  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  SW 5006  A6a 
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Mtwara water supply. Resp.  Auth.: Min-
istry  of  Water,  Energy  and  Minerals. 
5 mECU.  Works: drilling  of new wells,  and 
constructions.  Supply  of  equipment  and 
T.A.  Drilling  activities  and  power  supply 
connections by direct labour.  Other works : 
int.  tender  in  '86.  Supplies:  int.  tender  in 
'86. Supervision of works: G.W.E.  (D).  Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  T  A 5003  A2b 
Banana  improvement and pest control 
(Phase 1). Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture. Estimated total cost 3.740 mECU.  EDF 
3 mECU,  local 0.740 mECU.  Supply of pes-
ticides,  vehicles,  equipment  by  int.  tender. 
T.A. Short-list done for restr. tender. Project 
in  execution. 5th EDF. 
EDF  T  A  5008  A3a 
Ports of Zanzibar and Pemba. Estimated 
cost  10.17 mECU,  T.A.  for  management, 
organization,  pricing  and  financial  systems, 
training.  Restoration of infrastructure. T.A.: 
NEDECO  (NL).  Project  stage:  identification. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  T  A  5024  A2d 
Cooperative  Rural  Development  Bank 
(CRDB)  Project.  3. 15  mECU.  Provision  of 
equipment, training and  T.A. Date financing 
decision June 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  T  A  5026  A3a 
* Rehabilitation  of Zanzibar  Hospitals. 
Phase  II.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry of Health, 
Zanzibar.  EDF  2.705  mECU.  Cofinancing 
with Italy.  Works, supply of equipment and 
training.  Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  TA 5017  A7a 
TOGO 
Enquiry  into  consumer  expenditures. 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministere du Plan, de l'lndustrie 
et de  Ia  Reforme  Administrative.  Estimated 
total  cost  1.3 mECU.  EDF  1 mECU,  Local 
0.3 mECU,  T.A.  to  produce,  collect  and 
treat statistical data,  training  and  supply of 
equipment.  T.A.: short-list done.  Project in 
execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  TO  5011  A 1  e 
* Rural  reafforestation.  Estimated  cost 
±0.575  mECU.  1.500  ha  plantations  and 
1.500  ha  land  protection.  Project  on  ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  TO  5014  A3c 
TONGA 
Supply of a dredger. Resp.  Auth. : Minis-
try of Works. Estimated cost 0.500 mECU. 
Technical  study:  EUROCONSULT  (NL).  Int. 
tender foreseen 2nd half '86. Project on  ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  TG  5002  A2d 
Faua  Fisheries  Harbour.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministry  of  Works.  Estimated  cost 
3.3 mECU.  Construction  of a  new fisheries 
harbour, repair yards, fish market and  who-
lesale store with ice-making equipment.  Int. 
tender  for the  supply  of sheet  steel  piles 
launched in November 83 (conditional). Sup-
ply of cooling and  ice equipment int. tender 
launched  in  June  86.  Works  by  direct  la-
bour. T.A.: M.  Imrie (UK).  Project in execu-
tion.  5th EDF. 
EDF  TG  5001  A 3d 
VIII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Training  programme,  health  sector. 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Health and Environ-
ment.  1.2 mECU.  Training awards, laborato-
ry equipment (sound-meters, chemical chro-
matographs,  spectrometers)  by int.  tender. 
Short-term T.A. to coordinate and  establish 
new  laboratory.  Project  in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  TR  5003  A8c 
Goat  development  project.  Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0,750 mECU. 
Works and  supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for financing  deci-
sion July 86.  5th EDF. 
EDF  TR  5005  A3a 
UGANDA 
Kampala-Masaka Road.  Phase II. Resp. 
Auth.:  Government  of  Uganda.  Estimated 
cost 13 mECU.  Reconstruction of 64 km of 
the road.  Int. tender conditional launched in 
June 86. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for  financing  decision  September  86.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  UG  5003  A2d 
* Karamoja  Development  Programme. 
Phase  II.  Resp.  Auth.:  Government  of 
Uganda.  EDF 6 mECU.  Works and  supplies. 
Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  UG  500  1  A3a 
* Support to emergency relief and reha-
bilitation  programme.  Resp.  Auth.:  Gov-
ernment of Uganda. EDF 5 mECU. Project on 
appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  UG  5020  B2 
ZAIRE 
Kalemie  port  rehabilitation.  Resp. 
Auth. : Departement des Transports et Com-
munications. 6.5 mECU.  2 Int. tenders (con-
ditional)  launched  in  March  84.  Works  and 
supplies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing decision 2nd half 86. Regional 
project. 5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5215  A2d 
Banana  deep water port.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Departement des Transports et Communica-
tions.  Economic  and  financial  evaluation : 
SEMA  (F).  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZR  5013  A2d 
Butembo-Beni hydro-electrical develop-
ment. Preliminary study done by Tractionnel 
(B)  on  local  funds.  Detailed  economic  and 
technical  studies :  WLPU  (UK).  Project  on 
appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZR  5006  A2a 
* 2nd intervention Sysmin.  Gecamines 
Working. EDF  part estimated at 30 mECU. 
Supply of mining equipment, machine-tools, 
engines.  Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZR-SYS  5001  A4a 
ZAMBIA 
Animal vaccine unit production. Labora-
tory construction. Supply of equipment and 
T.A.  Estimated  cost  3.79 mECU.  EDF 
3 mECU,  local  0.79 mECU.  T.A.:  Central 
Diergeneeskundig  (NL).  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZA 5018  A3a 
Mkushi  electrification.  Estimated  cost 
6.07 mECU.  EDF  3.07 mECU.  Cofinancing 
needed.  Study  on  hand:  MERTZ-McLEN-
NAN  (UK).  Project stage : identification.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  ZA 5007  A2a 
Animal  health  improvement.  Special 
hunger  programme.  Project  on  appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 
86. 
958-ZA 5022  A3a 
Rehabilitation of  the Zambian Copper & 
Cobalt Mining  Industry.  II.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Z.C.C.M. Sysmin. 28 mECU, Italy 4.5 mECU. 
Local 4.9 mECU.  EDF  part supply of equip-
ment by int. tender.  19 int. tenders launched 
in the first half 86. Project in  execution. 5th 
EDF. 
EDF  ZA/SYS/5024  A4a 
* EEC  vehicle repair and transport sup-
port programme. Resp.  Auth. : ZIMCO.  Es-
timated  cost  12.8  mECU.  Part  supply  for 
trucks  and  related  transport  equipment, 
T.A. control and maintenance services. Pro-
ject on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZA 5025  A2d 
* Rehabilitation of 3  grain silos.  Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. NAMBOARD. 
EDF  7  mECU,  Germany  F.R.  7  mECU.  EDF 
part works, supplies and  work supervision. 
Project on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZA 5026  A3f 
ZIMBABWE 
Small-holder Coffee and Fruit Develop-
ment Programme. Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of 
Lands,  Resettlement  and  Rural  Develop-
ment.  EDF  4.2  mECU,  local  1.65  mECU. 
T.A. : I.R.F.A.  (F).  Project in  execution.  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  ZIM 5006  A3a 
Mashonaland  East  Smallholder  Fruit 
and Vegetable Programme. Resp.  Auth.: 
Agricultural and Rural  Development Authori-
ty  (ARDA).  2.9  mECU.  Works,  supply  of 
equipment  and  materials,  T.A.  and  credit 
line.  T.A.: Short-list done for restr.  tender. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZIM 50  12  A3a 
Rural  water supply in  South  Matabe-
leland.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of  Energy, 
Water Resources and  Development. Boring, 
wells, supply of hand pumps (MEWRD).  4.1 
mECU.  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  ZIM 5005  A2b 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
Curacao  slaughterhouse.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Departement  voor  Ontwikkelingssamen-werking,  Willemstad,  Curac;:ao.  cost 
2.90 mECU.  Work plans:  Bureau  T.  Janga 
(LoGal).  Works  by  int.  tender  (conditional) 
launched in December 85. Date financing de-
cision June 86. 5th EDF. 
EDF  NEA  50  12  A3a 
Liine of credit to the Aruba Dev. Bank to 
improve agriculture. livestock and fishe-
ry.  Resp.  Auth.:  Departement voor ontwik-
kelingssamenwerking.  Estimated  cost 
0.3 mECU.  Project on  appraisal.  4th EDF. 
EDF  NEA 4003  A5a 
T,ourism improvement . Curacao. Phase 
I.  Oltrobanda sewerage. Resp.  Auth.: Min-
istrv of Public Works. Estimated total cost 5 
mECU.  EDF  3  mECU,  Netherlands  2  mECU. 
EDF part: sewage, road works, piping. Pro-
ject on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  NEA  50  13  A5c 
FALKLAND ISLANDS 
*  Port  Stanley  Senior  School.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Public  Works  Department.  0.364 
mECU.  Work construction by direct labour, 
supply of equipment by int.  tender.  Project 
on appraisal.  Date foreseen for financial de-
cision July 86.  4th and  5th EDF. 
EDF  FK  4001-5001  A6d 
FRENCH  POLYNESIA 
Tahiti  territorial  abattoir.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Service de I'Economie Rurale, Papeete (Tahi-
ti).  Secretariat  d'Etat des  Departements  et 
Tenritoires  d'Outre-Mer,  Delegation  de  Ia 
Polvnesie Franc;:aise,  Paris.  Cofinancing with 
France.  1.270 mECU.  Project  in  execution. 
4th EDF. 
EDF  POF  4003  A3a 
MONTSERRAT 
Y~ater  Supply  Project.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Montserrat Water Authority and  Ministry of 
Public  Works.  1  mECU.  Project  planning: 
ShCirt-list already drawn up for restr. tender. 
Projject  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for fi-
nancing  decision  2nd  half  86.  4th and  5th 
EDF. 
EDF  MON  500  1  A2b 
PACIFIC OCT 
Regional programme rural photovoltaic 
elet::trification.  Resp.  Auth.:  SPEC.  Esti-
mated  total  cost  4.365 mECU.  EDF 
3.184 mECU. T.A.: short-list done for restr. 
tender.  Supplies  by  int.  tender  launched  in 
January 85. Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5715  A2a 
Regional Projects 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF  CEAO 
ESITEX  Segou  (Mali).  Resp.  Auth. : 
CEAO Secretariat.  Management training  for 
textile industry. Complex construction in Se-
gou.  Supply  of equipment.  Project  stage : 
identification.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5118  A6d 
GUYANA - SURINAME 
Guyana - ferry-link. Resp.  Auth. : Minis-
try  of  Public  Works  and  Ministerie  van 
Openbare  Werken.  Link  ferry  on  Corentine 
river.  12. 1 mECU.  Study under way by C.A. 
Liburd and Ass.+ Sescon Group (ACP). Pro-
ject in  execution.  4th and  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5602 - 4084  A2d 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF  M.R.U. 
(MANO RIVER  UNION) 
Telecommunication and Postal Training 
Institute (TPTI) of the MRU. Resp.  Auth.: 
MRU  Secretariat  in  Freetown.  Extensions, 
supplies  and  training.  Estimated  total  cost 
8.5  mECU.  EDF  2.5  mECU.  Project  on  ap-
praisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5104  A6b 
NIGER BASIN AUTHORITY 
Protection  and  reafforestation  in  the 
"Haut Bassin Versant du fleuve Niger en 
Guinea".  Works,  supplies  and  T.A.  Esti-
mated  total  cost  1.5 mECU.  Project  stage: 
identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5112  A8f 
ZAIRE - CONGO - GABON  -
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE -
EQUATORIAL GUINEA- CAMEROON 
Fishery  development  in  the  Gulf  of 
Guinea. Estimated  cost ±5  mECU.  T.A. to 
prepare these projects: Short-list done. Pro-
ject on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5206  A3d 
SENEGAL- MAURITANIA 
Establishment of cultivated areas in the 
Senegal River Valley.  Special  hunger  pro-
gramme.  2.380  mECU.  Project  in  execu-
tion. 
958-REG 5140  A3a 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF  UDEAC 
Sub-Regional  Institute  for  Applied 
Technology  and  Planned  Economy 
(ISTA). Resp.  Auth.:  1ST A Secretariat in  Li-
breville-Gabon.  Estimated  cost  +6 mECU. 
Building  centre construction  and  T.A. for -3 · 
actions.  Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  521 0  A6b 
PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES 
Pacific  Regional  Tourism  Programme. 
Resp.  Auth.: Tourism  Council  of the  South 
Pacific  (TCSP)  and  SPEC.  3.2 mECU.  Study 
to  be  done:  data  base,  organization  and 
strategy.  Short-list  already  drawn  up.  for 
restr. tender.  Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5714  A5c 
Pacific  Regional  Aircommunications. 
Stage  I.  Resp.  Auth.:  SPEC.  4.6  mECU. 
Buildings, runways and supply of navigation-
al  aids.  Project  on  appraisal.  Date foreseen 
for financing decision July 86.5th EDF.  -
EDF  REG  5717  A2d 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF  CILSS 
Provisional survey of natural renewable 
resources in the Sahel. Resp.  Auth. : CILSS 
Secretariat.  Estimated  cost  6 mECU.  EDF 
±2  mECU.  Setting up of an observation unit 
to forecast crop production. Remote sensing 
by satellite,  air  survey  and  ground  control. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5116  A8f 
Millet. maize. sorghum and niebe pro-
ject.  Resp.  Auth.:  CILSS  Secretariat.  Esti-
mated  cost  2 mECU.  To  provide  improved 
varieties for farmers.  Local  tests.  Purchase 
of  vehicles  and  equipment  and  to  take 
charge  for local  tests control  staff.  Project 
stage : identification.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5116  A3a 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF  U.A.P.T. 
Satellite  telecommunications  project. 
Resp.  Auth.:  U.A.P.T.  Secretariat  in  Braz-
zaville.  R.P.C.  Parametric  study  under  way 
by national organizations of I,  UK,  F and  D. 
Project stage : identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5307  A2c 
INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES 
* Tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean. EDF 
7 mECU. Determination of different methods 
of tuna fishing.  Evaluation  of resources  and 
T.A. to the countries.  Madagascar, Comor-
os and Mauritius to select models for devel-
opment. Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5504  A3d 
TANZANIA- ZAMBIA 
* Tazara  Ten  Year  Development  Plan 
(phase  1).  Resp.  Auth.:  Tanzania-Zambia 
Railway  Authority.  EDF  part  11.7  mECU. 
Programme to improve maintenance of track 
and  rolling  stock, supply  of equipment and 
T.A. Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5026  A2d 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical  training  centre  for  Eastern 
Africa in Tanzania. Resp.  Auth.: Secretar-
iat of the centre. 2.0 mECU. Widening of the 
capacity.  Construction  of class-rooms,  of-
fices  and  housing.  Project stage: identifica-
tion.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5311  A6b 
Kabale-Gatuna  Road.  Resp.  Auth.: 
Uganda  Government.  Estimated  cost 
2. 5 mECU.  Asphalting  of the  road  (21  km) 
up  to the  Rwanda  border.  Int.  tender with 
prequalification launched in June 86. Project 
on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5329  A2d 
Kigali-Gatuna-Corridor  North.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Government  of  Rwanda.  Section 
road, 22 km at the border between Rwanda 
and  Uganda.  Project on  appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5332  A2d 
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GHANA - MAURITIUS - SENEGAL -
ZAIRE 
Strengthening of scientific and techni-
cal capacities in the field of food and nu-
trition in Africa. Resp.  Auth.:  Association 
des Universites africaines.  AUA.  1.5 mECU. 
T.A., training, supply of equipment, produc-
tion  and  diffusion  of scientific  information. 
Project in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5054  A3a 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Campaign  against ·rinderpest  in  Afri-
can. Resp.  Auth.: QUA and IBAR. Estimated 
total cost for 2  years  50 mECU.  Supply  of 
equipment T.A. vaccines and research.  Pro-
ject in  execution·.  4th and  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5007 - 4085  A3a 
S.A.D.C.C. 
Maseru  Container  Terminal.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Lesotho  GOL  and  SADCC.  1.350 
mECU.  Construction  of  container  terminal 
and  supply  of containers,  handling  equip-
ment.  Study  required:  detailed  design  of 
works. Short-list already drawn up.  Project 
on appraisal.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5421  A2d 
BOTSWANA - SWAZILAND -
ZIMBABWE 
Regional Railway Training. Phase II. Es-
timated cost 2  mECU.  Project in  execution. 
5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  541 0  A2d 
MALAWI - ZAMBIA - ZIMBABWE 
Regional  Tsetse  and  Trypanosomiasis 
· Control  Programme. Resp.  Auth.:  Techni-
cal  and  financing  responsibility :  Zimbabwe 
national  authorizing  officer.  19. 150  mECU. 
Works by direct labour. Vehicles, veterinary 
products, aerial spraying and equipments by 
int.  tender.  T.A.  by direct agreement.  Pro-
ject in  execution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5420  A3a 
CARIBBEAN AND ACP 
COCOA PRODUCERS 
Cocoa  Research  Unit (CRU),  Phase  II. 
Resp.  Auth.: CRU  in Trinidad. 2.624 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipments and  agricultu-
ral  inputs, T.A. and  training.  Project in  exe-
cution.  5th EDF. 
EDF  REG  5043  A3a 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
EGYPT 
Soil  improvement  programme  in  Ka-
freei-Sheikh  Governorate.  Resp.  Auth.: 
X  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY 
Executive  Authority for Land  Improvement 
Projects  (EALIP).  Provisional  amount 
8 mECU. To reclaim an area of 65 000 acres 
of saline  soil,  located  in  Hamoui  district of 
the  Kafre-ei-Sheikh  Governorate.  Short-list 
already drawn up.  Project in  execution. 
MMI EGT  1  00  1  A3e 
Egyptian  Renewable  Energy  Develop-
ment Organization. EREDO.  Resp.  Auth. : 
Egyptian  Government.  EEC  contribution 
7. 7 mECU.  Construction  and  equipment for 
the centre.  Works and  supplies: int. tender 
with prequalification foreseen in 2nd half 86. 
T.A. :  GET /KFA  (D).  Int.  tender  dossier: 
Phoebus  (I). 
MMI EGT  1002  A2a 
* Training Institute for Egyptian Labour 
Representatives.  ''Workers University''. 
EEC  contribution  1.970  mECU.  T.A.  and 
supply  of  kitchen,  cafetaria  and  laundry 
equipment by int. tender. Project on apprais-
al. 
MMI EGT  A6d 
ALGERIA 
Training  for  heavy  industry.  Resp. 
Auth. : Ministere de l'lndustrie Lourde(MILD). 
3.9 mECU.  T.A., training,  supply  of peda-
gogical equipment.  Project in  execution. 
MMI aL  2003  A6d 
Training for Ministry of Public Works. 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministere des Travaux Publics. 
Direction  de  Ia  Formation.  EEC  contribution 
2. 75 mECU.  T.A., training, scholarships and 
supply of pedagogical equipment. Project in 
execution. 
MMI AL 2002  A6d 
Support  to  the  «  Ministere  de  I'En-
seignement superieur et de Ia  recherche 
scientifique"  (MESRS).  Resp.  Auth.: 
MESAS.  2.2 mECU.  Training  and  supply of 
scientific equipment and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 
MMI AL 2004  A4g 
TUNISIA 
Date-palm plantations study project in 
Regime Maatoug. Resp.  Auth.: Banque Na-
tionale  de  Dev.  Agricola  (B.N.D.A.). 
1.9 mECU. Feasibility study, drillings and ac-
cess roads.  Works by direct labour.  Study: 
Short-list done.  Project on appraisal. 
MMI TUN  2001  A3a 
Rural  credit  project  to  benefit  small 
·holders.  Resp.  Auth.:  B.N.D.A.  Estimated 
cost  17 mECU.  Project on appraisal. 
MMI TUN  2002  A3a 
Water resources research and training 
study. Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere de  I' Agricul-
ture.  1.0  mECU.  Supply  of soil  equipment 
and  data system. T.A. and  training.  Project 
in  execution. 
MMI TUN  2004  A2b 
Evaluation  of soil  resources  and  their 
liability to desertification in Southern Tu-
nisia.  Resp.  Auth.:  Ministere  de  I'  Agricul-
ture.  Estimated cost  1.2 mECU.  EEC  0.400 
mECU, local 0.800 mECU.  T.A. and training. 
Supply  of  specialized  equipment.  Date  fi-
nancing decision May 86. 
MMI TUN  2005  A3c 
Management improvement in the pub-
lic irrigated areas in Tunisia. Resp.  Auth.: 
Ministere de  I'  Agriculture.  EEC  contribution 
2.5  mECU.  Rehabilitation  of  hydro-electric 
equipment, training and  T .A. Date financing 
decision May 86. 
MMI TUN  2006  A3A 
T.A.  to the  "Unites  Cooperatives  de 
Production  Agricole  (U.C.P.A.).  Resp. 
Auth.: B.N.D.A.  1.800 mECU.  T.A., training 
and supply of equipment. Date financing de-
cision May 86. 
MMI TUN  2007  A3a 
JORDAN 
Faculty of Engineering and Technology, 
University of Jordan,  Phase  II.  2 mECU. 
Supply of equipment, A.T. and training. Pro-
ject in  execution. 
MMI JO 2002  A6a 
SYRIA 
ISSAT. lnstitut Superieur des Sciences 
Appliquees  et  de  Technologie.  Resp. 
Auth.:  State  Planning  Commission.  Esti-
mated total cost 22.2 mECU.  EEC part: sup-
ply  of teaching  and  training  equipment  for 
the institute. Project on appraisal. 
MMI SYR  2002  A6b 
Euphrates drainage and irrigation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Irrigation. General Organi-
zation  for  land  development  (GOLD).  Esti-
mated  total  cost  134.9 mECU.  EEC 
10 mECU,  EIB  20 mECU,  local  104.9 mECU. 
Works, supplies and  T.A. 2 int. tenders for 
supplies  and  works launched  in  March  86. 
Project in  execution. 
MMI SYR  2003  A3a 
Rural  Water Supply Suweida  Region. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry of Local  Administra-
tion  and  Ministry  of Housing  and  Utilities. 
Estimated  total  cost  8.1  mECU.  EEC 
3.2 mECU, local4.9 mECU. Project in execu-
tion. 
MMI SYR  2001  A2b 
CYPRUS 
Sanitation  in  Nicosia.  Phase  II.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Sewage  Board  of  Nicosia  for  the 
south and the Department for Water, Geolo-
gy  and  Mining  for the  north.  EEC  part  2.4 
mECU.  Increase of capacity of the treatment 
plant.  For the north by local tender, for the 
south by int. tender. Date financing decision 
June 86. 
MMI  A2b 
Non-associated 
developing 
countries 
BANGLADESH 
Small-scale  irrigation  sector  project. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Bangladesh  Water  Develop-ment  Board  (BWDB).  Estimated  total  cost 
82 mECU.  EEC  contribution  12 mECU.  Cofi-
nancing  with  ADB  (Asian  Dev.  Bank). 
Works,  supply  of equipment  and  vehicles, 
T.A. and  supervision.  Works: ace.  tender. 
Supplies: int. tender, 2nd half 86. 
ALA BD  8112  A3a 
Building of storage for fertilizers. Resp. 
Auth.: Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation  (BADC).  Cofinancing :  EEC  and 
Netherlands.  Total  cost  4 mECU.  EEC 
2 mECU  Netherlands  2 mECU.  EEC  part: 
Works  by  int.  tender.  Netherlands  part: 
buildings and  T.A. 
ALA.  BD  8201  A3f 
Rcmgpur.  Rural  Development  Pro-
gramme.  Resp.  Auth.:  Central  Coordina-
tion Committee. (CCC).  Total cost 40 mECU. 
EEC 25.5 mECU, NL 7 mECU, local 6 mECU. 
Works by ace.  tender.  Supplies by int. ten-
der  or  direct  agreement.  Project  in  execu-
tion. 
ALA.  BD  A3e 
Cotton  Development.  Phase  II.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Central  Coordination  Committee 
(CCC) and Cotton Development Board (COB). 
EEC  4.9 mECU.  Supply of T.A. training and 
equipment. Int. tender for supplies launched 
in  May 86. Project in  execution. 
ALA.  BD  8504  A3a 
CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP.) 
Fruit  Cultivating  and  Preservation 
Techniques.  Estimated  total  cost  4.350 
mEC:U.  EEC  1.600 mECU.  Cofinancing  with 
Italy. T.A. and transfer of technology. T.A.: 
Apples: B.D.P.A. (F). Citrus: Media Coop (1). 
Proj1ect  in  execution. 
ALA CHN  8337  A3a 
Flood  forecasting and  management of 
Beijiang  River.  Estimated  total  cost 
5. 5 mECU.  EEC  1. 7 mECU  T. A. and transfer 
of t1echnology.  Project in  execution.  TRAC-
TIONNEL  (B). 
ALA CHN  8338  A8g 
P1·awn farming development. Estimated 
cost:  0.700 mECU.  Supplies and  T.A. T.A.: 
Fish  Farming Int.  (UK).  Project in  execution. 
ALA,  CHN  8341  A3d 
Hainan  Cashew  Development.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Prefecture  of the  Autonomous  De-
partment of Li  and Miao National Minorities. 
Estimated  total  cost  2.350 mECU.  EEC 
0.800 mECU.  Supply of equipment and T.A. 
T.A.: K.I.T.  (NL).  Project in  execution. 
ALA CHN  8340  A3a 
V1egetable Seedling Production in Beij-
ing. ~stimated cost 1.2 mECU. Supplies and 
T.A. T.A.: Oranjewoud (NL).  Int. tender for 
supplies launched in July 86. Project in exe-
cutk>n. 
ALA CHN  8339  A3a 
Gansu Sugar Beet Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Gansu  Province Department of Agri-
culture.  EEC  contribution  1  mECU.  T.A., 
1  training and supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for financing  deci-
sion  1  st half 86. 
ALA CHN  8517  A3a 
* Strengthening of soil  and water con-
servation measures in Sichuan Province. 
1.5  mECU.  Supply  of  equipment,  training 
and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing decision July 86. 
ALA CHN  8526  A3a 
* Improvement  of the  rubber  quality. 
0.900 mECU.  Supply of equipment, training 
and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing decision July 86. 
ALA CHN  8527  A3a 
INDONESIA 
Bali  Irrigation  Sector  Project.  Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. DG for Wa-
ter Resources Development.  EEC  12 mECU. 
ADB±37 mECU.  Local  ±55 mECU.  Re-
habilitation and expansion of 50 village-level 
irrigation  schemes,  establishment  of  a 
water-management training  centre,  and  es-
tablishment of climatological  stations.  T.A. 
Works: ace.  tender.  Project in  execution. 
ALA IND  8114  A3a 
Provincial  Irrigation  Development 
(Western and Central Java). Resp.  Auth.: 
D. G. W.R.D.  Estimated  total  cost  423.6 
mECU.  EEC  26.3 mECU,  World Bank 232.6 
mECU,  local  164.7  mECU.  EEC  part:  dam 
construction  and  T.A.:  study,  execution 
. project and  tender  dossier.  Prequalification 
for dam construction launched in August 85. 
Date financing  decision May 86. 
ALAIND  A3a 
INDIA 
Development  of  Water  Control  Sys-
tems for diversification of crops in Maha-
rashtra. Resp.  Auth.:  Irrigation Department 
of  the  Government  of  Maharashtra.  EEC 
contribution  15  mECU.  Works,  supplies, 
T.A. and  training.  Project in  execution. 
ALA IN  8418  A3a 
YEMEN 
Seed production centre. Estimated cost 
5.8 mECU.  Project in  execution. 
ALA YAR  A3a 
PAKISTAN 
Karachi fishing port. Resp.  Auth.: Fishe-
ry  department  of the  Sind  Province.  Esti-
mated cost  12 mECU.  New facilities:  quay, 
boat repair yard, fish-shed,  dredging. Reha-
bilitation  of  existing  facilities,  equipments 
and  TA. TA: Prof.  Dr.  Lockner &  Partners 
(D).  Works  and  supplies  by  int.  tender 
launched in  June 86. Prequalification. 
ALA PAK 8101  A3d 
Irrigation  project  in  Palli  and  Lehri. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Department  of Irrigation  and 
Agriculture  Baluchistan  Provincial  Govern-
ment.  Estimate  ± 10 mECU.  Works and  in-
frastructures.  Studies for the execution and 
supervision  of works.  Project  on  appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing decision  1st half 
86. 
ALA PAK 8422  A3a 
Rural  Electrification.  10  mECU.  Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing de-
cision July 86. 
ALA PAK  8522  Aaei 
Vocational training. 16 mECU. Project on 
appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for financing  deci-
sion July 86. 
ALA PAK 8518  A6d 
NEPAL 
Nepal  Administrative  Staff  College. 
NASC. Resp.  Auth. NASC Secretariat. Esti-
mated  total  cost  6.5 mECU.  EEC  5 mECU, 
U.K.  1  .  5 mECU.  Renovation  and  construc-
tion works, supply of equipment and  train-
ing.  Project in  execution. 
ALA NEP  8407  A6b 
Soil and water conservation in Bagmati 
Watershed.  Special  hunger  programme. 
5.5 mECU.  Project in  execution. 
958-NEP 840  1  A3a 
Arjun  Kuhola  Irrigation  Projet.  1.536 
mECU.  Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen 
for financing decision July 86. 
ALA NEP  8521  A3e 
BHUTAN 
Water supply.  Resp.  Auth.:  Inter  dep. 
Commission on water and sanitation. Works 
by  direct  labour.  4.5 mECU.  Supplies  int. 
tender or direct  agreement.  T.A.:  UNICEF. 
Project in  execution. 
ALA BHU  A2b 
T .A. programme to the Department of 
Agriculture. Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Agri-
culture and Forests. 1.1  mECU. Two experts 
during  3  years.  1 Rural  Development  Engi-
neer and  1 agro-economist. Short-list alrea-
dy drawn up for restr. tender. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA BHU  8513  A3a 
THAILAND 
Oilseed crop development programme. 
Resp.  Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture  - Oil-
seed Project Steering Committee. Total esti-
mated cost 4.2 mECU.  EEC  3.3 mECU.  T.A. 
and  supply  of  equipment.  T.A.:  Crown 
Agents (UK). 
ALA TH  8203  A3a 
Mae Nam Chi River Basin. Water Man-
agement Development. Resp.  Auth.: Min-
istry of Agriculture and  Cooperatives.  Royal 
Irrigation  Department.  Estimated  total  cost 
5 mECU. EEC 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. and  training.  Project in  execution. 
ALA TH  8412  A3a 
Strengthening  of  planning  capacities 
for diversification and rural development. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Cooperatives.  2 mECU.  T.A.  for  coordina-
tion,  management,  training  needs,  project 
identification  and  planning.  T.A. for central 
and peripheral computer system for rural  ar-
eas.  Training  and  supply  of  computerized 
equipment. Short-list done. Project in execu-
tion. 
ALA TH  8420  A3a 
Rural credit and rubber planting. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and  Coopera-
The Courier no. 98 - July-August 1986  XI tives.  35  mECU.  Supply  of lines  of credit, 
T.A., training, rural inputs, equipments. Pro-
ject in execution. 
ALA TH  8509  .A3a 
PACTO ANDINO MEMBER COUNTRIES 
Technical  cooperation  (industry  and 
economic  planning).  Resp.  Auth.:  Junta 
del  Acuerdo  de  Cartagena,  Lima-Peru. 
Estimated  total  Cost:  1. 7 mECU.  EEC 
1.1 mECU. To place experts, equipment and 
T.A. and  training  at Junta's disposal.  Con-
tracts,  T.A.  and  experts  by the  Junta  and 
the EEC. 
ALA JUN  81 07  A4a 
Andean  Programme  for  technological 
development (Rural  PADn. Resp.  Auth.: 
Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima-Peru. 
Estimated  total  Cost:  7.560 mE CU.  EEC 
3.927 mECU.  Supply of equipment, training 
and  T.A.  Vehicles  purchase:  int.  tender. 
T.A.: Short-lists to be drawn up by the EEC 
and decision by the Junta. 
ALA JUN  81 08  A3a 
Regional programme for technical coo-
peration: food strategy. Resp.  Auth.: JU-
NAC. EEC contribution 7 mECU for European 
T.A.  and  supply  of  data-computerized 
equipment by int.  tender.  Project in  execu-
tion. 
ALA JUN  8406  B  1  a 
Regional programme for technical coo-
peration :  industry  and  sub-regional  ex-
changes. Resp.  Auth.: JUNAC.  EEC  Contri-
bution 7  mECU.  T.A. and  suppty of equip-
ment.  Project in  execution. 
ALA JUN  8503  A4a 
COSTA RICA- HONDURAS-
NICARAGUA - PANAMA -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Latin American qualified nationals rein-
statement in  5  Central American coun-
tries.  Resp.  Auth. :  CIM  (Comite  lntergou-
vernemental  pour  les  migrations).  1.4 
mECU. Reinstatement of 75 qualified nation-
als via CIM. Date foreseen for financing deci-
sion  2nd half 86. 
ALA CIM  8302  A8b 
COLOMBIA 
Reconstruction  Programme.  Resp. 
Auth.:  Corporation  de  Reconstruction  de 
Cauca.  Total  cost  5.9 mECU.  EEC 
3.9 mECU.  EEC part: supply of materials and 
T.A. Project in  execution. 
ALA CO  8403  A8a 
Microprojects programme in the pacific 
coastal.  Line  of credit,  T.A.  and  training, 
EEC  contribution  4  mECU  and  supply  of 
equipment.  Project in  execution. 
ALA CO  8516  A3a 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Integrated rural development pilot pro-
ject in Western  Cibao.  6  mECU.  Special 
hunger programme. Project in  execution. 
958-DO 8402  A3a 
COSTA RICA 
Productive projects programme for re-
fugees in Costa Rica. T.A. and  line of cre-
dit. 3.6 mECU.  Project in  execution. 
ALA CR  8501  A8b 
Integrated rural development of the re-
gion  of  OSA/GOLFITO.  Total  cost 
21.635 mECU.  EEC  9.95 mECU.  Supply  of 
equipment,  infrastructural  works,  mainte-
nance,  lines  of  credit  and  T.A.  Project  in 
execution. 
ALA CR  8506  A3a 
PANAMA - COSTA RICA -
NICARAGUA - HONDURAS -
EL SALVADOR- GUATEMALA 
Regional programme of technical coo-
peration for food  security.  Resp.  Auth.: 
CADESCA  (Comite de accion para  el  desar-
rollo economico y social de centroamerica -
Panama).  Total  cost  9.07 mECU.  EEC 
4.82 mECU,  France  0.350 mECU,  local 
3.9 mECU.  T.A.  training  and  supply  of 
equipment.  Project in  execution. 
ALA REG  8505  A3a 
* Regional programme for child survival 
in Central America. EEC  16.5 mECU,  Italy 
16  mECU.  Supply  of T.A., training,  equip-
ment,  medical  equipment  and  medicines. 
Date financing  decision May 86. 
ALA REG  8520  A7a 
EL SALVADOR 
Rehabilitation  Programme.  University 
of El  Salvador.  Resp.  Auth.:  U.E.S.  Total 
estimated cost 5 mECU.  EEC 3.3 mECU. Ita-
ly  1. 7  mE CU.  EEC  part:  supply  of equip-
ment, T.A. and training for Agronomics and 
partly for Electrotechnology. Italy part : sup-
plies for Electrotechnology, Physics and Me-
chanics,  T.A.  and  training.  Date  financing 
decision May 86. 
ALA 8519  A6c 
ECUADOR 
Rural development in the region of the 
Chambo river. Resp.  Auth. : lnstitut Equato-
rien  des  Ressources  Hydrauliques  (INERHI). 
EEC  9  mECU.  T.A.  and  training,  irrigation 
works,  line  of credit,  supply of equipment. 
Project  on  appraisal.  Date  foreseen  for  fi-
nancing decision June 86. 
ALA 8508  A3a 
BOLIVIA 
* Flood  protection  programme.  Santa 
Cruz.  EEC  9  mECU,  NL  1  mECU.  Works, 
supply  of equipment.  T.A. for NL.  Date  fi-
nancing  decision June 86. 
ALA 8510  A8g 
HONDURAS 
* Rehabilitation  and  Maintenance  of 
Feeder Roads in Coffee Producing Areas. 
Resp.  Auth.:  Institute  Hondureno  de  Cafe 
(IHCAFE).  EEC  2. 750 mE CU.  Supply of T .A. 
and  work construction  equipments.  Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing de-
cision July 86. 
ALA 8524  A3a 
MEXICO 
* Hospital construction. EEC  5.2 mECU. 
144 beds hospital. Works, supplies and  su-
pervision.  Project  on  appraisal.  Date  fore-
seen  for financing decision July 86. 
ALA 8602  A7a 
PERU 
* Support programme to the agro-pas-
toral  microprojects  PAMPA-PUNO.  EEC 
16 mECU.  Supply of T.A., equipments and 
recurrent expenditures.  Date financing  deci-
sion May 86. 
ALA 8601  A3a 
INTERNATIONAL CALLS FOR TENDER 
All international calls for tender (int. tenders) referred to in this Operational Sum-
mary are notified in due time in the Official Journal (O.J.) of the European Commu-
nities' «  S » supplement. 
Subscriptions to the O.J. « S ))  supplement should be addressed to the «Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities  )).  L-2985 Luxembourg. 
Tel.: 49 00 81. 
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY DIELEGATIONS  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
In  ACP countries 
Barbados 
SunjHt  House, Fairchild Street 
P.O.  Box 654 C,  Bridgetown. 
Tel.  427-4362/429-7103 
Tele>e  2327 DELEGFED  WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, BAtiment administratif 
B.P.  910, Cotonou 
Tel. :312684/312617 
Tele>t  5257 DELEGFED  - COTONOU 
Botswana 
P.O.  Box  1253 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel.  4455- 4456- 4457 
Tele>t  2403 DECEC  GABORONE 
Burkina Faso 
B.P.  352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel.  :336 346/336 348 
Tele>:  5242 DELEGFED  UV  -
OUAGADOUGOU 
Burundi 
Avenue du  13 Octobre 
B.P.  103, Bujumbura 
Tel.  234 26/238 92 
Tele>:  FED  BDI  5031  - BUJUMBURA 
Cameroon 
OUARTIER  BASTOS 
B.P.  847, Yaounde 
· Tel.  22 13 87/22 33 67/22 21  49 
Tele>:  DELEGFED  8298 KN 
YAOUNDE  - CAMEROON 
Central African Republic 
Rue  de Flandre 
B.P.  1298, Bangui 
Tel.  l31  30 53/61 01  13 
Tele>:  5231  RC  DELCOMEU  - BANGUI 
Chad 
Concession Caisse  Coton.  Route  de Farcha 
BP  552, N'Djamena 
Tel.  22 74/22 76 
Telex DELEGFED  5245 KD 
N'DJAMENA - CHAD 
Con"o 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Meridian 
B.P.  :2149,  Brazzaville 
Tel.  81  38 78/81 37 00 
Telex 5257 KG  DELEGFED  - BRAZZAVILLE 
C6te d'lvoire 
lmmEtuble  .. AZUR" Bd.  CROZET,  18 
B.P.  1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel.  :32.24.28 - 33 29 28 
Telex 3729 DELCEE  - ABIDJAN 
EthiCJ•pia 
T  edlcl  Desta Building 
Africa Avenue (Bole  Road)  1st Floor 
P.O.  Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel.  '152511 
Tele>c.  21135 DELEGEUR  -
ADDIS  ABABA 
GabCl•n 
Ouartier Batterie IV 
Lotis::;ement des Cocotiers 
B.P.  :321,  Libreville 
Tel.  :73 22 50 
T  ele>c  DELEGFED  5511  GO  - LIBREVILLE 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O.  Box  512, Banjul 
Tel.  777 - 87 69 
Tele>c  2233 DELCOM  GV  - BANJUL 
Ghana 
The Round  House - 65 Cantonments Road, 
Cantonments, Accra 
Tel.  774 201  - 774 202 
Telex 2069 DEL COM  - ACCRA 
Guinea-Bissau 
Rua  Eduardo Mandlane 29 
Caixa  Postal 359, Bissau 
Tel.  21  33 60/21 28 78 
Telex 264 DELCOM  Bl 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central  Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag  Section  - B 1  I 123) 
Rue  de  Ia. Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles 
Tel.  46 13.25/46 13 82 
(Conakry /Guinea) 
Telex 628 DELEUR  CKY 
Guyana 
64 B Middle Street South Cummingsburg 
P.O.  Box  10847, Georgetown 
Tel.  63 963- 62 615- 64 004- 65 424 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY- GEORGETOWN 
Jamaica 
Mutual Life Center,  2nd Floor 
Oxford Rd/Oid Hope Rd 
P.O.  Box 435, Kingston 5 
Tel. 92-93030/92-93031/92-93032 
Telex 2391  DELEGEC  KINGSTON  5 
Kenya 
National Bank  Building 
Harambee  A  venue 
P.O.  Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel  33 35 92 
Telex 22302 DELEGFED  - NAIROBI 
lesotho 
P.O.  Box MS  518 
Maseru,  100, Lesotho 
Tel.  313726 
Telex 4351  LO  DELEGEUR  - MASERU 
Liberia 
34 Payne  Avenue Sinkor 
P.O.  Box  3049, Monrovia 
Tel.  26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED  L1  - MONROVIA 
Madagascar 
lmmeuble Ny Havana  - 67 hectares 
B.P.  746, Antananarivo 
Tel.  242 16 
Telex 22327 DELFED  MG  -
ANTANANARIVO 
Malawi 
Lingadzi  House 
P.O.  Box 30102, Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel.  73 02 55/73 01  73/73 05 93 
Telex 4260 DELEGEUR  Ml  - LILONGWE 
Mali 
Rue  Guegau  - Badalabougou 
B.P.  115 Bamako 
Tel.  22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 526 DELEGFED- BAMAKO 
Mauritania 
IIOt V, Lot 24 
B.P.  213, Nouakchott 
Tel.  527 24/527 32 
Telex  549 DELEG  MTN  -
NOUAKCHOTT 
Mauritius 
61/63 route Floreal  Vacoas 
P.O.  Box  10 Vacoas 
Tel.  86 50 61/86 50 62/86 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC  IW VACOAS 
Mozambique 
C.P.  1306 - MAPUTO 
522/533 Avenida do Zimbabwe - MAPUTO 
Tel.: 74 44 73 - 74 40 92/93/94 
Telex 6-146 CCE  MO 
Aten<;:ao  Sr.  Antonio Marongiu 
Delegado da  Comissao da  CEE 
NA RPM 
Niger 
B.P.  10388, Niamey 
Tel.  73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 Nl  DELEGFED  - NIAMEY 
Nigeria 
4, ldown Taylor Str.  Victoria Island 
PM  Bag  12767, Lagos 
Tel.  61  78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM  NG  LAGOS- NIGERIA 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House,  3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag,  GPO,  Suva,  Fidji 
Tel.  31  36 33 
Telex 2311  DELECOM  FJ  - SUVA 
Papua New Guinea 
Pacific View Appartments 
8th Floor 
Pruth Street, Korobosea 
P.O.  Box  1264, BOROKO 
Tel.  25 92 22 
Telex NE  22307 DELEUR  - PORT  MORESBY 
Rwanda 
Avenue Depute Kamuzinzi,  14 
B.P.  515, Kigali 
Tel  55 86/55 89 
Telex  515 DELCOMEUR  RW KIGALI 
Senegal 
Avenue Albert Sarraut 57 (2
8  etage) 
B.P.  3345, Dakar 
Tel.  21  13 24/21 57 77/21 79 75 
Telex 440 DELEGSE- DAKAR 
Sierra leone 
2 Lamina  Sankoh Street 
P.O.  Box  1399, Freetown 
Tel.  239 75 - 230 25 
Telex. 3203 DELFED  SL  - FREETOWN 
Somalia 
Via  Makka AI  Mukarram, n° Z-A6/  17 
P.O.  Box  943, Mogadiscio 
Tel.  21  118/21 049/811 18 
Telex 628 FED  MOG  SM  - MOGADISCIO 
Sudan 
11, Street No  13, New Extension, Khartoum 
Tel.  444 85/445 10/449 10/412 43 
Telex 24054 DELSU  SO  - KHARTOUM 
Suriname 
Dr  S.  Redmondstraat 239 
P.O.  Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel.  993 22 
Telex  192 DELEGFED  SN 
Swaziland 
P.O.  Box  A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland 
Tel 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED  MBABANE 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O.  Box 9514, Dares Salaam 
Tel.  311 51/311 52 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR-
DAR  ES  SALAAM 
Togo 
Rue  de  Calais  22 
B.P.  1657, Lome 
Tel.  21  36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELEFEDTO-LOME 
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2, Champs Elysees 
Long Circular,  Maraval 
P.O.  Box  1148, Port of Spain 
Tel.  62-26628/62-20591 
Telex 22421  DELFED  WG 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank  Building, 
Plot  12 
Kampala Road,  5th Floor 
P.O.  Box 5244, Karnpa1e 
Tel.  33 303/4/5 
Telex 61139 DELEUR  - UGA  -
KAMPALA 
Zaire 
71, Av. des Trois Z 
B.P.  2000, Kinshasa 
Tel.  327 18 
Telex 21560 DECEKIN  ZR  KINSHASA 
Zambia 
P.O.  Box  34871 
Plot 4899 
Brentwood Drive 
Lusaka 
Tel. 25 09 06 - 25 07 11  - 25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA- LUSAKA 
Zimbabwe 
P.O.  Box 4252 
Stability House (1Oth Floor) 
65 Samora Machel Ave. 
Harare 
Tel.  70.7 1.20/39/40/43 
Telex 4.811 ZW HARARE- ZIMBABWE 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Mgr Kieckensweg 24 
P.O.  Box  822 
Willemstad, Cura<;ao 
Tel.  6250 84 - 6264 33 
Telex  1089 DELEG  NA -
WILLEMSTAD 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue  Arezki  Abri 
Hydra-16300 Alger 
Tel. 590822- 590925- 590942 
Telex 52246 EURAL  DZ  - ALGERIE 
Egypt 
4 Gezira Street, 8th Floor 
Cairo-Zamalek 
Tel.  340 83 88- 349 93 93 
Telex 94258 EUROP  UN  CAIRO 
EGYPT 
Israel 
2 rehov  ibn gvirol, Eliahu  House 
1Oth floor TEL  AVIV 
Tel.  03-26 62 12/26 62 13 
Telex 34 21 08 DELEG  - IL 
Jordan 
Shmeisani Wadi Sagra Circle,  Amman 
P.O.  Box 926 794 
Tel.  66 81 91/66 81  92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Lebanon 
lmmeuble  Duraffourd,  Avenue  de  Paris,  Bey-
routh 
B.P.  11-4008, Beyrouth 
Tel.  36 30 30/31/32 
Telex DELEUR  23307 LE  BEYROUTH 
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Morocco 
4 Zankat Jaafar As Sadik 
B.P.  1302, Rabat-Agdal 
Tel.  742 95/739 15 
Telex 32620 - RABAT 
Syria 
73 rue  Rachid 
P.O.  Box  11269, Damascus 
Tel.  335291/330001 
Telex 412919 DELCOM  SY 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 2 1 
B.P.  3, Belvedere- Tunis 
Tel. 2885 35 
Telex  13596 - TUNIS 
In non-associated 
countries 
India (HQ of the Delegation in  South Asia) 
YMCA Building 5th floor 
Jaisingh Road 
New Delhi  110001 
Tel.  34 42 22 - 35 04 30 
Telex 31/61315 EURO-IN 
Indonesia 
Wisma Metropolitan I,  3rd floor 
29, J.P. Jend. Sudirman 
P.O.  Box 34 KBYMP Jakarta  12 920 B 
Tel.  578 24 74/5 
Telex  62 788 DAMORE  lA 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation  in 
South-East Asia) 
Thai Military Bank  Bldg, 
9th &  1Oth Firs 
34, Phya  Thai  Road 
Bangkok 
Tel.  282 1452 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK  TH 
Venezuela (HQ  of the Delegation 
for Latin America) 
Quinta Bienvenida 
Valle Arriba, Calle  Colibri 
Distrito Sucre 
Caracas 
Tel.  92 50 56/92 39 67/91 47 07 
Telex 26336 COMEU  VC 
Offices of the Commission 
In ACP countries 
Antigua &  Barbuda 
c/o Antigua Commercial Bank 
St.  Mary's and Thames Streets 
St. John's, Antigua W.l. 
Tel.  (046)22970 
Telex 207  4 DELCEC  AK 
Bahamas 
Frederick House,  2nd floor 
Frederick Str. 
P.O.  Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel.  (32)55850 
T  alex  DELEGEC  NS 310 
Belize 
P.O.  Box 907 
Bella  Vista 85, Belize  City 
Cape-Verde 
PrMio «  Galeries » 
4° andar, 
apartarnento 0-C.P.  122-Praia 
Tel. 61.37.50 
Telex 71  DELGFED CV 
Comores 
B.P.  559 - Moroni 
Tel. 2710 - Telex 212 DELCEC  KO 
Djibouti 
Plateau  du Serpent 
Boulevard du Marechal Joffre 
B.P.  2477 Djibouti 
Tel.  352615 
Telex 5894 DELCOM  OJ 
Equatorial Guinea 
B.P.  7779- Malabo 
Tel.  2944 - 2945 
Grenada 
Old Fort 
P.O.  Box  5, St.  George's 
Tel. 3561  - Telex 3431  CWBUR  GA 
(Ann. EEC  Delegation) 
Solomon Islands 
NPF  Plaza 
P.O.  Box 844 - Honiara 
Tel.  22 765 
Telex 66370 - DELEGSI 
Sio Tome &  Principe 
B.P.  132- Sao Tome 
Tel.  (239) 21780 
Telex (0967) 224 
Seychelles 
P.O.  Box 530 - Victoria Mahe 
Tel23940 
Telex 2213 DELCAM  SZ 
Tonga 
Ramanlal  Building 
Taufa •  ahau  Road 
NukuAlofa 
Tel  21820 
Telex 66207 (OFFCEC  TS) 
Vanuatu 
Bougainville House, 
Suite no 6, Bougainville Street 
P.O.  Box 442, Port-Vila 
Tel.  2501 
Telex  1093 
Western Samoa 
cjo Private Mail Bag 
Chief Post Office, Apia 
Tel20070 
Telex 204 CECOF  SX 
In non-associated 
countries 
Pakistan 
House n°  13 Masjid Road,  F 6/3, 
Islamabad 
P.O.  Box  1608 
Tel (051) 82 18 28- 82 26 04 
Telex  54044 COMEU  PK 
Bangladesh 
House  CES  E 109 
Road  128, Gulshan  - Dharka  - 12 
Tel.  600564 
Telex 642501, CECO  BJ 
EEC  Information Office 
Turkey 
15, Kuleli  Sokak 
Gazi  Osman  Pa<;a,  Ankara 
Tel.  2161 45/27 61 46 
Tlllex 42819 ATBE TR Commission  of the  European  Com-
munities, Directorate-General for  De-
velopment  - Manual  for  preparing 
amd appraising project and programme 
dossiers  Document  no. 
VIII/527  /79,  Rev  2  - 15  November 
1985 
This revised edition of a document 
that  came  out  for  the  first  time  in 
1979  is  a  response  to  the  need  to 
translate  Lome  III  policy  into  the 
practical  work  of preparing  projects 
and  programmes  by  capitalizing  on 
experience. As the introduction points 
out,  the  handbook  focuses  on  three 
major ideas  - a  "global" vision  of 
development  as  something  "autono-
mous  and  self-sustaining",  sectoral 
concentration  and the  opening  up  of 
new  means  of action.  Each  of these 
has  precise  repercussions  on the  pre-
paration  and  assessment  of develop-
ment schemes. 
The Manual attempts to set out de-
velopment policies based on the pro-
visions of Lome III and on the experi-
ence of both the Community and oth-
er donors in this field.  This is the aim 
of the  first  part  of the  book,  which 
consists of a series of general notes on 
subjects  which  apply  to  most  of the 
sectors  of intervention.  It  describes 
such things as territorial development 
policies,  food  security  policies,  the 
anti-drought  and desertification  cam-
paign, the need to take account of so-
cio-cultural  factors  in  projects  and 
programmes,  recurrent  costs,  the  use 
of local resources and so  on. 
Secondly, this book follows the pre-
vious versions and sets out to provide 
everyone concerned with the prepara-
tion  and/or  assessment  of  develop-
ment projects and programmes with a 
set of sectoral (rural development, en-
ergy,  tourism,  training,  etc)  plans 
clearly  showing  all  the  information 
generally  thought  to  be  necessary 
when  a  financing  decision  has  to  be 
taken.  Lastly,  the handbook mentions 
those sectoral  schemes that are perti-
nent when it comes to preparing oper-
ations in new  or almost-new areas of 
cooperation (scientific research, infor-
mation and the promotion of cultural 
identity, for example). 
The  Manual,  which  is  available  in 
French  and  in  English,  can  be  ob-
tained  from  the  Directorate-General-
for  Development,  200  rue  de  la  Loi, 
B 1049,  Brussels,  Belgium. 
000 
Asia Review, Latin American and Car-
ibbean  Review,  Middle  East  Review, 
Africa  Review  1986.  Published  by 
World  of Information,  21,  Gold  St. 
Saffron Walden, Essex, UK£  25 (each) 
UK£  32  (each) Middle East and Afri-
ca,  £37 (each)  rest of world,  post in-
cluded,  1985. 
In  our no.  96,  we  published  a  re-
view  of this  publishing house's  latest 
venture,  the  Europe  Review.  It  is 
some time since reviews were publish-
ed of the other horses in the World of 
Information's  stable.  The  praise  lav-
ished on Europe Review  must be  re-
peated. And while information on Eu-
rope is not hard to come by, this is not 
always  the  case  for  the countries and 
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the economies dealt with in the com-
panion volumes. Yet, in these reviews, 
the information is  there,  several years 
out of date,  perhaps,  but never more 
so than the most authoritative sources 
for that information, the national sta-
tistical  offices,  the  World  Bank,  the 
leading economic reviews. 
Whoever leaves  on a  visit to these 
countries,  businessman,  diplomat, 
journalist,  will  find  them  invaluable, 
filled as they are with salient informa-
tion,  scrupulously  researched  and 
checked.  Alongside the articles on in-
dividual  countries,  the  Reviews  pro-
vide readers with an array of key facts 
and figures,  from  current information 
for  the  business  traveller  to  the  un-
derlying  facts  of the  economic  struc-
ture.  Among  many  new  features  this 
year are tables of economic indicators, 
calendars of trade fairs,  expanded di-
rectories  of  business  addresses  and 
new maps of each region. 
Each  year,  the  individual  country 
outlines are prefaced by a series of in-
depth articles provided by leading au-
thorities  on  the  region  and its  major 
preoccupations. 
000 
In memoriam 
Since May 1974 (Courier no.  25) 
our readers  have seen  the name of 
Colette  Grelet  as  heading  up  the 
magazine's  secreteriat.  It  will  no 
longer do  so, for Colette Grelet died 
on 4 June after a long illness.  Those 
who had the opportunity of  meeting 
her will remember her for her com-
petence,  her helpfulness and for her 
smile. 
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